tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-74205434794222788862024-03-08T03:32:19.896-08:00The Narrowest GroundsAsher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.comBlogger60125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-40875317797562288862018-07-07T10:40:00.000-07:002018-07-08T13:28:09.103-07:00Judge Kavanaugh's Curious Behavior in Garza<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Before I properly begin this post, I'll start with a summary so that people know why they're reading it.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(1) In <i>Garza v. Hargan</i></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">—</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the detained minor immigrant abortion case in which Judge Kavanaugh initially ruled, before being vacated en banc, that the government had eleven days to help a detained minor immigrant find a sponsor before potentially having to temporarily release her from detention without a sponsor to get an abortion</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">—</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Judge Kavanaugh declined to adopt a much broader anti-abortion argument that the government made.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(2) That argument was that even if the minor didn't find a sponsor to take her out of custody, the government would not unduly burden whatever abortion rights she had by barring her from getting an abortion so long as she refused to voluntarily depart the country, and that in any event, compelling the government to release her from detention to get an abortion would unlawfully force the government to facilitate or be complicit in abortion. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(3) That argument was the government's primary argument. The argument Judge Kavanaugh adopted was an argument the government weakly advocated in its opening brief, never mentioned in its reply brief, and actually resisted at oral argument.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(4) At oral argument, Judge Kavanaugh completely understood the government's arguments and their priority, was obviously and deeply skeptical of the government's primary argument, and spent most of the oral argument attempting to talk the government into satisfying itself with a much narrower position it didn't want to settle for.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(5) Later that day, Judge Kavanaugh wrote an order, and several days later, wrote a dissent, in which he never mentioned the government's real position and all but denied that the government had taken the position it had taken</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">—thereby avoiding the appearance of rejecting a broader anti-abortion position than the narrow one he was willing to accept.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">With that said, I'll start this post with a personal anecdote. Some years ago, the summer Judge Jeffrey Sutton and a Sixth Circuit panel were deciding a challenge to the Affordable Care Act's individual mandate, I befriended a number of liberal Sixth Circuit clerks. On a balkanized court like the Sixth Circuit of, say, 2002</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">–14, there can be a fair amount of distrust of judges across the aisle, at least on the part of staff if not the judges themselves. And in those days, Judge Sutton was perhaps the preeminent candidate for a Supreme Court vacancy should President Obama lose reelection and a vacancy open up during his replacement's administration. (At the time, my dark horse for the next appointment, which I was convinced would be made by Rick Perry, was recently outgoing Texas Solicitor General Ted Cruz.)</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">In this environment, and given Judge Sutton's excellent chances at elevation, at least a couple of my friends were convinced that Judge Sutton would find some way to avoid opining on the merits of the challenge to the mandate. In that world, when the Democrats still held the Senate and would still have been able to filibuster a nominee if they lost it, the argument went that supporting the mandate might cost him the nomination (though there was still some hope that the Supreme Court would deem the challenge to the mandate so fringy that a Republican President wouldn't fault him for it), but opposing the mandate would certainly cost him confirmation. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">My friends were quite shocked, then, when Judge Sutton <a href="http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/11a0168p-06.pdf#page=27">opined</a> at great length that the mandate was constitutional</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">—so shocked, in fact, that they initially insisted he really had ducked the merits by only holding that the plaintiffs' facial challenge failed because the mandate could be sustained in at least some applications, e.g., applications to people subject to state insurance mandates. Which was all he <i>held</i>, but his dicta left no doubt that he rejected the activity/inactivity distinction at the heart of the challengers' argument, and were probably the most devastating critique of that distinction that any judge or lawyer put to paper during the entirety of the litigation. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">As persuasive as those dicta were, however, they failed to persuade Judge Sutton's former boss, Justice Scalia, or Justice Thomas, or Justice Alito, or Justice Kennedy, or even Chief Justice Roberts, who</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">—never let it be forgotten!</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">—completely embraced the activity/inactivity distinction and opined that a purchase mandate would have been unconstitutional had Congress enacted one. (To be fair, maybe that's because the opinion was written almost entirely in rhetorical questions</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">—seriously, there are twenty-five of them</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">—</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">and sentences that began with "how strange" or "is it not strange.") So it was that Judge Sutton's eloquent (if rhetorically unconventional) rejection of what once seemed a fringe theory became conservative apostasy, and so it is that today Judge Sutton is less of a Supreme Court contender than a junior </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joan_Larsen" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">member</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"> of his own court who has written exactly zero published opinions since her confirmation eight months ago.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">Of course, one Republican contender for elevation to the Supreme Court did exactly what my friends predicted Judge Sutton would do. That would be Judge Kavanaugh, who avoided the merits in <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12283140068462647556&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">Seven-Sky v. Holder</a> </i>by <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12283140068462647556&q=seven+sky+v+holder&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p21">voting</a> to hold sua sponte that his court was ousted of jurisdiction by the Tax Injunction Act, a statute of <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/11-398_resp_private.authcheckdam.pdf#page=53">rather dubious jurisdictional status</a> (i.e., the Supreme Court had previously <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8426251106033758246&q=seven+sky+v+holder&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p639">held</a> the government could waive it) that was triggered, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12283140068462647556&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p22">according</a> to Judge Kavanaugh, by an obscure <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/6671">provision</a> of the Internal Revenue Code that the attorney representing the government <a href="http://joshblackman.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/HC-CTA-Transcript-Oral-Argument-9-23-11-1.pdf#page=91">admitted</a> at oral argument she hadn't even read. (Judge Kavanaugh's dissent would cite this unbriefed provision thirty-five times. That's ten more times than the number of times Judge Sutton would carpet-bomb his chances at elevation with pithy rhetorical questions <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14091194524815796667&q=%22how+strange%22&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p565">like</a> </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"If Congress may engage in the same type of
compelling/conscripting/commandeering of individuals to buy products
under the taxing power, is it not strange that only the broadest of
congressional powers carves out a limit on this same type of regulation?")</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">It is possible</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">—I don't even think it that unlikely</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">—</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">that along with </span><a href="http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Fourth-Circuit-Opinion-PACER.pdf" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Fourth Circuit Judges Diana Motz and James Wynn</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">, the </span><a href="https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/11-398_courtappointedamcuvacatur.authcheckdam.pdf" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">amicus</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"> the Supreme Court appointed to defend the position after the government adamantly </span><a href="https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/11-398_petitionerantinjunction.authcheckdam.pdf#page=35" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">disavowed</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"> it at considerable risk to its Taxing Clause defense, four tax professor amici and their counsel, two former IRS Commisioner amici and their counsel, and seemingly no other judge or lawyer in America, Judge Kavanaugh sincerely both believed that the Tax Injunction Act was jurisdictional and that it deprived him of jurisdiction. After all, as it's turned out (though no one could have predicted this in 2011), between the 2014 election of a Republican Senate majority, </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">the abolition of the filibuster for Supreme Court nominees, </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">and the unexpectedly smashing success of the arguments against the individual mandate at the Supreme Court, Judge Kavanaugh's chances of Supreme Court nomination would be much higher today had he voted to reach the merits and invalidate the mandate. At the time, though, Judge Kavanaugh's vote in </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Seven-Sky </i><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">seemed like the cleverer contemporary equivalent of the time Justice Thomas told the Senate Judiciary Committee that he couldn't recall ever having expressed an opinion about </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Roe</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"> in a conversation with anyone.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">Besides taking a fair amount of heat for not voting to strike the mandate down (although nowhere close to the disqualifying degree of heat Judge Sutton took for actually voting to uphold it), Judge Kavanaugh's presently being criticized in some circles for not taking <i>enough</i> of an anti-abortion-rights position in <i>Garza v. Hargan</i>. In <i>Garza</i>, the Trump adminstration's Office of Refugee Resettlement refused to let an unlawful immigrant minor (Doe) in government detention out of detention to get an abortion. The district court ordered the government to let her out immediately. Judge Kavanaugh, in what could have been a devastating blow to his nomination chances, was assigned to the panel hearing the appeal and forced to opine on its hot-button merits.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">In a feat of Solomonic justice, Judge Kavanaugh <a href="https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/order_2_0.pdf">crafted an order</a> giving the government eleven days to wait for a sponsor to materialize who could take Doe out of detention and <i>then</i> take her to get an abortion, thereby absolving the government of any complicity in the matter. Judge Kavanaugh's nominally per curiam order (nominally so because one member of the panel <a href="https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/garza_v_hargan_dissent_0.pdf">dissented</a> and another, Judge Henderson, <a href="https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/order_2_0.pdf#page=2">indicated</a> her intention to concur on separate grounds) was summarily <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/17-654-opinion-below.pdf">vacated</a> en banc. Judge Kavanaugh then <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/17-654-opinion-below.pdf#page=35">dissented</a>, elaborating on the reasoning that underlied his order; Judge Henderson separately <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/17-654-opinion-below.pdf#page=17">dissented</a>, writing that illegal aliens detained at the border had no abortion rights at all; and some people are now mad at Judge Kavanaugh because he didn't join her dissent and think the President should nominate someone else to the Kennedy vacancy because he didn't.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">In defense of Judge Kavanaugh, some conservative lawyers have <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/06/brett-kavanaugh-conservative-judge-supreme-court/">written</a> that the government assumed Judge Henderson's position away (<a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/10.20.17-TRO-Appeal-Hearing-Transcript-1.pdf#page=18">true</a>), that it was unnecessary to decide whether detained illegal aliens had abortion rights in order to decide whether it unduly burdened Doe's putative rights to make her wait an additional eleven days to get an abortion (also true), and that Judge Henderson's dissent had <a href="https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/on-judge-kavanaugh-on-garza-v-hargan/">nothing to do</a> with abortion in particular, just the constitutional rights of illegal aliens <i>generally </i>(also true, though it's hardly as if this White House is disinterested in judicial nominees' position on the constitutional rights of illegal aliens generally). So, Kavanaugh's defenders reason, what is the anti-<i>Roe</i> objection to Kavanaugh's behavior in <i>Garza</i>?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">The answer to that question, I think, is very simple. It's that Judge Kavanaugh (1) declined to endorse the much broader anti-abortion position the government <i>did</i> take, which <i>was</i>, unlike Judge Henderson's position on aliens, a specifically anti-abortion position, (2) cast doubt on that position in oral argument and, more subtly, in his en banc dissent, and (3) deftly avoided opining on the government's intensely controversial main argument, or even calling attention to his declining to opine on it, by not only neglecting to acknowledge in his order and dissent that it had been made, but all but denying that the government had made it. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">I am not the one, as the kids say, to hold (1) and (2) against Judge Kavanaugh; I happen to think that, given what the government did concede, the government's position was near-frivolously wrong under what Judge Kavanaugh pointedly referred to five times in his dissent as "existing Supreme Court precedent," and believe lower-court judges should follow Supreme Court precedent (especially the existing kind). I am the one, however, to take issue with (3), which puts me in mind of Judge Kavanaugh's behavior in <i>Seven-Sky</i>. And though I don't think that people should be faulting Judge Kavanaugh for failing to endorse cockamamie misreadings of precedents they don't like, the vast contingent of conservative lawyers who do believe in creatively misreading abortion precedent should know that Judge Kavanaugh hasn't displayed a propensity to do so</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">—even though creatively misreading Supreme Court precedent might be his most singular trait.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">With that said, what did the government really argue in <i>Garza</i>? Judge Kavanaugh admirably <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/10.20.17-TRO-Appeal-Hearing-Transcript-1.pdf#page=4">answered</a> that question about thirty seconds into <a href="https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2018.nsf/EE442BCAB574219F852581BF0057B320/$file/17-5236.mp3">oral argument</a>:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">JUDGE KAVANAUGH: So you seem to have three
differential strands of arguments, if I could set them as I
see them. One is the facilitation argument, you don't want
to be facilitating the abortion. Second, is that it's not
an undue burden because she can return to her home country. And the third is that it's not a undue burden because she
could be released to a sponsor. </span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">That's exactly right, and correctly ranks the arguments in order of the weight the government placed on them. To be precise, the government argued in its opening brief before the panel (technically a motion for stay pending appeal) that refusing to facilitate abortion did not unduly burden the abortion right as a matter of law; that the government would facilitate Doe's abortion by allowing her to temporarily leave its custody to get an abortion; and that it was not unduly burdening her right to obtain an abortion because her inability to get an abortion while in detention was a problem of her own making, as she could terminate her detention by voluntarily departing the country she'd illegally entered and caused to detain her, or, were she successful, by getting a sponsor. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">Since it was far from obvious that Doe would get a sponsor in time to get a legal abortion in Texas, where she was detained, and since getting one wasn't in Doe's control, the government naturally put vastly more weight on the first of her "two avenues to leave federal custody," as it called them. Indeed, the government's short reply brief had as much to say about Doe's sponsorship possibilities as the government had to say in <i>Seven-Sky </i>about the provision of the Internal Revenue Code on which Judge Kavanaugh based his preferred jurisdictional holding: that is, literally nothing. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">Instead, the reply argued that Doe had no right to obtain an abortion in her present position "because Ms. Doe is currently in HHS custody, and chooses to remain so rather than file a request to voluntarily depart the United States," that Doe was unlike federal prisoners that courts had held have rights to obtain abortions while in prison because, unlike prisoners, "Ms. Doe may elect to terminate her federal custody by filing a request for voluntary departure from the United States," and that "even if she is put to a difficult choice of choosing between leaving [sic; <i>staying in</i>] the United States and the ability to seek an abortion, that choice does not constitute an 'undue burden' that the federal government has placed in Ms. Doe's path." </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">It's little wonder, then, that a moment after summarizing the government's arguments, Judge Kavanaugh </span><a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/10.20.17-TRO-Appeal-Hearing-Transcript-1.pdf#page=4" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">complained</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"> that "we're being pushed in a span of 24 hours to make a sweeping constitutional ruling in one direction or another," and suggested that "the sponsor option" might be "[an]other avenue[] to resolving [the] dispute short of that . . . that would solve the Government's objection." </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">But even when Judge Kavanaugh signaled he was willing to give the government a limited win on the "sponsor option," the government showed little to no interest in taking it. The government's attorney initially <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/10.20.17-TRO-Appeal-Hearing-Transcript-1.pdf#page=5">conceded</a> that "yes, if it could happen that would resolve the case," but noted that attempts to find Doe a sponsor thus far had been unsuccessful. When Judge Kavanaugh continued to insist that "that option . . . is an option that solves her problem, it solves the issue, hasn't been explored," the government <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/10.20.17-TRO-Appeal-Hearing-Transcript-1.pdf#page=6">replied</a> that "it's one that I would think if it <i>was </i>an option [emphasis in <a href="https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/recordings/recordings2018.nsf/EE442BCAB574219F852581BF0057B320/$file/17-5236.mp3">audio</a>, see 4:08] that plaintiffs would have raised to identify to help [find a sponsor.]" And when Judge Millett pushed back on Judge Kavanaugh's sponsorship solution, remarking that she assumed Doe had done everything she could to find a sponsor and had no control over whether she'd get one, the government, rather than attacking Millett's premise or defending sponsorship as a realistic out for the court, confidently <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/10.20.17-TRO-Appeal-Hearing-Transcript-1.pdf#page=76">replied</a> that "voluntary departure is entirely within [Doe's] control," and that "[s]he can file a request for voluntary departure at any time and then she will be out of HHS custody."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">As Marty Lederman's <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/12/two-more-remarkable-things-about.html">written</a>, Judge Kavanaugh repeatedly signaled at oral argument that he didn't buy this argument. At one point he skeptically <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/10.20.17-TRO-Appeal-Hearing-Transcript-1.pdf#page=17">asked</a> the government if Texas could pass a law banning women who were in the country unlawfully from getting abortions "[o]n the theory that [they] can return to the home country"; at another point, he <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/10.20.17-TRO-Appeal-Hearing-Transcript-1.pdf#page=75">said</a> that the government's assumption that Doe had abortion rights at all "does make it hard . . . for you [to] turn around and say 'yes, assume she has constitutional rights, but also leaving the country is an option,'" because "normally the answer to someone who has constitutional rights is not 'oh we can deny them, just leave the country.'" </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">The answer to this seemingly devastating line of questioning is that, bizarrely enough, while the government was <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/10.20.17-TRO-Appeal-Hearing-Transcript-1.pdf#page=18">willing to assume</a> Doe had a constitutional right to obtain an abortion, it did not assume or accept that she and other detained unlawful immigrants had the right to obtain an abortion <i>in the United States</i>. Rather, the government's position was that it <i>could </i>bar her and other detained illegal immigrants from getting an abortion in the United States (the government certainly never conceded or assumed that it was constitutionally required to release her to a sponsor); all that it couldn't do was prevent her from voluntarily departing and attempting to get an abortion somewhere else. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">Though the government's position can't be understood any other way, Judge Kavanaugh would repeatedly assert in both his order and dissent that the government not only assumed Doe had a right to obtain an abortion, but assumed she had a right to obtain an abortion <u>in the United States</u>. So I want to belabor why that's patently incorrect for a bit before coming to what Judge Kavanaugh said about it. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">It's true that the government never explicitly said that Doe only had a right to get an abortion in her home country (though it's also true that the government never intimated that she had a right to obtain an abortion in the United States). Rather, what the government repeatedly said is that Doe's inability to obtain an abortion while in federal custody wasn't a <i>government</i>-imposed obstacle, but an obstacle she imposed on herself by staying in this country. </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">As the government </span><a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/garza.doj_.pdf#page=10" style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">put it</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"> in its opposition to Doe's en banc petition:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">In other words, any alleged
“obstacle” to Ms. Doe’s ability to obtain an abortion is by her own choice: she
is in federal custody because she entered the United States illegally, and that
custody is what she contends is blocking her ability to obtain an abortion. But
Ms. Doe may elect voluntary departure to end her federal custody, which would
eliminate the alleged “restriction” or “obstacle” of which she complains.</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">To say, though, that an illegal immigrant's choosing to immigrate to a country that forbids her from getting an abortion (as the United States forbade Doe from getting an abortion so long as she couldn't get a sponsor) is a "</span><a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/garza.doj_.pdf#page=10" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">self-imposed obstacle</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" to getting an abortion assumes that the relevant baseline against which to measure government-imposed obstacles is, as the government crisply described it at page 17 of its opening brief, the "position she would have been in had she not illegally entered the United States." (Similarly, the Court has <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2944985204861123439&q=planned+parenthood+of+southeastern+pa+v+casey&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p509">held</a>, in precedent that the government relied on, that blocking public hospitals from performing abortions doesn't unduly burden abortion rights because it merely puts women in the same position they'd have been if there were no public hospitals.) But that is just to say that people in Doe's position only have a right to abortion under U.S. law to the limited extent that the government cannot block them from leaving the country and exercising whatever abortion rights they have elsewhere. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">To see this, suppose Houston argued that it could constitutionally ban non-residents from getting an abortion in Houston because the choice to run up against Houston's ban on non-resident abortions instead of going to Austin is merely a self-imposed obstacle to getting an abortion. That argument might make quite a bit of sense. But it assumes that the relevant baseline for assessing whether Houston unduly burdens a non-Houstonian's abortion rights is the position she would have been in had she not come to Houston. That too might make sense, but Houston couldn't logically take that position <i>and</i> concede that non-Houstonians had a constitutional right to get an abortion in <i>Houston</i>, or against Houston-imposed obstacles to getting an abortion in Houston. A ban on non-residents getting abortions in Houston is undeniably a Houston-imposed obstacle to getting an abortion in Houston. Rather, Houston would have to be taking the position that non-Houstonians only have a constitutional right against Houston blocking them from getting an abortion anywhere at all, as it would if it jailed a pregnant non-Houstonian and refused to release her to get an abortion.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Perhaps there is some metaphysical sense in which it can both be true that (a) unlawful immigrant detainees have a constitutional right to obtain an abortion <i>in the United States</i>, and (b) the United States may constitutionally bar them from getting an abortion in the United States and force them to depart the United States to get an abortion. I don't see one. But in any event, to state in an opinion that the government assumed Doe and detainees like her had a right to obtain an abortion <i>in the United States</i> is both false in at least the sense that the government never positively assumed that much, and somewhere between extremely misleading and false in the stronger sense that the government probably should be understood to have taken the opposite position.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">With that said, I find the following statements by Judge Kavanaugh rather puzzling. First, later in the day he heard oral argument, at which time he perfectly understood that the government was arguing that it didn't violate whatever abortion rights Doe had to make her voluntarily depart the country to get an abortion, Judge Kavanaugh ended his per curiam order <a href="https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/order_2_0.pdf#page=2">in this way</a>: "</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">We note that the Government has assumed, for purposes of this case, that
J.D. – an unlawful immigrant who apparently was detained shortly after unlawfully
crossing the border into the United States – possesses a constitutional right to obtain an
abortion in the United States." That assumption was never made; if anything, the government argued just the opposite.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Second, even after the government, in its <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/garza.doj_.pdf">opposition</a> to en banc review, solely defended the panel's sponsorship-focused ruling on the ground that the government hadn't infringed Doe's assumed right to an abortion by forcing her to voluntarily depart the country to get one, <i>see</i> pages 8</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">–12, Judge Kavanaugh continued to <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/17-654-opinion-below.pdf#page=36">rather volubly insist</a> that the government had assumed that Doe and similarly situated unlawful detained immigrants had a right to obtain an abortion in the United States:</span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><u>All parties have assumed for purposes of this case, moreover, that
Jane Doe has a right under Supreme Court precedent to obtain an abortion
in the United States.</u> One question before the en banc Court at this
point is whether the U.S. Government may expeditiously transfer Jane Doe
to an immigration sponsor before she makes the decision to have an
abortion. Is that an undue burden on the abortion right, or not?</span> </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. . . </span> </blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>First,</i> the Government has assumed, presumably based on its
reading of Supreme Court precedent, that an unlawful immigrant minor
such as Jane Doe who is in Government custody has a right to an
abortion. The Government has also expressly assumed, again presumably
based on its reading of Supreme Court precedent, that the Government
lacks authority to block Jane Doe from obtaining an abortion. <u>For
purposes of this case, all parties have assumed, in other words, that
unlawful immigrant minors such as Jane Doe have a right under Supreme
Court precedent to obtain an abortion in the United States.</u></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Third, in addition to never writing a word about the government's main argument for reversing the district court's TRO and giving ten pages of arguments for reversing it that the government either only weakly advocated or never* made (which can hardly be deemed an exercise in restraint, as his defenders of his handling of this case would claim), Judge Kavanaugh went so far as to suggest uncertainty about what the government might argue in the event that Doe didn't get a sponsor in his vacated order's eleven-day time-frame. "[I]f no sponsor is expeditiously located," he <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/17-654-opinion-below.pdf#page=39">wrote</a>, "then it could turn out that the
Government will be required by existing Supreme Court precedent to
allow the abortion, depending on what arguments the Government can make
at that point." What arguments the government <i>can</i> make at that point? How about practically the only ones it ever <i>did</i> make: that making Doe leave the country to attempt to get an abortion did not violate whatever abortion rights she had, and that releasing Doe to get an abortion would force the government to facilitate abortion, which the court could not compel it to do.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">* In the department of arguments the government really never made, Judge Kavanaugh </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/17-654-opinion-below.pdf#page=40">claimed</a> the government was "merely seeking to place the minor in a better place when deciding whether to have an abortion" by insisting she pursue sponsorship before getting an abortion, when the government barely advocated the sponsorship option and the <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/17-654-opinion-below.pdf#page=9">only</a> interests it <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/garza.doj_.pdf#page=12">asserted</a> in its policy were promoting fetal life and avoiding complicity in abortion. Not only wasn't the government "seeking to place the minor in a better place," it definitely wasn't "merely" seeking to place her in a better place; its reasons for insisting she get a sponsor or leave the country before she could get an abortion had everything to do with its not wanting her to get one.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Finally, careful to only decide the artificially narrowed case before him rather than the intensely controversial case the parties actually argued, Judge Kavanaugh reserved judgment on what would happen if a sponsor were not found by October 31, one week from the day he was writing, only <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/17-654-opinion-below.pdf#page=38">lightly hinting</a> at how he might rule then:</span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">[I]f transfer does not work, given existing Supreme Court precedent and the
position the Government has so far advanced in this litigation, it
could turn out that the Government will be required by existing Supreme
Court precedent to allow the abortion, even though the minor at that
point would still be residing in a U.S. Government detention facility. If so, the Government would be in a similar position as it is in with
adult women prisoners in federal prison and with adult women unlawful
immigrants in U.S. Government custody. The U.S. Government allows women
in those circumstances to obtain an abortion. In any event, we can
immediately consider any additional arguments from the Government if and
when transfer to a sponsor is unsuccessful.</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Besides the implicit skepticism of the government's unmentionable "additional arguments," what's particularly funny about this passage is the suggestion that it could somehow "turn out" that the government would be required to allow Doe's abortion under "the position the Government has so far advanced," as if the government hadn't taken the position all along that it could never be required to allow Doe's abortion so long as she was "residing in a U.S. Government detention facility."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As I said above, I certainly don't begrudge Kavanaugh's skepticism of the government's position. Very briefly, if one assumes that Doe had a constitutional right under U.S. law to an abortion, it's very difficult to see how it can be limited to a right to not be prevented from going back to Central America to get one (or to be prohibited from getting one, as the case may be and <a href="https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/10.20.17-TRO-Appeal-Hearing-Transcript-1.pdf#page=29">apparently was</a>). A right under U.S. law to get an abortion is, almost by definition, a right to get an abortion in the United States (though the government didn't concede this), not a right against being prevented from getting an abortion anywhere on Earth. The Constitution isn't even concerned with whether the government prevents women from getting abortions in Central America; whatever abortion rights it grants detained illegal immigrants, then, must be rights that can be enjoyed here.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As to facilitation, as I understand the Court's facilitation cases, they say that women don't have rights to government-facilitated abortions so long as the denial of government-facilitated abortions doesn't legally block them from getting non-government-facilitated abortions. They don't say that the government can refuse to facilitate abortion when the only abortion legally available to a woman within the United States is a government-facilitated abortion. That's why federal prisons have to "facilitate" abortion by allowing pregnant female prisoners to get them. To say that in Doe's case there might have been a non-government-facilitated abortion available in Central America is irrelevant, because again, the Constitution does not guarantee a right to an abortion in Central America or apply there; whatever abortion rights it guarantees are both limited to the United States and enjoyable in the United States.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I would applaud Judge Kavanaugh, then, for implicitly rejecting the government's borderline-frivolous arguments. All that I object to is his going to bizarre lengths to avoid acknowledging that they'd been made and to make it out that the government's arguments for reversal were something else almost entirely. That, I think, is a strange way for a judge to act, but it is easily explicable. Had </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Judge Kavanaugh explicitly rejected the government's arguments, and perhaps even if he had merely acknowledged their existence and explicitly chose to decide on narrower grounds, he would stand a lower chance of nomination to the Court today, and had he accepted them, he wouldn't have been confirmable. As things are, he both appears to have gone as far as the government's litigating position allowed, thereby avoiding looking like an abortion moderate, while not going that far at all,</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> thereby passing muster with moderates. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of course, I don't mean to say that's the only possible explanation of his conduct, which may owe as much or more to a sincere (if often hidden) minimalist streak as to his ambitions. Giving the government some additional time to find a sponsor <i>was</i> a way to avoid unnecessarily reaching a "sweeping constitutional decision," as he said at oral argument. But avoiding reaching the government's arguments is one thing; playing possum with them is something else.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As to the substantive merits of what Judge Kavanaugh did or didn't do, for those who do believe in creatively misreading (or "narrowing") the Court's abortion precedents, it should be noted that Judge Kavanaugh hasn't been reluctant to creatively narrow or misread other precedents in the past. Most famously, though least egregiously, he opined that though the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of multi-headed independent agencies in <i>Humphrey's Executor</i>, and upheld the constitutionality of the single-headed Office of the Independent Counsel in <i>Morrison v. Olson </i>8-1 only thirty years ago, the independent Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was unconstitutional because it had a single head. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I still don't get why Judge Kavanaugh thinks single-headedness meaningfully distinguishes the CFPB from the SEC, or why he thinks that <i>Morrison </i>isn't fatal to his argument from single-headedness. But I can say that while he <a href="https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/B7623651686D60D585258226005405AC/$file/15-1177.pdf#page=235">purports</a> to faithfully follow <i>Morrison</i> and merely find it completely distinguishable, he also <a href="https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/B7623651686D60D585258226005405AC/$file/15-1177.pdf#page=198">writes</a> that today there is "nearly universal consensus . . . that Justice Scalia [the lone <i>Morrison </i>dissenter] had been right back in 1988 to view the independent counsel system as an unwise and <i>unconstitutional </i>departure from historical practice and a serious threat to individual liberty" (emphasis added). </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">For the proposition that there is near-universal consensus that a near-unanimous thirty-year-old Supreme Court precedent</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> was wrongly decided, he </span><a href="https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/B7623651686D60D585258226005405AC/$file/15-1177.pdf#page=198" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">cites</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> only a law school magazine's quotation of Justice Kagan's meaningless remark in a law school Q&A that Scalia's dissent in </span><i style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Morrison</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> "was one of the greatest dissents ever written and every year it gets better." (This in the context of a </span><a href="https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/justice-kagan-and-judges-srinivasan-and-kethledge-offer-views-from-the-bench/" style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">discussion of legal writing</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, not Justice Kagan's views about removal power. It is a really <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17629076715773250697&q=morrison+v+olson&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p697B">well-written dissent</a>.) </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Better yet, immediately after asserting that the independent counsel system was unconstitutional, Judge Kavanaugh <a href="https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/B7623651686D60D585258226005405AC/$file/15-1177.pdf#page=198">clarifies</a> that "</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">[i]</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n this section of the opinion, I am addressing the </span><i style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">historical
</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">practice of how independent agencies are structured. A separate
question is whether </span><i style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Morrison v. Olson</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> constitutes a </span><i style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">judicial
</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">precedent on the question of whether a single-Director independent
regulatory agency is constitutional." That way, it's clear that he's only saying that the Office of Independent Counsel was unconstitutional as an <i>historical </i>matter, not as a legal one, given the binding precedent that says it wasn't. Or something like that. (Perhaps <i>Morrison</i> <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-965_h315.pdf#page=43">has been overruled in the court of history</a>.)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Then there's <i>Chevron</i>. I've <a href="http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2017/05/another-addition-to-chevron-anticanon.html">written at great length</a> about Judge Kavanaugh's distortions of the major-questions exception to <i>Chevron </i>before. But to briefly summarize, in <i>King v. Burwell </i>the Court fashioned, for the first time, a major-questions exception to <i>Chevron</i>, under which the Court won't defer to agencies on really major interpretive questions and will instead decide for itself whether to uphold agency interpretations. The agency still can win, as it did in <i>King</i>; there isn't even a thumb on the scale against the agency. All that changes when the major-questions doctrine applies is that the agency's interpretation is reviewed de novo. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Prior to <i>King</i>, the Court routinely gave <i>Chevron</i> deference on major questions, but said in a number of cases that Congress is unlikely to "hide elephants in mouseholes," that is, hide authorizations of massive regulatory power in especially obscure or unassuming statutory provisions. And it said that in cases where an agency claims Congress has done so, the mismatch between those mousehole-like provisions and the agency's elephantine claims of regulatory power can be so great that it is unambiguous, under <i>Chevron</i>'s first step, that the agency lacks the power it claims.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">From these cases, Judge Kavanaugh fashioned a new doctrine completely of his own invention that he called the "major rules doctrine," which he would <a href="https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/06F8BFD079A89E13852581130053C3F8/$file/15-1063-1673357.pdf#page=77">claim</a> was just a better name for the major questions doctrine. It's not, which is why he had to give the doctrine a new name. Under Judge Kavanaugh's major rules doctrine, Congress can never be understood to authorize a "major rule" unless it does so unambiguously. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This doctrine, not to put too fine a point on it, has nothing to do with anything the Supreme Court has ever said about the major questions doctrine. What the Court has said is that (1) Congress <i><u>can</u></i> authorize profoundly major rules in profoundly ambiguous and even arguably textually foreclosed ways (<i>see King</i>), but that sometimes agencies won't get deference on the major <i>question </i>of whether Congress did (hence the name of the doctrine), and (2) sometimes when an agency claims that Congress gave it authorization for an elephantine rule in an obscure mousehole of a provision, it will be <i>unambiguous</i> that it didn't because of the implausibility of that kind of obscure authorization. The Court has never said that if Congress is truly <i>ambiguous </i>on the subject of a major rule, the agency writing the major rule automatically loses. Indeed, to say so would be literally nonsensical, because there are some subjects on which anything that an agency does would be a major rule (like the question in <i>King</i>, or how to classify ISPs, which was the question before Kavanaugh in the opinion where he launched the major rules doctrine).</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Finally, there's Judge Kavanaugh's take on my beloved <i>Marks</i> doctrine, which again so badly misdescribes the doctrine in question that he had to literally rename it to talk about his misdescription of it. According to Judge Kavanaugh, the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12064198172779556411&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p193">narrowest grounds rule</a>, under which the Court's holding in a fractured opinion is deemed to be the view of the members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds, is really the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3050712287267230868&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p610"><i>middle</i> grounds rule</a>, under which the Court's holding in a fractured opinion is deemed to be the view of the members who occupy some middle ground between a broader opinion and the dissent. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What does that mean in practice? Surprisingly, Kavanaugh says it means that if the <i>dissent</i> "<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4855364956518896140&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1337">did not address the issue</a>" on which the Justices concurring in the judgment disagree, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4855364956518896140&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1337">there is no "<i>Marks </i>middle ground"</a> and no binding precedent under <i>Marks</i>, even if one opinion concurring in the judgment is plainly narrower than the others. That is to say, the dissent controls the meaning of a fragmented opinion. </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Hypothetically, then, if two Justices say that a redistricting plan can </span><i style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">never</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> violate the Voting Rights Act and that the one before them therefore didn't, three Justices say that redistricting plans can </span><i style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">sometimes</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> violate the Voting Rights Act under a certain test and that the one before them didn't, and four dissent because they think the Court lacks jurisdiction, Judge Kavanaugh would say that under </span><i style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Marks</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, the three-Justice plurality isn't controlling* because their narrowest grounds aren't "middle grounds." </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That's an interesting idea, although there's no earthly reason to say that the plurality's opinion would become any more binding if the dissent had opined on the merits. In saying it would, Judge Kavanaugh expressly <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3050712287267230868&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#[14]">trades on</a> the <a href="https://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2018/03/hughes-v-united-states-argument-preview.html">fallacious view</a> that lower courts can somehow be bound by Supreme Court "majorities" largely comprised of dissenters (the argument being that if the dissent had broadly read the VRA, there would be a controlling dissent/plurality majority for the proposition that redistricting plans that <i>flunked </i>the plurality's more forgiving test are illegal, and that because it didn't, there's not). But however good an idea it may be, it mangles <i>Marks</i>,** which isn't just a rule about how to read precedent but itself a binding precedent of the Supreme Court. However confusing <i>Marks </i>may be in difficult applications, every judge in America besides Judge Kavanaugh would agree that in my hypothetical, the plurality would be binding under <i>Marks</i> even if the dissent consisted of a blank sheet of paper. To say it wouldn't<i> </i>because it wouldn't be a "<i>Marks</i> middle ground" transparently disobeys <i>Marks</i>. People who wish Judge Kavanaugh had endorsed the government's rather less transparent invitation to disobey precedent in <i>Garza</i>, then, have every right to ask why he didn't.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">* </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">To be clear, this isn't just a hypothetical, but a stylized illustration of something Judge Kavanaugh has done. Specifically, Judge Kavanaugh </span><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4855364956518896140&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1337" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif;">refused</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> to give stare decisis effect to a fragmented Supreme Court opinion, </span><i style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif;">Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance Co.</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, solely because the dissent didn't address the issues on which the Justices in the majority split, thereby preventing him from divining a "</span><i style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif;">Marks</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> middle ground</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">." In that case, Justice Stevens' grounds for concurring in the judgment have <a href="https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/02/69-Stan-L-Rev-795.pdf#page=68">generally</a> been <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17706080461692572582&q=whitlock+v+fsl+management+llc&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#r[2]">deemed</a> narrower than the plurality's and therefore <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14326538787687108199&q=658+f3d+1207&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#[7]">treated</a> as binding, though some courts don't find them narrower. Whatever the application of the real <i>Marks</i> rule to <i>Shady Grove</i>, Judge Kavanaugh didn't decline to treat Justice Stevens' opinion as binding because it wasn't narrower, but because the dissent didn't address the issues it did.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">** N</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ot to mention en banc D.C. Circuit precedent, which </span><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3050712287267230868&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p623" style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif;">flatly forbids</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span><i style="font-family: arial, helvetica, sans-serif;">Marks </i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">dissent-counting. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif; font-size: 16px;"></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-32843867799588260592018-04-26T20:58:00.000-07:002018-04-26T20:58:23.269-07:00Does Anyone on the Supreme Court Believe in Chevron Anymore? A Squib on Chevron in SAS Institute<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Yesterday the Court <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-969_f2qg.pdf">decided</a> <i>SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu</i>, a case on whether the Patent Office must decide the patentability of every patent claim challenged by a petitioner in an inter partes review (an adversarial review of previously issued patents), or may only rule on the petitioner's non-frivolous challenges. The Patent Office had issued a regulation providing that in deciding whether or not to institute an inter partes review upon being petitioned to do so, it could limit that review to only the petitioner's serious challenges. But in an opinion by Justice Gorsuch, the Court held 5-4 that the relevant statute unambiguously forbids that sensible procedure. Both that opinion and the lead dissent augur radical change in <i>Chevron</i> doctrine.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The majority opinion claims that the petitioner suggested the Court overrule <i>Chevron </i>and hints at some doubt about whether <i>Chevron </i>should be overruled before deeming the question unnecessary to deciding the case. One would think that if the petitioner in <i>SAS Institute</i> had asked the Court to overrule <i>Chevron</i>, we all would have heard much more about <i>SAS Institute</i>. That's correct; the petitioner didn't suggest the Court overrule <i>Chevron</i>.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In <i>SAS Institute</i>, the Patent Office sought <i>Chevron</i> deference to its regulation. The petitioner, which wanted inter partes review of all the claims it challenged in its petition for inter partes review, not just the ones to which the Patent Office initially thought it had serious challenges, argued at great length that this regulation was <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/16-969-ts.pdf#page=43">unambiguously foreclosed at Step One</a> of <i>Chevron</i>, and was, if not unambiguously impermissible, at least <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/16-969-ts.pdf#page=49">unreasonable at Step Two</a>. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In the course of making its Step Two argument, the petitioner <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/16-969-ts.pdf#page=51">noted</a> that "[t]there are strong, even powerful arguments
for the Court to retreat from <i>Chevron</i>’s approach of
agency deference, and instead favor the 'impressive
body of law' that Judge Friendly identified, pre-<i>Chevron</i>, 'sanctioning free substitution of judicial for
administrative judgment when the question involves
the meaning of a statutory term.'" But it didn't actually make those arguments. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Instead, the petitioner proceeded to <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/16-969-ts.pdf#page=51">suggest</a> that "</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">[t]hose constitutional concerns [about <i>Chevron</i>] can be avoided here,
however, either by holding that the Board’s practice
of issuing partial final decisions fails <i>Chevron </i>step
one, or by simply enforcing step two of <i>Chevron </i>by its
terms . . . ." Further still, the petitioner went on to argue that the constitutional concerns with <i>Chevron</i> could not only be avoided in its case were the Court to not defer to the Patent Office, but that <i>Chevron</i> was perfectly constitutional if correctly applied, <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/16-969-ts.pdf#page=51">concluding</a>: "</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In short,
<i>Chevron </i>can survive, and remain consistent with 'the Constitution of the framers' design,' [here <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11495806271514705762&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1149">quoting</a> from then-Judge Gorsuch's <a href="http://yalejreg.com/nc/judge-gorsuch-and-chevron-doctrine-part-ii-the-gutierrez-brizuela-concurring-opinion-by-asher-steinberg/">concurring opinion in <i>Gutierrez-Brizuela</i></a> recommending <i>Chevron</i>'s overruling] if its steps are enforced with vigor."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In his opinion, Justice Gorsuch <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-969_f2qg.pdf#page=14">summarizes</a> this take on <i>Chevron</i> in a curious way, as a "suggest[ion] that we might use this case to abandon <i>Chevron</i> </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">and embrace the ‘impressive body’ of
pre-<i>Chevron </i>law recognizing that ‘the meaning of a statutory
term’ is properly a matter for ‘judicial [rather
than] administrative judgment.’" Slip op. at 14 (quoting Petitioner's Br. at 41 (quoting <i>Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura</i>, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976) (Friendly, J.))). He then goes on to write that, because the statute is clear, "whether <i>Chevron </i>should remain is a question we may leave for another day." This is curious in a couple ways. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">First, the petitioner never suggested abandoning <i>Chevron</i>, but rather only noted "powerful [constitutional] arguments" to do so and ultimately both argued that the Court should avoid deciding <i>Chevron</i>'s constitutionality and that <i>Chevron</i>, properly applied, is a constitutional standard under which the petitioner would win. Justice Gorsuch would appear to be so interested in overruling <i>Chevron</i> that he's reading requests to overrule it into litigants' briefs that aren't quite there, thereby availing himself of an opportunity to suggest in an opinion for the Court that "whether <i>Chevron</i> should remain" is a live question.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Second, and along similar lines, his quotation from the petitioner's brief repeats, and if anything substantially enhances, the deceptiveness of petitioner's selective quotation of Judge Friendly. Judge Friendly's opinion in <i>Pittston Stevedoring</i> is famous for its description of pre-<i>Chevron</i> deference doctrine as an incoherent mess, not for its description of a cohesive "impressive body" of pre-<i>Chevron</i> law that rejected deference to agency statutory interpretation. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In the passage in question, Judge Friendly <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6772671378437215443&q=pittston+stevedoring+corp+v+dellaventura&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p49">wrote</a> eight years before <i>Chevron </i>that "it is time to recognize . . . that t</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">here are <i>two lines</i> of Supreme Court decisions on this subject which are
analytically in conflict, with the result that a court of appeals must
choose the one it deems more appropriate for the case at hand. Leading </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">cases supporting the view that great deference must be given to the
decisions of an administrative agency applying a statute to the facts
and that such decisions can be reversed only if without rational basis
are [collecting cases] . . . </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">However, there is an impressive body of law sanctioning free
substitution of judicial for administrative judgment when the question
involves the meaning of a statutory term." </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The petitioner, at least, suggested that the Court should "<i>favor </i>the 'impressive body of law' that Judge Friendly <i>identified</i>" counseling against deference, which implies that Judge Friendly at least might have identified another impressive body of law supporting it that the Court could favor instead</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">—</span>as he did. Justice Gorsuch, on the other hand, paraphrases the petitioner as suggesting that the Court simply "embrace the 'impressive body' of pre-<i>Chevron</i> law recognizing </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that ‘the meaning of a statutory
term’ is properly a matter for ‘judicial [rather
than] administrative judgment,' and then cites the brief as quoting Friendly, leaving the reader with the impression that Judge Friendly described a homogeneous and impressive body of anti-deference pre-<i>Chevron</i> law. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The Court's additions and alterations to Judge Friendly's language, which don't appear in petitioner's brief, are interesting too. Judge Friendly wrote of a body of law that merely sanctioned the free substitution of judicial for administrative judgment, without recognizing any particular order of priority between the two. But Justice Gorsuch has him (or petitioner's brief quoting him) describing a body of law that "<i>recogniz[ed]</i>" that statutory interpretation is "<i>properly</i>" a matter for "'judicial [<i>rather than</i>] administrative judgment'"</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "calibri" , sans-serif; font-size: 11.0pt; line-height: 115%;">—</span></span>a recognition one could scarcely find were one to read the cases Judge Friendly cited as exemplary of his "impressive body of law." <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13180713611323646923&q=pittston+stevedoring+corp+v+dellaventura&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">These</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15177475013498829709&q=pittston+stevedoring+corp+v+dellaventura&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">cases</a>, rather, were merely instances where the Court appeared to review an agency interpretation with little or no deference and little or no self-consciousness about its lack of deference (as the Court often does today without mentioning <i>Chevron</i>). There is nothing even like an argument in them for (or recognition of) judicial primacy in statutory interpretation.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The majority opinion's conjuring of a phantom attack on <i>Chevron</i>,<i> </i>and of an impressive body of Judge-Friendly-endorsed, anti-deference, pre-<i>Chevron</i> doctrine, though odd, is probably less odd than the lead dissent's commentary on <i>Chevron</i>. Justice Breyer's dissent proposed that the Court defer under <i>Chevron</i> to the Patent Office's regulation.<i> </i>In a paragraph of his dissent joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, but not by Justice Kagan, who otherwise joined his dissent in full, Justice Breyer pauses to <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-969_f2qg.pdf#page=27">offer</a> the following remarkable interpretation of <i>Chevron </i>before explaining why he would defer to the Patent Office:</span></span><br />
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In referring to <i>Chevron</i>, I do not mean that courts are to
treat that case like a rigid, black-letter rule of law, instructing
them always to allow agencies leeway to fill
every gap in every statutory provision. See <i>Mead Corp.</i>,
<i>supra</i>, at 229–231. Rather, I understand <i>Chevron </i>as a
rule of thumb, guiding courts in an effort to respect that
leeway which Congress intended the agencies to have. I
recognize that Congress does not always consider such
matters, but if not, courts can often implement a more
general, virtually omnipresent congressional purpose—
namely, the creation of a well-functioning statutory
scheme—by using a canon-like, judicially created construct,
the hypothetical reasonable legislator, and asking
what such legislators would likely have intended had
Congress considered the question of delegating gap-filling
authority to the agency. </span></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of course, <i>Chevron</i> is most definitely not a mere rule of thumb that guides courts to ask whether a hypothetical reasonable legislator would have wanted courts to defer to agency interpretations of a particular ambiguity in a particular statute. Rather, <i>Chevron</i> is indeed "a rigid, black-letter rule of law" that instructs courts to always defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes that they administer so long as agencies issue those interpretations in a sufficiently formal way, see <i><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6553117666921312576&q=city+of+arlington+tex+v+fcc&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">Mead</a></i>, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8614546201508695232&q=city+of+arlington+tex+v+fcc&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006"><i>City of Arlington</i></a>, and sometimes even when they don't, see <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17981729066831527493&q=city+of+arlington+tex+v+fcc&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006"><i>Barnhart</i></a>. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This rigidity is just what distinguishes <i>Chevron</i> from the pre-<i>Chevron</i> mess described in Judge Friendly's opinion; Justice Breyer's construct of the hypothetical reasonable legislator, on the other hand, is the signal feature of that pre-<i>Chevron</i> mess. Prior to <i>Chevron</i>, courts <a href="http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2017/03/yes-gorsuch-matters-ii-or-why.html">attempted to determine</a> whether Congress would have wanted them to defer to agency interpretations of particular ambiguities in particular statutes, just as Justice Breyer claims <i>Chevron</i> guides them to do today. Because Congress does not, as Justice Breyer says, "always [or usually] consider such matters," courts were left to imagine how much deference hypothetical reasonable legislators would have wanted, and to construct such hypothetical preferences by <a href="https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2017/03/yes-gorsuch-matters-ii-or-why.html&httpsredir=1&article=4032&context=penn_law_review#page=14">recourse to ten or more factors</a>. This inevitably resulted in an unpredictable body of law that the Court ultimately resolved in <i>Chevron</i>.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, it comes as no great surprise that Justice Breyer subscribes to the pre-<i>Chevron</i> approach to deference doctrine and claims, however implausibly, that <i>Chevron</i> can be squared with it. For he has been saying so for over thirty years, dating back at least to a law review <a href="https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/LegalProcess/breyer.txt.htm">article</a> he wrote as a circuit judge two years after <i>Chevron</i> was decided, in which he argued that even after <i>Chevron</i> a court should decide whether a hypothetical reasonable legislator would want it to defer to a particular agency on a particular question by considering ten or so factors, including whether the question is "one that the agency or the court is more likely to answer correctly" (not an easy question for the court to answer neutrally, that), and "whether the agency can be trusted to give a properly balanced answer."</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What is surprising, though, is that Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined the section of his dissent arguing that <i>Chevron</i> merely guides courts to ask whether a hypothetical reasonable legislator would desire deferential review of agency interpretations in any particular case. In the past, with the exception of an opinion, <i>Barnhart</i>, on when agencies should get <i>Chevron</i> deference to even their interpretations that aren't advanced in notice-and-comment rulemakings or formal adjudications, Justice Breyer has been alone on the Court in advancing his view of <i>Chevron</i>. (In <i>Barnhart</i>, he was able to get most of the Court to agree that, when an agency doesn't promulgate its interpretation formally, courts should consider all the factors he's always thought generally relevant to deference in deciding whether or not to defer to the informal interpretation.)<i> </i> </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Most recently, in <i>City of Arlington</i>, he wrote a solo concurring opinion <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8614546201508695232&q=city+of+arlington+tex+v+fcc&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1876">arguing</a> that <i>Chevron </i>deference was appropriate in that case only because it satisfied his multi-factor approach to "approximat[ing] how Congress likely [i.e., hypothetically] would have meant to allocate interpretive law-determining authority between reviewing court and agency." Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg did not join that opinion; they joined Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, which claimed that agencies must always receive <i>Chevron</i> deference to any sufficiently formal interpretation of statutes that they administer. Of course, it would be difficult to find five votes for that opinion now; Scalia has been replaced by Gorsuch, and the fifth vote in <i>City of Arlington</i>, Justice Thomas, now <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-46_bqmc.pdf#page=18">believes</a> <i>Chevron</i> is likely unconstitutional.</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It's possibly a mistake to read too much into Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg's joining this section of Justice Breyer's dissent; perhaps they only joined it out of collegiality or disinterest in fussing over the details of a dissent on a subject they don't tremendously care about. On the other hand, given that one of their colleagues refused to join this thoroughly gratuitous discussion of <i>Chevron</i> and presumably asked if it could be removed, it could hardly have escaped their attention. Perhaps, then, they now genuinely believe that lower courts should inquire into whether a hypothetical reasonable legislator would have wanted them to defer to an agency before granting deference. Or, perhaps they hope that Justice Breyer's proposal to trim <i>Chevron</i> back could operate as an olive branch to those members of the Court who want to overrule it.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In any event, after <i>SAS Institute</i> there is really only one Justice, Justice Kagan, who is committed on paper to upholding <i>Chevron</i>. Two members of the Court, Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch, have argued that deference to administrative agencies on statutory interpretation is unconstitutional; another three members, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Alito, joined the former's dissent in <i>City of Arlington</i>, which <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8614546201508695232&q=city+of+arlington+tex+v+fcc&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1883">argued</a> that courts must somehow decide, in the case of every ambiguity in a statute over which an agency has general rulemaking authority, whether Congress implicitly delegated gap-filling authority to the agency as to that particular ambiguity; and Justice Breyer, now joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, has argued much the same thing, albeit of course in a more distinctively Breyerian Legal-Process-School-influenced way. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The Breyer/Roberts position is certainly more moderate than the Thomas/Gorsuch position, and purports to stop short of overruling <i>Chevron</i>,<i> </i>but overruling <i>Chevron </i>is exactly what it would do. Inviting lower courts to decide in every case whether Congress would have wanted them to defer would simply reincarnate the bivalent pre-<i>Chevron</i> deference doctrine that Judge Friendly actually described in <i>Pittston Stevedoring</i>, and would inevitably lead to a great deal less deference than <i>Chevron</i>'s mandatory deference regime currently requires, as courts would simply find that Congress wouldn't have wanted them to defer in those cases that they really want to decide for themselves. To the extent that members of the Court are becoming more interested in Justice Breyer's long-held views in hopes that adopting them could stave off more extreme proposals to kill off deference altogether, they may want to ask themselves whether giving the lower courts unfettered discretion to grant or deny deference is what they really want.</span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-54947377160032030352018-03-27T02:27:00.002-07:002018-03-27T03:20:02.788-07:00Hughes v. United States Argument Preview, with Argumentative Comments on the Parties' and Amici's Arguments<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The Supreme Court is hearing argument this morning, in <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/hughes-v-united-states/"><i>Hughes v. United States</i></a>, on the meaning and perhaps the survival of this blog's namesake, the narrowest-grounds rule. That rule, first adopted by the Court in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12064198172779556411&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006"><i>Marks v. United States</i></a>, elliptically <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12064198172779556411&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p193">states</a> that "[w]hen a </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may
be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgment[] on the narrowest grounds." I have been busy writing an article on my preferred fate for the <i>Marks</i> doctrine that I hoped to publish before the argument, so I haven't had a chance to blog about this important case until now, but in lieu of that as-yet unfinished article I offer this hurried and overlong argument preview, which will contain a </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">précis of my views (and criticism of virtually everyone else's).</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>Hughes </i>arises out of a circuit split on the holding of <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10330935680184758118&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006"><i>Freeman v. United States</i></a>, a 4-1-4 decision of the Court on whether, and when, criminal sentences that follow plea agreements that recommend a particular sentence are based on the Sentencing Guidelines. Under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3582">18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2)</a>, when a defendant's sentence is "based on" a Guidelines sentencing range that was retroactively lowered by the Sentencing Commission post-sentencing, that sentence can be adjusted to fit the retroactively lowered range. This puts a lot of pressure, especially in a world where the Guidelines are now advisory, on what it means for a sentence to be "based on" the Guidelines. In the case of plea agreements under Rule 11(c)(1)(C) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the question of whether a sentence is based on the Guidelines was difficult enough to divide the Court 4-1-4.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcrmp/rule_11">Rule 11(c)(1)(C)</a> says that in the federal system, a plea agreement can specify a particular sentence or sentencing range</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">—very often one derived from the Guidelines</span>. The district court has discretion to reject the agreement <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10330935680184758118&q=freeman+v+united+states+3582&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006&as_vis=1#p2692">in light of, inter alia, the Guidelines</a>, but if it accepts the agreement, the sentence or sentencing range binds the court. The multiple layers of causation between Guidelines and sentence in cases of so-called "C-type agreements" complicate the based-on analysis, and there is a wide range of reasonable views on when C-type sentences are based on the Guidelines, which the various opinions in <i>Freeman</i> respectively advance. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">One view, advocated by the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10330935680184758118&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p2700">four Justices in dissent</a> in <i>Freeman</i>, is that such sentences are never based on the Guidelines; rather, they are based solely on C-type agreements, which may in turn have their genesis in the Guidelines but whose basis is irrelevant to the basis of the sentences accepting their recommendations. Another view, argued by Justice Sotomayor's <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10330935680184758118&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p2695">solo opinion concurring in the <i>Freeman </i>judgment</a>, is that a C-type sentence is based on a C-type agreement, but that when the underlying C-type agreement specifically references and employs a Guidelines sentencing range, the C-type sentence is, by way of the transitive property, based on the Guidelines. Finally, another, broader view, argued by the <i>Freeman</i> four-Justice plurality, is that C-type sentences are usually based on the Guidelines whether their underlying C-type agreements reference the Guidelines or not, because district judges consider the Guidelines in deciding whether or not to accept C-type agreements. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Perhaps correctly anticipating that, under <i>Marks</i>, their broader opinion would not bind lower courts analyzing the fragmented <i>Freeman</i> decision, and therefore supposing that their responsibility to offer guidance was minimal, the plurality was far from clear on whether all, or only most, C-type sentences were based on the Guidelines in their view. Instead, the plurality would confuse lower courts with cryptic remarks like (emphases mine), "</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Even when a defendant enters into an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, the judge's
decision to accept the plea and impose the recommended sentence is
<i>likely </i>to be based on the Guidelines," or, </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"Even where the judge varies from the recommended range, <i>if</i> the judge uses the sentencing range as the
beginning point to explain the decision to deviate from it, then the
Guidelines are in a real sense a basis for the sentence." This would frustrate lower courts' efforts to determine what the "narrowest grounds" supporting the <i>Freeman</i> judgment were and ultimately lead to a raging circuit split on the subject, because absent clarity on what the plurality's grounds for concurring in the judgment were, it couldn't be said with certainty that Justice Sotomayor's grounds were narrower.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">While law review articles and the petition for certiorari in <i>Hughes</i> will claim that there's a circuit split on what the narrowest-grounds rule means, there's really a rough consensus on the subject, absent one important point of disagreement that divides the parties in <i>Hughes</i>. For the most part, the circuits agree that an opinion concurring in the Court's judgment states the narrowest grounds for that judgment if, and only if, it produces the kind of result the Court reached in a completely lesser included subset of the cases the other opinions concurring in the judgment produce that kind of result. That is to say, to give an example, Justice Sotomayor's opinion in <i>Freeman</i> would state the narrowest grounds for the <i>Freeman</i> judgment if, and only if, every case in which <i>her</i> opinion would deem a C-type sentence to be "based on" the Guidelines (which was the result in <i>Freeman</i>)<i> </i>is a case in which the plurality would deem a C-type sentence to be based on the Guidelines. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">If this is not the case, the argument goes, how can it be categorically said that Justice Sotomayor's opinion is "narrower" than the plurality's? It might be true, empirically, that it would provide for 3582(c)(2) relief in fewer, indeed in many fewer cases. But that cannot be proven as a matter of logic if her opinion provides for relief in some cases where the plurality would not. And more to the point, perhaps, if the plurality wouldn't always agree with Justice Sotomayor's results, and would in some cases oppose relief that she would grant, what is the justification for following her opinion? The <i>Marks</i> doctrine, its most able lower-court practitioners claim, should identify points of law on which a fractured majority of the Court is implicitly in majority agreement</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">—indeed, points of law that implicitly underwrite the majority's assent to the judgment.</span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">Now, as I say, the <i>Freeman</i> plurality fell short of stating a rule about when C-type sentences are based on the Guidelines, so lower courts were unable to agree on whether the plurality would say that C-type sentences are based on the Guidelines in every case where Justice Sotomayor would. Most circuits said they would, reasoning that in the plurality's view all C-type sentences were based on the Guidelines. From that assessment, the conclusion followed that Justice Sotomayor's opinion stated <i>Freeman</i>'s narrowest grounds, and bound lower courts</span></span><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">—<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a tremendously important conclusion, because it meant that any C-type-agreeing defendant whose agreement didn't explicitly reference the Guidelines was out of luck.</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><i> </i></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">But the Ninth and D.C. Circuits ultimately concluded that in at least some hypothetical cases, the plurality wouldn't always deem a C-type sentence based on where Justice Sotomayor would. From that assessment, the conclusion followed that Justice Sotomayor's opinion didn't state <i>Freeman</i>'s singularly narrowest grounds, that indeed no opinion in <i>Freeman</i> did, that no <i>Freeman</i> opinion, therefore, bound lower courts, and that lower courts were free to adopt the plurality's more generous view of based-on C-type sentences</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">—which the Ninth and D.C. Circuits proceeded to do.</span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">Before launching into the parties' arguments about this mess, I should say that the Ninth and D.C. Circuits were probably right. The clearest hypothetical case where Justice Sotomayor would grant 3582(c)(2) relief and the plurality wouldn't, even on the plurality's murky rule, goes as follows. A C-type agreement specifies a sentencing range drawn from the Guidelines, and the Guideline from which that sentencing range is drawn is retroactively amended. The district court accepts the agreement, but not because he agrees with the agreement's Guidelines calculation; he thinks it's wrong and that some other Guideline that isn't subsequently retroactively amended applies. He nevertheless accepts the agreement because either the other Guideline generates the same range, or because it doesn't but he thinks that a departure from the correct Guideline's range to the range recommended by the agreement is appropriate. On Justice Sotomayor's view, the sentence is based on the retroactively amended Guideline identified in the agreement; on the plurality's view, the judge's reasoning controls and the judge did not rely on that Guideline. </span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">Therefore, under <i>Marks</i> as it's traditionally practiced, <i>Freeman</i> does not contain a binding precedential rule (perhaps its result binds, whatever that might mean). Under that approach to <i>Marks</i>, then, the Court in <i>Hughes</i> should either (a) vacate the Eleventh Circuit, which thought itself bound by Sotomayor's opinion, and remand for the Eleventh Circuit to arrive at a rule of its choosing, or (b) simply decide the merits of Hughes's case under 3582(c)(2), which might or might not result in another fragmented opinion. (<i>Freeman </i>is only seven years old and only one Justice has left the Court since <i>Freeman</i>, though that Justice, Scalia, dissented and his replacement, Justice Gorsuch, could conceivably join the still-intact four-Justice plurality and provide a majority for its rule.)</span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><u>The petitioner's position</u></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">The petitioner in <i>Hughes</i> is a C-type-sentenced defendant who loses under Justice Sotomayor's rule, though not, it would seem, under the murky standard proposed by the <i>Freeman</i> plurality. The Eleventh Circuit thought Justice Sotomayor's opinion binding under <i>Marks </i>and therefore ruled that he was ineligible for 3582(c)(2) relief; the petitioner would like the Court to hold that <i>Freeman</i> contains no <i>Marks</i> holding and that the Eleventh Circuit is therefore free to fashion its own, more favorable rule, or to hold that <i>Freeman</i> contains no binding rule and that the Court will adopt the plurality's view.</span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">The petitioner's argument under <i>Marks</i> is broader than that of the circuits that agree with him. The Ninth and D.C. Circuits thought Sotomayor's rule non-binding because they could imagine cases where her rule would produce favorable results for defendants that the plurality's rule would not, making her rule less than categorically narrower than the plurality's. The petitioner goes farther; he claims that even if the plurality granted 3582(c)(2) relief in every case where Justice Sotomayor would, Justice Sotomayor's rule would still not bind, because it wouldn't represent a "logical subset" of the plurality's. For it to represent such a logical subset, her <i>rule</i>, as opposed to the brute results it generates, must have a logical relation of a certain kind to the plurality's. </span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">For example, if both she and the plurality started from the premise that what a C-type agreement says about the Guidelines is what matters, but she required C-type agreements to identify a Guidelines range and not deviate from it, while the plurality would deem a sentence based on the Guidelines even if the underlying agreement said it started from a Guidelines range but recommended a departure from it, one could say, in the petitioner's view, that her rule was a logical subset of the plurality's; both would share the necessary condition of a Guideline-referring agreement, but she would add a second condition of non-deviation from the Guidelines.</span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">Why should it matter if the rules espoused by opinions concurring in a judgment, as opposed to the results they generate, have a set/subset relationship or not? One answer might be that unless the rules themselves have some logical relation to each other, we won't know if the results they generate will have a set/subset relation to each other. We may be able to empirically predict with great confidence that where one rule calls for a certain kind of result, another logically unrelated rule will always call for that kind of result, but unless such outcomes are logically entailed by the rules' relation, we might not be sure of those outcomes; the rules continuing to produce the same results will depend on facts about the world that could change. But that isn't a very convincing answer in some cases. If it were true, for example, that the <i>Freeman</i> plurality's rule says that all C-type sentences are based on the Guidelines, it would logically follow that Justice Sotomayor's rule would never find a C-type sentence based on that the plurality wouldn't, even if there is no logical relationship between the two rules.</span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">The better answer is that while a set/subset relationship of two rules' results may allow us to say that the Court would agree that in the cases where, e.g., Justice Sotomayor's rule grants relief, relief is appropriate, it doesn't allow us to say that the Court would agree that <i>because</i> a case satisfies Justice Sotomayor's rule, relief is appropriate. And this distinction might matter if <i>Marks</i> rests on a theory of implicit majority agreement. </span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">Consider, for example, a case where some Justices concur in a result on the ground that it's mandated by the Constitution, an unconstitutional statute foreclosing that result notwithstanding, while others concur on the ground that it's mandated by that very statute in some subset of cases that their colleagues say the Constitution requires it. One could say that in that subset of cases, the majority concurring in the judgment would agree that that result should obtain. But one could not say that in that subset of cases the Court would agree that under the statute, that result should obtain; some members of the majority would say that the statute, by itself, prohibits that result. And a lower court will understandably feel shy about saying that a majority of the Court would agree that, in this subset of cases, for no particular reason or logically reconcilable set of reasons, the following result should obtain. The Court's failure to form anything like an implicit agreement on reasons makes it rather awkward, if <i>Marks</i> is about implicit majority consensus, for the lower court to rely on legal reasoning that some members of the Court's majority thoroughly rejected.</span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">The petitioner, then, would require Justice Sotomayor and the plurality to agree on some subset of conditions for when a C-type sentence is based on the Guidelines in order to deem Justice Sotomayor's opinion binding. But if they did agree on some subset of conditions, Justice Sotomayor's opinion would be binding even if it added additional, more strenuous conditions for 3582(c)(2) relief that the plurality did not accept</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">—as in the hypothetical above where both opinions require agreements to refer to the Guidelines, but she goes on to require adherence to them.</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">I think this goes both too far and not far enough. On the too far, I simply do not understand why shared reasoning is essential, or even relevant, to precedent's having binding effect. If members of the Court concurring in a judgment are committed to Result X in Set-of-Cases Y for Reason A, and other members of the Court concurring in a judgment are committed to Result X in Set-of-Cases Y for Reason B, I think that lower courts are bound to reach Result X in Set-of-Cases Y for the simple reason that the reasons (Reasons A and B) that were necessary for the members of the majority to concur in the judgment commit the majority to reaching Result X in Set-of-Cases Y, and therefore bind lower courts to do so. </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">For example, as then-Professor, now-Sixth Circuit Judge John Rogers <a href="http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/vanlr49&div=38&id=&page=">wrote</a> some years ago (and as Ryan Williams <a href="https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/02/69-Stan-L-Rev-795.pdf#page=40">argued</a> anew in a recent article on <i>Marks</i>), if the Supreme Court (<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7898500653399075084&q=tidewater+national&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006&as_vis=1">as it did</a>) upholds an exercise of diversity jurisdiction under the diversity statute between a citizen of D.C. and a citizen of a state, some Justices voting to do so on the ground, hotly rejected by their colleagues, that Congress can use its Article I powers to augment the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond that provided in Article III, others on the ground, hotly rejected by their colleagues, that D.C. and other territories are "states" as the term is used in Article III's provision for diversity jurisdiction, lower courts are bound to uphold the application of the diversity statute to suits between citizens of states and citizens of territories. The lack of a coherent rationale, even a coherent implicit rationale, for this result is neither here nor there, Judge Rogers argued; a majority of the Court held, for its various logically irreconcilable reasons, that diversity suits between citizens of territories and citizens of states were legal, and lower courts must follow suit.</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">The excesses of the petitioner's position, however, are nothing compared to its shortcomings. The petitioner would concede that if only Justice Sotomayor and the plurality shared a logical starting point for conditions on 3582(c)(2) relief, Justice Sotomayor's additional unshared conditions for relief would bind lower courts. But this makes no sense at all.</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">The theory of <i>Marks</i>, in most lower courts and commentators' views and certainly in the petitioner's, is implicit majority agreement. If Justice Sotomayor's rule aligned with the plurality's in the way the petitioner says is necessary, we could say that she and the plurality agreed that in a certain set of cases, for a certain shared substrate of reasons, defendants are eligible for 3582(c)(2) relief. But the whole reason the petitioner is fighting the application of Justice Sotomayor's rule, and the reason <i>Freeman</i> has posed such a heavily litigated <i>Marks</i> problem, is that <i>outside</i> that set of cases, Justice Sotomayor would deny relief while the plurality would usually grant it</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">—that is to say, outside that set of cases, there is no implicit majority agreement. </span> </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">The fact, were it the case, that Justice Sotomayor and the plurality would grant relief in a set of cases for partially shared reasons certainly should compel lower courts, even on the most abstemious view of <i>Marks</i>, to grant relief in that set of cases. But why does this agreement on results in that set of cases, and some substrate of reasons for those results, mandate adherence to Justice Sotomayor's rule in cases where the plurality would disagree with her results because it doesn't share all of her reasoning? Why is the petitioner willing to concede that if only Justice Sotomayor and the plurality agreed to grant relief in the cases she would grant relief for roughly similar reasons, the Eleventh Circuit would rightly deny him relief because Justice Sotomayor would, though the other four Justices concurring in the judgment would not? </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">The answer is a slippage between kinds of agreement. Suppose it were true that the majority would agree that 3582(c)(2) relief is deserved in the cases where Justice Sotomayor's rule says it is. Because we are used to legal rules that state two sides of a coin</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">—rules that tell you when a result of some kind obtains and when it doesn't</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">—we can easily slip into saying that the majority would agree that 3582(c)(2) relief is deserved when Justice Sotomayor's rule says it is and not deserved where her rule says it's not, or more simply, that 3582(c)(2) relief is deserved if, and only if, which we conflate with "if," Justice Sotomayor's rule says so. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">But that is false. The majority agrees, hypothetically, that defendant winners under Justice Sotomayor's rule are winners. It doesn't agree, indeed the plurality would vehemently disagree, that the only C-type agreeing defendant winners under 3582(c)(2) are the ones who win under Justice Sotomayor's rule. All the majority agrees upon, even supposing the petitioner's requirements for <i>Marks</i>-bindingness were met, is that satisfying her rule is a sufficient condition for 3582(c)(2) relief</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">—not, as Justice Sotomayor would contend, that satisfying her rule is necessary. In a case that flunks her rule but satisfies the plurality's broader rule, there is no implicit majority agreement, only explicit majority disagreement, and to speak of shared "common denominators" and logical subsets that mandate an outcome in such cases is preposterous. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">I have made this argument before at greater length <a href="http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2017/06/a-sixth-circuit-themed-primer-on-marks.html">here</a>, and Adam Steinman has recently made the same argument in an <a href="https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/nonmajority-opinions-biconditional-rules">essay</a> in the Yale Law Forum. Steinman writes that a traditional approach to <i>Marks</i> is inapt with respect to "biconditionals:" rules of the form, "if X, Y result, if not X, no Y result." In the case of such rules, a broader biconditional may necessarily agree that if X, Y, but won't agree that if not X, no Y. I would put the point in terms of sufficient and necessary conditions. If two rules with a set/subset relation to each other only describe sufficient conditions for the Court's result, reserving the question of their necessity, there isn't any problem with doing <i>Marks</i> in the traditional way; all the lower court will say is that the Justices concurring in the broader rule would agree that a narrower set of sufficient conditions is sufficient, which is true</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">—those Justices would agree that they are sufficient conditions for the result, though not exhaustive of sufficient conditions for the result.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">Most opinions the Court produces, however, don't say that certain conditions presented by the facts before it are sufficient for the Court's result and that the Court will reserve judgment on cases lacking those conditions until it comes across such a case. Rather, most of the Court's opinions lay out comprehensive tests that say certain conditions are both sufficient for and necessary to its result. For example, referring to a specific Guideline is sufficient, in Justice Sotomayor's view, to make a C-type sentence based on that Guideline, but also necessary as well; without such a reference, the sentence following the agreement won't be based on the Guideline. It is this claim of necessity that the plurality disagrees with; the plurality, at least on most circuits' understandings, would agree that it's sufficient for a C-type sentence to be based on the Guidelines that the agreement references the Guidelines, since the plurality thinks, according to those circuits, that all C-type sentences are based on the Guidelines. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">Where two opinions state, and differ on, necessary conditions for their result, the broader opinion won't agree on the narrower's necessary conditions for the result reached. Rather, implicit agreement on necessary conditions will be limned by the <i>broader </i>opinion, with the narrower opinion only describing an implicit agreement on sufficient conditions. For example, if some Justices invalidate a statute of a certain type under intermediate scrutiny, and others under strict, the majority would agree that it's <i>sufficient </i>for unconstitutionality that a statute of that kind fails intermediate scrutiny. But they would not agree that a statute of that kind <i>must</i> fail intermediate scrutiny to be unconstitutional; rather, they would actually only agree that it must fail strict scrutiny to be unconstitutional. The sum total of their implicit agreements is that statutes of that kind that fail intermediate scrutiny are unconstitutional, and statutes of that kind that don't fail strict scrutiny are constitutional. As to statutes, however, that fail strict scrutiny but don't fail intermediate scrutiny, there is no agreement.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><u>The government's position</u></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">The government, besides decrying petitioner's insistence on some substrate of reasoning between opinions concurring in the judgment and arguing that agreement on a subset of results suffices to make an opinion describing that subset bind, primarily argues that Justice Sotomayor's opinion is binding because the <i>Freeman</i> dissent agrees with its negative results. There are a couple versions of the argument. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">The more ambitious one goes that Justice Sotomayor's opinion is binding because in the cases where she would grant relief, the four-Justice plurality would (because it always would), and in the cases where she wouldn't, the four-Justice dissent wouldn't (because it always wouldn't). Thus, any result called for by Justice Sotomayor's opinion is supported by five Justices who participated in <i>Freeman</i>. Less ambitiously, the government says that whether or not it's so that the plurality would grant relief whenever Justice Sotomayor would, the dissent would certainly deny relief whenever she would. As this is a case where she would deny relief, this is a case where five <i>Freeman</i> Justices, including dissenters, living and deceased, would deny relief. That agreement of five <i>Freeman</i> Justices on how to decide this case, the government claims, is binding on lower courts.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">This approach certainly addresses the defect I've pointed out in even the petitioner's demanding version of classical <i>Marks</i> doctrine: that just because the <i>Freeman</i> majority would grant relief where Justice Sotomayor would doesn't mean, no matter the harmoniousness of their reasons, that it would deny relief where she would. To this problem, the government has a ready response: the dissenters, who with Justice Sotomayor add up to five Justices, would deny relief where she would. But so what?</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">The government is unable to offer a persuasive reason for treating the views of dissenters as binding, because there isn't one. We could say that dissenters' views predict what the Court would do with a case before the lower courts. But that ceases to be true the instant that the dissenters leave the Court, as one of the <i>Freeman</i> dissenters already has. Besides, the Court doesn't believe that precedent consists of those rules that lower courts can predict the Court would follow if it granted cert in the case before a lower court. If it did, lower courts would be free to predict, on the basis of persuasive evidence in the form of dissents, concurring opinions, statements respecting certiorari, suggestive dicta, and so forth, that the Court will overrule one of its precedents. The Court, however, has been very adamant about lower courts not doing that sort of thing.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">One might next argue that dissents are binding on a theory that a case before the Supreme Court is just a caucus on legal rules; legal rules espoused by a majority of the Court are binding. But that simply isn't what a case before the Supreme Court is. The Court chooses to vote on the judgment, not on rules, with the result that on occasion a judgment will issue that is inconsistent with rules that majorities of the Court endorse. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">For example, in <i>Tidewater</i>, discussed above, a majority of the Court, dissenters included, agreed that Congress had no Article I power to augment federal jurisdiction, and a different majority of the Court, dissenters included, agreed that territories weren't states for Article III purposes. If both of those rules of law are right, you can't get to the result the Court reached: upholding an exercise of diversity jurisdiction between a citizen of D.C. and a citizen of a state. But the Court did get to that result, because a majority of the Court voted to get to it, some on the majority-rejected Article I ground, others on the majority-rejected territories ground. If cases were caucuses on legal rules, the Court would actually caucus on legal rules; first rejecting one ground to uphold jurisdiction by a majority vote, and then another, the Court would have concluded there was no jurisdiction under the rules it had voted to adopt. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">That isn't, however, how the game works, and because it isn't, the Court can reach results that are inconsistent with rules that majorities of the Court, including dissenters, accept. If the legal views of majorities that include dissenters were binding, it would follow that lower courts would be bound to reject diversity jurisdiction where the Court upheld it in <i>Tidewater</i>, as they would be bound to deem D.C. a non-state for Article III purposes and reject Article I arguments to uphold applications of diversity jurisdiction to the territories. Still more absurdly, the Court itself would be bound by the precedential rules of <i>Tidewater</i> to overrule <i>Tidewater</i>'s result. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">Besides the logical inconsistency of treating dissenters' views as binding with how the Court votes, once one rejects a predictive rationale for treating dissenters as binding there isn't any good rationale left. Obviously one cannot say that dissents are reasons for the Court's judgments; that's just what they're not. One might argue that whether or not a Justice is giving reasons for the Court's results, that Justice will be better-briefed and smarter than lower-court judges, and that lower-court judges ought to defer to what he says, so long as a majority of the Court agrees with him. This is certainly a fair argument for giving some deference, or assigning some persuasive weight, to the views of a majority of dissenters and concurring Justices; it isn't, though, a remotely compelling argument for treating those views as binding. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">What five Justices, four of them dissenters, said about the law in 1960 may not be terribly persuasive today, by which time the way we read statutes or the Constitution or think about the substantive area of law in question either has or will likely have changed quite a bit. Likewise, what five Justices, four of them dissenters, said about the law in 2011 might not be very persuasive fifty years from now. Even if Supreme Court Justices were categorically smarter in some absolute sense than lower-court judges, which is obviously not the case, though it may well be true on average, the views of, for example, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Goldberg, Fortas and Warren on a question of statutory interpretation are likely to be less instructive to us today than the views of Judge Easterbrook on the same question. It's very hard to see, absent their authoring a judgment on the basis of those views, why we would treat their views as binding.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">Finally, there is something bizarrely arbitrary about counting up dissenters and their colleagues until you reach five, as if they had a meaningful majority for anything but their separately scattered thoughts. To count dissenters' noses and say that some result is compelled because if a case were presented to those dissenters, four of them plus some concurring colleague would reach it, confuses persuasion and the quantity of it with the Court's voting rules on judgments, which only apply to its votes on judgments and are never applied to votes on legal rules (which simply aren't taken). It is rather like saying, if you believe in legislative history, that the views of Senators who vote <i>against </i>a bill are controlling legislative history about what it means, but only if sixty Senators, enough to defeat a filibuster, state those views, forty of them in their critique of the bill, the other twenty in support of its passage (with the other forty who actually voted for the bill understanding it differently altogether). That is a hopelessly confused view of the world, as is a view of precedent that treats as binding the thoughts of dissenters once you count to five.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><u>The heavyweight academic amici</u></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">Finally, there are two academic amicus briefs of note, the first principally authored by Maxwell Stearns, and the second solely authored by Richard Re. The <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-155/33873/20180131112648540_BRIEF%201.25.2018.pdf">Stearns brief</a> defends traditional <i>Marks</i> analysis, more or less, on grounds external to traditional <i>Marks</i> doctrine, while Re's brief would abandon <i>Marks</i>, and any pretense of being bound by areas of shared majority agreement in fractured opinions, altogether.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">Stearns's theory of <i>Marks</i> is that a <i>Marks</i> holding is a Condorcet winner: the opinion that would knock off the others in pairwise comparisons, the dominant second choice, or the opinion that everyone (besides the Justices who already joined it) would join if forced to abandon their own views. Justice Sotomayor's opinion in <i>Freeman</i> is binding because the plurality would prefer it to the dissent, and the dissent would prefer it to the plurality; thus, a majority would prefer it over any other opinion in the case, and everyone besides Justice Sotomayor would join it if forced to abandon their more categorical position and pick one of the positions left. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">How Stearns knows this, and other things he purports to know about fractured opinions, is unclear; the assumption seems to be that if a Justice wants a lot of some sort of result (3582(c)(2) relief, the denial of 3582(c)(2) relief), he'll always prefer more of it to less of it, even if he thinks the reasons his colleagues have for calling for more of it rather than less of it arbitrarily select which parties get more. Both the <i>Freeman</i> plurality and the <i>Freeman</i> dissent denounced Justice Sotomayor's opinion as something of a random results generator; it isn't entirely obvious that the plurality or dissent would prefer it to their colleagues' more (in their view) cogent reasoning because it would produce more of the result they like. Indeed, aside from their own reasoning calling for it, which they can't have in Stearns's thought experiment of a Court forced to abandon its first choices, it isn't entirely obvious that they "like" the sort of result they tend to arrive it. Maybe the <i>Freeman</i> dissenters would love to see more 3582(c)(2) relief, simply thought the statute forbade it for C-type agreeing defendants, and would prefer, both on normative and interpretive grounds, a relatively cogent reading of the statute that grants it all the time to one that arbitrarily denies it some of the time.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">In any case, the fact, if one could show it was a fact, that an opinion is the Court's dominant second choice strikes me as a cosmic irrelevancy to that opinion's precedential effect. Besides simply not understanding what a Justice's hypothetically preferring reasoning he <i>didn't</i> give for his vote on a judgment to some other reasoning he <i>didn't</i> give for his vote has to do with the former reasoning binding a lower court, it is critical to note that an opinion can only be deemed the Court's Condorcet winner or dominant second choice once we start counting the non-binding hypothetical preferences of dissenters. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">To show this, suppose we ask, disregarding the dissenters, what the dominant second choice of the <i>Freeman</i> majority was. We'll be at an impasse; we may find that among those five Justices, Justice Sotomayor's rule would beat the dissent's, but it won't of course beat the plurality's, who preferred theirs. Figuring out which rule, besides her own, Justice Sotomayor would prefer if forced to choose will also be a perplexity. Only when we count the dissenters can we say that Justice Sotomayor's rule "defeats" the plurality's, because only then can we find five votes that (assuming a great deal) would prefer her rule to the plurality's. But for all the reasons that it made no sense to treat the actually articulated views of dissenters as binding, it makes no sense to treat the hypothetical second-order preferences of dissenters as binding.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">Finally we come to Re's <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/17-155/33360/20180126134313770_17-155%20Re%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf">brief</a>, which is an adaptation of his excellent forthcoming Harvard Law Review <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3090620">article</a>. First, a recapitulation of my position, which Re's article addresses under the heading of shared agreement and rejects. As outlined above in my comments on petitioner's position, I would contend that <i>Marks</i> goes too far in treating as binding the necessary conditions of comprehensive tests whose sufficient conditions a majority implicitly agrees are sufficient. What is binding in a fragmented decision with rivaling comprehensive tests supporting the judgment is just those tests' implicit agreement on a subset of sufficient conditions. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">In the case of <i>Freeman</i>, the plurality and Justice Sotomayor agree that it is <i>sufficient </i>for a C-type sentence to be based on the Guidelines that the underlying agreement references the Guidelines, at least so long as the court accepting the sentence also bases its acceptance on the Guidelines in some obscure way. On the generally prevailing reading of the plurality, the majority agrees that it's sufficient for a C-type sentence to be based on the Guidelines that it meets Justice Sotomayor's test, with no extra strings emanating from the plurality. In other words, the majority agrees that if a defendant wins under Justice Sotomayor's test, and, perhaps (or perhaps not), meets some murky plurality caveats, he wins. I say that that agreement is binding. What is not binding is Justice Sotomayor's view that a C-type-agreeing defendant must satisfy her test to obtain 3582(c)(2) relief; that claim about necessity is not a subject of majority agreement.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">Re would say that this is all wrong. Even if it were true, he contends, that the plurality is committed for its reasons to 3582(c)(2) relief in all cases of C-type agreement, it does not follow that they are committed to relief in the subset of such cases delineated by Justice Sotomayor's opinion. How can that be, if they say that the statute requires relief in all C-type cases? Re says that it can be because the plurality could take such issue with the line Justice Sotomayor draws that they would rather no relief be awarded in such cases than relief be awarded along the lines Justice Sotomayor proposed. Indeed, even if, as I (and Ryan Williams, and I think Adam Steinman) contend, lower courts were only bound to follow Justice Sotomayor's rule in the sense that they would have to grant relief where she would and remained free to consider granting relief where she wouldn't, Re would say that even the mandatory use of her rule as a sufficient condition for relief might so offend the plurality that they would prefer the dissent's rule to this limited use of Justice Sotomayor's.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">This seems paradoxical; again, if a Justice believes that 3582(c)(2) relief is allowed in all C-type cases, how can he say that lower courts should afford it in none rather than grant it in <i>at least</i> the cases called for by Justice Sotomayor's rule? Re is actually right that a view of this kind is logically possible. Suppose, for example, that a Justice believed the distinctions drawn by her rule's insistence on an agreement's reference to the Guidelines were so arbitrary and unfair as to be unconstitutional. He would prefer that no relief, retroactive sentencing relief after all not being constitutionally required, be granted than relief be granted on the basis of her unconstitutional distinctions. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB">Or suppose, as was actually the case, that the plurality didn't think her rule was unconstitutional, but did think it was terribly arbitrary. And then suppose that the plurality believes it better to interpret a statute in a non-arbitrary though categorically incorrect way, as a first-order matter of what the statute textually means, than to interpret a statute in a terribly arbitrary way that gets some cases right, as a first-order matter</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">—indeed, thinks that interpreting a statute to arbitrarily get some cases right as a textual matter gets <i>all </i>cases wrong in a more important sense than mere textual wrongness. They could then prefer the dissent to Justice Sotomayor's rule, and believe that lower courts would be mistaken in granting relief in at least the cases where her rule calls for relief.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">Very well; such preferences, belying Justices' seeming logical commitments to results, are conceptually possible. But having acknowledged that they are, we then must ask a question. If a member of the <i>Freeman</i> plurality felt that way about Justice Sotomayor's rule, why would he concur in a judgment that hinged on a vote grounded on that rule? That may sound like a curious question. The plurality did it, of course, because they thought the law required them to vote to rule that Freeman was eligible for 3582(c)(2) relief, the law stating, in their view, that all or just about all C-type-agreeing defendants are. Justice Sotomayor's wrongheaded rule had nothing to do with their vote. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">That doesn't, though, answer the question. If making decisions on the basis of her rule were in their view so arbitrary and unjust, why would they allow a judgment of the Court to rest on her rule's arbitrary distinctions? The reason Freeman won was because Justice Sotomayor drew those distinctions in his favor; absent her vote, he would lose. If it is worse for defendants to win because a judge draws those arbitrary distinctions in their favor than for C-type defendants to universally lose under 3582(c)(2), why did they let Freeman win on account of a judge, Justice Sotomayor, drawing those distinctions? They could have stopped it by voting against Freeman.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">That might sound like a rather metaphysical argument about the meaning of the plurality's very ordinary behavior, but I don't think it is. First, consider that Re's argument relies on hypotheticals about opponents to the death penalty concurring in a judgment reversing an execution with colleagues who concur on the ground that Christians cannot be executed. It is easy to see that a Justice who believes the death penalty is unconstitutional could also believe that it is better to permit the death penalty universally than for courts to ban it for, at least, Christians; that's the force of the hypothetical. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">But it is also easy to see that a Justice who claimed to have those beliefs would be acting rather hypocritically if he concurred in a judgment reversing an execution where the necessary votes for the judgment were cast by Justices who reasoned that the death penalty was unconstitutional for Christians. He might claim to prefer executions to judicial religious discrimination, yet given a choice between preventing dispositive judicial discrimination and allowing an execution on the one hand, and stopping an execution but allowing dispositive judicial discrimination to occur at the judiciary's highest level on the other, he chose the latter. I think we could fairly conclude that such a Justice preferred to save all the people from execution he could to preventing judicial discrimination. His vote would prove that he preferred the narrower discriminatory rule of his colleague to the dissent's categorical license to execute, since by his vote he allowed that narrower rule to operate, even if only in that one case.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">Second, whether or not the <i>Marks</i> rule is right as an original matter, Justices cast votes under its shadow. There are many signs in <i>Freeman</i> itself</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">—the plurality's description of Justice Sotomayor's rule as an "intermediate" position, the fact that both the plurality and dissent devoted great energies to attacking it, as if they were dissenting from her rule</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">, the plurality's lack of care about describing its rule, Justice Sotomayor's greater precision in describing hers—that the Court anticipated lower courts would treat her rule as binding. Besides, then, allowing Justice Sotomayor to draw arbitrary distinctions in Freeman's favor, the plurality behaved in a way that foreseeably caused lower courts to draw those same distinctions in thousands of cases. If they thought the dissent's rule better than those distinctions, why didn't they give the dissent's rule a majority?</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">Third, even if we might suppose that a plurality that viewed Justice Sotomayor's rule as unacceptably arbitrary could nevertheless stomach its application to Freeman in the single case of <i>Freeman</i>, the plurality would not, if it preferred the dissent's rule to hers, continue to vote its rule in future cases. That is to say, if <i>Freeman</i> sequels came to the Court, each Justice voting his position in <i>Freeman</i>, a pattern of judgments would emerge where defendants that satisfied Justice Sotomayor's rule would win and ones that didn't satisfy her rule would lose. The plurality, by hypothesis, would prefer that no defendants win than a subset of defendants identified by Justice Sotomayor's rule to win. But to make that preference a reality, they would have to switch their votes and join the <i>Freeman</i> dissent. Otherwise, Justice Sotomayor's swing vote and swing reasoning would continue to dictate outcomes.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">What that means, though, is that for the <i>Freeman</i> plurality to have the preferences Re hypothesizes it could have, the <i>Freeman</i> plurality would have to be willing to change its votes in identical iterations of <i>Freeman</i>. When someone came along who, just like Freeman, was fortunate enough to mention a Guideline in his plea agreement, the plurality would have to switch positions so that the Court didn't continue to arbitrarily select defendants similarly situated to Freeman for favor. But shouldn't we assume, when interpreting a precedent, that Justices would not change their votes in identical iterations of that precedent? Re's doubt that the <i>Freeman</i> plurality is committed to Justice Sotomayor's subset of their results over the dissent entails doubt about whether they would maintain their <i>Freeman</i> positions in like cases. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">Yet doubting whether Justices concurring in a precedent case's judgment would continue to vote their positions in like cases cannot be a proper grounds for determining that precedent case's precedential effect. We must assume, when reading precedent, that the Justices concurring in it would continue to adhere to it; otherwise, we are free to doubt the precedential effect of any precedent. Re's argument subtly, but unmistakably, depends on doubt not only of whether Justices are necessarily committed to seeming logical subsets of their views, but whether they are committed to <i>their own views</i></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="st" data-hveid="59" data-ved="0ahUKEwj7s_6Z6ovaAhWCTd8KHRgSClUQ4EUIOzAB"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc">. But that is just the questioning of precedent simpliciter.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span class="Y0NH2b CLPzrc"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com19tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-1774007309972620312017-12-12T22:18:00.000-08:002017-12-12T22:18:43.359-08:00A Comment on Some Misplaced and Dangerous Slippery-Slope Concerns About Masterpiece Cakeshop<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">One concern one hears from various quarters (<a href="http://www.firstmondays.fm/episodes/2017/12/11/ot2017-9-peak-sg">this </a>episode of First Mondays, this <a href="https://verdict.justia.com/2017/12/12/liberty-equality-sometimes-require-tragic-choices-just-not-masterpiece-cakeshop">column</a> by Michael Dorf, Justice Kagan's questioning at oral argument, any number of amicus briefs) about Masterpiece Cakeshop's position in <i>Masterpiece Cakeshop</i> is that if wedding-cake designers who object to same-sex marriage have First Amendment rights not to service same-sex weddings, then so do makeup artists, hair stylists, florists, tailors, and just about any other wedding-related service provider with the same views. All of them, the argument goes, might equally be said to be engaged in expression of a sort. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Because that degree of accommodationism seems intolerable, a flight is then proposed to the safety of Eugene Volokh's amicus brief (or something like it), which <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/16-111_bsac_american_unity_fund.pdf#page=14">neatly limits</a> First Amendment protections of symbolic expression to (1) things that convey more articulate, particularized messages than cakes or coiffures, or to (2) instances of media that just <i>are </i>"generally expressive," either because they've been deemed expressive historically or because, again, they just <i>are</i> "inherently" expressive—even when, like music or abstract art, these media aren't necessarily any more articulate than cake. If you're an artist who chooses to eschew a traditional redoubt of abstract expression like painting in favor of garden design or, I kid you not, architecture (see <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/16-111_bsac_american_unity_fund.pdf#page=15">footnote 4</a>), you're out of luck on this approach; of course a town can't ban your modernist painting (<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Degenerate_art">as the Nazis did</a>), but you can be damn sure it can ban you from building a modernist house.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I find this approach to the First Amendment so wrongheaded and dangerous that I would gladly accept the boundless accommodations it's supposed to avoid rather than take it up, and I will say a little about why below. But I am principally here to tell you that we do not need to take it up, or any other ground on which to reject Cakeshop's claims, in order to protect same-sex weddings from boundless accommodation to discrimination.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Where people go astray in worrying that accommodating wedding cake-bakers will take us down a slippery slope of accommodations for makeup artists, hair stylists, and other professionals who beautify weddings and the people in them, is supposing that Cakeshop's compelled-speech claim is merely one of expressive complicity. By expressive complicity, I mean being complicit in something, here the celebration of a same-sex wedding, by engaging in expressive conduct in service of that wedding. Complicity may be, at bottom, what Cakeshop's owner is worried about, and it is certainly what grounds his free-exercise claim (which may well be, if not for <i>Smith</i>, the better conceptual framework for his concerns). But it isn't what Cakeshop's speech claim is about.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Rather, Cakeshop argues monotonously throughout its briefs that baking a wedding cake for a wedding says three things about the wedding and the underlying marriage it celebrates: that a wedding has occurred, that a marriage has begun, and that the marriage should be celebrated. Therefore, being compelled to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding compels Cakeshop to say, or help its customers say, that the same-sex wedding <i>is</i> a wedding, celebrating the beginning of a marriage, and that that marriage should be celebrated. Whether or not that's right, you can certainly see where it gets those ideas. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">First, people generally don't buy, and cake-bakers generally don't bake, wedding cakes (which do not look like other cakes) unless there's a wedding, no more than women generally walk around in uniquely bridal gowns and white lace veils outside of weddings. Wedding cakes, the argument goes, are one of many symbolic ways of saying that an event is a wedding, as opposed to some other fancy occasion with generically elaborate dress and dessert. As "Justice Q" said in the dialogue preceding this post, a pre-<i>Obergefell </i>law that forbade same-sex couples from having wedding cakes at their weddings would be properly understood as a form of viewpoint discrimination against the view that same-sex weddings are proper weddings, rather than some second-class form of union.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Next, weddings celebrate marriages; people don't often have weddings without an underlying marriage to celebrate. So a wedding cake communicates the idea that the couple is celebrating a marriage. Finally, the argument goes, a wedding cake isn't just an ornate symbol that tips attendees off that they're at a wedding; rather, through its colors, figurative elements, and elaborate, often highly traditional, shape, a wedding cake says</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—of course in an abstract way</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—something festive and celebratory about the wedding at which it's displayed.</span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Cakeshop, critically, claims to disagree with all these three ideas when applied to same-sex marriages. Not only doesn't it think that same-sex marriages are worthy of celebration, it doesn't think that same-sex marriages or weddings <i>are</i> marriages or weddings at all. Marriages just are, for Cakeshop's principals, the union of a man and a woman. Symbolically calling same-sex marriages marriages by baking wedding cakes for them, as far as Cakeshop is concerned, would be something like baking a "Happy Bar Mitzvah!" cake for a communion. </span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">If you want to get more tightly or plausibly analogous, suppose a kosher bakery run by Orthodox Jews is asked to bake a "Happy Bar Mitzvah!" cake for a family of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Messianic_Judaism">Messianic Jews</a>, i.e., Jews who believe Jesus is the Messiah. That family wants to eat the cake at a party following a "Bar Mitzvah" ceremony at which their son will read, not from the first five books of the Old Testament as is traditionally done at Bar Mitzvahs, but the Gospel of Matthew. Few non-Messianic Jews of any denomination or degree of religiosity would regard such a ceremony <i>as a Bar Mitzvah</i>, whatever the understandings and intentions of the celebrants. Many would take great umbrage at being forced to call it the real thing. Yet Colorado's public-accommodations law would likely regard a refusal to bake that cake for Messianic Jews as religious discrimination, so long as the bakers had baked the cake for what they would call real Bar Mitzvahs in the past. Cakeshop's claim is that you don't need "Happy Wedding!" on a wedding cake for a wedding cake to say "happy wedding!," and that it doesn't want to express that message about events it views as non-celebration-worthy non-weddings.</span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now there are many objections to getting from Cakeshop's position on what wedding cakes express, and its disagreement with that expression when applied to same-sex weddings, to recognizing a First Amendment right against being compelled to sell cakes to same-sex weddings. I tend to agree with some of them, and indeed I tend to think Cakeshop should lose. But one thing that is attractive about Cakeshop's compelled-speech claim is that it plausibly argues it is being compelled to express a particular position about same-sex weddings contrary to its principals' religious dogma</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span>that view being that a same-sex wedding is a real wedding that celebrates a real marriage, and that that marriage is worthy of celebration. Can the hair stylists, makeup artists, florists and tailors of many people's fears say the same? </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I generally don't think they can.</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, I know only a mite more than nothing about wedding makeup, wedding hair, wedding floral arrangements, or even wedding men's suiting, and I am sure that some makeup styles, hair styles, floral arrangements, or men's suits are thought more fitting for weddings than other generically attractive makeup styles, hair styles, floral arrangements, or men's suits. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely to me that there is any makeup style, hair style, etc., that is so distinctive to weddings and so unfit for non-matrimonial glamorous occasions that anyone, outside perhaps of a small coterie of bridal-magazine-scouring cognoscenti, could look at that makeup style or hair style or suit or floral arrangement and say, "that makeup/hair/floral arrangement/suit symbolically expresses that this is a wedding." </span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Absent a bridal dress, for example, I doubt many people could tell with confidence from looking at a bride's makeup or hair that she was dressing up for a wedding; absent a telltale boutonniere, you usually can't tell from a man's suit that he's a bridegroom; and absent something like a wedding cake, I don't think one can tell from wedding flowers alone that an event is a wedding. On the other hand, wedding cake at a non-wedding is very nearly a contradiction in terms; at the least, if you see one you know with near certainty what sort of event you're at.</span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I recognize, of course, that people do not generally go around trying to guess at what sort of party they've been invited to by analyzing the decor; one (usually) knows. So whether something is a telltale sign of a wedding might seem an irrelevant thought experiment. But I think it gets at a deeper expressive point. </span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That point is this. Great makeup, hair, a nice suit, or even flowers simply do not symbolically express "wedding" in particular; they symbolically express "nice/big event," and in the case of great makeup or hair, they may only express the wearer's desire to look good. If you are a makeup artist, you can happily do a bride's makeup for her wedding without feeling you are saying anything (or even assisting her to say anything) about whether her wedding really is a wedding or not, just as a very Orthodox Jewish tailor could prepare a boy's suit for a Messianic "Bar Mitzvah" without feeling that he had symbolically expressed a view that the child was having a real one. Even if the wedding or Bar Mitzvah are not, in the professional's view, true weddings or Bar Mitzvahs</span></span> in a religious sense, it's in the nature even of faux-weddings and faux-Bar Mitzvahs</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—indeed, of all formal events</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>that the participants will want to dress up. At most, these professionals are being compelled to help their customers say something like, "this is a big day for me." </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of course, the reason the customers think that "this is a big day" is that they're having, in their view, a wedding or Bar Mitzvah, so one might argue that in context the makeup artist or tailor is being compelled to help the customer say "this is a wedding/Bar Mitzvah and is worthy of celebration." But that is a fallacy, like claiming that because <i>the reason</i> someone's dressmaker is asked to make his customer a special dress is that customer's excitement about attending the Trump inaugural ball, the dressmaker is being asked to symbolically express the message that "this event is the Trump inaugural ball, and that's something to celebrate." No dress can articulate that. A bridal dress, however, by virtue of its distinctively bridal style, <i>can</i> say, "this is a wedding, and it's a lovely occasion."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">On the other hand, just as we must grant wedding invitation makers that they are at least being asked to help their customers say "this event is a wedding, and we want you to come," I think we must grant wedding cake-makers that they are at least in the business of helping their customers symbolically express, "this event is a wedding, not some other generically nice event that we're making a to-do over, and it's a joyous occasion." Whether we attribute that speech to the buyer or cake-baker; whether we think that laws compelling cake-bakers to bake cakes for all comers irrespective of their membership in protected classes are content-neutral regulations of conduct that only incidentally burden speech, and are therefore presumptively constitutional; whether we think that commercial expression is importantly distinct from parading or being in the Boy Scouts, I think we must at least grant these basic and, if not for <i>Masterpiece Cakeshop</i>, uncontroversial truths about the nature of wedding cake. If we don't, I'm not sure how we explain what a wedding cake even is.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Because most wedding-service professionals are not in the business of providing goods or services that symbolically express "this is a wedding," but rather are only in the business of helping their customers mark their weddings as generically big occasions, I think they will have a difficult time mounting compelled-speech claims against public-accommodation laws that force them to provide services to same-sex weddings. That's not to say that they don't have First Amendment rights against regulation of the content they produce; unlike Professor Volokh, I think a hair stylist has roughly the rights of a more traditional artist. I just don't see a plausible claim that a hair stylist who's compelled to provide services for participants in a same-sex wedding is being compelled to express, or assist in expressing, any particular message of which she disapproves.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">On the other hand, wedding cake-bakers and wedding dress-makers can at least say that they are in the business of creating goods through which their customers symbolically hold out their weddings as weddings; wedding invitation designers can say the same, less the symbolism. And wedding photographers are asked to make art that portrays the weddings they capture as weddings, calling attention to those visual aspects of the wedding that distinguish it from other parties or ceremonies. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I don't know how convincing all that will be to anyone, though it seems sound to me, but I want to add that if it doesn't seem sound to you, the proposed cure of cordoning off non-traditionally expressive media from First Amendment protection is a great deal worse than the disease. Volokh's brief <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/16-111_bsac_american_unity_fund.pdf#page=14">suggests</a> we only protect conduct that clearly expresses particularized messages, along with media that don't, but historically have been recognized as expressive, like painting or music, no matter how inarticulate or abstract. As for anything else, so long as it fails to express a particularized, legible message (like a Jackson Pollock painting), and (unlike a Jackson Pollock painting) isn't made in a medium that has "long conveyed messages," it doesn't get First Amendment protection.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As I said above, I find this approach disastrously wrongheaded. (It perhaps goes without saying that the Court has never adopted it. The Court has certainly extended First Amendment protections to the things Volokh would protect, but has never said that everything else is ineligible, and the Court's <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8332999881059454410&q=547+us+47&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p569">last word on the subject</a> reads to me more like a disavowal of any requirement of a particularized message than a reaffirmation of that requirement outside a limited set of traditionally expressive media.) In the first place, it strikes me that Volokh has no real rationale for protecting abstract art or much of music; abstract painting is only begrudgingly grandfathered in as part of an historically expressive medium rather than protected for its own expressive sake. Otherwise, he'd be interested in protecting other sorts of abstract art without regard to whether they were painted in oils. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Volokh's brief confirms these suspicions; in it he's fairly candid about his indifference to abstract art's expressive value. He <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/16-111_bsac_american_unity_fund.pdf#page=15">says</a> that because painting has "long conveyed messages" about things like religion, politics, or the character or beauty of its representatively depicted subjects, we're stuck protecting the other paintings that may not do so, for courts are "ill-equipped" to make the aesthetic judgments needed to decide whether individual paintings "convey enough of a message." Paradoxically, however, he thinks courts are well-equipped to make the aesthetic judgments needed to decide whether individual cakes or found-object sculpture convey enough of a message; indeed, that is his test for First Amendment protection of art that lies outside traditionally expressive media. What he might as well say is that he'd like to jettison First Amendment protections of abstract painting for lack of a clear message, but knows that position is hopeless before real-world judges. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That said, the argument is just as objectionable when taken at face value. The suggestion that were only judges better art critics, we could deny First Amendment protection to the Abstract Expressionists for lack of a particularized message about religion, politics, or the character or beauty of the subjects that were missing from their work, is disturbing, and typical of the narrow, marketplace-of-ideas-centric cast of his First Amendment thought that led him to argue in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2853347803518998660&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006"><i>Alvarez</i></a> that people had no First Amendment right to tell ennobling fairy tales about their military service because lies have <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/11-210_petitioneramcu2profs.authcheckdam.pdf#page=33">nothing to contribute</a> to a productive "exposition of ideas."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Having narrowly grandfathered in a few traditional media</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—painting, music, poetry</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, and parading—that sometimes fail to make sufficiently direct contributions to the marketplace of ideas, </span></span></span></span></span></span>Volokh proceeds to fence out all the rest. To his credit, he is quite candid about leaning in to the most unattractive implications of this view. Even though one might have assumed that architecture traditionally conveyed enough messages about power, wealth, religion, culture, landscape, and so on for less explicitly expressive architecture to be grandfathered in with modern painting, Volokh <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/16-111_bsac_american_unity_fund.pdf#page=15">assures us</a> that towns may ban modern residential architecture in favor of "neo-Tudor" stylings, the theory apparently being that architecture is only expressive in a merely aesthetic sense. As far as I can tell, he would see no First Amendment objection to a nationwide ban of modern architecture. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Next, <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/16-111_bsac_american_unity_fund.pdf#page=19">granting</a> that "a woman's pantsuit [] may be seen in some time and place as implicitly connected with some symbolism, such as . . . a view of women's equality with men," he nevertheless <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/16-111_bsac_american_unity_fund.pdf#page=20">insists</a> that the state may ban that symbolism, as far as the First Amendment is concerned, because clothing lacks "the communicative elements necessary" to be worthy of First Amendment protection. Such protection as women may hope to find from pantsuit bans, or compelled dress codes of traditionally feminine clothing, <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/16-111_bsac_american_unity_fund.pdf#page=20">must be found</a> in the Equal Protection Clause. As for transgender persons, who have not yet been extended heightened scrutiny, at least in the Supreme Court, there would be no clear constitutional recourse. And if a state banned gender-differentiated clothing, or immodest clothing, it's not clear that the scads of people who would be forbidden from expressing the traditional gender norms or sexual identity they'd like to express, in one of the most traditional ways such norms and identities are expressed, would have any claim at all. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Finally, and perhaps most alarmingly, he <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/16-111_bsac_american_unity_fund.pdf#page=20">suggests</a> that a hairstylist who objects to a white customer's asking for cornrows on the ground of distaste for cultural appropriation, or even perceived racist mockery, is not being asked to engage in any protected expression and lacks even the beginnings of a compelled-speech objection to a public-accommodations law that requires him to assist his customer in giving him racist offense. (The articles cited in Volokh's brief defending or criticizing such ostensibly contentless gestures are protected speech, of course, but the far more powerfully expressive conduct they debate is not.) Hairstyles, he explains, though "aesthetically appealing," and though they may "convey links to particular attitudes," are not communicative enough to merit any First Amendment protection.** As far as I can tell, he not only thinks the state may compel a barber to help a white customer express whatever he means to express by wearing cornrows, but also thinks the state may ban cornrows or Afros altogether on the ground that they're unattractive, just as it may ban the modern house.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">** His point that we couldn't regulate entry into the hair styling profession if hair styling were protected speech doesn't follow; else we would have to conclude that legal advocacy is entirely unprotected speech as well, rather than what it almost axiomatically is, speech that is merely permissibly regulable to an unusual degree (see, e.g., Rule 11), but not plenarily so. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It is difficult, of course, to explain the value of what we would lose in this First Amendment world, because what would be lost is inarticulate. But that does not mean nothing would be lost. The importance of protecting cornrows, pantsuits, or modern architecture from what could only be described as viewpoint discrimination is not mitigated by the difficulty of stating with particularity what views cornrows, pantsuits, or modern architecture express. Nor is the difficulty of describing those views evidence that they don't exist. Anyone who's ever had an opinion about Allen Iverson or Hillary Clinton, positive or negative, knows that cornrows and pantsuits convey a wealth of meaning. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The impossibility of reducing that meaning to a syllogism only shows that it is expressive on a more fundamental and vital level than most of the ideas Volokh and our increasingly inflexible First Amendment doctrine are so eager to protect—that it is deeper, more rich in connotation and sheer symbolic force, than any form of words for which it might be substituted. </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The
First Amendment world Volokh describes is one in which we are free to
engage in inane political discussions on cable news, to say ghastly
things to each other about our loved ones at their funerals, to racially
demean our fellow students at public universities, but not to express, in the ways ordinary people do, who we are, who we think we are, who we aspire to be, or in the case of architecture, how we understand ourselves in relation to the earth. </span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">No amount of inconvenience or even stigma in the procurement of wedding services can be worth these costs. But fortunately, outside of wedding cakes, invitations, photographs, and bridal gowns, it isn't really a price we have to pay.</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
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Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-82004757390271048702017-12-07T00:59:00.000-08:002017-12-07T00:59:38.676-08:00A Dialogue on Whether Wedding Cake and Wedding Cake-Baking Are Speech<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">A surprising amount of argument in <i>Masterpiece Cakeshop</i> revolved around whether wedding cakes are speech. This was surprising because both Colorado and the private respondents in the case (the same-sex couple that tried to purchase a cake from Masterpiece Cakeshop don't particularly contest that wedding cake is speech, but rather argue that even if it is, Colorado's public-accommodation law is a law that targets conduct, not speech, and that its incidental effects on expressive conduct should be reviewed under <i>O'Brien</i> or some even more deferential standard of review for laws that regulate commercial conduct.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of course, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Solicitor General disagree, the latter arguing that public-accommodations laws are subject to heightened scrutiny in applications where they compel someone to "create expression" and to participate, through that expression, in an "expressive event." I'm not exactly sure what that means or where it's coming from, but one might have thought that argument might focus on where the parties primarily disagree, which is what First Amendment standard of review applies in this case assuming that baking a wedding cake is speech of some sort.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">However, that wasn't what oral argument was mostly about (as Howard Wasserman and Rick Hills lament <a href="http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/12/argument-in-masterpiece-cakeshop.html#comments">here</a> and <a href="http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/12/hunting-for-the-snark-of-private-expressiveness-in-masterpiece-cakeshops-oral-argument.html#more">here</a>); a great deal of the argument concerned a proposition that the respondents, especially the private respondents, were willing to assume, i.e. that Colorado's public-accommodation law incidentally captures some speech in its generally conduct-regulatory net, including Masterpiece Cakeshop's cake-baking. One might take that as a good sign for respondents. Alternatively, and perhaps more probably, one could conclude that the pro-respondent Justices either were unimpressed by respondents' own arguments and thought a better tack was attacking the premise that cake is speech at all, or that they hoped to convince their colleagues that just about anyone could claim a First Amendment exception to a public-accommodation law if a cake-baker could.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I find the standard-of-review question a difficult one on which I have nothing of value to say; hence, I had avoided writing about the case because I thought that was what the case was about. But I do have somewhat developed, though unresolved, thoughts on whether wedding cake and wedding cake-baking are speech, and what they express if they are. In addition, I found the questions and answers at oral argument on this point fairly unilluminating. And unlike Professor Hills, I don't see the expressive/non-expressive status of wedding cake as a cosmic irrelevancy or an incoherent subject of inquiry.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I thought, then, that I might produce a dialogue in the form of an oral argument on the subject, in order to help clarify why we might think, or not think, that wedding cake is speech, that baking a wedding cake for someone else's wedding is speech, and precisely what, if any, speech is compelled when a cake-baker is compelled to bake a cake for a same-sex wedding. Various points made here draw on the briefs, amicus briefs, and questions and answers at oral argument. The questions are all questions I would ask someone making these arguments, and the answers are <i>roughly </i>answers I would give if I were in the position of the lawyers being asked them.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Colorado: A wedding cake isn't speech. Like any other food, the primary purpose of a wedding cake is to be eaten. Petitioner's wedding cakes may be beautifully crafted, but that doesn't make them speech, any more than a dinner at a fine restaurant is speech because of how elegantly it's presented on the plate. Were you to deem wedding cake speech, you would blow a hole through public-accommodation law; any restaurant could decline to serve dinner to a same-sex couple on their wedding anniversary on the ground that it doesn't want to honor a same-sex marriage with its "speech."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: Counsel, I wonder if we might not distinguish wedding cakes from other foods. Aren't wedding cakes unusually symbolic? Why do we even call wedding cakes "wedding cakes," and why do weddings always have wedding cake instead of some other, perhaps better-tasting, dessert? Isn't the reason that wedding cakes symbolize weddings? Inasmuch as wedding cake is a subgenre of cake, aren't the differences between ordinary cakes and wedding cakes all expressive? That is, wedding cakes are designed in various ways to symbolize the wedding for which they're baked; ordinary cakes are not.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Colorado: Justice Q, of course I would grant that wedding cakes are traditionally associated with weddings, and perhaps have become symbols of weddings because of that association. But I don't think that a wedding cake expresses anything in particular, besides, at most, the fact that the event at which it is being consumed is a wedding. And the fact that a food is traditionally associated with a particular event, and therefore might be understood to convey the fact that the event at which it's being served is that particular event, can't be enough to make the food speech. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">For example, a large turkey is traditionally associated with Thanksgiving, and it very well may symbolize Thanksgiving and even convey the message, when served for dinner, that tonight is Thanksgiving. But Thanksgiving turkey isn't speech and there would be no First Amendment problem with a state banning the slaughter of turkey.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: There's a lot in what you say to unpack, but first, are you sure Thanksgiving turkey isn't speech? Suppose a city banned the consumption of turkey on Thanksgiving because it perpetuated false narratives about the interaction between Pilgrims and Native Americans. Do you suppose that would be constitutional? Or do you think it would be constitutional to compel the consumption of turkey on Thanksgiving in order to promote a certain narrative about the history of Thanksgiving?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Colorado: I don't, but that would be viewpoint discrimination, which we don't have here--</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: But you said Thanksgiving turkey isn't speech at all, so how can regulating something that isn't speech be viewpoint discrimination?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Colorado: Perhaps Thanksgiving turkey was a poorly chosen example because of its historic connotations. But I still maintain that the mere fact that a food is symbolically associated with an event isn't enough to make it speech. So if you don't like turkey, consider cranberry sauce. Cranberry sauce --</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: Well if we could stay on Thanksgiving turkey for a moment, you concede that Thanksgiving turkey is expressive enough that certain laws about Thanksgiving turkey could unconstitutionally compel or restrict speech. But you don't think that's true of wedding cake, is that right?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Colorado: That's right. Thanksgiving turkey, I would now concede, may have some historic or even ideological symbolism besides merely incidentally conveying that the day on which it's served is Thanksgiving. But wedding cakes don't express anything; they merely are foods traditionally associated with weddings, like cranberry sauce is traditionally associated with Thanksgiving. At the very most, they incidentally indicate that the event at which they're served is a wedding, because of their association with weddings. That's not to say that certain messages <i>on</i> wedding cake aren't speech or that it's impossible to imagine viewpoint discrimination as to those messages. But no, I don't think that wedding cakes in general could be the subject of viewpoint discrimination.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: So what if a state, before our decision in <i>Obergefell</i>, said that it objected on moral grounds to same-sex marriage, and further said that it objected to same-sex couples having the customary trappings of weddings at their weddings or commitment ceremonies, including wedding cakes and bridal gowns. No First Amendment violation?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Colorado: Well I certainly think that would be an odious equal protection violation, even before <i>Obergefell</i>, under this Court's decisions in <i>Romer</i> and <i>Lawrence</i>. I think the claim would sound in equal protection. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: Really? The whole point of the law would be to forbid same-sex couples from symbolically holding themselves out as wedded couples in the same way that other couples do, to ban them from saying that even though the state might see their unions as second-class they did not. How could that possibly not be a First Amendment violation?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Colorado: Your Honor, I concede that it would, and I recognize that to concede it I must concede that a wedding cake is speech of a sort. But I want to qualify that concession in two crucial ways. The reason that your hypothetical poses a case of viewpoint discrimination is that—as your hypothetical shows—a wedding cake is a statement by the couple that buys it that says "this is a wedding." The same-sex couples in your hypothetical are being forbidden from expressing that view through the traditional media of wedding cakes and bridal gowns. But that doesn't help Petitioner for two reasons.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">First, I don't understand Petitioner to be complaining that he was compelled to symbolically express that the private respondents' wedding was a wedding, which is just a fact that he can't deny; he claims that he was compelled to celebrate and endorse the wedding. I concede that wedding cakes say, "this is a wedding," but not that they endorse weddings.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Second, while a wedding cake is, I concede, a statement by the wedded couple that a wedding's happened, it's not a statement to the same effect by the baker. And the easiest way to see that is to ask whether a baker that wanted to bake cakes for same-sex couples would have a First Amendment claim in your hypothetical. I don't see that he would. The viewpoint being discriminated against in that hypothetical is the couple's, not the baker's.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: Could I push back on a factual premise of your answer? Petitioner does object to being compelled to celebrate same-sex marriages, but he also seems to object to being compelled to say that same-sex marriages are marriages. At Joint Appendix 162, he says in his affidavit that a wedding cake communicates that a wedding has happened and a marriage has begun; at Joint Appendix 158 he says that God regards marriage as between a man and a woman; at Joint Appendix 167 he says the reason he won't bake a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding "has everything to do with the nature of the wedding ceremony itself and my belief about what marriage is." </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, you conceded to me a moment ago that same-sex couples couldn't be forbidden from expressing through a wedding cake that their wedding is in fact a wedding and their marriage is in fact a marriage, even in a state that banned same-sex civil marriage and didn't recognize same-sex marriages licensed in other states. Why doesn't Petitioner by the same token have a right against being compelled to express the same idea through the same medium? </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Colorado: Justice Q, because we're not compelling Petitioner to express that idea. And let me offer an analogy of my own that I hope will make that clear.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, I grant you that a wedding cake is a statement by the couple buying the cake that they just had a wedding, just as a birthday cake is a statement by the person buying the cake that the person for whose birthday is bought is having a birthday. And maybe I'll even assume that the wedding cake and birthday cake express a celebratory message about the wedding or the birthday. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">But your Honor, even though a birthday cake is a statement by the buyer that someone's having a birthday worth celebrating, it isn't a statement by the baker that the recipient is having a birthday worth celebrating, or even that the recipient is having a birthday. He's just been engaged to make a birthday cake; he doesn't necessarily have an opinion about whether anyone's having a birthday or not, much less whether the recipient's someone whose birthday he wants to celebrate. Even the messages he's asked to write on the cake aren't his speech. Suppose a couple came in that appeared to be in their 40s and one bought the other a 30th birthday cake. The baker might write "Happy 30th Birthday" on the cake, but that doesn't mean that he's expressing the view that the recipient is really celebrating his 30th birthday.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: So as far as you're concerned, a messianic cult could compel Petitioner to make a "Happy Birthday, Son of God" birthday cake for their leader. He's not stating the view that the cult leader is the son of God; only the buyer is. Do I have you right?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Colorado: You don't have to decide that case to decide this case, and we wouldn't do that because our public-accommodation law only requires retailers to make the same products for customers of one religion that they would for another. Petitioner presumably wouldn't bake that cake for anyone.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: Oh, but if Petitioner were willing to make such a cake for a church that had a funny way of celebrating Christmas, you would compel him to make it for the cult. No?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Colorado: We would, and I don't think that raises free-speech concerns because the cake speaks the message of the buyer, not the artisan commissioned to write that message in icing. Likewise, a typesetter, in the days of movable type, couldn't raise free-speech objections to a public-accommodation law that effectively required him to set in type messages with which he disagreed. But we're getting a little far afield, because the private Respondents didn't ask the Petitioner to write any particular message on their cake.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: I suppose. Let me ask you, leaving aside any verbal message or figurative representation of his clients, do you think that Petitioner has any First Amendment rights in the cakes he bakes, or do all the First Amendment rights inhere in his clients?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Colorado: I hesitate to say yes, but I think he might have a claim if we regulated wedding-cake style or color, or forbade traditional cake designs or required them, or banned wedding cake altogether. Not that we ever would do that, but I want to be responsive. I would concede that Petitioner's cakes express certain ideas he has about the sanctity and beauty of marriage, yes. What I don't think is that by selling a cake to a particular couple, Petitioner makes any statement at all about that couple's wedding or marriage. What's happening here is that Petitioner's customers are taking Petitioner's abstract ideas about the sanctity of marriage or the joyousness of birthdays and applying them to their particular marriages or birthdays.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: That's an intriguing construct, but to what else would you apply it? What about companies that write wedding vows or wedding speeches? Could they be compelled to write vows or speeches for same-sex weddings on the theory that they're only being compelled to reiterate boilerplate sentiments about marriage that their clients will apply to their own marriage?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Colorado: No, I think that's quite different. Any set of vows or wedding speech that such a company would write would say something in particular about the couple getting married.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: Yes, but why does that make it the speech of the speechwriter on your view? I thought that you said that even if a cake-baker wrote "Happy Birthday, Son of God" on a cult leader's birthday cake, <i>he</i> wouldn't be saying that the cult leader was the son of God.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Colorado: And I still maintain that. The difference is between transcription and speechwriting. The wedding speech wouldn't be perceived of as the personal message of the speechwriter, any more than the icing on the cake would be perceived of as the opinion of the cake-baker, but there's still a First Amendment problem with compelling someone to write someone else's message. So if this case were about a ghostwriter who objected to writing autobiographies about the lives of same-sex couples, I think this would be a very different case. Things like speeches and memoirs are so central to First Amendment protection that even though speechwriters or ghostwriters might not be perceived as the speakers of that speech, you still wouldn't want to compel them to help someone else figure out how to express their message through those media.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: Fascinating. Maybe we could hear a little from the private Respondents.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Private Respondents (represented by ACLU, hereafter ACLU for short): Justice Q, we didn't actually take a position on whether wedding cake is speech, but since the question seems to be of such importance to the Court, I'd like to advocate for a position one of our amici, Eugene Volokh, <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/16-111_bsac_american_unity_fund.pdf">took</a> on this issue. My friend started off by arguing that cake isn't speech because its purpose is to be eaten. Others might think wedding cake's primary purpose is decorative. Professor Volokh would suggest it doesn't matter, because either way wedding cake isn't symbolic expression.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In his brief, Professor Volokh shows that this Court has recognized two kinds of symbolic expression. First, conduct can be symbolic expression if it falls within a generally expressive medium, like painting or music or parading. Second, even if conduct falls outside a generally expressive medium, this Court has protected it if it's intended to convey a particularized message that would likely be understood by those who viewed it, like flag-burning. Neither of those circumstances are present here.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: I read Professor Volokh's brief, and I have to say that I'm very puzzled about how we're supposed to decide what a generally expressive medium is. In the first place, I don't know where he gets the idea that we've announced this rule about generally expressive media. He <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/16-111_bsac_american_unity_fund.pdf#page=6">cites</a> <i>Hurley</i>, but the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=8332999881059454410&q=547+us+47&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p569">part</a> of <i>Hurley</i> he cites just says it can't be the case that only symbolic expression with a particularized message is protected, and that parades, protest armbands, painting, and music are too. I don't see where it says that for conduct that lacks a particular message to be symbolic expression, it's got to fall within a generally expressive medium.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ACLU: Well, Justice Q, I'd first suggest that a generally expressive medium is the through-line that connects all of those examples in <i>Hurley</i>. But I also think it has to be the case, because absolutely anything could be deemed protected speech if we didn't require either a particularized message or a generally expressive medium. Orthodox Jewish delicatessens, for example, could claim that their lox spreads are art and that they have a speech right not to sell them to intermarrying couples' weddings, or non-Orthodox bar mitzvahs.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: Really? If a medium can be deemed expressive even if practitioners of that medium don't convey particularized messages—like music, for example—why can't we just say that something is expressive if it's expressive by whatever criteria you're using to say whether a medium as a whole is expressive? Why will the same criteria fail to provide any limiting principle in individual applications? </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Also, what makes a medium generally expressive anyway? The brief you're defending says that clothing and hair-cutting aren't expressive media, and that sex-based dress codes wouldn't raise First Amendment issues, though they might raise equal protection issues. If a school said that in order to do its part towards ending the patriarchy, it would impose a unisex dress code, would you have no First Amendment problem with that at all? Would students that wanted to express traditional gender norms through their clothing have no claim?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ACLU: They might have a claim, and here I guess I differ from Professor Volokh. Clothing choices are very personal and say a great deal about the person wearing the clothes. But I would caution the Court that that kind of logic can be taken too far. What kind of car someone drives may say a lot about them too, but I don't think car choices implicate speech rights. These are hard lines to draw, but the Court must draw them or the First Amendment would subsume all commercial regulation. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In any event, I don't think wedding cake is a particularly close case. Wedding cakes are just another decorative element of the wedding, like the flowers, or the table settings. They're no more protected expression than carpeting, which we certainly wouldn't recognize as speech even though some carpets are very expensive, have great aesthetic qualities, and even hang in the Louvre.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: I don't know that we're getting anywhere. But let me ask you why wedding cakes don't at least convey particularized messages. Your friend agreed that wedding cakes convey the message, "this is a wedding." Is he right?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ACLU: I think certain wedding cakes, maybe most, do that, although Petitioner refused to bake my clients any cake for their wedding, not just a cake with a special wedding-signifying design. But everyone at a wedding knows that they're at a wedding.already, so it's just a redundant statement of an uncontroversial fact, not a particularized message akin to the one sent by flag-burning. Even if Petitioner ran a newspaper that refused to run for-pay same-sex wedding announcements, I don't think he would have much of a claim.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: But Petitioner doesn't see your clients' wedding as a wedding; he believes that marriage is a union of a man and a woman, and at the time he denied your clients a cake, he was right as a matter of Colorado law. So why isn't he being required to express a very controversial proposition?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ACLU: Justice Q, I think the factual statement that my clients had a wedding is very distinct from a statement that the relationship between my clients is a marriage by the lights of Petitioner's religious belief system. Certainly Petitioner must accept that same-sex marriages happen today, whether or not he thinks that they're recognized by God as marriages.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: So if wedding cakes just express the banal, redundant factual statement that the party you're at is a wedding, why would it be unconstitutional for a state to ban wedding cake at same-sex weddings? Or don't you think it would? Or what about a ban of wedding cake at all weddings?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ACLU: The latter very well could survive if it were enacted for valid nutritional purposes. As to the former, the rule against viewpoint discrimination extends very far, into areas where there's otherwise little or no First Amendment protection. Even quite redundant symbolism can be the subject of viewpoint discrimination. Perhaps a state couldn't selectively ban balloons at same-sex weddings either, but I don't think that even Petitioner would claim he would have a case if he were a balloon merchant, or that an environmental ban of helium balloons would receive any First Amendment scrutiny at all.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: Well I must say that I don't understand how something that isn't even speech can be the target of viewpoint discrimination. If the state could viewpoint-discriminate by banning balloons at same-sex weddings, that can only show that balloons at weddings are a form of symbolic expression. If a state that didn't like same-sex weddings banned same-sex couples from having really good steak at their wedding receptions, or tiramisu, would <i>that</i> be viewpoint discrimination? The reason a discriminatory ban of wedding cake would be is that wedding cake says that this event is a wedding.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ACLU: Arguably a discriminatory ban of steak or tiramisu at same-sex weddings would be viewpoint discrimination, inasmuch as those foods signal that this event is a special event. I don't know if they're on any different footing than the wedding cake ban. Of course all of them would be cases of sexual-orientation discrimination and I do think that that's what those claims really sound in.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: One last thing. You said a state might be able to ban wedding cake. Could a state compel every wedding to have a wedding cake, or every bride in a wedding to wear a traditional bridal gown, in order to promote traditional ideas about marriage?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ACLU: I think the answer to those two hypotheticals might be different. As to the wedding cake, I can't say I see that as a compelled-speech problem. It may be so irrational that the law would simply fail rational-basis review.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: Under what kind of theory?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ACLU: Substantive due process, or perhaps bakers that don't bake cake and would like to sell alternative desserts to couples that prefer something less traditional would have an equal protection claim. I don't think we have to worry about a state enacting such a law, in any event.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Q: Well thank you. We'll hear from the United States.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: For all the reasons that have been brought out in oral argument today, we think wedding cake is symbolic expression, but I'd like to offer the Court a doctrinal framework to work through these issues. Along the lines of what Justice Q was saying to my friend, we think that Professor Volokh's test is too narrow, and we don't think this Court has ever adopted it. Something doesn't have to carry a particularized message or be made within a generally expressive medium to be symbolic expression. It just has to be expressive itself. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It can't be right that whether Jackson Pollock was engaged in expression depended on his working in a medium that has traditionally been deemed expressive; otherwise, artists couldn't create new expressive media that received First Amendment protection unless they engaged in particularized speech. Marcel Duchamp's urinal wouldn't be expression under that test because it carried no particularized message that people would likely understand, and because urinals had never been art before. So we need a different test.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The test <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-111_f314.pdf#page=41">we propose</a> is the one offered by Judge Cabranes in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13609198179144134249&q=mastrovincenzo+v+city+of+new+york&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p95"><i>Mastrovincenzo</i></a>. First, he and the Second Circuit asked whether an item has expressive elements, or an expressive purpose, at least in part. If so, the court then asks whether it has a non-expressive function. If so, the court then asks whether the item is predominantly expressive or predominantly non-expressive. Here, I think it's pretty clear that Petitioner's clients primarily buy his cakes for their expressive qualities, not to eat them. Those expressive qualities include the symbolism and celebration of marriage discussed earlier in the argument.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: Well General, I guess I'm stuck on the first part of the test. Take a luxury watch, for example. Now many watches are predominantly about decoration rather than time-keeping, so you might say they're predominantly non-utilitarian, but are they predominantly expressive? Is decoration expressive? </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: I don't think mere decoration is expressive, Justice P, and I therefore don't think that luxury watches will generally be entitled to First Amendment protections, absent some expressive feature particular to a given watch.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: I see why you want to say that, but what's your rationale, then, for protecting abstract art, or really all sorts of art that doesn't express any particular message and might be deemed merely decorative? I take it you don't want to limit protections for non-particularized expression to traditional expressive media and that you would recognize new forms of abstract or conceptual or non-figurative art, so why couldn't watches or any primarily decorative good be such a medium? I'm sure that art critics would tell us that abstract art isn't merely decorative and conveys some obscure expression, but judges aren't good at this sort of thing. That's why I think there's a lot to what Professor Volokh says, even if his standard does run the risk of underinclusion. If we don't stop at traditionally expressive media, we won't know where to stop.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: Justice P, the question of what is and isn't art even vexes philosophers, but that doesn't mean that this Court can choose not to protect emerging genres of art because the question's hard. I think a little common sense goes a long way here. Fine watchmakers certainly see themselves as craftsmen or even artisans, but I don't think they would tell you they're engaged in artistic expression. Petitioner and other cake-bakers like him do have expressive purposes. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I think another way of getting at this is to ask whether it's possible to imagine a medium being the subject of illegitimate viewpoint discrimination or content-based regulation. So my friends, or at least one of my friends, were willing to concede that banning wedding cake at same-sex weddings would be a form of viewpoint discrimination against the view that same-sex marriages are just as much marriages as opposite-sex marriages. I can't imagine a similar hypothetical about luxury watches. If a state bizarrely attempted to stigmatize same-sex couples by banning male participants in same-sex weddings from wearing nice watches, that would raise many problems, but viewpoint discrimination wouldn't be one of them.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: With respect to my colleague, don't these viewpoint-discrimination hypotheticals either prove too much or too little? I suppose it could be viewpoint discrimination to ban people from giving especially nice watches as same-sex wedding gifts, or giving nice kitchen appliances, if the point were to suppress the message that same-sex weddings were worthy of nice gifts. But that doesn't show kitchen appliances are speech. So I think your friend is right; just about anything can be the subject of viewpoint discrimination if you construct the right hypothetical.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: Your Honor, I would distinguish between gift-giving, where any intrinsically non-expressive item can be used for expressive purposes, from the mere display of a wedding cake or a watch. The point of Justice Q's hypothetical, as I understood it at least, is that simply displaying a wedding cake at a wedding expresses a view about that wedding, such that a selective restriction on displaying wedding cakes at weddings could be viewpoint discrimination. And the point of my hypothetical is that the same isn't true of watches.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: What would you say in response to your friend's point that the mere association of a food with some event isn't enough to make it expressive? What's wrong with saying that wedding cake is to weddings what stuffing is to Thanksgiving or flourless sponge cake is to Passover?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: Justice P, besides, not to be question-begging, the artistic and expressive qualities of wedding cake, particularly that of the Petitioner, I thought my friend made a helpful concession when he distinguished between Thanksgiving turkey and cranberry sauce. Some traditional foods are merely associated with an event, as you say, and others are expressive of traditional ideas about that event. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Wedding cakes are symbolic of weddings, sometimes in a very literal figurative sense and sometimes in a more abstract sense, and while my friend said that a ban of wedding cake might be constitutional if it served nutritive purposes, I don't think he would really claim that it wouldn't at least raise First Amendment concerns or be subject to some level of First Amendment review. I think he and I would both agree that you would review such a law under <i>O'Brien</i>, and I think he and I would both agree that if wedding cake were banned for the purpose of suppressing traditional iconography about marriage, a ban of that sort would be unconstitutional. The same's probably true of Thanksgiving turkey, which expresses certain ideas about the traditions and history of Thanksgiving. But I don't think that stuffing or cranberry sauce are entitled to any First Amendment protection, even if they've come to symbolize Thanksgiving by virtue of being a staple of Thanksgiving dinners over the years.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: Let me ask you, then, about what I see as the real weak point of your argument.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: By all means.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: I'm not sure that I can see my way to a rule on which wedding cakes are speech and things like luxury watches or jewelry or furniture aren't, and that worries me, because if those things are speech, I suppose watchmakers with objections to same-sex marriage could refuse to sell their wares to a member of a same-sex couple who wanted to present them as an anniversary gift. Perhaps you'll tell me that an anniversary dinner isn't an expressive event and a wedding is, but I frankly didn't understand that part of your brief or see on what principle you can limit your rule to some artificially described subset of expressive events. But suppose I get over that concern.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What troubles me about your position is that I can't for the life of me see what speech the Petitioner is being compelled to make, besides some generalized thoughts about marriage that all his cakes express. I suppose we'd all agree that a birthday cake that says "Happy Birthday So-and-So" on it expresses that So-and-So is having a birthday, the giver's wish that the birthday be a happy one, some celebratory attitude, and so on. But are any of those messages the speech of the baker? </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">For example, and maybe this is a ridiculous example, if someone wanted to testify that their spouse was a certain age, I imagine you could impeach their testimony with proof that the testifying spouse had bought their spouse a birthday cake with a number on it that was inconsistent with their testimony. But if the baker testified to the same person's age, you couldn't impeach him with the cake, could you? He'd just say that he wrote what he was told to write on the cake.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: Justice P, I want to answer you directly, but I would first question whether any of that matters. Compelled speech very often won't be understood as an expression of the actual views of the speaker, but this Court has held that that doesn't matter. Compelled-speech doctrine isn't principally concerned with protecting compelled speakers from being misunderstood. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In part, compelled-speech doctrine is about protecting compelled speakers from the internal, psychological effects of being coerced to say something they don't agree with. And in part, compelled-speech doctrine seeks to prevent the government from creating an official orthodoxy that over time may crowd out differing views. Colorado will tell you that Petitioner can oppose same-sex marriage in any other forum, but his business is where he has the greatest voice. No one ever would have heard of Mr. Phillips if he only talked about his views about marriage in church. If the state can shield people from hearing religious opposition to same-sex marriage in the marketplace, it can go a long way towards preventing people from hearing that message altogether.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now if I could turn to your question about birthday cake, I think we agree that normally a birthday cake won't be understood as an expression of the baker's view that the recipient of the cake is turning a certain age or has a birthday worth celebrating or even is having a birthday. But as I say, I don't think that matters. Suppose Petitioner had a customer who belonged to a cult led by a man that claimed to be Christ, and the customer wanted to buy the cult leader a birthday cake that said "Happy 2000th Birthday, Jesus." Of course baking that cake wouldn't be an expression of Petitioner's own view that his customer's cult leader was really 2000 years old or really Christ, and perhaps no one would make the mistake of thinking so. But I hardly think it follows that he would have no First Amendment right against being compelled to make that cake. Doing so would be very offensive to him, even blasphemous.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: Of course, Colorado's public-accommodation law would never require him to make that cake, unless he was in the habit of making similar cakes for Christians celebrating Christmas.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: Sure, but respectfully, the force of the hypothetical, such as it is, doesn't depend on whether Colorado would compel him to bake that cake. The point is that whether or not a cake would be perceived to express the views of its baker, a baker could still have a free-speech objection to being compelled to bake the cake. Being compelled to create anathematic expression for someone else to use is still compelled speech.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: Is that also true of being compelled to sell a pre-made good to someone else so that the buyer can say something anathematic with it? Suppose the Respondents had asked Petitioner for a pre-made cake to have at their wedding. Is there a compelled-speech problem there?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: No, because in that case the speech was complete before any compulsion kicked in. Similarly, we don't think a songwriter could be compelled to write a song on spec for a same-sex wedding, but we absolutely think that a songwriter could be forbidden from refusing to license his songs for performance at same-sex weddings.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: Of course I agree with the second half of that, and maybe the first, though I'd have to think about it, but isn't the force of the hypothetical that in the one instance no one would suppose the performance of some well-known song at a wedding was the songwriter's endorsement of the wedding, while in the other instance people would suppose that the songwriter had endorsed the wedding by writing a song for it? On the other hand, I can't quite see the expressive difference between baking a cake for a same-sex wedding and selling an equally lovingly crafted pre-made cake to a same-sex wedding. No one at the wedding would ever know the difference. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Let me ask you, what part of your explanation of the aims of compelled-speech doctrine isn't implicated with equal force in the case of a pre-made cake as it is in the case of a custom-made cake? The aims being, as I recall, protecting compelled speakers from psychological coercion and preventing government from establishing an orthodoxy.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: Justice P, first, whether or not the purposes of compelled-speech doctrine might be furthered by extending it into the compelled sale of pre-made speech, compelled-speech doctrine can only protect speech, and in such cases there just isn't any speech to protect. I suspect you'll want to push back on that--</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: Yes.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General -- but if I could answer your question, I think there's a far greater problem with compelling baking a cake as far as the internal effects of coercion go, for starters. In that case, he's coerced to bake a cake that he knows will be used to express messages contrary to his deeply held religious beliefs, really is being coerced to labor at crafting the visual representation of an idea that he profoundly disagrees with. In the other case, he bakes a cake of his own free will, no coercion there, and then is coerced to simply sell it. He may not like selling it, but it's a far cry from being coerced to bake the cake in the first place, just as there's no comparison between being coerced to write marriage vows for a wedding you disapprove of and selling a book you wrote with pre-written vows in it to the same couple.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: Did you have anything on government orthodoxy?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: Only a difference of degree.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: Okay, well on pre-made cake and coercion, wouldn't Petitioner know when he's baking the pre-made cakes that some of them will be sold to same-sex weddings? Why wouldn't that knowledge be just as painful?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: Perhaps feeling a difference between the two cases is irrational, Justice P, but the psychological effects of coercion don't have to be rational. A hit songwriter with Petitioner's religious convictions might similarly know that his songs would be played at weddings he'd disapprove of, and that he couldn't refuse to license his songs on the basis of sexual orientation, but I doubt that would affect how he felt about writing songs. He'd feel very differently if he were compelled to write custom songs for same-sex weddings.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: But you keep coming back to songwriters, which seem quite inapposite given the other big differences between the two songwriter hypotheticals. Do you really imagine that if Petitioner made a large number of pre-designed cakes, and was forced to sell a fair number of them to same-sex couples, he wouldn't feel that he had been made into a mouthpiece for a pro-same-sex marriage message?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: Perhaps he would and perhaps he wouldn't. But compelled-speech doctrine isn't a panacea for feelings of complicity, nor should it be; some amount of complicity or association with views one doesn't like is the inevitable and even healthy byproduct of a public-accommodations regime. Compelled-speech doctrine just protects speech, and there's no speech in the pre-made cake hypotheticals to protect.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: I guess the problem with that move is that it obscures that Petitioner's objection isn't to the speech he's being compelled to create at all. Colorado's law doesn't compel Petitioner to make some sort of same-sex-marriage-themed cake; he has to bake the same sort of cake he'd bake for an opposite-sex couple. So the cake, as far as that goes, won't be objectionable to him, indeed will be just the sort of cake he loves designing. His problem is the association of that cake with a same-sex wedding, but he's being compelled to associate his cake with same-sex weddings in the case of pre-made cakes, which you concede don't raise a First Amendment problem.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: No, in the instance of the custom-made cake he is being compelled to bake a cake that symbolically expresses the message that the same-sex wedding for which it's bought celebrates a marriage, not some non-marriage union, and that that marriage is worthy of celebration. When he bakes the pre-made cakes, he isn't being asked to express anything of the kind; it just happens that people subsequently buy the cakes in order to express that message.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: But all those messages you say the first cake expresses are only placed on it by the buyer at the moment the cake is displayed. Until then, it's just a cake that symbolically celebrates marriage in the abstract. If the buyer sold it to another couple, it would say, if you're even right, that their marriage is worthy of celebration. Maybe he knows the buyer will use his cake to symbolically express that their marriage is a marriage and so forth, but the same can be anticipated of the pre-made cakes.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: Your Honor, I hate to come back to songwriters, but it strikes me that on this logic you would permit a state to compel a songwriter to compose a sufficiently generic love song for a same-sex couple's wedding, that you would see no difference between that case and licensing an already written song for the wedding.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice P: Well yes, when it comes down to it, I don't see a difference. If the song's just a generic treacly ballad that doesn't say anything about the couple, what's the problem? If he wants to write more specific songs about husbands and wives, he'll have no product that public-accommodations law can compel him to sell to a same-sex couple; public-accommodations law can't make him make a product he doesn't already make. If he wants to write generic treacly ballads that say nothing about gender or sexual orientation at all, he's got to go on writing them for everybody and as far as his speech goes, they'll keep expressing the same generic ideas. He may not appreciate the sorts of couples that associate his message of love and marriage with their marriages, but that's just the same problem he'd have with couples using songs he'd already written.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Solicitor General: Is there a question there?</span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com16tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-21024853605774416492017-12-01T00:30:00.000-08:002017-12-01T09:04:09.115-08:00A Note on Carter's "Court-Packing"<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As I discussed in my prior post, Professor Steven Calabresi has recently proposed that Congress create sixty-one new circuit judgeships, for a 36.1% increase in the number of regional circuit judgeships (i.e., circuit judgeships outside the Federal Circuit). In his <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3067662">paper</a> proposing this increase, he looked to a <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1629.pdf#page=4">1978 bill</a> signed by President Carter that added thirty-five judgeships to the then ninety-seven-judge-strong courts of appeals, for a 36.1% increase, as a precedent for the propriety of a proportionate increase under President Trump. But in response to suggestions that his proposal was a court-packing scheme, he rapidly switched tack, <a href="http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/454045/it-wouldnt-be-court-packing-republicans-expand-federal-courts">arguing</a> that Carter had packed the courts, that the current composition of the courts was the result of Carter's "court-packing," and that his proposal would merely "restore the judiciary to what would have been the status quo but for Democratic court-packing" by expanding the circuit courts in proportions equal to Carter's expansion.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I have already demonstrated that Carter's so-called court-packing has no effect whatsoever on the present composition of the circuit courts. Of Carter's fifty-six appointees to the circuit courts, only one, Judge Reinhardt, is still in active service on those courts. And (this point is new to this post), of the thirty-five judgeships that Carter and the Democratic Congress of 1978 created (some of which Carter never got to fill), sixteen are now held by Democratic appointees, fourteen by Republican appointees, and five are vacant, with Trump nominees already down the pike in some cases. (In the case of one such vacancy, Republicans <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_B._Brennan#Court_of_Appeals_nomination">successfully held it open for seven years after rejecting multiple Obama nominees and appear primed</a> to fill it.) Republican appointees will soon hold a majority of the judgeships Carter created. There is no persisting Carter court-packing to, in Calabresi's words, "counteract."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That said, Calabresi's proposal not only can't be justified as a corrective to some present-day Carter court-packing problem; it also can't even be justified as payback for Democratic court-packing of the past. For what Carter did was neither court-packing, nor unique to Carter, who was only the first of several presidents to expand the circuit courts at the behest of the Judicial Conference.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The circuit courts of 1978 were, in some cases, not so different from the circuit courts of today; in other cases, they were unrecognizable. There was no Eleventh Circuit then, and the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over Florida, Texas, Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and Louisiana. This super-circuit, which had jurisdiction over approximately 15% of the population of the country, only a little shy of the Ninth Circuit's share of the population, had only <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1629.pdf#page=4">fifteen judges</a>. Today, the Florida-less Fifth Circuit has seventeen judges alone, and the Eleventh Circuit, which has jurisdiction over three of the former Fifth Circuit's states, has twelve. The Ninth Circuit, even more impossibly, had only <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1629.pdf#page=4">thirteen judges</a> to hear mandatory appeals from California, Arizona, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Hawaii, and Alaska. Prior to the Carter expansion, some of the Ninth Circuit's smaller states didn't have a circuit judge who sat in their state. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">According to Calabresi's own paper (see pp. 14–15), a circuit judge should only make 255 merits votes a year; on the basis of this figure, he calculates that the Ninth Circuit should have seventy-nine judges and that today's Fifth and Eleventh Circuits should have a total of 109 judges. And given Calabresi's concern for appellate caseloads, it should interest Calabresi to know that <a href="https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/JudgCrea.pdf#page-6">appellate filings more than doubled from 1968 to 1978 while the size of the circuit courts remained constant</a>. Surely, then, Calabresi would grant that the thirteen-judge Ninth Circuit of 1978 and the fifteen-judge super-Fifth Circuit of 1978 were badly understaffed. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">So the Judicial Conference and Congress thought, apparently, when on the former's urging the latter expanded the Ninth Circuit to the more recognizable size of twenty-three judges and expanded the Fifth Circuit to twenty-six judges, or three fewer than its descendants have today. Outside of these two profoundly understaffed super-circuits, the 1978 bill created only fourteen new judgeships in the ten other regional circuits, increasing their total size from sixty-nine to eighty-three, a rather modest 20% increase for a period in which appellate filings more than doubled.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This bill passed the House 292-112 and the Senate 67-15 (Richard Primus is mistaken in <a href="https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/rulebooks-playgrounds-and-endgames-a-constitutional-analysis-of-the-calabresi-hirji-judgeship-proposal/">claiming</a> it passed the Senate by voice vote—only the original Senate bill did so), with the votes of, among others, Orrin Hatch, Strom Thurmond and Dan Quayle. I have not been able to find a list of the yeas and nays by party, but it does seem possible that a majority of Republicans in both chambers either voted against the bill or abstained. While Republicans didn't quite call the bill a court-packing scheme, some Republicans complained that Democratic Congresses had resisted Nixon's requests for more judges, only to accede to Carter's. But there wasn't much doubt about the need for more judges, only criticisms of the bill's failure to abolish diversity jurisdiction, to create merit selection for the district courts, and of its compromise solution to the Fifth Circuit problem (the bill allowed the Fifth Circuit to split into administrative units, as it briefly did).</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It wouldn't be long before the Judicial Conference came back to Congress asking for more judges. In 1984, during the Reagan administration, Congress <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-98/pdf/STATUTE-98-Pg333.pdf#page=14">created</a> twenty-four new circuit judgeships, this time on a much more evenly spread basis; seventeen of the twenty-four were outside the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, compared to the Carter bill's fourteen of thirty-five. The bill, which was primarily concerned with reorganizing the bankruptcy courts in the wake of the Court's decision in <i>Northern Pipeline</i>, passed both chambers by voice vote. Interestingly, it <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-98/pdf/STATUTE-98-Pg333.pdf#page=14">provided</a> that Reagan could fill no more than eleven of the new circuit judgeships before Inauguration Day, 1985, presumably in the hope that Reagan might not get reelected, though there was <a href="http://content.gallup.com/origin/gallupinc/GallupSpaces/Production/Cms/POLL/jl9opzbwnks1r9yjwdbqxq.gif">never much doubt</a> that he would. (Even had the bill lacked this provision, the Senate never would have processed twenty-four circuit court nominations between the bill's passage on July 10 and Inauguration Day.) Reagan did get reelected, of course, and he got to fill the remaining seats. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Six years later, during the George H.W. Bush administration, Congress <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-104/pdf/STATUTE-104-Pg5089.pdf#page=10">created</a> another eleven circuit judgeships, again by voice vote in both chambers after a 387-18 vote in favor of the original House bill. Only six of the circuits were expanded, and only one seat went to the Fifth, Ninth or Eleventh; four of the seats went to the Fourth Circuit alone, giving Bush an opportunity to fill nearly a third of its seats. Bush, however, would only fill two; one remained vacant for eleven years until his son filled it with Clinton's renominated nominee, now-Chief Judge Roger Gregory.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In a six-year period, Reagan and Bush added thirty-five judgeships to the circuit courts, exactly the number that Carter had. To be sure, Carter expanded the circuit courts by a somewhat greater percentage—36%, to Reagan/Bush's 26%. I don't quite see, though, how that matters; if one party increased the size of the Court by four Justices, would the next party to do it be any less court-packers than the first? From the perspective of 1990, both parties were responsible for creating thirty-five of the regional 167 judgeships each (putting to one side the bipartisan support for all three bills). </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Moreover, raw numbers seriously distort the two expansion's effects. The Carter bill primarily addressed an understaffing disaster in the nation's two most populous circuits; Reagan and Bush did relatively little to them. Whereas Carter added twenty-one judges to the super-Fifth and Ninth Circuits, Reagan and Bush added only eight to the Ninth, Fifth and Eleventh. On the other hand, while Carter added just fourteen judgeships to the rest of the circuits, Reagan and Bush added twenty-seven. Carter expanded these circuits by 20%; Reagan and Bush, by 33%. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Carter, then, created a famously liberal majority on the Ninth Circuit that persists today, as many of his appointees took senior status in the '90s and were replaced by Clinton appointments. (His impact on the Fifth Circuit was far more fleeting, as his appointees were split between the rump Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit in 1981.) But outside the Ninth Circuit, the Reagan/Bush expansion had the greater impact. Reagan and Bush expanded the Third Circuit by 40%, the First Circuit by 50%, the Fourth Circuit by 50%, the Tenth Circuit by 50%, and the Sixth Circuit by 45%. Of course, these unanimously enacted expansions of the small and mid-sized regional circuits weren't court-packing. But if that's true, what Carter did wasn't either.</span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-90376693909349921632017-11-29T00:37:00.000-08:002017-11-29T09:56:09.881-08:00The Composition of the Courts of Appeals Is Not a Function of Jimmy Carter's, Harry Reid's, or Chuck Schumer's "Court-Packing"<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As readers of this blog are likely aware, Steven Calabresi recently <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3067662">proposed</a> that Congress create sixty-one new circuit judgeships in order to "undo[] the judicial legacy of President Barack Obama." This proposal has been roundly criticized, including by <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/11/27/the-case-against-court-packing/?utm_term=.ecd1ec0f409b">some</a> impeccable <a href="http://www.nationalreview.com/article/454074/republicans-court-nominations-congress-shouldnt-pack-courts">legal conservatives</a>, as a court-packing scheme, as its stated aims suggest. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In response, Professor Calabresi has <a href="http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/454045/it-wouldnt-be-court-packing-republicans-expand-federal-courts">claimed</a> that his scheme is really a "court <i>unpacking</i>" scheme, designed to "counter-act[] Democratic court packing under President Carter" and packing-adjacent chicanery under Chuck Schumer. President Carter, the story goes, packed the lower courts by expanding them; Chuck Schumer protected Carter's court-packing from attrition by filibustering George W. Bush's nominees and abolishing the filibuster for lower-court judges during Obama's presidency. (Actually, Harry Reid did that.) That's why, he <a href="http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/454045/it-wouldnt-be-court-packing-republicans-expand-federal-courts">writes</a> at the National Review, most of the circuit courts (nine out of thirteen as of 2016) are majority-Democrat-appointee instead of majority-Republican-appointee:</span><br />
<div>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Republicans will have controlled the presidency for 32 of the 52
years between 1969 and 2021. By all rights, Republicans ought to have a
three-fifths majority on all the federal courts of appeals. Instead,
there is a Democratic majority on almost all of those courts. [AS: Actually, nine out of thirteen. Calling that almost all is mathematically identical to saying that <a href="https://www.baseball-reference.com/players/t/troutmi01.shtml">Mike Trout</a> makes an out in almost all of his at-bats, or that the day is almost all over at 4:37 P.M.] This is
the result of the Carter judgeship bill plus Senator Schumer’s [AS: Reid's] shameful
behavior in filibustering Bush’s lower-court judges and then abolishing
the filibuster for Obama’s lower-court judges.</span> </blockquote>
<blockquote>
<div>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Our proposal simply would restore the judiciary to what would have been the status quo but for Democratic court-packing</span></div>
</blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Or as he puts the point only a hair less tendentiously at <a href="https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/judicial-appointments-after-judge.html">Balkinization</a>:</span></div>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">
The bottom line is that the Republican Party won the presidency for 32
out of the 52 years between 1969 and 2021 and so one would expect that
about three-fifths of all federal court of appeals judges would be
appointed by Republican presidents. The fact this is not the case is
evidence of the court packing Jimmy Carter and Chuck Schumer have been
engaged in.</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I don't know if Calabresi seriously believes that we should expect 60% of active judges on every circuit to have been appointed by Republican presidents because Republican Presidents will have held the White House for 60% of the time between 1969 and 2021, or actually thinks that there's any Carter "court-packing" left to unpack. Probably the more charitable assumption is that Calabresi understands the current composition of the courts isn't a function of Carter and Schumer/Reid's "court packing," and that he is merely attempting to provide a thin veil of spin to politicians who might support his plan. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">However, supposing that Calabresi means what he says seriously, the reason Democratic appointees control the circuit courts in spite of Republican control of the White House for three-fifths of the 1969–2021 period is not anything that Carter or even Schumer and Reid did, but death and senior status. The lifespan of the average circuit-court judge is simply too short, the temptation of senior status too great, and the age at which circuit-court judges are appointed too high, for Republican control of the White House through much of the '70s, or even Republican control of the White House through all of the '80s, to have much effect on the composition of the circuit courts in 2017.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">To begin with, it is nonsense to say that we should expect anything about the composition of the courts because of Republican control of the White House in 2018, 2019, and 2020, which, it should hardly need saying, haven't happened yet. When those years do pass, we <i>should</i> expect the courts to become somewhat more Republican, but they have to pass first. So the relevant years, taking Calabresi's start date of 1969 as a given for a moment, are 1969 through 2017, and Republicans have controlled the White House for twenty-nine of those forty-nine years. To be sure, that's still 59%. But then we come to the matter of Calabresi's start date.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The first eight of the twenty-nine years since 1969 that Republicans controlled the White House were 1969–76, five and a half of which were years when Nixon was the President, two and a half of which were years in which Ford served out Nixon's second term. If for some reason we discounted those, Republicans would have controlled the White House for just twenty-one of the relevant forty-one years. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, in spite of only holding the White House for five and a half years, Nixon was a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_federal_judges_appointed_by_Richard_Nixon">tremendous success</a> as an appointer of federal judges. He appointed four Supreme Court Justices, and 231 federal judges in all, thirty-eight more than the previous record-holder, FDR, who held the White House for a little over twelve years. Nixon's appointees, however, couldn't live forever. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist and Blackmun are all dead. So are most of the forty-six judges he appointed to the courts of appeals. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of the small handful who aren't dead, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_federal_judges_appointed_by_Richard_Nixon#Courts_of_Appeals">all of them</a> either retired from the judiciary altogether or took senior status long ago, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/371">a form</a> of semi-retirement that can become available as early as age 65. The last active Nixon appointee to the courts of appeals <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiram_Emory_Widener_Jr.">retired</a> from active service over ten years ago, and died two months later. By 1998, he was the only Nixon appointee in active service on the courts of appeals; by June 30, 1992, only eighteen years after Nixon's resignation, he was one of only three. Only three Nixon appointees even remain in senior service; the youngest is almost eighty-nine years old. Many of the other Nixon appointees that Calabresi seems to think should still be on the lower courts would be well over a hundred were they alive today.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">None of this should be surprising. The '70s were quite a while ago. And because of the normal age of appointment to the circuit courts (somewhere in the 40s or 50s), the attractions and early availability of senior status (which carries full pay), and the weak inducements to serve in active status until death, a president's influence on the composition of the lower courts wanes very rapidly—far more so than his influence on the composition of the Supreme Court, where, for example, Nixon/Ford appointees made up a majority of the Court until Burger's retirement in 1986, and still held two of nine seats until Rehnquist's death in 2005.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">We should not expect, then, <i>anything</i> about the current composition of the circuit courts on account of Nixon's tenure in the White House; each and every of his appointees to those courts aged out of active service over a decade ago. What about Ford? Ford, who spent half of his time in the White House running for reelection, appointed eleven judges to the courts of appeals in his brief presidential stint. Of those eleven, one, Gerald Tjoflat, is still in active service in the courts of appeals; Justice Kennedy, a Ford appointee to the Ninth Circuit, is still active, but is so on a higher court. As early as 1998, almost twenty years ago, there was only one active-duty Ford appointee left on the courts of appeals, Judge Tjoflat. The others were appointed to the Supreme Court or took senior status, and of the senior-status judges, only two of them even still hold senior status; the others died off. The youngest of the remaining Ford circuit judges, Tjoflat, is about to turn eighty-eight.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">We shouldn't expect, then, the current composition of the circuit courts to reflect Nixon <i>or</i> Ford's tenure in the White House; through no fault of Democratic "court-packing," only one of the fifty-seven circuit judges Nixon and Ford appointed is both alive today and chooses to remain in active service. Nixon and Ford's eight years in the White House are simply irrelevant to present circuit-court composition. So rather than Republicans controlling the White House during twenty-nine of the relevant past forty-nine years, we could say that Republicans have controlled the White House during twenty-one of the relevant past forty-one years, or just over 50%.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That assumes, however, that Carter's four years in the White House are relevant. This is a double-edged sword for Calabresi's argument. If we discount Carter like we discounted Nixon and Ford, while (incorrectly, as it will turn out) treating Reagan and George H.W. Bush as especially relevant, Republicans would have controlled the White House for twenty-one of the relevant past thirty-seven years, or back up to 57%, begging the question of why Democratic appointees control the circuit courts. On the other hand, if we discount Carter as a meaningful influence on circuit-court composition, we reject half of Calabresi's court-packing thesis: that the composition of the circuit courts is a function of President Carter and Senators Schumer and Reid's court-packing. As it turns out, Carter is just as irrelevant to the composition of the circuit courts today as Nixon and Ford; his "court-packing" has nothing whatsoever to do with Democratic control of those courts.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Carter <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_federal_judges_appointed_by_Jimmy_Carter">appointed</a> a great many judges to the circuit courts, fifty-six, in part because a bill enacted during his tenure <a href="https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/rulebooks-playgrounds-and-endgames-a-constitutional-analysis-of-the-calabresi-hirji-judgeship-proposal/">with robust Republican support</a> created a great many new circuit judgeships. However, of these fifty-six judges, only one is in active service on the courts of appeals, a now eighty-six-year-old Stephen Reinhardt. The others all retired, took senior status, died, or became Supreme Court Justices. At the end of Carter's presidency in 1981, Carter appointees held a whopping 42% of the 132 active judgeships on the courts of appeals. By November 2005, only twenty-four years later, Carter appointees held just seven of the 179 active judgeships on the courts of appeals, or a little less than 4%. Today, the number is 0.6%. As with Nixon and Ford, death and the attractions of senior status rapidly eroded Carter's influence on the composition of the lower courts. The composition of those courts simply has nothing to do with Carter's wealth of '70s appointments, whether or not those appointments should be deemed the fruits of a court-packing scheme.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Having discounted Carter, Nixon, and Ford, should we expect the composition of the courts to reflect Republican control of the White House for 57% of the years between 1981 and today? Again, no. Reagan, like Nixon, was <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_federal_judges_appointed_by_Ronald_Reagan">a colossal success</a> as a judicial appointer, appointing three Justices to the Supreme Court and eighty-three judges to the circuit courts to just under half of the 167 circuit judgeships that existed by the end of his tenure. He was certainly no victim of Democratic defensive court-packing. Today, however, what were once eighty-three active judges comprising half of the circuit court judgeships have become ten active judges comprising 5.6% of the circuit court judgeships. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This isn't Democrats' fault, of course; Reagan's appointees simply died or retired. Indeed, in circuits that Republican appointees do control, the reason is often that Reagan appointees have stuck for longer than most. The Seventh Circuit has an eighty-one-year-old Reagan appointee, a seventy-nine-year-old Reagan appointee, a sixty-nine-year-old Reagan appointee, and until recently had a seventy-eight-year-old Reagan appointee, Judge Posner. Because of the unusual declination of these judges to take senior status, Democratic appointees never gained a majority on the Seventh Circuit in the Obama years. Two of the Fifth Circuit's thirteen active judges are Reagan appointees, both appointed to the court at unusually young ages. A more typical story is the Ninth Circuit, where six Reagan appointees have died, three have taken senior status, and one, Judge Kozinski, who joined the court at thirty-five and is only sixty-seven today, retains active status amongst a court of twenty-nine.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Reagan, then, is barely relevant to the present composition of the circuit courts, like the presidents before him; between him, Carter, Ford, and Nixon, presidents who collectively held the White House for twenty of the past forty-nine years, we can account for only 6.7% of the active circuit judges. Assuming George H.W. Bush is still relevant to the composition of the circuit courts, Republicans held the White House for only thirteen of the relevant past twenty-nine years, or 45%. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Bush, however, is no more relevant than Reagan. Like Reagan, he was not a victim of Democratic obstruction; he appointed forty-two judges to the circuit courts, or 23%, a robust number for a presidency that lasted four years. Today, though, only nine active judges are left, comprising 5% of the active judgeships. Over half of the thirty-three other appointees serve in senior status; the rest have retired or died.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Collectively, Bush and Reagan account for 10.6% of the active circuit-court judgeships; their predecessors account for only 1.1% more. The remaining overwhelming majority of active judges were appointed by Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump, in a twenty-five-year period when Democrats controlled the White House 64% of the time. Thus, we should expect to see majority-Democrat circuit courts, as we in fact do. As it turns out, today Republican appointees hold 46% of the filled active judgeships (seventy-six of 166), which is just about what you'd expect, if not indeed better, given the dwindling influence of the Reagan/Bush presidencies and Democratic dominance in the White House thereafter.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Democratic dominance in the years that are actually relevant to circuit-court composition is not the only reason for Democratic majorities on the lower courts, however. The other reason is that the last President was a two-term Democrat. Professor Calabresi claims that besides Carter's "court-packing," the other driver of Democratic dominance on the circuit courts was Harry Reid's use of the filibuster in the Bush years and abolition of the filibuster for judicial nominees in the Obama years. Yet in spite of this manipulative use of the filibuster, Bush actually appointed more circuit court judges than Obama: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_federal_judges_appointed_by_George_W._Bush">sixty-two</a>, to Obama's <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_federal_judges_appointed_by_Barack_Obama">fifty-five</a>, over the same length of tenure. And in spite of the filibuster's abolition in 2013, Obama would only succeed in appointing two judges in 2015 and 2016, thanks to Republican blue-slipping and control of the Senate. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It's true that Democrats blocked a few more Bush nominees than Republicans blocked Obama nominees. </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Bush <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_W._Bush_judicial_appointment_controversies">ultimately lost</a> five nominees to the filibuster, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_W._Bush_judicial_appointment_controversies">nine</a> <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31868.pdf#page=15">others</a> to stall tactics, and <a href="https://vettingroom.org/2017/11/24/grassleys-strategic-error/">six to blue slips</a>, for a total of twenty. (I omit from my list of stalls three <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/federal_judiciary/ratings110.authcheckdam.pdf#page=5">nominations</a> made in late-July through September of 2008, which fell afoul of the so-called <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thurmond_rule">Thurmond Rule</a>.) </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">By my count of the nominees on this <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Federal_judges_nominated_by_Barack_Obama">list</a>
of Obama's nominations, which omits Abdul Kallon's nomination to the Eleventh Circuit, thirteen
of Obama's circuit court nominees never got a vote, whether because of
the blue slip, filibustering, or stalling in committee. </span></span> </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That's a difference of only seven, and the Obama count omits the <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/05/25/blue-slips-and-judicial-nominees-in-senate/">many vacancies</a> that never even got nominations in the Obama years because of the threat of blue slips, </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">like the two long-open <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Fifth_Circuit#Vacancies_and_pending_nominations">Texas vacancies</a> on the Fifth Circuit that are only now being filled</span></span>. It should also be noted that Bush filled a number of the vacancies for which his initial nominees were rejected. I see no evidence of a material difference between Republican obstruction in the Obama years and Democratic obstruction in the Bush years; the two probably all but entirely canceled each other out (and both, given the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miguel_Estrada">quality</a> of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victoria_F._Nourse">nominees</a> we lost, are to be lamented).</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The Obama factor actually driving Democratic majorities on the circuit courts is much simpler than a comparative advantage at confirming his judges: having served as President more recently, his judges haven't retired yet. Of his fifty-five appointees, just two have retired; fifty-three remain. Of Bush's sixty-two appointees, sixteen have already retired, been elevated, taken senior status, or died; forty-six remain. Seven took senior status or retired in the Obama years, and Obama replaced four of them. This drop-off, which Obama's appointees have yet to embark on, has given Obama's slate of nominees a numerical advantage over Bush's that Harry Reid and Chuck Schumer could not.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Finally, Republicans are partly the unlucky victims of judicial maldistribution. A chart in Calabresi's paper shows that by 2016, before Trump took office, Republican appointees still held 44% of the filled active judgeships on the circuit courts. (As of today, that's up to 46%; Trump and his nine appointees are already moving the needle towards parity, though half have replaced Republican appointees who retired post-election.) However, as of the same date Republican appointees held majorities in only four of the thirteen circuits. How come? Because their judges were inefficiently distributed. Republican appointees held supermajorities in several circuits, while Democratic appointees held majorities everywhere else. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">For example, Republican appointees in 2016 still held eight of the nine active non-vacant judgeships on the Eighth Circuit, because, whether due to luck or other factors, only one Eighth Circuit judge retired in the Obama years until 2015, by which time the Senate was closed for judicial nominations. By contrast, George W. Bush made six appointments to the relatively small Eighth Circuit, four of which are in active service still. This is great for Republican control of the Eighth Circuit, but Republicans would have been better off had more judges retired from the Eighth Circuit in the Obama years and fewer retired elsewhere, or if fewer judges had retired from the Eighth Circuit in the Bush years and more retired elsewhere.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Besides the Eighth Circuit, as of 2016 Republican appointees also held two thirds of the filled seats in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits and nearly two thirds in the Fifth. These supermajorities were a function of vacancy timing and other chance factors: eight Bush appointments in the Sixth to Obama's two, two Bush appointments in the Seventh to Obama's one (partly thanks to Wisconsin's Republican Senator keeping a vacancy open for seven years of Obama's presidency) and the unusual vitality of Reagan's Seventh Circuit appointees, and seven Bush appointments in the Fifth to Obama's three (partly a function of Texas's Senators barring Obama from making appointments to old vacancies), plus the continued active service of two unusually young Reagan appointees. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Here too, Obama was simply given unusually few chances to appoint judges, and when he had opportunities, they sometimes were blocked; Bush, on the other hand, was given a disproportionate abundance of opportunities. In most of the other circuits, however, Obama appointees built slim Democrat-appointee majorities. It isn't, for the most part, Democrats' fault that the vacancies Bush got to fill were more geographically concentrated than Obama's; it just happened that way. If a fraction of Bush's twenty-one appointments to the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits had ended up on the closely divided First, Third and Tenth Circuits instead, Democratic appointees would only control six of thirteen circuits instead of nine.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Republican appointees' minority position on most of the circuit courts has nothing to do, then, with President Carter's "court-packing," which ceased to influence the composition of the courts long ago, or with Schumer and Reid's "court-packing," which was counterbalanced by Republican filibustering in Obama's first term, Republican blue-slipping, and all-out Republican obstruction in the last quarter of Obama's presidency. Rather, it's a function of the death and retirement of Nixon, Ford, Reagan, G.H.W. Bush, and even G.W. Bush appointees; Democratic dominance of the White House in the years that actually matter to circuit-court composition, the recent ones; and bad breaks in the geographical concentration of vacancies in the G.W. Bush years and geographical diffusion of vacancies in the Obama years.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">All of this should be ameliorated to a large degree in Trump's first term, and should be subsumed if the Republicans hold the White House in 2020. Thirty-five aging Clinton appointees, plus one Carter appointee, remain in active service; so do fifty-three younger Obama appointees. If history is any precedent, in eight years, twenty-four years out from the end of Clinton's presidency, there will be very few active Clinton appointees left, as there were very few Carter appointees left twenty-four years after the end of his presidency (nine out of fifty-six), and few Reagan appointees left twenty-four years after the end of his presidency (seventeen out of eighty-three). And if history is any precedent, a fair number of Obama appointees will have retired in eight years, just as over a quarter of G.W. Bush appointees have retired to date.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of course, Clinton and Obama appointees may well decline to retire during Trump's presidency. So far, Trump has filled four vacancies created during his presidency; each of those vacancies was created by the retirement or elevation of a Republican appointee. Of the other six post-election vacancies Trump has made nominations for, all but two of those were created by the retirement of a Republican appointee, and one of the Democrat-appointee retirements, Judge Frank Hull, is quite conservative, while <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diana_E._Murphy">the other</a> is eighty-three years old. Clinton and Obama appointees do not seem interested in having Trump fill their seats, while Bush and Reagan appointees seem very interested. That, however, is not court-packing, whatever else it might be called. And in any case, the Clinton appointees cannot serve forever; the average age of the active Clinton appointees (excluding Hull, who will retire upon the appointment of a successor) is seventy, and many are much older than that.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In sum, the Obama judicial legacy that Calabresi wants to undo is not the fruit of court-packing, but the natural (though artificially slight, thanks to Republican maneuvering) fruit of a recent two-term presidency. To undo it, Republicans need only do what Democrats did to undo the Reagan/G.H.W. Bush judicial legacy, or the G.W. Bush legacy: namely, win multiple elections. Barely veiled attempts at court-packing historically <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_1938">haven't been</a> conducive to that goal. But if Republicans want to take political advice from someone whose idea of political salesmanship is to complain about invisible hordes of Carter appointees swamping the rightful Nixon/Ford majority, they could do worse things, I guess.</span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-69905702989267656962017-11-28T01:35:00.000-08:002017-11-28T01:47:50.558-08:00Talking Gibberish in Cyan Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_6">Rule 6</a> of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the last day of a period is included in counting time, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday. Legal holidays are defined, and only defined, in subparagraph (a)(6) of the rule. Suppose the rule read as follows: "When the period is stated in days . . . include the last day of the period if it falls on a weekday, except as provided with respect to legal holidays in subparagraph (a)(6)." How would you interpret that sentence?</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">At first, I imagine, you would attempt to make sense of it by seeing what Rule 6(a)(6) "provided" on the subject of legal holidays and counting time. When you realized that Rule 6(a)(6) says nothing whatsoever about counting time, I think you would understand the sentence as a bit of sub-literate gibberish, albeit gibberish obviously <i>intended</i> to convey the information that one should include the last day of the period if it falls on a weekday, except for legal holidays as defined in Rule 6(a)(6). Likewise, suppose someone wanted to explain Jewish dietary law's prohibition on eating dairy with meat to you, and wanted to enlist the help of a particular dictionary's definition of meat in clarifying the definition. (Poultry counts; fish doesn't.) If that person said, "Jewish people can eat anything with dairy, except as provided in Webster's Third with respect to meat," you would probably think he didn't know English very well. You would understand, though, that he meant Jewish people can eat anything with dairy, except for meat as defined in Webster's Third.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">What sentences like that actually mean, though, is something quite different. The trouble isn't that "provided" can only refer to substantive rules, as opposed to definitions; for example, "all terms in this statute have their ordinary meanings except as provided in definitional section q" is perfectly good English. Likewise, Rule 6(a)(6) certainly "provides" something with respect to legal holidays (and so does Webster's Third with respect to meat). But what it provides with respect to legal holidays is only the phrase's definition, such that to say "include the last day of the period if it falls on a weekday, except as provided with respect to legal holidays in 6(a)(6)" is to say "include the last day of the period if it falls on a weekday, except that 'legal holiday' means New Year's Day, Thanksgiving, Christmas, Independence Day . . . ." </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That is nonsense, so so too is the rule it glosses. The problem with drafting the rule that way is what can only be described as a functionally illiterate misuse of "except as provided with respect to." The drafter of the rule would seem to think that "except as provided with respect to legal holidays in 6(a)(6)" means "except for the set of days described by 6(a)(6) with respect to legal holidays." But "except as provided with respect to legal holidays in 6(a)(6)" actually means, in any literal or colloquial sense, "except for what 6(a)(6) says about legal holidays." And what 6(a)(6) says about legal holidays—just what "legal holiday" means—is not a comprehensible exception to the rule that when counting a period, you include its last day if it falls on a weekday. Precisely, however, because the rule as hypothetically drafted is nonsense, we would have to read it as if its drafter had written what it definitely doesn't mean—"except for legal holidays, as defined in 6(a)(6)"</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—because that's the only thing its drafter could have had in mind in drafting an exception to a time-counting rule that cross-referenced the definition of legal holidays.</span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">We should be careful about imputing subliterate gibberish to Congress, though if Congress undeniably writes a bit of subliterate gibberish, we must try to make sense of what it meant, or as a textualist would say, what Congress appears to have meant (the whole aim of textualism being, as I've repetitively argued here, determining Congress's <i>apparent</i> intent from what it wrote). After all, it's unlikely that Congress is that bad at English. So if we encounter a statute that appears to say, "the following is a [non-definitional] rule, except as provided in this [definitional] section with respect to a phrase/word not in the rule," we should make certain that the cross-referenced section isn't doing something non-definitional that could provide a sensible exception to Congress's non-definitional rule, thereby allowing us to read "except as provided" in a normal way. Otherwise, Congress will have said that such and such is a non-definitional rule, except that a term not even in the rule means such and such</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—which, as I say, is gibberish, albeit gibberish whose intended meaning can be deciphered.</span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It is this precise sort of gibberish that the petitioners in <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/cyan-inc-v-beaver-county-employees-retirement-fund/"><i>Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund</i></a> (a case to be argued this morning) impute to Congress. 15 U.S.C. 77v(a) <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/77v">provides</a> that federal and state courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction over lawsuits under the Securities Act of 1933, subject to one exception, the scope of which is the subject of <i>Cyan</i>. The exception, along with the provision it's contained in, reads as follows: </span></span></span></span></span><br />
<blockquote>
<span style="font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of
any Territory shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under
this subchapter and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission in respect thereto, and, concurrent with State and
Territorial courts, <i>except as provided in section 77p of this title with
respect to covered class actions</i>, of all suits in equity and actions at
law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this
subchapter.</span></span></span></span></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/77p">Section 77p</a> of Title 15 provides three things with respect to "covered class actions," in the following order: </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">First, subsection 77p(b) provides that no "covered class action" based on state law can "be maintained in any State or Federal Court" if it alleges a material misstatement, material omission, manipulative or deceptive device, or contrivance, in connection with the sale of certain securities. The Supreme Court has <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/05-409.ZO.html#1">described</a> this as a "preclusion provision" rather than a preemption provision because it does not preempt state law regarding these sorts of allegations outside the "covered class action" context. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Second, subsection 77p(c) provides that "[a]ny covered class action </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">brought in any State court involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b)," may be removed to federal court. (How far that grant of removal jurisdiction goes is also disputed by the parties, as well as the government, whose interpretation I defend briefly at the end of the post.) </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Third, paragraph 77p(f)(2) provides a complicated definition of "covered class actions," which includes, in part, any class action involving 50 or more members in which common questions of law or fact predominate over individual ones.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Cyan Fund argues that it's this last provision of section 77p about "covered class actions," their definition, that "except as provided in section 77p . . . with respect to covered class actions" invokes, not any of the substantive provisions of 77p regarding covered class actions that might be thought to provide actual exceptions to state courts' concurrent jurisdiction over Securities Act claims. That is, they read "jurisdiction . . . concurrent with State and Territorial courts, except as provided in section 77p . . . with respect to covered class actions" to mean "jurisdiction . . . concurrent with State and Territorial courts, except with respect to covered class actions as defined in section 77p(f)(2)." </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Cyan Fund makes this surprising move, in short, because all the other candidates for cross-reference are off the table, or so they say. First, the "preclusion" provision has nothing to do with jurisdiction, but rather commands merits dismissals of certain covered class actions. And even if it did concern jurisdiction, it applies equally to state and federal courts. It therefore can't be the exception to state courts' concurrent jurisdiction in section 77p that Congress meant to cross-reference.** </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">** This last point seems a red herring to me. The "except as provided" clause can easily be read as an exception to both state and federal courts' jurisdiction; the statute says that federal courts shall have jurisdiction, concurrent with state and territorial courts, except as provided with respect to covered class actions in section 77p, over actions brought to enforce liabilities or duties created by the Securities Act. Why can't, given its placement, the except clause be read as an exception to both sets of courts' jurisdiction just as easily as an exception to state courts' concurrent jurisdiction alone? </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">As
for the removal provision, they say it too has nothing to do with state
courts having concurrent jurisdiction in the first place. Besides,
they add that even if removal jurisdiction might be seen as an exception
to full-throated concurrent jurisdiction, it turns out that section 77v
also has an anti-removal provision which cross-references the exception
to that provision in 77p(c) ("[e]xcept as provided in section
77p(c)"). That cross-reference would seem to make a cross-reference to
77p(c) in the concurrent-jurisdiction provision unnecessary, as well as
misplaced. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Thus, by process of elimination, what section 77v must be talking about when it provides for concurrent jurisdiction except as provided in section 77p with respect to covered class actions is just the definition of covered class actions. And what Congress must have really meant is to provide for concurrent jurisdiction except over covered class actions, as defined in the definition that section 77p "provides." That's the argument.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Cyan's insistence that Congress would never mix concurrent jurisdiction with removal jurisdiction, or rules of "preclusion" that forbid certain suits from being "maintained" in state court at all, or engage in surplusage, speaks well for its respect for Congress's legal acumen. But in its zeal to portray Congress as a perfect student of the Court's current narrow understanding of jurisdictionality (an understanding that only <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/04-944.ZO.html">fully emerged</a> a decade after Congress enacted the statute in question), it seems to me that Cyan's made out Congress to have made a much more fundamental error than the faux pas of thinking of removal jurisdiction, or unusually peremptory bars to actionability, as exceptions to concurrent jurisdiction. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">That fundamental error, of course, is the error of speaking in subliterate gibberish. For it isn't, as I've explained above, good English to say that state courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction except as provided with respect to covered class actions in section 77p, if what one means is that state courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction except over covered class actions as defined in section 77p. If 77p's definition of covered class actions is what 77v is talking about when it carves out an exception for what 77p "provided" about covered class actions, what Congress literally said was that state courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction, except that a covered class action is defined as a class action involving 50 members, that etc. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">That is nonsense; the mere definition of covered class actions is in no way an exception to concurrent jurisdiction. It certainly is something that 77p "provides" with respect to covered class actions, and to the extent Cyan suggests the textual objection to its argument is that it's not, it's kicking at a straw man. The problem, rather, is that the definition has nothing to do with concurrent jurisdiction. Whereas removal jurisdiction or a merits bar to certain covered class actions are not exceptions to concurrent jurisdiction in a strict legal sense, the definition is simply a nonsensical exception to concurrent jurisdiction in any sense, like saying "we sell cars in every major color, except that purple is the color made by combining red and blue" when what one means is that one sells cars in every major color except for purple, which is the color, in case one didn't know, made by combining red and blue. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">In order to understand Congress to have actually excepted covered class actions from concurrent jurisdiction, rather than nonsensically providing that their definition is an exception to concurrent jurisdiction, we have to read "except as provided with respect to covered class actions in section 77p" to mean "except for the thing, covered class actions, with respect to which something (a definition) is provided in section 77p." But that is not, as any literate English speaker knows, what "except as provided" means; it is only, at best, an illiterate yet comprehensible misuse of "except as provided." Because we should assume that Congress is not functionally illiterate, we should assume that Congress was referring to the substantive provisions in 77p regarding covered class actions, which reasonable people, if not a certain elite subset of lawyers, can understand as exceptions to concurrent jurisdiction over Securities Act suits.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Cyan's response to this is to claim that Congress actually uses "except as provided in" in this way all the time, which is supposed to show that it's perfectly good English. (Even if it didn't, it could tend to show that Congress really is confused about what "except as provided in" means; either works.) Cyan <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/15/15-1439/19618/20171113123046009_15-1439rb.pdf#page=9">says</a> that while respondents and the government claim that "except as provided in Statute X" must refer to some "self-operative limit" in Statute X, sometimes it "borrow[s] a term or concept from another provision, which requires some translation to be incorporated into the relevant statute." </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Cyan primarily leans on the example of a clean-hull statute that regulates "persons" in various ways. The definition of "person" <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/33/3801">includes</a> any "instrumentality of the United States, except as provided in 3802(b)(2) of this title," but when we arrive at 3802(b)(2) we don't find a definitional provision, but instead are <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/33/3802#b_2">told</a> that the EPA "may" apply the requirements of the clean-hull statute to federal vessels if the agency operating the vessels agrees. From this, they say, we can infer that government vessels aren't regulated "persons" unless the EPA says so. Doesn't this show that "except as provided" is sometimes used non-literally to refer to some recapitulated version of what a cross-referenced section actually "provides"?</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Not at all. Read literally, the definition of persons says that a regulated person includes any instrumentality of the United States, except that the EPA may or may not, in consultation with agencies, apply the requirements of the statute (which <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/33/3841">apply to "persons"</a>) to government vessels. Now, if government vessels were persons, the statute's requirements <i>would</i> apply to government vessels whether or not the EPA said so, so it must follow that government vessels aren't persons unless so designated. That necessarily follows, however, from the literal and not-at-all nonsensical meaning of what Congress said; 3802(b)(2) wasn't "translated" into a definitional exception in order to make sense of "except as provided," but logically entailed a definitional exception. Nothing, on the other hand, follows at all from saying that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Securities Act suits, except that a covered class action is a class action with predominant questions and 50 members. It especially does not follow from saying so that state courts have no concurrent jurisdiction over actions so defined.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Cyan's other examples of unconventional uses of "except as provided" are similar flops. A statute <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/37/101">provides</a> that inactive-duty training is defined not to include correspondence-course study, "except as provided in 206(d)(2) of this title." 206(d)(2), however, allows for compensation for certain correspondence courses under the auspices of compensation for inactive-duty training. Read literally, the statute means that inactive-duty training, which is compensable, doesn't include correspondence-course study, except that you can get paid for taking certain correspondence courses. Because those correspondence courses are only compensable by virtue of compensation for inactive-duty training, it necessarily follows that they are inactive-duty training. 206(d)(2) is not "translated" by the magic of cross-reference into a definitional exception; it entails one given the literal meaning of the cross-reference. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Even, though, if you see that as translation of a sort, it's a translation fueled by logical entailment, not a grasping for what Congress must have meant but didn't say. Certain substantive provisions being logically incompatible with a definition that cross-references those provisions as exceptions, the substantive provisions must be "translated," if you like, into exceptions to the definition. What Cyan fails to find in the entire U.S. Code is a single other statute in which Congress does the reverse: say "the following rule obtains, except as provided with respect to x in section y, a definition of x," and mean "except for x as defined in section y." That would require "translating" the cross-referenced definition into the defined term itself. In fact, Cyan doesn't offer an example of anyone ever using "except as provided with respect to x" in this bizarre way, probably because it's never been done; people who are sufficiently ignorant of English to be this confused about what "except as provided" can mean don't use legal jargon like "except as provided," and people who do use legal jargon are all sufficiently conversant in English not to make the mistake.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Cyan's only good example of this sort of usage is a sentence that no one ever wrote before Cyan invented it: a <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/15/15-1439/19618/20171113123046009_15-1439rb.pdf#page=11">parking sign</a> that reads "No parking, except as provided in 5 U.S.C. 6103 with respect to legal holidays," a statute that merely provides a list of legal holidays and says nothing about parking. Wouldn't one have to read that to mean no parking, except on legal holidays as defined in section 6103? </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Of course, once one realized to one's bewilderment that 6103 said nothing about parking. But that only shows that we would try to make some sense out of a nonsensical sign, not that the sign makes sense. What the sign means, like the hypothetical at the beginning of this post, is no parking, except that legal holidays include Christmas, New Year's, Thanksgiving, etc. That can't be what was meant, so we assume the writer of the sign can't write and thinks that "except as provided with respect to legal holidays in 6103" is an acceptable way to say "except for legal holidays, as defined in 6103." It's not, though, and if 6103 said anything at all about parking on legal holidays, or could even merely be arguably read to, we would read the sign to refer to whatever 6103 said about parking because we assume basic literacy on the part of sign-writers. All the more so of Congress.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Finally, one word on a much closer dispute between the parties and the government, namely the scope of 77p's removal provision. 77p(c) says that </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">"[a]ny covered class action brought in any State court involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b), shall be removable." 77p(b), the preclusion provision, bars covered class actions under <i>state </i>law asserting misstatements, omissions, contrivances or manipulative devices in the sale of covered securities. The government argues that 77p(c) provides for the removal of any covered class action involving those sorts of claims about the sale of covered securities, <i>whether or not</i> the claims are made under state or federal law. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">Respondents, in response, say that 77p(c) defines removable actions as those "set forth in subsection (b)," and subsection (b) only talks about and bars state-law actions; thus, 77p(c) only permits removal for purposes of enforcing that bar, in cases that at least present a mix of state- and federal-law claims. To adopt the government's reading (which includes subsection (b)'s subject-matter limitations to claims about deceit in the sale of covered securities), they argue, is to arbitrarily apply only half of what's "set forth" in subsection (b).</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;">I think that is wrong. The phrase preceding the cross-reference to subsection (b) is "involving a covered security"; what is "set forth in subsection (b)" is what it means for a covered class action to involve one. The government accepts that actions are only removable under 77p(c) if they involve covered securities in the fashion subsection (b) talks about. The requirement, for preclusion purposes, that claims be brought under state law is not a part of what subsection (b) "sets forth" on what it means for a covered class action to "involve" a covered security; it's what it "sets forth" on another subject (the state-law-specific scope of the preclusion bar). A covered class action brought under federal law can involve a covered security just as much as one brought under state law, and is just as much a covered class action. I am inclined, then, to think the government is right; any covered class action that involves the sorts of allegations about covered securities sales that 77p(b) describes is removable from state court, largely obviating Cyan's policy concerns about runaway state-court class actions on a much sounder textual ground.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-80837088023255297092017-11-07T23:13:00.000-08:002017-11-08T07:58:46.336-08:00Patchak v. Zinke Oral Argument Recap, and a Couple Suggestions on What the Court Should Do with "and Shall Be Promptly Dismissed" in the Gun Lake Act<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Today the Supreme Court <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-498_21o3.pdf">heard</a> oral argument in <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/patchak-v-jewell/"><i>Patchak v. Zinke</i></a>. <i>Patchak</i> is a case about everyone's favorite doctrine, the <i>Klein</i> doctrine, which says—this is disputed by academics, but not by the parties, at least not comprehensibly so—that while Congress may make new law applicable to pending cases, and even limit that new law's applicability to a pending case, it may not direct results of cases under old law without impinging on the federal courts' powers under Article III. That's how the Court <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-770_9o6b.pdf#page=17">understood</a> the doctrine a year ago in <i>Bank Markazi v. Peterson</i>, at any rate.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In <i>Patchak</i>, Patchak <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12151413964789172053&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">sued</a> the Department of Interior under the APA to challenge its decision to take title to a tract in Michigan known as the Bradley Property on behalf of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians. The government claimed it hadn't waived its sovereign immunity from this sort of suit; the Supreme Court <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12151413964789172053&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">held</a> in <i>Patchak I</i> that it had. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Congress responded by passing the Gun Lake Act, section 2(b) of which <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/16-498-op-bel-D.C.-Cir.pdf#page=5">provides</a> that "an action (including an action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment of this Act) relating to the land described in subsection (a) [the Bradley Property] shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed." The D.C. Circuit <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/16-498-op-bel-D.C.-Cir.pdf">held</a> that the Gun Lake Act constitutionally stripped federal jurisdiction over Patchak's suit. Patchak petitioned for and somehow obtained certiorari on whether, as <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/16-498-cert-petition.pdf#page=2">he put it</a>, "a statute directing the federal courts to 'promptly dismiss' a pending lawsuit . . . without amending underlying substantive or procedural laws [] violate[s] the Constitution's separation of powers principles."</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Patchak's briefs were, to charitably understate matters, extremely unhelpful on what about this statute violated <i>Klein</i>. The relevant sections of his briefs consist of string-cites of every high-sounding generality in a Supreme Court opinion about the separation of powers in the last 200 years, interspersed with occasional empty assertions about the statute actually on review. (<a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/16-498-ts.pdf#page=16">E.g.</a>, "the principles recognized and secured in the Court's prior decisions instruct that the Gun Lake Act invades and weakens the judicial power, and thereby violates the separation of powers.") </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">An amicus brief in support of Patchak signed by Steve Vladeck and joined by Prawfsblawgger Howard Wasserman and such eminent professors as Dean Chemerinsky, David Strauss, and Ernest Young provided much more concrete guidance. This brief, rather candidly and self-defeatingly, <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/16-498-tsac-Federal-Courts-Scholars.pdf#page=26">allowed</a> that the "first clause" of section 2(b), the part that said a suit relating to the Bradley Property "shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court," was constitutional. The problem, its signatories <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/16-498-tsac-Federal-Courts-Scholars.pdf#page=27">argued,</a> was that section 2(b) didn't "only remove[] federal jurisdiction," which would have been fine; </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">when it went on to say that cases relating to the Bradley Property "shall be promptly dismissed, </span>it "additionally command[ed] the federal courts to dismiss all cases" as to which jurisdiction had been removed. That isn't okay, they argued, because it deprived federal courts of jurisdiction <i>to decide</i> that jurisdiction had been removed under the "shall not be filed or maintained" clause, and simply dictated a brute result.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">With respect to Vladeck et al., this is rather like arguing that section 1332 would violate Article III and the separation of powers if it said that federal courts must dismiss suits brought under 1332 that don't involve the requisite amount in controversy, as opposed to "only" saying, as it now does, that jurisdiction only extends to diversity suits that do involve the requisite amount in controversy. Of course federal courts must dismiss suits over which they have no jurisdiction; what else are they supposed to do with them? Such a clause in 1332 would be as inoffensive as it would be unnecessary. But Patchak's briefing being what it was, that was the thread by which his case was hanging going into oral argument.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">At oral argument, the majority of the Court snipped the thread. Clearly convinced that the addition of "shall be promptly dismissed" to a jurisdictional bar couldn't sink that bar (whether because it could be severed, because it could be deemed surplusage, or because it could simply be deemed the necessary consequence of a jurisdictional bar), a number of Justices repeatedly asked Patchak's counsel to say whether 2(b) would be unconstitutional without the (putatively) offending phrase, and if so why. Patchak's counsel adamantly insisted that 2(b) would be unconstitutional if it merely stripped jurisdiction over suits relating to the Bradley Property without commanding their dismissal, but was completely unable to articulate a reason why. Recounting in any detail the various attempts he made to give a reason why would be unkind, but they generally circled around the mantra that even if Congress had made new jurisdictional law and applied it to Patchak's pending case, the Court still had to ask whether Congress was exercising judicial power </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">in doing so</span>. How Congress could possibly be exercising <i>judicial </i>power in making a new jurisdictional bar, and how the Court was to decide if Congress had done so in enacting the Gun Lake Act, Patchak's counsel never explained.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">So the Gun Lake Act will survive, and deservedly so; there was never anything really the matter with it. There is, however, the niggling detail of just what to say about "and shall be promptly dismissed." I want to suggest a couple ideas, the first of which should appeal to the Chief Justice, who seems to be the only member of the Court that's truly worried about the constitutionality of the statute.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The Vladeck amicus brief claims that "and shall be promptly dismissed" deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to determine whether "shall not be filed or maintained" strips their jurisdiction over Bradley Property-related actions; they must dismiss such actions and enter judgment for the government whether they think they have jurisdiction or not. This strikes me as a rather uncharitable reading of section 2(b), and certainly one that flouts the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Having provided that Bradley Property-related suits "shall not be . . . maintained" in federal court, Congress had <i>already </i>mandated their dismissal before it said so; how could a court heed the command that such suits shall not be maintained in federal court without dismissing them? The addition of "and shall be promptly dismissed," rather than mandating dismissal prior to or independently from a jurisdictional determination, can be read to merely confirm the jurisdictional nature of "shall not be filed or maintained," which otherwise might be read as a claim-processing rule under the Court's <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=263839110266911189&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">clear-statement rule</a> for deciding when jurisdictional statutes are really jurisdictional. One might say that this reads 2(b)'s second clause to contain a silent "therefore"</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—"shall not be filed or maintained in federal court and shall <i>therefore</i> be promptly dismissed"</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—that clarifies Bradley Property-related suits are to be dismissed <i>because</i> they "shall not be maintained in federal court," i.e., because there is no federal jurisdiction over them. I do not think it does much violence to 2(b) to suggest that this "therefore" is nascent in the statute.</span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Such a parsimonious reading of mandatory language should be familiar to Chief Justice Roberts, who, having determined in <i>NFIB </i>that the ACA <i>would</i> be unconstitutional if it contained an insurance mandate, invoked avoidance <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11973730494168859869&q=nfib+v+sebelius&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p2594">to read</a> the ACA's seeming command "that individuals 'shall' maintain health insurance" as "a condition . . . that triggers a tax," not as "a legal command to buy insurance." I tend to find that saving construction more plausible than most; since the only legal consequence of "mandating" people to buy insurance under the ACA was requiring them to make a relatively small payment to the IRS if they didn't, it was quite possible to read the mandate as precatory. I also have never understood what great difference the saving construction made; couldn't the mandate have been severed from the tax/penalty and practically produced just the same result?</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">But in any event, I think my reading of "and shall promptly be dismissed" is even more plausible than Roberts' reading of the mandate; whereas Roberts read the ACA's "shall" to mandate nothing at all, I would read "and shall be promptly dismissed" to mandate dismissal, <i>on the jurisdictional grounds</i> provided earlier in the sentence. This seems to me not only a permissible reading of section 2(b), but its most natural reading. After all, if 1332 said that federal courts had jurisdiction of diversity suits with an amount-in-controversy in excess of $75,000, and shall dismiss suits with an amount-in-controversy of $75,000 or less, would we read the "shall dismiss" clause to deprive district courts of jurisdiction to determine their jurisdiction in cases with an amount-in-controversy of $75,000 or less, or simply as the inverse of the jurisdictional grant? I should think the latter, and if 1332's constitutionality turned on it, we would be compelled to read it that way. So too with the Gun Lake Act. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This is not only correct as a matter of avoidance and, I would suggest, common sense; it's also correct as a matter of anti-surplusage. For the Vladeck reading of section 2(b) renders "shall not be filed or maintained in federal court" a nullity that federal courts <i>cannot apply</i> before applying the "and shall be promptly dismissed" clause; the claim quite literally is that the latter clause "<a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/16-498-tsac-Federal-Courts-Scholars.pdf#page=27">does not <i>allow</i></a>" federal courts to decide if Bradley Property-related suits are jurisdictionally barred by the former clause. Were that so, why did Congress bother to write "shall not be filed or maintained in federal court"? If the courts are not even allowed to apply that language, for whom was it written? My reading, on the other hand, not only gives effect to that language, but gives effect to "shall be promptly dismissed" as well; for me, that phrase confirms the jurisdictionality of "shall not be filed or maintained in federal court," which could otherwise potentially be read as a non-jurisdictional claim-processing rule.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Given all that, I would find a holding that section 2(b) contains a brute command of results overlaid on top of a jurisdictional bar that federal courts are pretermitted from applying, as opposed to a garden-variety jurisdictional bar and some language confirming that bar, all but indefensible. It isn't what 2(b) means and it certainly isn't what 2(b) unambiguously means, so if unconstitutional or even possibly so, that interpretation of 2(b) must be avoided. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">However, if 2(b) does command dismissal of Bradley Property-related suits independent of their extrajurisdictionality under 2(b) itself, that command could be severed as unconstitutional. It is critical to note, however, that that would be in no way a win for Patchak. Patchak's suit would still be barred by the perfectly constitutional jurisdictional provision that his suit may not be maintained in federal court, and the judgment below affirming the dismissal of that suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction would be affirmed. To be sure, the Court <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1191_2a34.pdf#page=28">sometimes</a> "affirms" a judgment it disagrees with, for remedial reasons, because it agrees with the constitutional holding of an opinion below, so conversely it might "reverse" the D.C. Circuit's judgment because it disagrees with the D.C. Circuit's opinion insofar as it found no constitutional violation. As Will Baude has <a href="http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2017/06/the-judgment-in-morales-santana-scotus-symposium.html">argued</a>, however, the Court should really cut this sort of thing out; a constitutional holding isn't itself a judgment or a part of a judgment, but only a reason for it.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Assuming the Court affirmed, it isn't obvious to me how the Court could write an opinion in which the invalidation and severing of the "shall be promptly dismissed" clause wouldn't be one huge dictum, given that the Court's judgment would ultimately rest on the ground that Congress constitutionally forbade Patchak's suit from being "maintained" in federal court, whether or not it acted constitutionally in proceeding to further mandate its dismissal. And even if the Court's severance of the "shall be promptly dismissed" clause were deemed a holding, its severing that clause would have no effect whatsoever on how any district court adjudicated suits relating to the Bradley Property; district courts would continue to dismiss those suits for lack of jurisdiction. The emptiness of such an undertaking underscores the wisdom of the Chief Justice's course in <i>NFIB</i>; why go to the trouble of invalidating a phrase in a statute that has no real legal consequence?</span>
Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-80447678711978291482017-11-04T00:39:00.000-07:002017-11-04T01:01:09.068-07:00Supreme Court 2017 Statutory Term in Preview: Definitional "Ambiguity" in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, Part 1<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The subject of the following series of posts will again be textualism, and what I intend to again persistently asseverate, to borrow a phrase from a <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=meQYAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA261&lpg=PA261&dq=persistently+asseverate&source=bl&ots=oJtDbk3ytO&sig=CnnJNUiIMxeQt7UIluEHsIeNAMk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwirh4ex2qvWAhWHWSYKHfkNAhcQ6AEINTAD#v=onepage&q=persistently%20asseverate&f=false">passage</a> of Henry James's <i>dialogue</i> (the character saying it is supposed to be rather simple!), is that textualism is a less constraining methodology than some of its advocates claim, but a more constraining one than some of its false friends want it to be. The particular textualist problem I want to address here is statutory definitions that seem to make a peculiar meaning out of uses of the defined terms to which they apply. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This problem is the subject of the statutory blockbuster (I speak unironically) of the upcoming Supreme Court term, <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/digital-realty-trust-inc-v-somers/"><i>Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers</i></a>, as it was of the Court's decision in <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-158_6579.pdf"><i>Bond</i></a> three years ago,<i> </i>as it was in part, in a fashion that escaped almost everyone's attention, of the Court's decision one year ago in <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-233_i42j.pdf"><i>Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust</i></a>. I will propose a middle course between the definitional nihilism that insists a definition is a definition no matter what, on the one hand, and the definitional immolation of <i>Bond</i> on the other</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—the course that Justice Thomas steered for the Court in <i>Franklin California Tax-Free Trust </i>and that Justice Scalia steered for the Court in <i><a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-1146_4g18.pdf">Utility Air</a>.</i></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That middle course, in sum, is this. Assuming a typical definitional clause, a statute can never be ambiguous on whether a statutory definition applies to that statute's use of the defined term that definition defines.<i> </i>So long as a statute says where its definition applies</span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—"in this section," "in this chapter," "in this Act"</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—the definition unambiguously applies where the statute says it does. "In this section/chapter/Act, the following definitions shall apply" is not ambiguous language, and such language is the <i>only </i>language relevant to deciding whether a statute's definition <i>textually </i>applies to a use of a defined term. Uses of the defined term that don't seem to match the definition only tend to show that Congress may have made a scrivener's error in using a term elsewhere defined.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">However, a statute's application of a definition to a particular use of a defined term may very well be a correctible scrivener's error. Scrivener's errors of this sort happen often; they happen when drafters use a term and forget how that term was previously defined. The error here, technically, is neglecting to use a different, non-defined term, or neglecting to revise the definitional clause to except certain sections of a bill from its application. Particularly in longer statutes, and particularly in the instance of terms that have non-technical meanings and come easily to mind, it's quite unsurprising that drafters forget what a definitional section says and use terms in ways that clash with their statutory definitions. </span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">But while we shouldn't be surprised that these errors happen, before we correct them we shouldn't demand anything less than the certainty we demand to correct other kinds of scrivener's errors. Definitions that don't fit uses of defined terms, again, are not a species of ambiguity; there is nothing ambiguous about saying that a definition shall apply in this section of this statute. They are accidents of drafting that permit courts to depart from the meaning of otherwise clear texts, and before courts do so, they must be certain that an accident occurred.</span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Finally, because the two options in a case of possible definitional mismatch are either following the text's plain meaning, or correcting a plain error, cases of definitional mismatch are not cases where <i>Chevron</i> has any role to play, or where, for that matter, any other ambiguity-resolving canon has any role to play, including clear-statement rules or constitutional avoidance. Statutes are never ambiguous on whether their definitions are mismatched; the only "ambiguity" to speak of in such cases is uncertainty about whether Congress <i>intended</i> to write what it wrote, not ambiguity in the meaning of what it wrote. But under current doctrine, that sort of ambiguity resolves in favor of assuming Congress did intend to write what it wrote; the only ground for correcting drafting error is certainty that one happened. </span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Further, uncertainty about whether Congress intended to enact the text it wrote or some other variant is particularly not a ground for <i>Chevron</i> deference. <i>Chevron</i> assumes that Congress enacts text that is indeterminate on some question and leaves that question open for further policy choice, thereby delegating that question to an agency to <i>decide</i> (not interpret). Ambiguities about what text Congress meant to write are not delegations to make interstitial law, but rather ambiguities about the content of the determinate policy choice Congress did make.</span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">1. The definitional problem in <i>Digital Realty</i>.</span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">There is a <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/78u-6">section</a> buried in</span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the Dodd-Frank Act that provides "securities whistleblower[s]" a small but potent suite of "incentives and protection[s]," quoting the section's title. The question in <i>Digital Realty </i>is whether that section's definition of "whistleblower" applies to the section's whistleblower-protection's use of the word "whistleblower." Though section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act takes a while explaining itself, what it gives securities whistleblowers is fairly simple. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">First, if a securities whistleblower gives the SEC, and the SEC alone, the goods on someone</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—as the statute puts it, if "1 or more whistleblowers . . . voluntarily provided original information to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement of [a] covered judicial or administrative action"</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—he will get an award of between ten to thirty percent of the monetary sanctions the SEC recovers. Section 922 proceeds to lay out the details of this award scheme, and the money to pay for it, in seven subsections, (b) through (g) and (i). Subsection (j), the last subsection of the statute, is a grant of rulemaking authority that doesn't mention "whistleblowers," subsection (a) contains the section's definitions, to which we'll get, and subsection (h) is the section's eponymous "protection," an unusually generous anti-retaliation and confidentiality provision at the heart of <i>Digital Realty Trust</i>.</span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Subsection (h), entitled "Protection of whistleblowers," does a few things. First, it prohibits three types of retaliation against "a whistleblower." Employers may not retaliate against whistleblowers for any "lawful act done by the whistleblower" in providing the SEC information, assisting or testifying in an SEC investigation, or for "</span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-">making disclosures that are required or protected under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [cross-references omitted] and any
other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission." Sarbanes-Oxley, crucially, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1514A">protects disclosures</a> of violations of securities law to <i>non</i>-SEC federal agencies, Congress, or anyone with supervisory authority over the employee. Does that mean that 922(h) will offer retaliation protections to anyone who discloses violations of securities law to internal auditors? Put a pin in that and read on. </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-">The balance of subsection (h) does three things. First, it provides victims of the proscribed sorts of anti-whistleblower retaliation with a generous cause of action, with a six-year statute of limitations and a three-year discovery rule in case of late discoveries, double back pay, reinstatement, and fee-shifting. Second, it prohibits the SEC from disclosing information that could be "reasonably . . . expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower," though certain inter- and intra-governmental disclosures are permitted provided that the recipients of the disclosures maintain the same level of confidentiality. Third, the last sentence of subsection (h) is a sort of Ninth Amendment for "whistleblower[s]," preserving all rights they have under all other sources of law.</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-">I've belabored the various things the statute does for whistleblowers for a reason, but long before I say what that reason is, I want to discuss the definition of "whistleblowers." And before I say <i>what </i>the definition is, I want to say why the definition is needed. Though this might not be immediately obvious, the repeated usage of "whistleblower" in this statute is quite eccentric statutory drafting and wouldn't work at all without a definition. The word whistleblower, in an ordinary-language sense, is a non-technical term of extraordinary vagueness, encompassing a vast array of types of whistleblowing on a vast array of subjects to a vast array of people; no competent statutory drafter would use the word without giving it a technical, non-ordinary definition.**</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-">** The Solicitor General, arguing that "whistleblower" keeps its ordinary meaning in subparagraph (h)(1)(A) of section 922, <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/16-1276-bsac-united-states.pdf#page=25">claims</a> that "numerous federal statutes use 'whistleblower' in the ordinary sense." Not so. His sole citations for that claim are: (1) a findings and purpose <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-103/pdf/STATUTE-103-Pg16.pdf#page=1">section</a> of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 that uses the word twice, and in the first instance <i>defines</i> whistleblowers as "</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-">those individuals who make disclosures described in such section 2302(b)(8)"; (2) the <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-103/pdf/STATUTE-103-Pg16.pdf#page=17"><i>title</i></a> of an operative section of the Act, section 5; (3) <a href="https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-103/pdf/STATUTE-103-Pg16.pdf#page=17">section 4</a> of the Act, which never uses the word and seems to have been cited by mistake. Indeed, it's rather telling that even the Whistleblower Protection Act never uses the word "whistleblower" in the text of any of its operative sections.</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-">As for other federal statutes, some thirty-three statutes (I've checked) use the word "whistleblower." Of the statutes that really refer to whistleblowers in some operative sense (rather than generically referring to "whistleblower protections"), virtually all of them <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/49/30172">define</a> <a href="http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:38%20section:323%20edition:prelim)">whistleblowers</a> either <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/7/26">formally</a> (and almost always in terms of disclosures to a particular agency) or informally, by <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/51/30502">describing</a> the whistleblowers to be protected with great specificity. I am aware of just one exception to this rule, in the Inspector General Act of 1978, and even that one's debatable, as the <a href="http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?hl=false&edition=prelim&req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title5a-node20-section5&num=0&saved=%7CZ3JhbnVsZWlkOlVTQy1wcmVsaW0tdGl0bGU1YS1ub2RlMjAtc2VjdGlvbjM%3D%7C%7C%7C0%7Cfalse%7Cprelim">provision</a> strongly implies that the whistleblowers Congress is talking about are whistleblowers who talk to Inspectors General. More typical of congressional drafters' sense of the propriety of using "whistleblower" sans definition in statutes is the Internal Revenue Code's <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/26/62">reference</a> to "any provision of federal law (<i>popularly known</i> as whistleblower protection provisions)" that affords certain protections which the Code proceeds to define in more technical terms. [End of footnote.]</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-">To be sure, perhaps you could get by without a definition if you were very clear on what sorts of whistleblowing a whistleblower would get an award for, and what sorts of whistleblowing he'd be protected from retaliation against, and what a whistleblower had to say to entitle himself to confidentiality. But then, if the meaning of "whistleblower" were to be derived exclusively from context, you wouldn't have to use "whistleblower," would you? Instead you'd say that a "person" would get an award for providing certain information to the SEC, and an "employee" would be protected from retaliation for disclosing certain information to certain people, and a "person" would have his identity kept confidential if he disclosed this or that</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—not that a "whistleblower" would be protected if he blew the whistle in very specific ways.</span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-">That would be a somewhat harder statute to draft, though, and in fact a close reading of the statute reveals that as presently drafted it would collapse without a definition of "whistleblower." The awards subsection doesn't say quite what a whistleblower provides the SEC</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—information that leads to a successful enforcement, yes, but about what?</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—the retaliation subsection doesn't even say that much about what information the whistleblower has to give the SEC, just that it's got to be "information [provided] in accordance with this section," and the confidentiality subsection doesn't say a word about what earns a "whistleblower" confidentiality. So the statute truly hinges upon the definition of "whistleblower" in all operative respects.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Unsurprisingly, given the SEC-focus of most of the operative provisions in the statute, it turns out that section 922's definition of "whistleblower" is exclusively about SEC, securities-law whistleblowing. A "'whistleblower' means </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who
provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to
the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
Commission." That clears up what sort of information the whistleblowers have to provide: information of securities-law violations. Where does this definition apply? Just in this section, actually, in the context of the small handful of incentives and protections it provides: "In <i>this</i> section the following definitions shall apply." And so it turns out that only SEC, securities-law whistleblowers get the benefit of section 922's generous retaliation provision, of its awards, and of its confidentiality protections.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">But wait, you ask: doesn't this definition make one third of the anti-retaliation provision meaningless? Weren't "whistleblowers" to be protected from retaliation against Sarbanes-Oxley-protected disclosures, which included disclosures to mere internal auditors? Could Congress really have meant that only <i>SEC</i> whistleblowers would be protected from whistleblowing to auditors or other agencies? And if it had, wouldn't that make that part of the anti-retaliation provision surplusage? After all, Congress had already offered "whistleblowers" protection from retaliation against SEC whistleblowing, so what work does it do to protect SEC whistleblowers from retaliation against internal reporting? Is there any SEC whistlebower who would be fired because of his internal report and not because of his more damaging SEC whistleblowing? And given all these concerns, doesn't it seem as if section 922's SEC-specific definition of "whistleblower" can't apply to 992(h)(1)(A)'s prohibition of retaliation against whistleblowers who blow internal whistles? That's the question presented by <i>Digital Realty Trust</i>.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">2. The scope of the definition in <i>Digital Realty</i> (and most any definition) is unambiguous. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">All fair questions, though all, as we'll see, with answers, but for now I want to ask a different question: do these questions actually make whether 922's whistleblower definition applies to 922(h)(1)(A) <i>ambiguous</i>? Now, a small group of <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2805431">very smart people</a>, including Judge Kavanaugh, have <a href="https://harvardlawreview.org/2016/06/fixing-statutory-interpretation/">begun to argue</a> that this question should have no bearing on interpretation; if legislative history, policy concerns, or even inferences of intent from surplusage are relevant to interpretation, they should be relevant even when a statute's text is clear, but if they're not so relevant, we shouldn't be bothering with them even when a statute's text is ambiguous. I think this is all wrong and quite radical, but whether these people are right or not, they're not describing the law as it exists, as they of course readily admit. Under current law, whether 922's definition's application to 922(h)(1)(A) is ambiguous all but decides the case, in the following four ways.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">First, whether 922's definition's application to 922(h)(1)(A) is ambiguous determines, under current law, whether the <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/17/240.21F-2">SEC's interpretation</a> of "whistleblower" in the anti-retaliation provision to mean <i>anyone </i>who does any of the acts it protects will receive <i>Chevron</i> deference. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Second, whether the definition's application to 922(h)(1)(A) is ambiguous determines whether the surplusage argument I've sketched does any work; if a statute unambiguously contains surpulsage, arguments against surplusage are unavailing, but if it's ambiguous whether it does or not, courts may be influenced by anti-surplusage presumptions to avoid reading the statute to contain surplusage. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Third, whether the definition's application is ambiguous determines whether <i>policy </i>concerns, or legislative history, do any work; in our half- or pseudo-textualist world, if the statute's ambiguous, legislative history can be used to decide what Congress meant, but if it's not, legislative history can't be used. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">And finally, if 922(h)(1)(A) unambiguously incorporates section 922's definition of "whistleblower," the non-SEC whistleblower in <i>Digital Realty Trust</i> suing his employer under Dodd-Frank for an internal disclosure is going to lose unless he can show that the definition's application 922(h)(1)(A) is (a) unmistakably a drafting error or (b) absurd (and even that probably overstates things</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—he probably has to show that it's an unmistakable drafting error <i>because</i> it's absurd).</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">So is it ambiguous whether 922's definition of "whistleblower" applies to the use of "whistleblower" in 922(h)(1)(A)'s retaliation provision? No, not at all, and in fact, the only sort of question about whether a definition applies to a use of its defined term is whether the definition's application to that term is a scrivener's error. An "ambiguity" about whether a definition applies to a use of a defined term is really just a doubt about whether the drafter accidentally forgot to except that use from the scope of the definition. And because that doubt is a doubt about whether there's a drafting error</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—the existence of which doctrine (<a href="http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2017/08/supreme-court-2016-term-in-review.html">correctly</a>, in my view) requires certainty before courts can correct it</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—such "ambiguities" always must be resolved in favor of applying the definition. The only definitions that don't apply to uses of the terms they define, on this view, are the ones that were undoubtedly applied to those uses in error.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Why am I so sure of all this? Consider section 922's definition of "whistleblower" as an example. As Judge Dennis Jacobs correctly <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4432349298645599925&q=berman+v+neo+ogilvy+llc&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p158">points out</a> in his dissent on this question, the relevant language to whether that definition applies to the anti-retaliation provision in 922(h)(1)(A) is not the anti-retaliation provision, but what the definition itself says about its scope. And what it says is that "[i]n this section the following definitions shall apply." Among the definitions that follow is the whistleblower definition, and 922(h)(1)(A) is in "this section," section 922. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What
this unambiguously means is that the meaning of "whistleblower" in
922(h)(1)(A) is that provided by the whistleblower definition in
922(a)(6). There is no alternate reading. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>"In this section the following definitions shall apply" can't be read to mean "in this section the following definitions may apply," or, "in this section less subsection (h)(1)(A), the following definitions shall apply." These are not meanings that any reasonable speaker of English can give to "shall" or "in this section." They are not, crucially, things that anyone would ever <i>intentionally use the sentence "in this section the following definitions shall apply" to say</i></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a critical test of ambiguity.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> Anyone trying to communicate the message that the whistleblower definition would apply throughout section 922 less section 922(h)(1)(A) would say <i>that</i>. No one who wanted "whistleblower" to mean something different in 922(h)(1)(A) and realized that she had written that the whistleblower definition "shall apply" "in this section" would hope for courts to figure out what she wanted from the fact that she protected non-SEC whistleblowing from retaliation in (h)(1)(A)(iii). Rather, she would correct the definition. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The definition's statement of its scope is not, to be clear, merely unambiguous in a literal or semantic sense; if that were all, that would not exhaust interpretation. It's also unambiguous in the sense that no one could intentionally use the statement to imply something narrower than what it literally means, and unambiguous in the further sense that no one could use the statement to mean something narrower on the mistaken belief that it has a narrower meaning. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">While we can imagine, for example, people using phrases like "<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-750.ZO.html">convicted in any court</a>" to impliedly mean any court in the United States, or "<a href="http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2017/08/supreme-court-2016-statutory-term-in.html">Pick up every object on your floor</a>" to impliedly mean something more like "pick up every object but the furniture," given that people use "any" and "every" all the time in reference to some impliedly limited domain, there is no similar phenomenon of people referring to "this section" and implicitly meaning "this section less its most important provision." And while Congress will sometimes use a word in a way that suggests it might be mistaken about its meaning and would have used a different word absent its mistake (which I have <a href="http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2017/08/supreme-court-2016-term-in-review.html">contended</a> is a form of ambiguity), like the time <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14118102670860400516&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p509">it gave</a> "defendants" special protections against impeachment in the Rules of Evidence and seemed to mistakenly believe that "defendants" meant criminal defendants, there is no conceivable mix-up of that sort about the meaning of "this section" or "shall apply." </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Again, a good litmus test for ambiguity that embraces far more than semantic ambiguity is to ask whether a person trying to say something could intentionally use the language at issue to say it. If they couldn't</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span>if the only way you can imagine someone using the language at issue to say something is their accidentally writing the wrong words, or intentionally writing what they wrote, changing their mind about what they wanted to say, and forgetting to correct what they wrote</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span>then the language is unambiguous and the only way to escape its meaning, if you believe Congress meant to convey that point, is to invoke drafting error. And here, the only way we can imagine a drafter using "in this section, the following definitions shall apply" to mean that the whistleblower definition wouldn't apply to the core of "this section" is a sort of drafting error, probably the sort where Congress, after writing the definition, used "whistleblower" more broadly in the anti-retaliation provision and forgot that the definition existed.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">3. The Court's confusion of ambiguous intentions with ambiguous meaning in <i>Bond</i>.</span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The Court had a very different view of these matters in <i>Bond</i>. There, the Court thought it <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-158_6579.pdf#page=18">ambiguous</a> whether the extraordinarily broad definition of "chemical weapon" in the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act, which included any toxic chemical, applied to the operative provision of that act. Claiming that "<a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-158_6579.pdf#page=19">dissonance</a>" between the ordinary meaning of "chemical weapon" and its statutory definition made it ambiguous whether the term's ordinary meaning or its definition controlled, the Court resolved the ambiguity, on the basis of ambiguity-resolving federalism canons, by functionally axing the definition from the entire statute. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">To be precise on how radically sweeping this judicial repeal of the act's definition of its key term was, a point which I don't think has ever been fully appreciated, the Court technically held that the statute's definition of chemical weapons did not apply to <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/229">section 229</a> of the statute, which prohibited the use, possession, ownership, or production of chemical weapons; in its place, the Court interpolated an ordinary-meaning definition. Now, there are only six other sections in the statute, and all of their usages of chemical weapon are completely parasitic on section 229's, section 229 being the only truly operative provision in the statute. Going through those sections:</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Section 229A is a penalties section for violating section 229 that doesn't mention chemical weapons.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/229B">Section 229B</a> concerns criminal forfeiture of chemical weapons in the event of a conviction under section 229 for owning or possessing them; if the definition doesn't apply to section 229, it can't apply to section 229B. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/229C">Section 229C</a> is a savings clause for pepper sprays that would be completely unnecessary if not for the statute's broad definition of chemical weapon; it also doesn't mention chemical weapons. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Section 229D, also not mentioning chemical weapons, gives the United States a cause of action to seek an injunction against the conduct prohibited in section 229; it is completely parasitic on section 229's use of "chemical weapon" and the meaning it has there.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/229E">Section 229E</a> says that the Attorney General can ask the Department of Defense for assistance in enforcing section 229 "in an emergency situation involving a chemical weapon." The predicate for that authority is enforcing section 229, so it too is completely parasitic on section 229's use of chemical weapon; the Attorney General couldn't seek assistance in an emergency involving a chemical weapon that satisfied the statute's definition but fell outside the Court's reading of chemical weapon in section 229, or there would be no section 229 enforcement to assist. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Finally, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/229F">section 229F</a> is the statute's definitions section. It uses "chemical weapon" (outside of its definition of "chemical weapon") only in defining "purposes not prohibited under this chapter," a phrase that's a component part of and carve-out from 229F's definition of "chemical weapon." </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The following, then, is a non-hyperbolic statement; after the Court's ostensibly interpretive holding in <i>Bond</i> that 229F's definition of chemical weapon doesn't apply to section 229, there is <u>no use</u> of chemical weapon in the entire statute to which it does apply. It is simply as if Congress had never enacted the definition at all.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, was there some sort of ambiguity as to whether the definition of chemical weapon in the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act actually applied to the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act? The question is like asking whether the term "endangered species" in the Endangered Species Act means what Congress said it did in the ESA's <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/16/1532">definitional section</a>, or some other preferred meaning of your imagination. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act is codified in chapter 11B of title 18. Section 229F <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/229F">begins</a>, "In this chapter: The term 'chemical weapon' means the following . . . ." Can "[i]n this chapter: The term 'chemical weapon' means the following" mean "In this chapter: The term 'chemical weapon' <i>doesn't</i> mean the following, but instead means whatever it means ordinarily"? Not so much. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What Chief Justice Roberts described as an ambiguity of statutory meaning is really an ambiguity in congressional intention. And while there was no ambiguity of the former variety, the ambiguity of the latter variety was very real; the Court's mistake wasn't in finding some kind of ambiguity at all, but in confusing unactionable doubt over whether Congress really meant to write what it said with doubt as to the meaning of what Congress did say. As Heather Gerken, hardly an unforgiving textualist, has <a href="http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5908&context=fss_papers#page=6">written</a>, "[t]he statute's language was crystalline"; the Court "thought the statute was ambiguous" because "it couldn't bring itself to believe that Congress had, in fact, passed a statute broad enough to reach Bond's conduct." <i> </i></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>Did</i> Congress really make it a federal crime to use (with exceptions for peaceful purposes) any "<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/229F">toxic chemical</a>" capable of causing permanent harm or temporary incapacitation to human or animal life? Absolutely. Did Congress really <i>want </i>or consciously <i>intend </i>to make any use of a toxic chemical a violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act? Hard to say, and perhaps hard to believe; most likely, Congress implemented the titular Chemical Weapons Convention by copying its definition of chemical weapon without entire awareness of its breadth or the consequences. And <i>would</i> Congress have really wanted to make it a violation of the Chemical Weapons Act to smear mild-skin-burn-inducing chemicals on someone's mailbox, were the question put to them? Very possibly not. But these uncertainties about what Congress wanted to do, or what it would have wanted to do had it thought harder about a court's present problem, aren't ambiguities</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—not for a textualist anyway. They only matter, really, to a sort of purposivist that's no longer supposed to exist.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Two final comments on <i>Bond</i>. First, what of Roberts's <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-158_6579.pdf#page=18">argument</a> that it isn't "unusual to consider the ordinary meaning of a defined term, particularly when there is dissonance between that ordinary meaning and the reach of the definition"? Is there nothing to that? As Justice Scalia said in his separate concurrence, it is most unusual to consider a defined term's ordinary meaning for the Court's purposes; prior to <i>Bond</i> the Court had only considered the ordinary meaning of defined terms to shed light on the meaning of ambiguous definitions, not to delete them. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">But more fundamentally, the argument is nonsense. To say that there's dissonance between the ordinary meaning of chemical weapon and what the statute says it "means," and that it's therefore ambiguous if "chemical weapon" in that statute means what the statute says it does, is like saying that a child's answer on his homework that "3 X 7 = 37" is ambiguous because there's profound dissonance between "37" and the ordinary meaning of "3 X 7." One could talk of scrivener's error in some similar cases; if the child wrote that "3 X 7 = 10," you might wonder if he meant to write a plus sign, or maybe even if he thought the multiplication sign <i>is</i> the addition sign. But the meaning of the equation would still be unambiguous and the only way you could dissolve the dissonance between "3 X 7" = 10 would be to read the use of the multiplication symbol as an accident or mistake. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Similarly, imagine Congress defined a vegetable, in the school-lunch statute, to include any food or beverage containing a food syrup derived from a vegetable</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—e.g., a soda containing corn syrup.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> The dissonance between what vegetable means in any ordinary sense and how Congress defined it would be profound, much more so than the dissonance that worried the Court in <i>Bond</i>, and the policy, at least to my mind, would be vastly more offensive. But would there be any ambiguity about whether "vegetables" in the statute included soda? And if a parent sued a school for providing soda-vegetables as vegetables on the theory that sodas weren't statutory vegetables because they weren't ordinary-language vegetables, the "dissonant" definition notwithstanding, wouldn't (and shouldn't) their lawyer be sanctioned for frivolously asking the court to rewrite the school-lunch law? What distinguishes <i>Bond</i>?</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Finally</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, why <i>didn't </i>Roberts suggest that equating chemical weapons with any harmful toxic chemical was likely some sort of mistake, rather like "3 X 7 = 10" might be, instead of claiming that the statute was ambiguous as written? Because making that argument, I think, would be impossible. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">How, after all, in legal drafting, do definitions get mistakenly (technically, <a href="http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1647&context=mlr#page=16">accidentally</a></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>linguistic mistakes are confusions about meaning, not drafting errors) applied to defined terms? Usually, you define a term, use it to mean its natural meaning, and forget you already defined it to mean something rather different. That account of definitional accident, was unavailable in <i>Bond</i>, because it's unthinkable, at least extremely improbable, that Congress or its drafters carefully defined "chemical weapon" in section 229F, forgot how it had been defined, and then wrote each of sections 229, 229B, and 229E, the small handful of adjacent sections that mention chemical weapons, on the mistaken assumption that their central, hardly self-defining term either wasn't defined or had been defined in a very different way. To impute that sort of accident to Congress requires an assumption of staggering congressional incompetence or collective drunkenness.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , 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style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In my next post I'll address when definitions can be corrected, <i>Chevron</i>'s relationship to claims of definitional error, and hopefully get around to how <i>Digital Realty</i> itself should be decided.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-58662127281361689632017-10-11T00:52:00.000-07:002017-10-15T13:22:15.697-07:00Supreme Court 2016 Statutory Term in Review: Perry v. MSPB, Punctuating Adverbial and Adjectival Phrases, and the Beach Boys<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I've been promising people a post on Justice Gorsuch's noted <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-399_5436.pdf#page=21">dissent</a> in <i>Perry v. MSPB</i>. Much, however, as I might <a href="http://yalejreg.com/nc/judge-gorsuch-and-chevron-doctrine-part-ii-the-gutierrez-brizuela-concurring-opinion-by-asher-steinberg/">appear</a> to <a href="http://yalejreg.com/nc/judge-gorsuch-and-chevron-doctrine-part-ii-the-misuse-of-precedent-by-asher-steinberg/">relish</a> taking Justice Gorsuch's opinions <a href="http://yalejreg.com/nc/judge-gorsuch-and-chevron-doctrine-part-i-the-misuse-of-fact-in-de-niz-robles-by-asher-steinberg/">to task</a>, I (a) don't, and (b) don't think there's much of real importance or methodological interest to say about the <i>Perry </i>dissent. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">However, a promise is a promise, I do have a few things to say that will probably sound familiar, and those of you who have been looking for a definitive answer to whether Gorsuch was right in <i>Perry</i> will get it. So, here goes. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As any reader of this post will no doubt recall, Justice Gorsuch <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-399_5436.pdf#page=21">began</a> his dissent with the arresting claim that "Anthony Perry," the petitioner who would prevail 7-2, "asks us to tweak a congressional statute</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—just a little</span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—so that it might (he says) work a bit more efficiently," and concluded it with the arresting suggestion that "[r]espectfully," the Court ought to "follow" the </span></span></span></span>"<a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-399_5436.pdf#page=32">perfectly good law</a>" Congress wrote. In the middle, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-399_5436.pdf#page=24">he wrote</a> there was "a constitutionally prescribed way" to address Perry's concerns and "it's called legislation," denounced "judicial tinkering with legislation," explained that the difficulties of "bicameralism and presentment" are "the point" of the Constitution requiring them ("the better to preserve liberty"), and said many other things in this genre. (All of which I quite agree with, apart from its application to this statute.)</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This predictably got a lot of unreflective attention. No one, though, at least in anything published that I've seen, actually spent any time addressing whether Gorsuch was right. The assumption seems to have been, as it usually is in such cases, that such a confident statement (especially one joined by Justice Thomas) that the Court had gone off the textual rails must be true or at least amply arguable; the problem at issue in <i>Perry</i> was too difficult, insignificant and dull to merit any commentary.</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In arguing that the Court</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> adopted a "<a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-399_5436.pdf#page=27">seriously atextual</a>" "tweak" of Congress's perfectly good law, Justice Gorsuch </span></span>placed much of the blame for the Court's wayward interpretation on the much-pilloried Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-399_5436.pdf#page=24">he claimed</a>, in a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6327693052942039768&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">1983 en banc</a>, "adopted <i>a fix</i> [all emphases mine] much like what Mr. Perry now proposes: allowing civil service claims to tag along to district court with discrimination claims <i>because,</i> <i>in its judgment</i>, '[f]rom the standpoint of judicial economy, consideration of all issues by a single tribunal is clearly preferable.'" What Gorsuch said the statute required was bifurcation; in an agency appeal where a federal employee raised both civil-service claims and employment-discrimination claims before the Merit Systems Protection Board, the MSPB's decision on the former claims would be reviewed in the Federal Circuit, while its decision on the latter claims would be reviewed in district court, simultaneously.</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">To read Justice Gorsuch's dissent, one would think the reason the Federal Circuit allowed civil-service claims to tag along to district court with discrimination claims, rather than taking up the civil-service halves of these sorts of (in the parlance of the field) "mixed" MSPB decisions itself, was "because" the Federal Circuit thought it pragmatically preferable, "in its judgment," "from the standpoint of judicial economy." Justice Gorsuch doesn't quite make it clear whether the Federal Circuit even attempted to textually justify its "fix," or whether it copped to making a "fix" on the ground of its policy "judgment." But I think it's at least fair to say that one would never guess from Justice Gorsuch's characterization of the Federal Circuit's decision that the Federal Circuit deemed itself bound by the statute's plain meaning to come out at the "seriously atextual" place Gorsuch says it did, or that pragmatic arguments from judicial economy played only a marginal role in the Federal Circuit's decision.</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Well, one would never, as I say, guess it from what Justice Gorsuch wrote, but it's true all the same. The fact of the matter is that </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the <i>textual</i> case for the interpretation that Gorsuch described as an atextual tweak is, if perhaps not <i>quite</i> unambiguously correct, compelling enough that the Federal Circuit argued </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">with considerable force in an 8-3 decision that "<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6327693052942039768&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1488">[t]aking the language [of the statute] literally, one would conclude</a>" that the matters Gorsuch argued were clearly <i>within </i>the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, and could only be put outside it on atextual and dubious policy grounds, were "<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6327693052942039768&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1488">clearly <i>beyond</i> our jurisdiction</a>." </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Influenced, however, by their sister circuits, which hadn't exactly found the statute ambiguous, but had in some instances found it difficult enough to write a few pages about it, they did pause to judiciously consider Gorsuch's preferred non-literal alternative; rejected it at great length as textually foreclosed, as had the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5647135287795366455&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">Fifth</a>, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15049851071435891206&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">Tenth</a>, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7292598083256371994&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">First</a>, and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14661174191997640727&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">D.C. Circuits</a> in interpreting a materially similar version of the statute for much the same textual reasons; and finally added in a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6327693052942039768&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1490">brief policy-themed coda</a>
(Part IV of a five-part opinion, counting the conclusion) what Gorsuch
represents and quotes as the sole driver of the Federal Circuit's decision. A delightful and elegant <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6327693052942039768&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1491">concurring opinion</a> by Judge Nichols argued that the case for the majority's position was "even stronger than the opinion spells out," that bifurcation was clearly foreclosed, and that it was "as unreasonable as it is contrary to the statutory language."</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Finally, a thoughtful, though to my mind ultimately unpersuasive dissent "<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6327693052942039768&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1494">disagree[d]</a> with the majority's assertion that [the statute], read literally, 'clearly' indicates" that appeals of this kind were beyond the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction, found a degree of ambiguity in the statute, argued that Congress never considered or addressed whether MSPB appeals would be severed or not (unlike Gorsuch, who claims Congress plainly mandated severance), and ultimately <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6327693052942039768&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1496">relied rather heavily</a> on statements in committee reports on the general purpose of the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional grant in deciding that severance was the best way to handle this open question. </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Moreover, after the Federal Circuit's decision, the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3845661585184885534&q=tolliver+v+deniro&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1396">Ninth Circuit</a>, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1993586021178219115&q=chappell+v+chao&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1378">Eleventh Circuit</a>, and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14133278580543484469&q=kean+v+stone&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p283">Third Circuit</a> all followed along for the same reasons. (So did the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=18052022819360578667&q=924+f2d+61&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">Fourth</a>, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5140552215645417290&q=768+f2d+756&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">Sixth</a>, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12379230597053517918&q=339+f3d+454&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">twice</a>, and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10936166658713344504&q=32+f3d+315&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">Eighth</a>, but all in rather cursory fashion, though that only underscores how easy they found the problem.)</span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">No court ever disagreed with these eleven circuits; indeed, the question Gorsuch wanted to decide wasn't the question the Court granted cert to address, the parties both argued he was wrong, the government doing so against its interests, and the Court itself <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12197975702902609517&q=kloeckner+v+solis&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p604">unanimously ratified</a> the lower-court consensus five years ago in another case where the parties both took it as a given. </span></span>So to recap, the Federal Circuit majority thought itself textually compelled to reject Gorsuch's position, like four circuits before it, six after it, and the Solicitor General's office; the dissent, acknowledging the majority's determination of unambiguity, thought itself textually free to adopt Gorsuch's position, claimed the statute didn't resolve the question, and only ended up where Gorsuch did on the ground of a freewheeling purposivist frolic through the legislative history. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of course, in theory Gorsuch could have seen something in these difficult statutes that the Federal Circuit en banc and ten other circuits didn't see. That, however, is emphatically not the case; at least if he did he's not telling us. While there's a lot of fun rhetoric in his dissent, there isn't a word in it disputing the textual reasons that the Federal Circuit and nearly every regional circuit in the country thought that what Gorsuch called an atextual tweak was plainly the law; most of the relevant language isn't even quoted. After reading the dissent a half-dozen times, I still don't know why he even thinks the statute ambiguous, much less why he thinks it means what it means. </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The problem Gorsuch wanted the Court to take up in <i>Perry</i> isn't nearly as complicated as commentary on the case made out to be, though it admittedly isn't very interesting either. First, the MSPB hears appeals from certain federal employment decisions under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7701">5 U.S.C. 7701</a>, including terminations or reductions in pay. Under that grant of administrative appellate jurisdiction, it decides questions of civil-service law. The MSPB's decisions in 7701 appeals are reviewable by petition in the Federal Circuit under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7703">5 U.S.C. 7703(b)(1)(A)</a>. That much is undisputed.</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Next, under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7702">5 U.S.C. 7702</a>, the MSPB also decides appeals in "case[s]," <i>see </i>7702(a)(1), (b)(4), and (f), in which an employee "has been affected by an action," otherwise appealable to the MSPB under 7701, and "alleges that <i>a</i> basis for the action" was a violation of certain employment-discrimination statutes. In a 7702 appeal, the MSPB is required to "decide <i>both </i>the issue of discrimination <i>and </i>the appealable action" as it would in a 7701 appeal. (All those quotes are from 7702(a)(1).)</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">No one disputes, not even Gorsuch, really, that a federal employee can raise both civil-service issues and employment-discrimination issues in a single 7702 appeal, not just employment-discrimination. The three Federal Circuit dissenters whose position he rescued from early-80s obscurity <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6327693052942039768&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1494">wrote</a> that "[i]t is uncontested that Congress envisioned that the MSPB render a single decision in a 'mixed' case." And, indeed 7702 describes the product of such double-barreled appeals, in 7702(a)(3), as a singular "decision" and "judicially reviewable action." </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Gorsuch, for his part, while not explicitly admitting the existence of these non-bifurcated MSPB proceedings, could at most only <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-399_5436.pdf#page=28">suggest</a> that not <i>every</i> 7702 appeal or "mixed case" involves a mix of discrimination and civil-service issues, because some may only involve appealable employment <i>actions</i>, e.g., terminations, that solely raised employment-discrimination issues. Entirely true as a matter of what 7702 says and means in practice, but equally irrelevant. The question Gorsuch wanted to decide is whether the unitary 7702 appeals that <i>do </i>present a mix of civil-service and discrimination issues bifurcate on judicial review into two separate cases that land in two different courts.</span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Finally, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/7703">section 7703(b)(1)(A)</a> generally grants the Federal Circuit jurisdiction to review the MSPB's "final order[s] or final decision[s]," "[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection," i.e., 7703(b)(2). And what 7703(b)(2) says in relevant part is this: "Cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702 of this title shall be filed under [enumerated provisions of employment-discrimination law], as applicable."</span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, what are these "cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702"? Well, in the view of the Federal Circuit, ten other circuits, and the majority in <i>Perry</i>, they are quite simply the "cases" that the MSPB hears under section 7702. Section 7702 talks about the MSPB deciding certain "cases," and describes those cases as ones involving appealable employment actions, <i>an</i> alleged basis for which is discrimination. Again, not necessarily the only basis, but <i>a </i>basis, and the MSPB is required in such a "case" to "decide both the issue of discrimination and the appealable action" and render a unitary "decision" that "shall be a judicially reviewable action." </span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">So, the Federal Circuit argued rather fulsomely, a 7702 "case," whether containing only employment-discrimination issues or employment-discrimination issues and other issues, is a unitary case before the MSPB, and remains a unitary "case" and "judicially reviewable action" in district court, to which such "cases" are routed. Perhaps it's a little odd to talk about a "case of discrimination" when one means a case presenting, among other things, discrimination claims, but that's just what 7702 says the "cases" that are "subject to the provisions of 7702" are.</span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Whatever made Justice Gorsuch think that this rather literal, even somewhat crabbed interpretation of 7702 and 7703 is not only wrong, but a "seriously atextual," willful "judicial tinkering" with the statute? And what could have led such a self-styled textualist to believe that "cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of 7702" actually only means what 7702 calls "the issue of discrimination" that the MSPB decides <i>in</i> a 7702 "case," leaving the other half of that 7702 "case" or "judicially reviewable action" for review in the Federal Circuit? </span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I have no idea. Again, Gorsuch never says a word about the lower courts' plain-language interpretation of 7703, their harping on 7702's distinction between a discrimination "issue" and a larger "case" concluding in a "decision"/"reviewable action" on all issues before the MSPB, their argument that 7702 defines 7703(b)(2)'s reference to "cases of discrimination subject to . . . 7702," or any of the other textual points in the lower courts' favor. He <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-399_5436.pdf#page=22">quotes the relevant language</a> in 7703(b)(2), not pausing for a second over what it means; misleadingly paraphrases 7702 in three quotation-free sentences as a statute about pure "cases of discrimination," glossing completely over all the awkward language in 7702 about unitary cases, decisions, and judicially reviewable actions with embedded discrimination issues; and <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-399_5436.pdf#page=23">finally announces</a> "the statutory scheme is plain": civil service disputes go to the Federal Circuit, and "discrimination cases go to district court." That just doesn't cut it.</span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As far as I can tell, the one textual argument Gorsuch's got to support all his textualist <i>Sturm und Drang</i> is the <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-399_5436.pdf#page=25">fair enough point</a> that 7703(b)(2) says that "cases of discrimination" are supposed to be "filed under" employment-discrimination statutes. (Most of Gorsuch's arguments, ironically, are <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-399_5436.pdf#page=26">pragmatic or purposivist ones</a> about the difficulties, obscurities and costs of district-court review of civil-service claims, which it's fair to say Congress failed to fully address.) How do you file an appeal of the MSPB's decision on a civil-service issue under an employment-discrimination statute? You can't, it would seem, which suggests, perhaps a little paradoxically, that 7703(b)(2) "cases of discrimination subject to . . . 7702" only involve the discrimination "issues" embedded within 7702's "cases." </span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The idea that 7702 discrimination "issues" embedded in mixed 7702 "cases" blossom under 7703(b)(2) into "cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of 7702," while the other half of the MSPB's "decision" in the mixed 7702 "case" blossoms under 7703(b)(1)(A) into a freestanding "final order or final decision" of its own reviewable in the Federal Circuit; that the 7702 "case" and MSPB "decision" themselves undergo a process of 7703-induced fission; and that all this is made unarguably clear by 7703(b)(2)'s directive that "cases of discrimination subject to . . . 7702" are to be filed under discrimination statutes, is certainly inventive</span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, if entirely unexpressed in Justice Gorsuch's opinion, which again fails to quote 7702 once or acknowledge the reality of multi-issue 7702 cases. (A remarkable omission, given that 7703(b)(2) refers you to 7702 to see what the "cases of discrimination" it's talking about are.) And to be fair, it's not a completely unreasonable view; the Federal Circuit dissenters <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6327693052942039768&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1494">ably argued</a> the statute <i>could</i> be read that way. But as far as textual points about the meaning of "cases of discrimination subject to . . . 7702" go, Justice Gorsuch has one decent one to the Federal Circuit's half-dozen, plus its rather sensible ancillary concern about bifurcation impairing judicial economy that he lampoons. </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Besides, even if the consensus reading of 7703(b)(2) didn't have vastly more text on its side than Justice Gorsuch has on his, Justice Gorsuch's one decent textual point is hardly compelling upon careful reflection. One could quite reasonably, for example, write a statute providing that "cases of discrimination shall be filed under" certain federal discrimination laws in district court, even if another statute allowed plaintiffs to bring pendent state-law claims with their discrimination claims. One wouldn't suppose that a statute like that meant that pendent state-law claims weren't part of the "case of discrimination" that belonged in district court. Likewise, the fact that 7703(b)(2) calls for filing under discrimination statutes can't be fairly read to mandate</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—certainly not unambiguously so</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span>that the entirety of the "case of discrimination subject to . . . 7702" must be filed under those statutes.</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">At oral argument, the government and Christopher Landau, Perry's counsel, both stood up to Justice Gorsuch's novel reading of 7703(b)(2). There, Gorsuch was forced to confront <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/16-399_3f14.pdf#page=48">the government's well-worn point</a> that 7702 defines a case of discrimination subject to 7702 "as a mixed case that includes both discrimination and other components." To this, he had a curious response. </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This argument, he said, "raises the question what 'subject to' means, right?" That's true enough; the basis for saying that 7703(b)(2) "cases of discrimination" are the "cases" described in 7702 is the phrase "subject to the provisions of 7702." But how many ways are there to read "subject to" in that sentence? Cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702 just means, can only mean, cases of discrimination governed by section 7702, which is to say the cases of discrimination described by 7702. The point of a reference to 7702 is to distinguish 7702 "cases of discrimination," the ones 7702 governs, from all the other discrimination cases in the world. Justice Gorsuch, however, saw a different possible reading, and at that point things got confusing. I'll just let Justice Gorsuch and the assistant to the Solicitor General take it <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/16-399_3f14.pdf#page=49">from here</a>:</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">JUSTICE GORSUCH: . . .
And -- and you're equating “subject to” with “meeting the test of.” But “subject
to” can also mean subject to. It can be tested under. Not that it meets the
test, but it can be tested under, right? That's often how Congress uses that
phrase</span>.<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;"> </span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">MR. FLETCHER: I -- I
understand. I -- I may not be grasping in that sense. I understand that you
might use it to say this is true, subject to some other provision that might
qualify it. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">JUSTICE GORSUCH: Right. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">MR. FLETCHER: I don't think
that's how Congress used it here.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">JUSTICE GORSUCH: It may or may
not qualify, not that it does qualify. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">MR. FLETCHER: I guess -- </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">JUSTICE GORSUCH: Often, it's
used in that sense, right? </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">MR. FLETCHER: I -- I'm not sure
that it -- I -- I can agree with that. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">JUSTICE GORSUCH: Really? Why
not? You just gave me a good example.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">MR. FLETCHER: Then I think maybe
I'm misunderstanding the question. I -- I agree sometimes Congress says the
rule is you go to district court, subject to, in this case, you can go to some
other tribunal. So it's describing an exception.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">I think that that's not what
it's doing here. Here, it's using that as a description --</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">JUSTICE GORSUCH: Do you have
any authority for that proposition?</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">MR. FLETCHER: <i>Kloeckner </i>[a
unanimous 2012 <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-184_5ifl.pdf">opinion of
the Court</a> rejecting Gorsuch's interpretation in either holding or dictum, though the <i>Perry </i>majority <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-399_5436.pdf#page=5">thought it holding</a>],
which I think says, you know, this is a--</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">JUSTICE GORSUCH: Besides <i>Kloeckner</i>.
Anything else?</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , sans-serif;">JUSTICE KAGAN [the author of <i>Kloeckner</i>]:
Well, <i>Kloeckner </i>certainly says it, but beyond <i>Kloeckner</i>, I mean,
merits cases that -- that have been -- have been going to district court for
years prior to <i>Kloeckner</i>; isn't that right?</span></span></span></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As somebody who once almost wrote a whole article on whether the word "under" in a statute meant "subject to," "by reason of the authority of," or "under the heading of" (the subject, in one instance, of a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11117802937549581580&q=ardestani+v+ins&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">classic circuit split</a> between <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7672947232325689819&q=ardestani+v+ins&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">then-Judge Ginsburg</a> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11771911150445010089&q=ardestani+v+ins&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">Judge Reinhardt</a>), I feel I should be able to understand what Justice Gorsuch is talking about here. But neither I, nor seemingly Assistant Fletcher, nor anyone I know, can quite figure out what alternative sense of "subject to" he's talking about or how it could fit in this statute. If I understand him, and it's a big if, "subject to the provisions of section 7702" isn't descriptive; rather, it means something like "if 7702 allows," so that the whole first sentence of 7703(b)(2) should be parsed, "Cases of discrimination, if allowed by 7702, shall be filed under the following discrimination statutes." That seems to me to be a non-starter for a few reasons. </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">First, and it's a rather nitpicky but both intuitive and grammatically correct objection, 7703(b)(2) doesn't contain commas before and after the "subject to" clause; it reads "Cases of discrimination subject to the provisions of section 7702 of this title shall be filed," not "Cases of discrimination, subject to . . . 7702 of this title, shall be filed . . . ." Now, if "subject to" were an exception to "shall be filed," as Gorsuch seemed to suggest, it would technically be an adverbial phrase modifying "shall be filed." If it means what I think it means, and what all the courts to interpret it have thought it meant, it's an adjectival phrase that modifies "cases of discrimination." </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">If "subject to" is an adjectival phrase modifying "cases of discrimination," as I claim, the lack of commas makes sense, like saying "the bushes <i>under the tree</i> died" instead of "the bushes, under the tree, died." Adjectival phrases following the nouns or noun-phrases they modify aren't set off by commas unless they're <a href="http://www.cws.illinois.edu/workshop/writers/restrictiveclauses/">non-restrictive</a>. Adverbial phrases immediately following nouns or noun-phrases, though, are set off by commas, or they'd be mistaken for restrictive adjectival phrases. </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">For example, "Asher, <i>with some exceptions</i>, is usually readable" needs commas because "with some exceptions" is actually modifying "is" in that sentence, not "Asher." Consider a closer example: "Eastern European nations subject to Soviet control trade with the United States" means that Eastern European nations <i>that are </i>subject to Soviet control do such trade, but "</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Eastern European nations, subject to Soviet control, trade with the United States</span></span></span></span></span></span>" means "Eastern European nations trade with the United States<i>, subject to what's allowed by </i>Soviet control." So if 7703(b)(2) meant what Gorsuch suggests, it would have read "Cases of discrimination, subject to . . . 7702, shall be filed . . . ." To claim it means what he says is to claim that 7703(b)(2) as written is a scrivener's error. </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Second, it's actually really hard to find a provision of 7702 that would carve out some exception to 7703(b)(2)'s mandate that "cases of discrimination . . . shall be filed" under discrimination statutes in district court. Gorsuch, recall, seems to read 7703(b)(2) to mean that cases of discrimination, subject to 7702 allowing it, shall be filed in district court under discrimination statutes. But 7702 is all about what the MSPB does; it does nothing to stop anyone from filing a "case of discrimination" in district court. </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The one relevant thing in 7702 to Gorsuch's proposed interpretation are several timing provisions about when the MSPB decision in a mixed case is deemed a "judicially reviewable action," but the problem with reading "subject to the provisions of section 7702" as a carve-out for untimeliness given 7702's rules about reviewability accrual is that 7703(b)(2)</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—you guessed it</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—<i>specifically </i>invokes those rules elsewhere. To wit, 7703(b)(2)'s last sentence reads, "</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any such case filed under
any such section must be filed within 30 days after the date the
individual filing the case received notice of the judicially reviewable
action under such section 7702." So that's not what "subject to . . . 7702" can be all about.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Third, even if Gorsuch were right, we'd still have the following problem. The Federal Circuit is granted jurisdiction over MSPB decisions in 7703(b)(1), less the carve-out for district-court jurisdiction in 7703(b)(2); that carve-out covers "cases of discrimination." Bracketing "subject to 7702," cases of discrimination" still aren't any old "case of discrimination" under the enumerated federal laws, but some subset of MSPB orders. Now, if one wanted to figure out what a case of discrimination that also involved review of an MSPB decision looked like, one would naturally be led to 7702, and there one would find that the MSPB renders unitary decisions, in "cases" presenting (exclusively <i>or</i> non-exclusively) discrimination "issues," that are treated as unitary "judicially reviewable actions," a phrase 7703(b)(2) picks up. How, then, could one conclude that the 7702 "decision"/"judicially reviewable action" on all issues turns into a judicially reviewable action on discrimination issues only in 7703? It's a real stretch. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In sum, you can argue the statute unambiguously means what everyone's always said it clearly means except for Justice Gorsuch and the three Federal Circuit dissenters; you can possibly say it's ambiguous and opt for Gorsuch's reading for purposivist reasons of unitary Federal Circuit doctrine on civil-services law, as the Federal Circuit dissenters did. Justice Gorsuch's position that the statute is plain <i>his</i> way, however, is simply unarguable, and if it can be argued, it's yet to be done because Justice Gorsuch has never attempted to argue it. Instead, the comments I quoted above at oral argument were his only attempt to deal with the text that supports the consensus view, and an implausible attempt at that; his dissent either omits that text (7702) completely, or in the case of "subject to . . . 7702," doesn't attempt to explain how it's consistent with his interpretation.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That much is vexing enough. But what I find really frustrating is that even Justice Gorsuch patently saw at oral argument that the statute is ambiguous at best. Then, he <i>said</i> that "subject to" could bear multiple meanings, and that one permissible meaning of "subject to," "meeting the test of" (though I would proffer "governed by" or "described in"), supports the overwhelming consensus view. That being so, I can't understand why he would go to such lengths to deride this confessedly permissible reading as a faithless judicial "tweak," and why he didn't at least explain, in his dissent, why he thought it wrong. </span></span></span></span> </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>***</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Inspired by Aaron Nielson's inclusion of lesser-known Tom Petty songs in his <a href="http://yalejreg.com/nc/d-c-circuit-review-reviewed-most-things-i-worry-about/">last edition</a> of D.C. Circuit Review, I've included this <a href="https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLc6Wmwuzi2EQ5VOvxr1sF_gpdyv1bKg6L">chronological playlist</a> of fifty-one lesser-known '60s Beach Boys songs in this final edition of OT 2016 Statutory Term in Review for my dear readers. I've completely skipped their most famous album, <i>Pet Sounds </i>(which I heretically don't like very much anyway), most of the more recognizable hits, and included a bunch of unreleased songs and alternate versions, though even people who don't know the Beach Boys very well will probably recognize a few songs here. (I've also included what's been described as a proto-shoegaze live recording of "Surfer Girl.") It's a long list, but I particularly recommend, in no particular order, "Breakaway," "Busy Doin' Nothin,'" "Passing By," "Your Summer Dream," </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"Little Pad," </span></span>all the "Can't Wait Too Long" recordings, especially the first two, "Cabin Essence," the pre-Brian-Wilson-nervous-breakdown recording of "Wind Chimes" and the distinctly post-Brian-Wilson-nervous-breakdown recording of "Wind Chimes," "You're So Good to Me," "Please Let Me Wonder," "Don't Hurt My Little Sister," "Why Do Fools Fall in Love," "The Little Girl I Once Knew," and "Let Him Run Wild."</span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-49560433688892669532017-10-08T00:04:00.000-07:002017-10-08T18:04:05.011-07:00Partisan Gerrymanders Aren't Intentional Viewpoint Discrimination (or Any Other Type of Discrimination)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As I mentioned in my last post, there's an increasingly popular argument going around that it's unconstitutional for state legislators to draw districts for the purpose of advantaging their party and disadvantaging the opposition party—period. (Several new articles making this argument are collected <a href="https://electionlawblog.org/?p=94441">here</a>.) The argument, or a key part of it, goes like this. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">To begin with, everyone agrees it would be unconstitutional to impose a tax on the basis of partisan affiliation in order to put members of one party in a worse financial spot than another; it would also be, indeed has been held, unconstitutional to give out civil-service jobs on the basis of partisan affiliation in order to empower members of one party and disadvantage members of another. In fact, it's unconstitutional to do just about anything in order to favor members of one party and disfavor members of another; whatever the state did in that vein would be viewpoint discrimination. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Partisan gerrymandering, the argument goes, isn't any different or exceptional. Partisan gerrymandering is just another way of disfavoring or, in the language of <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3011062">this article</a>, subordinating members of one party and favoring members of another. How so? Well, a "Republican" by definition is just someone who supports Republican candidates, and a "Democrat" by definition is just someone who supports Democratic ones. When a state draws districts with the purpose of making it hard for Democratic or Republican candidates to get elected, its intention is necessarily to frustrate Democrats' or Republicans' electoral preferences, which are the very preferences that define them as Democrats or Republicans. Thus, far from partisan gerrymandering being the one sort of law motivated by partisan favor or disfavor that's okay, it's the quintessential case of invidious partisan favoritism. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I don't think this argument works. To see why, consider these analogous arguments, or at least arguments that I think are analogous. It would be unconstitutional to impose a tax on voters who support affirmative action, to discriminate in public employment against voters who support affirmative action, or indeed to do just about anything to disfavor voters who support affirmative action. That would be impermissible viewpoint discrimination. Therefore, "<a href="http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0386p-06.pdf#page=11">rigg[ing] the game</a>," as one court put it, against voters who support affirmative action by prohibiting it in the state constitution, thereby making it much tougher for voters who support affirmative action to get what <i>they</i> want than voters who oppose affirmative action or support other kinds of admissions preferences, must also be unconstitutional. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of course, that's just what the Sixth Circuit held in <i>Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action</i>, though even the Sixth Circuit thought its anti-game-rigging theory was limited to policies that benefit racial minorities and didn't protect other groups. We know what happened next; even that narrow formulation of anti-game-rigging theory was <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-682_8759.pdf">reversed</a> by the Supreme Court 6-2. It turns out that it's quite constitutional to "rig the game" against supporters of affirmative action when the "game" being played isn't taxes or public employment, but a political fight over affirmative action itself.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This isn't because (or at least not only because) the Fourteenth Amendment "does not require what it barely permits," as Judge <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2658730258715710529&q=coalition+to+defend+affirmative+action&hl=en&as_sdt=4,111,126#p709">O'Scannlain</a>, Judge <a href="http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/12a0386p-06.pdf#page=60">Sutton</a>, and Justice <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-682_8759.pdf#page=27">Scalia</a> all argued. The Constitution more than "barely permits" marijuana legalization; it absolutely permits it, is completely indifferent to it. However, the following argument doesn't work: it would be unconstitutional to discriminate against voters who support marijuana legalization in taxation, public employment, public university admissions, or certainly in the realm of speech</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—that's all viewpoint discrimination</span>. Therefore, it must also be unconstitutional to "rig the game" against marijuana-legalization supporters by amending a state constitution to remove drug policy from the ballot-initiative process, or amending the state constitution or state legislative rules to require a supermajority for a ballot initiative on drug legalization, or for passage of a bill legalizing marijuana. And further still, if it's unconstitutional to merely make it <i>harder</i> to legalize marijuana, do you know what's a really unconstitutional subordination of people who want to legalize marijuana? Banning marijuana.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Obviously none of that follows. What does follow from this illustration is that it seems it is unconstitutional to rig the employment, taxation, university admissions, or speech "games" against supporters of marijuana legalization, but <i>not</i> the marijuana legalization game. More generally, what we learn from this and innumerable hypotheticals that could be spun out just like it is that it is unconstitutional to discriminate against a group of people defined by some political preference <i>except with respect to their achieving that preference</i>. Or more precisely, "discriminating" against a preference group by thwarting their preferences isn't discrimination against that group at all.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of course, someone might make the following objection. When a state bans marijuana or makes it harder to legalize marijuana, it's not doing it to disfavor the people who support marijuana; it's doing it for the purpose of banning marijuana. That's why those things are constitutional and discriminating against marijuana supporters in taxation/employment/admissions/speech is not</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—not because it's impermissible to discriminate against people with a particular preference in any way except making it hard for them to achieve their preferences, but because the reason for making it harder to legalize marijuana isn't to disfavor marijuana supporters, while the motive for doing all those other bad things is. On the other hand, the partisan-intent theorist will claim, the purpose of a partisan-advantage-driven gerrymander <i>is</i> to subordinate members of one party and favor another, not to block the disadvantaged party's political agenda.</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I think this gets to the nub of whether partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional, at least on a theory of invidious motive. To see precisely when it would be accurate to say that a partisan gerrymander had an invidious motive, consider a claim of an anti-Hasidic-Jewish gerrymander; Hasidic Jews in New York City actually made such a claim in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2968500296906052166&q=430+us+144&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006"><i>UJO v. Carey</i></a>. I don't use the example to suggest that party is different from religion or race; indeed, I'll assume that discriminating against the one is just as bad as discriminating against the other. Rather, I want to use the example to get clear on the distinction between a gerrymander that's genuinely intended to subordinate some group of voters and a gerrymander that targets preferences, as opposed to the groups that have them.</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">A state legislature might have a variety of reasons for drawing district lines that reduced the political power of a geographically concentrated Hasidic Jewish community by splitting it up between multiple districts. One reason might be that Hasidic Jews don't tend to vote for the candidates that black voters support; in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act and draw a sufficient number of districts where black voters are able to elect their preferred candidates, it becomes necessary to crack the Hasidic community. That's what happened in <i>UJO</i>, and the Court didn't think that was an anti-Hasidic gerrymander, though its purpose was to help candidates that black voters favored and that Hasidic voters happened to disfavor. The reason we wouldn't call it an anti-Hasidic gerrymander is that it wasn't done <i>for the sake</i> of harming Hasidics or their political power. Hasidics just happened to be an obstacle to advancing black political power, so their political power was intentionally reduced.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Next, perhaps Hasidic Jews uniformly favor Republicans (I have no idea if this is the case), and New York wants to draw district lines that favor Democrats. In order to do this, in multiple cases, they have to splinter Hasidic communities between multiple districts, or put them all in one where they can't have any impact on the elections in others. Again, that would not be deemed an anti-Hasidic gerrymander; though the state would have intentionally harmed Hasidic voting strength, it didn't do it to harm Hasidics, but to benefit Democrats, who Hasidics hypothetically disfavor. The Court has upheld that kind of politically motivated ethnic sorting of voters (so long as it's part of a larger political sorting of voters and entire districts aren't organized around ethnic stereotypes of political behavior) in cases like <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=172627255846891648&q=easley+v+cromartie&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006"><i>Easley v. Cromartie</i></a>; it doesn't understand it as a racial gerrymander. Maybe it's an impermissible partisan gerrrymander, but not an anti-Hasidic one.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">So w</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">hat would count as an anti-Hasidic gerrymander? Suppose Hasidics didn't reliably favor any particular party, but swung from election to election. Suppose too that Hasidics don't pose a problem for Voting Rights Act compliance. An anti-Semitic legislature that simply doesn't want Hasidics to have a meaningful say in the outcome of elections splinters compact Hasidic communities up into so many tiny pieces that their votes will rarely have a dispositive effect on any election. <i>That</i> would be an anti-Hasidic gerrymander, one motivated to politically subordinate Hasidics and make it difficult for them to achieve their preferences <i>whatever</i> they happen to be, not to thwart particular electoral preferences that Hasidic voters happen to have.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, are partisan gerrymanders like that sort of gerrymander, or like the gerrymanders I described that target preferences rather than subordinating groups of voters? I think they're obviously gerrymanders of the second variety. A Republican state, for example, doesn't diminish Democratic voting strength for the sake of thwarting registered Democratic voters' preferences <i>whatever </i>they happen to be, whether they're for electing Democrats or Republicans. If a bunch of registered Democrats started voting for Republicans in state-legislative elections, while continuing to vote for Democrats in national elections, the state wouldn't keep its state-legislative gerrymander in place the way an anti-Semitic legislature would keep its anti-Hasidic gerrymander in place regardless of who Hasidics happen to vote for. </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Rather, it would rejigger its state-legislative gerrymander while keeping its congressional gerrymander constant. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The reason it would rejigger the one gerrymander and not the other is because the purpose of partisan gerrymanders isn't to disempower some group of voters, but to prevent candidates of a particular party from getting elected. Partisan gerrymanders target preferences, not people; they kneecap candidates, not voters. To the extent they intentionally reduce particular voters' political power, they do so only because of the transient preferences those voters happen to have at the moment, not because of an inelastic desire to subordinate those voters. So it's not true that partisan gerrymanders meaningfully differ from laws that "gerrymander" marijuana-legalization politics; both are just intended to block some political preference, not to harm the people who have it. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Next, one might <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239491">object</a> that the motives for partisan gerrymanders are more "tribal" than the motives for rigging marijuana legalization politics against the legalizers. The politicians who change the procedural rules of legalizing drugs to make marijuana legalization harder have some good-faith policy rationale for doing what they're doing, but partisan gerrymanderers have no more motive than increasing the political power of their "tribe" and diminishing that of the opposing tribe. Even if partisan gerrymanders' targets are political preferences rather than the voters who have them, their motive is so base that we shouldn't think of them like other preference gerrymanders.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I think that's wrong, but in the first place I'm not sure why it matters. Consider the following example. Nothing is more tribal than intrastate college-football rivalries; there can be no high-minded purpose in supporting one team and opposing another. And if </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a state had two state universities with popular football teams, it
couldn't discriminate against supporters of the one and favor supporters
of the other in employment, taxation, speech, or anything else. That would be viewpoint discrimination of an exceptionally inane kind. </span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">However, the state obviously could favor one team over the other in the sphere of football, disappointing the other team's fans in the process. It could make one of the two teams the state's official football team,
decide to pour money into the one team and starve the other, simply
disband one of the two teams, or to get closer to gerrymandering, have
one set of procedures for appropriating funds for the one team and
another much more onerous set of procedures for appropriating funds for the
other team. All those policies would serve no other purpose than to delight fans of the one team and immiserate fans of the other, but like my other examples, that's not viewpoint discrimination; it's picking a side of a funding dispute <i>on which</i> people have views, not discriminating against the people with the rejected view. As stupid, petty and tribal as the choice to favor one of the teams would be, it still isn't viewpoint discrimination.</span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">said, I don't think partisan gerrymanders are anything like picking a side in a football rivalry. The reason politicians gerrymander for their party isn't ultimately loyalty to the party, but their desire to advance the policies for which it stands and hinder the policies for which its opponent stands. For example, suppose that segregationist Southern Democrats discover in 1964 that their party has just become the party of civil rights, voting rights, and welfare for the non-white poor on the national level. Will they continue to draw Democratic gerrymanders and do so around the new voters who join the party while diluting the electoral strength of the voters who leave? Or will they switch over time to another party and draw gerrymanders in order to thwart the policies that Democrats used to oppose? I think we <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Party_switching_in_the_United_States">know</a> <a href="https://www.270towin.com/historical_maps/1960_large.png">the</a> <a href="https://www.270towin.com/historical_maps/1964_large.png">answer</a> <a href="https://www.270towin.com/1968_Election/">to</a> that question.</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Or, suppose that President Trump announces tomorrow that the Republican Party is now the party of single-payer healthcare, progressive taxation, and immigration reform. Will Republican state legislatures still churn out Republican congressional-districting gerrymanders, attempting to draw districts that diminish the power of former Republican voters who left the party and maximize the power of all the new Republican voters who join up? Or might they start a third party and gerrymander for that party? I think it's unlikely that loyalty to the name brand would persist for very long. Instead of Republican gerrymanders, we would soon see gerrymanders by formerly Republican legislators for whatever party opposes single-payer healthcare, progressive taxation, and immigration reform. Partisan gerrymandering may, as Justin Levitt <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2239491">argues</a>, be motivated by "tribal partisanship," but the "tribes" are held together by some minimal set of policy preferences and attitudes, not, when the rubber meets the road, a party logo. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">One
might argue that I'm just wrong and that thwarting a group's preferences is, in at least some contexts, discrimination against that group. For
example, wouldn't a ban of <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Challah">challah</a>
discriminate against Jews? And if so, isn't that only because they like to eat challah in their religious rituals? Didn't same-sex-marriage bans discriminate against gays and lesbians, given their preference for same-sex marriage over opposite-sex marriage? </span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I think the answer to these questions is that, if challah bans or same-sex marriage bans are discriminatory, they are only so because their purpose is to harm the groups that like challah and same-sex marriage, not because banning or impeding a group's preference is ever tantamount to discrimination by itself. Take challah. As we know, it's not deemed religious discrimination to ban peyote, even though some religions smoke peyote in their rituals. That's because the purpose of those bans is to ban peyote for the sake of banning peyote, not to discriminate against religions that smoke peyote. The same could be true of any number of substances or foods used in religious ceremonies.</span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In the case of challah, though, there's no conceivable purpose for banning challah other than animus against Jewish people, unless challah were banned as part of a general ban of fattening breads. Such a law would fall, despite its facial neutrality, under <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=975414503455261754&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p533"><i>Lukumi Babalu Aye</i></a>. Unless it can be shown that the purpose of partisan gerrymanders is really to harm the voters who support the minority party independent of their political preferences, partisan gerrymanders aren't like banning challah. In reality, of course, partisan gerrymanderers gerrymander to increase their party's chance of winning elections and instantiating its agenda, not to subordinate voters who like the minority party for the sake of subordinating those voters.</span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As for same-sex marriage, I tend to think </span></span>it's more correct to explain <i>Obergefell</i> in terms of burdening the right to marry than in terms of discrimination against gays and lesbians. (Likewise, if partisan gerrymandering poses a First Amendment problem, it's a problem of indirect burden on people with partisan views, not viewpoint discrimination. I may address the question of indirect burden in a later post.) The universal prohibition of polygamy doesn't seem to me to discriminate against people who wish to form polygamous marriages; at most, it unduly restricts their right to marry. State marriage laws' age requirements don't<i> discriminate </i>against high-school students who, as the Beach Boys <a href="https://youtu.be/fWsDpZzsgs0">sang</a>, "want to get married, but [are] so young [and] can't marry no one"; age requirements may pose a liberty problem, and they may pose an age-discrimination problem, but they do not discriminate against the class of persons who want to get married in their teens. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That said, it could be argued that the only thing that motivated same-sex marriage bans was animus against the people who wanted to obtain gay marriages, just as the only thing that could possibly motivate a challah ban would be animus against the Jewish people who eat challah. If and (I think) only if that is so, same-sex marriage bans were an instance of anti-gay discrimination. If not, talk of same-sex marriage bans as discrimination or subordination is just another instance of natural but fallacious conflation between thwarting a preference and discriminating against the people who have it</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—the same conflation that grounds arguments that partisan gerrymanders are a way of intentionally subordinating minority party members. </span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">***</span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I should note that it's possible that, while partisan gerrymanders don't disfavor or subordinate minority party voters, the purpose to advantage one party and disadvantage another is simply an impermissible purpose, regardless of whether all policies motivated by this purpose discriminate against minority party voters. For example, while <a href="https://ssrn.com/abstract=3019390">this article</a> by Michael Kang argues that partisan gerrymandering discriminates against minority party voters, it relies at times on the somewhat different claim that official government partisanship is impermissible</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—that the government couldn't endorse candidates for office, or contribute funds to only one party's candidates' campaigns. Laws like that wouldn't discriminate against voters (they would discriminate against candidates), but they'd still probably be invalid on the ground of illicit purpose. So too, one might argue, are partisan gerrymanders for the same reason, even absent viewpoint discrimination against minority-party voters. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I tend to think that partisan gerrymanders can be defended from this argument too; the government probably couldn't officially endorse one side of a ballot initiative or contribute to one side of a ballot-initiative campaign, but I believe it could, as I said above, adopt a supermajority requirement for ballot initiatives on certain subjects, or remove a subject from the ballot-initiative process for the purpose of preventing an officially disfavored position from succeeding. But it's a better argument.</span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-37690662362972599192017-10-04T23:25:00.000-07:002017-10-04T23:25:40.085-07:00A Miscellany of Thoughts on Justice Kennedy's Maximal-Partisanship Hypothetical in Gill<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">1. Justice Kennedy's hypothetical at oral argument in <i>Gill</i> and the answers he received. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As you probably know if you read this blog, Justice Kennedy asked the <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/16-1161_kjfm.pdf#page=20">following hypothetical</a> at oral argument in <i>Gill v. Whitford</i> Tuesday of Erin Murphy, counsel for the Wisconsin State Senate:</span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">You've probably considered the hypo many times. Suppose a state constitution or state statute says all districts shall be designed as closely as possible to conform with traditional principles, but the overriding concern is to increase -- have a maximum number of votes for party X or party Y. What result?</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It didn't, however, seem like Murphy had considered the hypo any times</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—which is odd, for as I'll discuss below, Kennedy had already asked and answered essentially just this hypo himself 13 years ago in his essential <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16656282825028631654&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p306">concurring opinion</a> on the subject in <i>Vieth v. Jubelirer</i></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span></span></span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">as </span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">she <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/16-1161_kjfm.pdf#page=20">began</a> with a tentative "at least you're closer [to something unconstitutional]" answer, drifted into an "I don't think . . . that you've proven a constitutional violation" <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/16-1161_kjfm.pdf#page=21">answer</a> on further questioning from Justice Ginsburg, returned seconds later on still further questioning on the hypo from Justice Alito to allowing that "at least at that point, you know the intent," <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/16-1161_kjfm.pdf#page=23">then confidently told</a> Justice Kagan minutes later that "just finding the intent isn't a problem," after which, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/16-1161_kjfm.pdf#page=27">when told</a> by Justice Kennedy that "I don't think you ever answered the question," she (a) volunteered that his hypo "could be your instance of a -- a problem that can be actually solved by the Constitution," (b) <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/16-1161_kjfm.pdf#page=28">said</a> that whether his hypo violated the Equal Protection Clause or First Amendment was "a little hard to say at this point because, you know, it really just hasn't been fully explored, this concept of how you would come at all this from a First Amendment perspective," and finally (c) <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/16-1161_kjfm.pdf#page=28">answered</a> about 10 seconds later:</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Yes. It would be an unconstitutional, if it was on the face of it, and I think that that would be better thought of probably as an equal protection violation, but you could think of it just as well, I think as a First Amendment violation in the sense that it is viewpoint discrimination against the individuals who the legislation is saying you have to specifically draw the maps in a way to injure, but, again, I --</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: . . . </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">By my count, that's four maybes (the two "at least" answers, the "could be your instance" answer, and the "a little hard to say" answer), two nos, one final and definitive yes, and one stunningly quick switch on "how you would come at all this from a First Amendment perspective." (None of which is to dump on Murphy, who's done a lovely job in her past appearances at the Court.) Wisconsin's SG, for his part, recognizing the significance of the question, picked it up in rebuttal and <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/16-1161_kjfm.pdf#page=64">said that</a> Kennedy's hypothetical statute would violate the First Amendment because it would stigmatize the minority party, not because it would be evidence of a facially partisan gerrymander. This is clever but I don't think it will help Wisconsin, as I doubt anyone will agree that the only problem with that hypothetical is stigma.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">2. The answer I would have given to his hypothetical.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Lamenting how argument went with an appellate-lawyer friend who, like me, wants Wisconsin to win (though I want Wisconsin to win for <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6066081450900314197&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p267">Frankfurterian</a> reasons and he or she has some troglodytic reason or another having to do with the powers of common-law courts at Westminster), my friend asked how I would answer Justice Kennedy's question. That's easy, I said. (Sorry, Erin Murphy.) </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As I had always understood the Court's partisan-gerrymandering precedents and Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in <i>Vieth</i>, or even the <i>Vieth </i>dissents, a gerrymander isn't unconstitutional merely because it has partisan purposes; virtually all redistricting does. Rather, a gerrymander has to go too far, excessively diminish the electoral power of the minority party or excessively entrench the then-majority power. And whether even a law that facially requires maximized partisan advantage in districting, subject to traditional districting principles, results in <i>excessive</i> gerrymanders will depend on the districting plans that maximization generates and how much partisan advantage maximization gets you in those plans. For sometimes a maximally partisan gerrymander may not be all that partisan, given the constraints of traditional districting principles and compliance with federal law, both constitutional (one-person one-vote) and statutory (the Voting Rights Act), that are baked into Justice Kennedy's hypothetical. We could easily imagine, for example, that a particular districting plan that maximized partisan advantage as much as it could while adhering to traditional districting principles and federal law would only translate 50% of statewide votes to 54% of legislative seats in a given election cycle. Is that unconstitutional? It sounds pretty unexceptional.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In order to decide if an admittedly maximally partisan gerrymander did go too far, then, the Court couldn't just decide on the ground of the state's stated aims; it would still have to engage in the line-drawing and measurement problems that have confuted all attempts to decide partisan-gerrymandering claims since the cause of action was recognized. That is to say, first the Court has to draw a non-arbitrary line for how far is too far; next it has to somehow predict whether a districting map will, in future elections, go too far. So far, both have proved impossible tasks, though that doesn't mean they always will. So, I told my friend, a challenge to Justice Kennedy's hypothetical law would be just as nonjusticiable as a challenge to a facially neutral districting scheme, no more no less, and even if Justice Kennedy believes he knows that this scheme was intended to maximize partisan advantage, as do I, whether that maximization is excessively partisan given the constraints on maximization is a nonjusticiable question. At least, that would be my answer were I in Ms. Murphy's position.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">3. . . . which turns out to have been flatly rejected by Justice Kennedy's opinion in <i>Vieth</i>.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The funny thing is, though, is that everything I've just said is completely undermined by what Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in <i>Vieth</i> actually said. In <i>Vieth</i>, Kennedy famously couldn't find partisan-gerrymandering claims justiciable yet, but was unwilling to hold they could never be found justiciable on the ground of some standard that had yet to be offered. People have always thought that the standard he was looking for was an excessiveness standard, but that doesn't seem to be right at all, or at least not in the sense that he's been searching for a quantitative measure of excessiveness.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In the first place, Justice Kennedy already answered his own hypothetical in <i>Vieth</i> in a way that rules out my answer to his question. Arguing that partisan-gerrymandering claims at least might be justiciable, he <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16656282825028631654&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p312">wrote</a> that "[i]</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">f a State passed an enactment that declared 'All future apportionment
shall be drawn so as most to burden Party X's rights to fair and
effective representation, though still in accord with one-person,
one-vote principles,' we would surely conclude the Constitution had been
violated." But why? It can't be because the mere existence of partisan purposes in districting is unconstitutional; that, Kennedy <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16656282825028631654&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p313">wrote</a> a page later, "describes no constitutional flaw." Nor can it logically be because maximizing partisan advantage necessarily works an unconstitutional <i>amount</i> of partisan disadvantage. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The reason is simply this: political "classifications, though generally permissible," are unconstitutional, or so Kennedy <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16656282825028631654&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p307">claims</a> at the very beginning of his opinion, if they "were applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective." The absolute subordination of other "aims of apportionment" to partisanship just is, Kennedy thinks, unlawful. So when Kennedy <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16656282825028631654&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p312">writes</a>, immediately after he poses his hypothetical, of "the possibility . . . that a legislature might attempt to reach the same result [of maximized partisan advantage" without [an] express directive," and of "a standard [that] might emerge that suitably demonstrates" whether a legislature is making that attempt, what he imagines is a standard that "establishes the [partisan] classification is unrelated to the aims of apportionment and thus is used in an impermissible fashion." And later, when he explains why the plaintiffs' claims in <i>Vieth</i> failed, he <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16656282825028631654&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p313">says</a> they "[f]ail[ed] to show that the alleged classifications are unrelated to the aims of apportionment."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Kennedy's implicit rejection of some definition of quantitatively excessive partisan advantage as the Holy Grail of partisan-gerrymandering law, in favor of some as-yet unknown test for excessive subordination of apportionment <i>aims</i> to the <i>purpose</i> of creating partisan advantage, gets much more explicit at the end of his opinion. In what can only be described as one of the more confused and confusing passages in his work, he <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16656282825028631654&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p316">posits</a> that</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—while mere partisan classifications are permissible</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—all "gerrymanders" are bad, no matter how quantitatively excessive:</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That said, courts must be cautious about adopting a standard that turns
on whether the partisan interests in the redistricting process were
excessive. Excessiveness is not easily determined. Consider these
apportionment schemes: In one State, Party X controls the apportionment
process and draws the lines so it captures every congressional seat. In
three other States, Party Y controls the apportionment process. It is
not so blatant or egregious, but proceeds by a more subtle effort,
capturing less than all the seats in each State. Still, the total effect
of Party Y's effort is to capture more new seats than Party X captured.
Party X's gerrymander was more egregious. Party Y's gerrymander was
more subtle. In my view, however, each is culpable.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Besides that "Party Y's effort" can't sensibly be aggregated across multiple independent states and their independent legislatures that Party Y controls, a point I would expect Justice Kennedy of all people to understand, the conclusion is nonsense; as described, "Party Y" hasn't done anything "culpable" at all, though it's hard to understand from the hypothetical what exactly "Party Y" did. But read most charitably, which requires reading a great deal into the hypothetical, it seems the idea is that, so long as a legislature's districting "scheme" is a partisan scheme, it doesn't matter how much partisan injury it causes.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">4. Why Justice Kennedy hasn't announced an intent standard already. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">We know, then, that thirteen years ago Kennedy believed that the absolute subordination of "legitimate" apportionment aims to partisan advantage was unconstitutional, and I think we probably know from his repeatedly asking Murphy whether she agreed that he still thinks it today. What mystified me at first on rereading <i>Vieth</i>, then, is why he didn't settle on a simple intent-based standard for adjudicating partisan-gerrymandering claims long ago. It shouldn't be too hard to find out, as a factual matter, whether the only thing a legislature was interested in when drawing its district maps was partisanship. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Indeed, Justice Kennedy has demanded much harder and quite similar findings of district courts before; in instructing them on how to decide racial-gerrymandering claims, he <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7185803527074045268&q=miller+v+johnson&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p916">required them</a> to decide whether "race was the predominant factor" motivating the shape of a particular district, and whether "the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial considerations." Deciding whether a legislature's <i>only</i> motive was partisanship, aside from compliance with one-person-one-vote, the Voting Rights Act, and a superficial show of district compactness and internal contiguity, should be much easier than deciding whether a legislature's predominant motive was race, a standard which is widely seen as meaningless (in what sense can motives predominate?), especially given that political gerrymandering is easily mistaken for racial gerrymandering.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The reason, I think, that Kennedy didn't write an opinion like that in <i>Vieth </i>is that he doesn't really have an absolute-subordination standard in mind; rather, he's looking for some purpose-based threshold that's impossible to describe, and certainly can't be described in quantitative terms. An absolute-subordination standard would describe a null set; bracketing compliance with one-person-one-vote and the Voting Rights Act, a districting plan will always attempt to do at least <i>something </i>besides afford the ruling party partisan advantage, whether it's drawing contiguous and compact districts, protecting incumbents, or avoiding splitting at least some municipalities, communities of interest, or political subdivisions. And even if it didn't describe a null set now, absolute subordination would describe a null set in the future given that states could work around it by pursing some tertiary aim to some minute degree.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Absolute subordination also isn't quite what he says he wants a standard to measure; rather, he wants a standard that can "establish[ a partisan] classification is unrelated to the aims of apportionment," that "the alleged classifications are unrelated to the aims of apportionment," that partisan "classifications . . . were applied . . . in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective." The question, oddly, on this formulation isn't whether the legislature did or didn't <i>also</i> serve some legitimate aim of apportionment, but whether the legislature's partisan classifications, taken by themselves, are related to legitimate aims of apportionment. That is, the partisan motive for the partisan classification must be a purely partisan, illegitmate motive, though it can be <i>mixed</i> with other legitimate motives and legitimate non-partisan classifications. For this reason, an attempt to maximize partisan advantage subject to all sorts of traditional districting criteria is still unconstitutional on Kennedy's view, because the partisan motive is, as far as it goes, pure and illegitimate. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Probably needless to say, this can never be an operable test (but see sec. 6 below), as classifying voters on the basis of partisan affiliation is always (or at least can always be described and viewed as) purely partisan and illegitimate. Any districting map that districts on the basis of partisanship at all singlemindedly pursues partisan advantage to the extent it singlemindedly pursues partisan advantage; it may do all sorts of other things, may even be dominated by those other things, but to the extent it classifies some of the voters on the map on a partisan basis, it won't have done so for some legitimate non-partisan reason (absent things like incumbency protection). </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">So, unless Kennedy thinks that all districting schemes drawn by politicians are invalid, he can't be serious about invalidating any partisan classification that's unrelated to non-partisan aims. Nor could one explain his holding in <i>Vieth </i>if he were serious; is there any doubt that partisanship had been pursued purely for the sake of partisanship to <i>some </i>extent in <i>Vieth</i>?<i> </i>It would seem that what's being groped for here is some sort of predominant-motive test, like his test for racial gerrymandering, but even that isn't quite stringent enough for what Kennedy seems to want.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">One of the reasons Kennedy was unable to settle on a predominant-illicit-motive test is that, at least in 2004, he seemed deeply unsure of what the <i>legitimate </i>"aims of apportionment" were. His opinion <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16656282825028631654&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p307">complains</a> that there isn't "any agreed upon model of fair and effective representation," any "agreed upon substantive principles of fairness in districting," that the parties <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16656282825028631654&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p308">hadn't shown him</a> "statements of principled, well-accepted rules of fairness that should govern districting," and most oddly, that he had "not been able to discover[] helpful discussions on the principles of fair districting discussed in the annals of parliamentary or legislative bodies." It was "[b]ecause," he <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16656282825028631654&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p308">wrote</a> at one point, "there are yet no agreed upon substantive principles of fairness in districting" that the Court had "no basis on which to define . . . standards for measuring the particular burden a given partisan classification imposes on representational rights." </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Many people naturally read this passage as a request for a model to measure quantitative deviations from some as-yet undiscovered quantitative measure of fairness; that is certainly a possible reading of the opinion, especially given his <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16656282825028631654&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p313">later hope</a> that "new technologies may produce new methods of analysis that make more evident the precise nature of the burdens gerrymanders impose on . . . representational rights." But I think it also suggests an uncertainty about what the "legitimate legislative objectives" and permissible "aims of apportionment" even are, and absent some notion of that, even a purpose-based test is hopeless.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Finally, there is no doubt that Kennedy gave political scientists and election lawyers ample reason in <i>Vieth</i> to think he was searching for some quantitative measure of the "burden" on "representational rights."</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> For example, at one point he <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16656282825028631654&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p315">suggested</a> that gerrymanders would violate the First Amendment just so long as "a State did impose burdens and restrictions on groups or persons by reason of their views," but that, "[o]f course, all this depends first on courts' having available a manageable standard by which to measure the effect of the apportionment and so to conclude that the State did impose a burden or restriction on the rights of a party's voters." </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Even this, though, is bizarrely non-quantitative; how, if it's true that the mere use of political classifications is constitutional, can it be that the imposition of "a burden" is a per se First Amendment problem no matter the burden's size? And what sort of quantitative standard would measure whether "a burden" exists or not? Yet at least this motivates his answer to his hypothetical; minimizing the political power of one party, to the extent compatible with traditional districting principles and federal law, would certainly count as "a burden" on that party, even if minimization wasn't ultimately that minimal.</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">5. Finally, why Justice Kennedy is wrong about the invalidity of "maximizing" partisan advantage. </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of all this, I can only say, and must say, that Kennedy's thoughts on partisanship and districting in <i>Vieth</i> were extraordinarily incoherent, and appear to remain so in their most critical respects. If Kennedy wants to hold that partisan intent in any degree invalidates a districting plan, that would be a workable, if implausible, standard (but see note below acknowledging recent contrary scholarship). But the rule or intuition to which he seems powerfully inclined</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—that </span></span></span></span></span>though partisan motives are generally permissible, a motive to "maximize" partisan advantage to the extent that can be done while also serving a bunch of other motives, like hewing to traditional districting principles, is invalid</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—is just nonsense. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">For one thing, "maximizing" partisan advantage subject to the pursuit of other restrictive aims can't sensibly be described as maximization, anymore than one can sensibly talk about living a maximally hedonistic life subject to keeping a reasonable diet, avoiding undue risks, obeying the law, and working fifty hours a week. If that's living a maximally hedonistic life, everyone lives a maximally hedonistic life except for all the ways in which they don't, and if a state can "maximize" partisan advantage subject to (a) district compactness, (b) district contiguity, (c) respect for political subdivisions, (d) avoiding one-person, one-vote liability (which doesn't mean going right to the edge of it), and (e) avoiding Voting Rights Act liability (ditto), probably every state controlled by a single party maximizes the partisan advantage of the party in power. For maximizing one aim subject to five others is simply what it means to rationally pursue that aim at all. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">For example, suppose that a state with sixty districts has three partisan options that would comply with traditional districting criteria and federal law: a plan that would give the majority party control of 31 seats, a plan that would give the party control of 32 seats, and a plan that would give the party control of 33 seats. Picking the one with 33 safe seats would "maximize" partisan advantage subject to traditional districting criteria, and picking the ones with 31 and 32 safe seats would not, but what rational legislature that cared to pursue partisan advantage at all would pick those plans when the 33-seat plan satisfied every other objective the legislature had? No legislature would do so, anymore than a gourmand on a diet would choose to eat, as between three healthy, appetizing foods, the one that only sounded the second or third most appetizing to that person at that point in time. Any person, gourmand or otherwise, in that situation would pick the most appetizing healthy option. You could call that person a "maximal" hedonist, or you could just call them sane. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Even if "maximizing" partisanship subject to other goals meant anything besides pursuing partisanship in a non-irrational way, it is impossible to explain why such a "maximal" pursuit of partisanship is per se invalid on grounds that don't invalidate non-maximal pursuits of partisanship. "Maximal" pursuits of partisanship can't be invalid because they're necessarily all that partisan or that maximal; traditional districting criteria may, or may not, prevent them from getting that partisan. A theory of First Amendment burdens on representational or associational rights doesn't explain anything either; in what sense is a non-maximal burden not a burden? How, as a matter of First Amendment law, could the Court sensibly hold that only "maximal" burdens on a party's viewpoints were invalid? Obviously that would never fly in any other area</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—one is tempted to say any <i>real</i> area</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—of First Amendment law. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">All that is left, it would seem, is that maximizing partisanship is a bad motive, but if the Court held this tomorrow, why wouldn't it also follow that it would be bad for the state in my hypothetical to pick the plan with 32 safe seats instead of one with 31, 30, or 0? Why would the theoretical possibility of a more partisan and unlawful 33-safe-seat plan that complied with traditional districting criteria save the state's intentional choice of the most partisan <i>non</i>-maximally partisan plan it could draw? It shouldn't, at least not on whatever theory would per se invalidate the "maximally" partisan plan, anymore than people who condemn living a maximally hedonistic life have grounds to condone people who attempt to skirt moral objections by always opting to behave in the second-most hedonistic way they can think of. I can only say that someone whose central intuition about regulating redistricting is this incoherent has no business regulating redistricting.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">6. A note on the partisan-intent theorists </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I am aware that a growing chorus of election-law scholars, whose articles are helpfully collected in the last sentence of <a href="https://electionlawblog.org/?p=94441">this post</a>, argue that at least some sort of partisan motive is invalidating, at least when that motive is met with some success. The author of one of these articles, Michael Parsons, has <a href="https://moderndemocracyblog.com/2017/10/04/turmeric-for-a-rare-consensus/">just written an excellent post</a> cheering on Justice Kennedy's interest at argument in invalidating gerrymanders that stated their maximally partisan aims. I would say just two things about their work in relation to Kennedy's feelings about intentions to maximize partisan advantage. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The first is that it certainly doesn't explain a rule against "maximally" pursuing partisan advantage (or maximally pursuing partisan advantage). Partisan-intent theorists might think such a rule is better than nothing, as it captures a subset of what they're worried about, but it makes no more sense on their lights than permitting the non-maximal pursuit of racial subordination would. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The second thing I would say is that I don't see this as a standard that Justice Kennedy is willing to accept. At least some of the intent theorists' articles argue that not all partisan intent is bad, just partisan intent to subordinate the minority party, or "tribal partisanship." This is intended both to palliate concerns that their rule would invalidate all partisan districting, and to get around the objection that the Court in general and Justice Kennedy have repeatedly said that <i>some</i> partisanship is alright. I guess I don't understand, though, how subordinating the minority party (which is just a pejorative way of talking about favoring the majority party) is a practically lesser subset of partisan redistricting purposes or partisan classifications; what other sorts of partisan purposes or classifications are there? </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">When some of the intent theorists <a href="http://cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/PARSONS.39.DeNovo.pdf">argue</a> that when Justice Kennedy writes that partisan classifications aren't per se impermissible, all he means is that states may seek to <i>promote</i> proportionality or perhaps incumbency advantage by way of districting for partisan balance, I have a tough time following them. It's true that Kennedy's repeated citation for the proposition that partisan classifications are okay by themselves is <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7614074586430856768&q=vieth+v+jubelirer&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">an early case</a> that upheld a <i>bi</i>-partisan gerrymander that sought to achieve a rough measure of proportionality. But it strikes me that if Kennedy thought that pursuing partisan advantage to any degree and with any success was per se unconstitutional, he would have adopted a very simple intent test a long time ago. It wouldn't be too difficult for district courts to decide whether states pursued partisan advantage <i>in part</i> in drawing their districting plans; Kennedy has asked district courts to decide the much harder question of whether race <i>predominated</i> over other districting aims. And I don't understand why Kennedy would keep returning to the theme of maximizing partisan advantage, or the pursuit of partisanship in a fashion that's unrelated to any legitimate aim, if he were actually interested in setting aside districting schemes motivated by <i>any </i>hopes of achieving partisan advantage.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-23697162284471801032017-09-21T02:18:00.000-07:002017-10-03T23:00:33.410-07:00The Textual Argument That the President Does Not Hold an "Office Under the United States"<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">On Tuesday, in the Trump Hotel emoluments cases, Seth Barrett Tillman and Josh Blackman filed an <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/359390871/Blumenthal-v-Trump-Amicus-Brief-of-Scholar-Seth-Barrett-Tillman-and-the-Judicial-Education-Project">amicus brief</a> in the District Court for the District of Columbia, and a <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6pbwibK31LaN1k4aWw1WEJ0REk/view">motion for leave</a> to file a response to an <a href="https://www.evernote.com/shard/s210/sh/73beb712-6016-47dc-af42-77bb4c8958dc/a49d488f04853403">amicus brief</a> of several legal historians in the Southern District of New York, in support of Professor Tillman's distinctive originalist position that the President does not hold an "office of profit or trust under [the United States]" and therefore is not regulated by the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Much more attention has been given, on "appellate Twitter" and <a href="http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/09/20/new-filings-in-the-emoluments-clause-litigation/">Josh's</a> <a href="http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/09/20/the-early-days-of-the-obamacare-and-emoluments-clause-litigation/">blog</a>, to the latter filing. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That filing, as readers of this post likely know, addresses the legal historians' brief's claim (subsequently expatiated upon in strong terms on "Take Care" by one of the amicus historians and <a href="https://takecareblog.com/blog/foreign-emoluments-alexander-hamilton-and-a-twitter-kerfuffle">counsel</a> for <a href="https://takecareblog.com/blog/a-little-more-on-alexander-hamilton-and-the-foreign-emoluments-clause">plaintiffs</a> <a href="https://takecareblog.com/blog/what-alexander-hamilton-really-said">themselves</a>) that in 1793 Alexander Hamilton prepared a list for the Senate of persons holding "office under the United States" and their respective salaries that included then-President Washington and then-Vice President Adams</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, and that Professor Tillman had failed to disclose the existence of<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> this document in his recent writings and misrepresented its authenticity in his initial SDNY brief.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span> In reality, it appears that the only authentic copy of this 1793 list did not include Washington or Adams, and that the list on which the plaintiff-amici legal historians and plaintiffs' counsel relied is a bad copy, probably prepared decades after the original, as Tillman had been claiming for years; at least, so say five experts in the relevant field with great confidence. This would seem to definitively clear the air on an important though hardly dispositive document, besides whatever it says about the plaintiff-side "Take Care" contributors' efforts to attack Tillman personally.**</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">**10/3: I should note here in fairness to those contributors that the historian amici have <a href="https://shugerblog.com/2017/10/03/our-correction-and-apology-to-professor-tillman/">graciously apologized</a>
to Tillman and Blackman, retracted what they wrote in their brief on this matter, announced that they now believe Tillman is probably right about the provenance of the alternate version of Hamilton's list, and repudiated plaintiffs' counsel's posts, which they say they were "wrong to cite" in their brief and now characterize as "mistaken." The other people I mention above, however, have not
apologized or retracted their comments at all, and one, Brianne Gorod,
has even <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/politics/trump-emoluments-clause-alexander-hamilton.html">suggested</a>
that there remains an "ultimately immaterial" but "fascinating academic
discussion to be had about the provenance of these . . . documents."
With all respect, the only discussion left to be had</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—one that Gorod </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">previously said was terribly "<a href="https://takecareblog.com/blog/what-alexander-hamilton-really-said">important to know everything</a>" about and "<a href="https://takecareblog.com/blog/a-little-more-on-alexander-hamilton-and-the-foreign-emoluments-clause">even took a trip to the National Archives</a>"
to investigate—is precisely which year the faulty scrivener's copy that Gorod promoted was prepared. What's always been obvious</span></span> is that the <a href="https://takecareblog.com/images/dmImage/StandardImage/IMAGE.png">signature</a> Gorod <a href="https://takecareblog.com/blog/a-little-more-on-alexander-hamilton-and-the-foreign-emoluments-clause">trumpeted</a>
as "none other than Alexander Hamilton['s]" is a copyist's fake,
something that a two-second Google Images search for Hamilton's <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanraab/2016/12/15/alexander-hamilton-has-invaded-the-luxury-autograph-market/#539a49eb6fdd">distinctive signature</a> would have revealed.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The more interesting of these filings, however, for people who have an interest in the substance of this litigation, as opposed to litigious antics, is the new Tillman-Blackman amicus brief filed in DC, which lays out their position in full. I must disclose here that I was kindly asked to review this brief in draft, not because it was assumed that I would be sympathetic to it, but because it was expected that I would be skeptical. I was very skeptical indeed of Tillman's position at first, the necessary consequences of which include: (a) that Presidents and members of Congress are not covered by the Foreign Emoluments Clause, (b) that the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ineligibility_Clause">Incompatibility Clause</a>, which prohibits holders of office under the United States from serving in Congress, does not prevent the Speaker of the House or Senate Majority Leader from simultaneously serving as President, (c) that the President can be a member of the Electoral College notwithstanding the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Two_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Clause_2:_Method_of_choosing_electors">Elector Incompatibility Clause</a>, which prohibits holders of office under the United States from serving in the Electoral College, and (d) that Congress cannot bar an impeached President from running again for the Presidency, notwithstanding the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_One_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Clause_7:_Judgment_in_cases_of_impeachment.3B_Punishment_on_conviction">Disqualification Clause</a>, which allows Congress to disqualify impeached officials from serving in any office under the United States. These seem like fairly odd rules, and I happen to be someone who believes that oddity is a cognizable constitutional-interpretive consideration, both by way of gauging what the Constitution was likely intended to mean by its drafters or understood to mean by its ratifiers, and as a perfectly legitimate freestanding consideration of its own.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">However, as I reviewed the drafts of Tillman and Blackman's brief and read the <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292334">various</a> <a href="http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1038&context=djclpp">responses</a> to Tillman's articles that have been <a href="https://conlaw.jotwell.com/constitutional-officers-a-very-close-reading/">written</a> over the <a href="http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1039&context=nulr_online">years</a> by some of the academy's leading originalists, most of which were sharply critical, I began to become convinced not only that there is a very serious textual argument for Tillman's position, but that it was difficult to see what an adequate textual rejoinder would look like. None, I believe, has yet been offered. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I do not think this textual argument is entirely made or entirely clear in Tillman's brief or perhaps even in his articles, which dwell as much on historic practice as on text and pull several textual punches. Unlike the brief's authors, or many originalists, I am not someone who attaches profound importance to who Hamilton listed as an officer under the United States in 1793, or whether then-President Jefferson accepted a bust of the Czar of Russia without asking for permission from Congress. These instances of practice seem to me, at best, indicia of what a couple high-ranking officials made of the Constitution near its ratification, no more or less weighty than the EPA Administrator and her deputy's near-contemporaneous understanding of the Clean Air Act—information in which the connoisseurs of Tillman and Blackman's sort of argument tend to have little to no interest. I am, however, interested in constitutional text, especially a part of the Constitution's text as little-interpreted as this one, and I think any reader will agree that under normal, humdrum rules of textual interpretation, Tillman's initially counterintuitive claim that the President does not hold an office under the United States is at least a very plausible reading of the text if not indeed the best.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">A. Officers of the United States </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">To begin with, we need to defuse a very natural objection—that it is so obviously the case that the President holds an office under the United States that any other reading of the text is trivially wrong. The Foreign Emoluments Clause <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Title_of_Nobility_Clause#Text">provides</a> that "[n]o </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">title of nobility shall be granted by the United States: and no person
holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the
consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or
title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state." The antecedent of "them" in "no person holding any office of profit or trust under them" is, of course, "the United States. Does the President hold an office of profit or trust under the United States? </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Well, the argument would go, the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Two_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Clause_1:_Executive_Power">text</a> of Article II, section 1, clause 1 tells us that the President shall "hold [an] Office." (Likewise, section I, clauses 5, 6 and 8 refer to the Presidency as an "Office.") And, the same clause refers to him as the "President of the United States." Certainly the Presidency is an office of "trust" or "profit," and while an "office under" the United States is a funny, antiquated way to talk, surely an "Office" in the government of the United States, indeed at the very head of it, is an "office under" the United States.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This argument, however, proves a bit too much, because it is almost unambiguously the case that the President is not an "officer of the United States," a phrase that appears several times in the Constitution, even though he textually holds an "Office" the very title of which says is "of the United States." This is most clearly the case in that the Appointments Clause requires that "all . . . officers of the United States" be<i> appointed</i>, not elected, by the President or by some other constitutionally provided mechanism. The Appointments Clause famously <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appointments_Clause#Text_of_the_Appointments_Clause">provides</a> that the President,<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> "</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and
<u>all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for</u>," though Congress may vest appointments of inferior officers in the President alone or heads of departments. So, to be an "Officer of the United States," either the President must appoint you with the advice and consent of the Senate, or your appointment must be "herein otherwise provided for" in the Constitution.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, the President of course does not appoint himself, nor the members of Congress. But nor are their "<i>Appointments </i>. . . herein otherwise provided for" in the Constitution; the President is, in the language of Article II, section 1, clause 1, "elected," as are the members of the House, <i>see</i> Article I, section 2, clause 2, while the members of the Senate were, under the original Constitution, "chosen by the [state] Legislature" in an "Election," <i>see</i> Article I, section 3, clauses 1–2. The word "appoint" is used with circumspection throughout the Constitution to refer to literally appointed, unelected officials of various types, such as Senators temporarily appointed to midterm vacancies, <i>see</i> Article I, section 3, clause 2, officers in state militias, <i>see</i> Article I, section 8, clause 16, and the ambassadors, ministers, and judges of the Appointments Clause itself. Definitionally, then, an officer of the United States is an appointed officer.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Moreover, Article II, section 3 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Two_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Section_3:_Presidential_responsibilities">charges</a> the President with the duty to "commission all the Officers of the United States," just as he must appoint "all" officers of the United States less those whose appointments are constitutionally committed elsewhere. But no President has ever self-commissioned or commissioned his successor; nor has any President ever commissioned members of Congress, to my knowledge. This isn't because commissions are formal niceties. Presidents still commission federal judges to this day; a confirmed judge cannot serve, indeed is not a judge, until he receives his judicial commission from the President. And <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marbury_v._Madison#Background_of_the_case"><i>Marbury</i></a>, of course, is a testament to how essential the founding generation viewed the delivery of the constitutionally requisite commission to serving as a judicial officer of the United States. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Further still, Article II, section 4 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Two_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Section_4:_Impeachment">provides</a> that "</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">[t]he President, Vice President <i>and </i>all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment," raising the obvious inference that the President and Vice President are not themselves officers of the United States. (Were they officers of the United States, they would undoubtedly be civil, i.e., non-military, officers of the United States.) And further yet, <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292334">we know</a> that the original version of this clause said that the President, Vice President, and "other" officers of the United States could be impeached, and that the Committee of Style, which made technical corrections to the proposed Constitution, tellingly excised "other." Professor Calabresi has <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1294671">suggested</a> that the word "other" was redundant because it was somehow already obvious that the President was an officer of the United States; not only isn't it obvious, that argument raises the question of why, if the Committee of Style were so concerned about redundancy, it wouldn't remove the five words "the President, Vice President, and" from the clause as well, which would be, on this view, far more redundant. Indeed, it is far from apparent that "other" would on Calabresi's own view be redundant at all; does a phrase like "A, E, and all English vowels," as opposed to "A, E, and all other English vowels," really make sense? The former is like saying, "A, E, and A, E, I, O, and U."</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Finally, the Constitution's <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articlevi">Oaths Clause</a>, Article VI, section 3, requires that "all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States a</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nd of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution." One might assume that the President was an executive officer of the United States. Yet Article II, section 1, clause 8 specifically provides <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Two_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Clause_8:_Oath_or_affirmation">a particular oath</a> for the President, one which does not refer to "supporting" the Constitution (unlike <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/3331">the oath</a> Congress requires all executive-branch officials besides the President to take, in keeping with the Oaths Clause), but to preserving, protecting, and defending it. If the President were an executive officer of the United States, he would be covered by the Oaths Clause and the presidential oath clause in Article II would either be unnecessary or require the swearing of a second oath on top of the general executive-branch oath to "support" the Constitution.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As far as officers of the United States go, then, the Constitution all but textually compels the conclusion that the President is not an officer of the United States. This should at least make us willing to doubt, or pause before we assume, that the President holds an "office under the United States" just because the Constitution provides that he holds an "office" in the United States government; one could likewise assume with equal logic that the President was an officer of the United States, and yet would be wrong. Indeed, were one simply engaging in a plain-language intuitionist interpretation of "officer of the United States" and "office under the United States," one would be more likely to suppose that the President was an officer of the United States but did not hold office <i>under</i> it.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">B. Offices Under the United States.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">1. Members of Congress plainly do not hold office under the United States. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What of offices under the United States? Perhaps, one might suppose, the difference between offices under the United States and officers of the United States is that the former includes the Presidency and seats in Congress and the latter does not. But this is clearly at least half-wrong. The text of two clauses of the Constitution makes it quite plain that members of Congress do not hold office under the United States.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">To begin with, the Incompatibility Clause <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ineligibility_Clause#Text">provides</a> that "no </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." Whether this prohibits the President from being a member of Congress or not, it certainly can't prohibit a member of Congress from being a member of Congress, yet that's just what it would do if members of Congress were deemed to hold "<i>any </i>Office under the United States." Were members of Congress holders of office under the United States, the clause would be as nonsensical as saying that "no holder of federal elected office shall be the President."</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Second, the obscure Elector Incompatibility Clause provides a strong anti-surplusage kick to the view that members of Congress do not hold office under the United States. It <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Two_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Clause_2:_Method_of_choosing_electors">says</a> that "</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">no Senator or Representative, <i>or</i> Person holding an Office of Trust or
Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector." Like the clause subjecting the President and Vice President to the impeachment power, it is difficult to see why the drafters of the Constitution would specifically refer to Senators and Representatives if they were persons holding offices under the United States. Indeed, sentences with this structure scan as almost nonsensical, or at least extremely ill-formed, if redundant; for example, "no mouse, gerbil, or animal was harmed in the making of this film."</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">2. But do Presidents? </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, it is just conceivable that the difference between officers of the United States and offices under the United States is that the latter includes Presidents and Vice Presidents, while both leave Congress out.** I think there are six problems with that. First, and weakest, a different part of the Incompatibility Clause than the part I've quoted links offices under the United States with appointment, as the Appointments Clause ties officer-of status to appointment. It provides that "[n]</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">o Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was
elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the
United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof
shall have been increased during such time." This part of the clause prohibits a member of Congress from being appointed to <i>any</i> civil office under the United States the salary of which has increased during the time that member was in office. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Presidential salary has increased over the years, of course, so were the Presidency an office under the United States, it could in theory fall under the prohibition of this clause. Yet if the Presidency were an office under the United States, "any civil Office under the Authority of the United States. . . the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time" can't really mean <i>any</i> civil office under the United States, because <i>appointment</i> (which is what the clause prohibits, not appointment or election) to the Presidency is an impossibility. Tellingly, Madison advanced the compromise that was ultimately ratified by <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=ZgBNAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA150&lpg=PA150&dq=that+no+office+ought+to+be+open+to+a+member,+which+may+be+created+or+augmented+while+he+is+in+the+legislature&source=bl&ots=UdbouU131e&sig=hmLW7EFdC2Yk-2ywhyB2kjUelMg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj_8IHjzrXWAhVI7IMKHWe4CaoQ6AEILTAB#v=onepage&q=that%20no%20office%20ought%20to%20be%20open%20to%20a%20member%2C%20which%20may%20be%20created%20or%20augmented%20while%20he%20is%20in%20the%20legislature&f=false">arguing</a> that "no office ought to be open to a member, which may be created or augmented while he is in the legislature." Yet if Madison saw the Presidency as an office under the United States, the clause as written contains a loophole relative to what he sought to achieve; on the other hand, if he thought that offices under the United States were definitionally appointed offices, the clause as ratified makes sense.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">** </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Akhil
Amar has advocated in <a href="http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/991/">this paper</a> (according to <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1970909&download=yes">Tillman</a> at least, though
I find Amar's position as to the Presidency opaque with the exception of <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=xfkJRm6VCQ0C&pg=PA171&lpg=PA171&dq=%22such+a+lawmaker+became+acting+president%22&source=bl&ots=Q4rsP7ZykX&sig=6GhKCvyOwldBwuNPfTGm8fC3tJc&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi2g_GC5bXWAhVSySYKHRj4DvYQ6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=%22such%20a%20lawmaker%20became%20acting%20president%22&f=false">these</a> <a href="https://books.google.com/books?id=xfkJRm6VCQ0C&pg=PA182&lpg=PA182&dq=%22prohibited+individual+states+from+greasing+a+president%27s+palm%22&source=bl&ots=Q4rsP66HiY&sig=4pdmSkhI5KZbIvS1jOncAiHAEfw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwix_YTK5LXWAhVBQCYKHS4VBNYQ6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=%22prohibited%20individual%20states%20from%20greasing%20a%20president%27s%20palm%22&f=false">ipse dixits</a> in his book) for a cousin of
this position, on which officers of and holders of office under are synonyms and
both include the President and exclude members of Congress. This
position strikes me as all but indefensible, and in any event he gives
no positive argument for the inclusion of the President. </span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Second, there doesn't seem to be any evidence that anyone at the framing held a hybrid view of offices under the United States, on which the phrase included appointed federal officers, elected executive-branch offices, but not elected legislative-branch offices. The plaintiffs' legal historian amici have <a href="https://www.evernote.com/shard/s210/sh/73beb712-6016-47dc-af42-77bb4c8958dc/a49d488f04853403">pointed out</a> that George Mason and Edmund Randolph, the country's first Attorney General, said that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applied to the Presidency. But as Tillman and Blackman say in response, Mason and Randolph also believed that members of Congress could be impeached, which is to say they believed that they were officers of the United States (<i>see </i>Article II, section 4), despite strong textual indications to the contrary, and despite what's almost universally viewed as the Senate's <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=lamar+v+united+states+241&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006&case=1521311294867856813&scilh=0#p112">conclusion</a> in 1799 that it lacked the power to convict impeached members of Congress (though see this <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2509665">interesting article</a> arguing that the Senate didn't actually make that determination). The point isn't to impugn Mason or Randolph as interpretive sources or to suggest that if they were wrong on one thing they had to be wrong on another; it's that they don't support the hybrid view. Plaintiffs or their amici haven't identified a framer or founding-era source that supports what has to be their theory of the case: that Presidents hold office under the United States while Congressmen do not.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Third, it seems extremely difficult to me to understand what theory would underlie this hybrid understanding of offices under the United States, or how anyone at the framing would have known that "office under the United States" was a term of art that included the Presidency but excluded seats in Congress, especially without leaving any evidence of their talking about the term in this way. I can understand, or at least acclimate myself to, a linguistic convention on which only appointed federal officials were deemed officers of the United States or holders of office under the United States. I can't quite grasp a convention, though, on which Presidents and Congressmen weren't thought officers of the United States, as I think is clear, on which Congressmen weren't deemed to hold office under the United States, as I think is also clear, but on which Presidents were deemed to hold office under the United States. What theory of "office under" as distinct from officer of would underlie these strange distinctions? </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">More fundamentally, even if "officer of" and "office under" could be defined in this way on some hidden logic, how would anyone in the ratifying conventions or in the debates at the Constitutional Convention have understood these reticulated definitions of these newly invented terms of American law without at least some explanation or clarification in those debates or indeed in the text itself? A widely, though not universally shared understanding that general references in the Constitution to officers and offices did not include elective office seems like the much simpler explanation of how people could have coordinated around and voted on the text we have today.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Fourth, and critically, it in fact does appear that there is an explanation for how people were able to vote on the Constitution and agree to its language without further textual or extratextual explanation of what its many opaque references to offices under the United States meant. And that is that, as Tillman and Blackman explain at pages 7</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">–8 of their <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/359390871/Blumenthal-v-Trump-Amicus-Brief-of-Scholar-Seth-Barrett-Tillman-and-the-Judicial-Education-Project">brief</a></span>, there is a quite old British tradition, dating back to at least 1707, of using the phrase "office under the Crown" to refer to appointed offices, and an equally old British tradition of distinguishing elective offices from offices under the Crown. The richest source they cite is this 1941 Attorney General <a href="https://www.scribd.com/document/351326422/Memorandum-of-the-U-K-Attorney-General-Sir-Donald-Somervell-for-the-Select-Committee-on-Offices-or-Places-of-Profit-Under-the-Crown">memorandum</a>, which traces the history of understandings of "office under the Crown" back into the seventeenth century. What is quite clear is that by 1707 British statutes, written much like our Constitution's Incompatibility Clause, forbade members of Parliament from holding offices under the Crown</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—an incoherent proscription if members of Parliament themselves held such office. This settled British legal and linguistic tradition of understanding office under the Crown to exclude elected office explains how the framers and ratifiers could have coordinated around the otherwise cryptic and novel phrase, "office under the United States." Indeed, something like a practice of this kind is almost necessary to explain how such coordination was possible.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Fifth, while I share the textualist impulse to think that there must be some important difference between officers <i>of</i> the United States and offices <i>under </i>the United States, it is perfectly possible that the framers simply referred to offices under the United States when they spoke in the abstract of offices (as they had to in order to talk about offices of profit or trust), and officers of the United States when they spoke in the concrete of officers. It does not appear, after all, that the Constitution <i><u>ever</u> </i>refers simply to offices <i>of</i> the United States, or to "officers <i>under</i>" the United States. I find this explanation of the variation in phraseology quite plausible.</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Alternatively, Tillman has provided a plausible account of the difference that is at least borne out by unbroken practice from 1789 to the present day. This is that "officers of" the United States do not include appointed legislative-branch officers, such as the Secretary of the Senate or the Director of the Congressional Budget Office. Offices under the United States, on the other hand, do, he claims, include these offices. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The argument from practice and structure that legislative-branch officers are not officers of the United States, no matter how high-ranking, is very strong. While </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Article II, section 3 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Two_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Section_3:_Presidential_responsibilities">requires</a> the President to "commission all the Officers of the United States," the President has never commissioned a legislative-branch officer. And while "all civil officers of the United States" are impeachable under Article II, section 4, it would seem unnecessary to extend the impeachment power to legislative-branch officers given that Congress implicitly has the power to remove those officers, given, in turn, each House's textually committed power in the fifth clauses of Article 1, sections 2 and 3 to appoint those "Officers." Here too, we see that we cannot reason from the Constitution describing a federal official as an "Officer" to the conclusion that he necessarily is an "officer of" or holds an "office under" the United States; Article 1, section 2, clause 5 <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_One_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Clause_5:_Speaker_and_other_officers.3B_Impeachment">provides</a> that "</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">[t]he House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and
other Officers," but no President has ever commissioned a Speaker of the House or any other officer of the House as an officer of the United States. </span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I have two quibbles with this argument. The first and more serious is that while Tillman makes a strong argument that legislative-branch officers are not officers of the United States, I don't see the positive argument for concluding that legislative-branch officers do hold office <i>under </i>the United States. If they do, the Incompatibility Clause prohibits the Clerk of the House or the Secretary of the Senate from being a Congressman or Senator</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—a good idea, perhaps, but not quite the sort of thing one would expect to rise to the level of unconstitutionality. Moreover, claims that legislative-branch officers hold office under the United States and are thereby constitutionally excluded from membership in Congress are complicated, quite a bit, by the House's officers clause just quoted above, which <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_One_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Clause_5:_Speaker_and_other_officers.3B_Impeachment">says</a> that "[t]he House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers . . . ." </span>If the Speaker, who is an "Officer" of the House, can be a House member, why can't the "other Officers," which the clause lumps together with the Speaker? And how would we know which legislative-branch officers, like the Speaker, can serve in Congress, and which can't because they hold office under the United States?</span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The second quibble is the opposite concern; the Appointment Clause's implication that there are officers of the United States "whose Appointments are . . . otherwise herein provided for" by limiting the President's Senate-confirmed appointment power to officers of the United States "whose Appointments are <i>not</i> otherwise herein provided for" makes me wonder if those otherwise herein provided-for officers are the "Officers" appointed by each House. However, this is just an implication, and the language may merely be a careful savings clause inserted in case there were such appointments provided for later in the drafting process, or in a subsequent amendment. Further, to the extent otherwise-herein-provided appointed officers of the United States are implied, it is possible that these could be found in the Recess Appointments Clause (an exception to the normal Appointments Clause procedure) or the inferior officers discussed in the Appointments Clause, or the members of the Electoral College, who the states "<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Two_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Clause_2:_Method_of_choosing_electors">appoint</a>." And it is also possible that they can be found in the "Officers" of the militia, the appointment of which Article 1, </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">section 8, clause 16 leaves to the states, even though the state militias could be, under that clause, "employed in the Service of the United States," and thus might be viewed as containing officers of the United States that are appointed in a manner "otherwise herein provided."</span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">My sixth and final problem with the hybrid reading of office under the United States is the Presidential Emoluments Clause. It is not dispositive, but certainly suggestive, that the President in fact has his own Emoluments Clause, which <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Article_Two_of_the_United_States_Constitution#Clause_7:_Salary">reads</a>, in full: "</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a
Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the
Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive
within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of
them." Nothing is said here about foreign emoluments; what is proscribed, interestingly, is payment by state governments. Of course, it is possible that the President is both regulated by the Foreign Emoluments Clause as a holder of office under the United States, and by the Presidential Emoluments Clause as the President. But ratifiers attempting to understand the Constitution could certainly have drawn a fair intratextual inference that the President was not covered by the Foreign Emoluments Clause and did not hold office <i>under</i> the United States. How anyone reading the document at the time would have drawn the opposite inference</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—that Presidents did hold office under the United States, while members of Congress did not</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—escapes me at the present time.</span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">3. A closing comment.</span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">My intention here has not been to provide anything like a conclusive argument that Presidents (at least as a textual matter) do not hold office under the United States. My intention, rather, has only been to show that there is a strong argument that they do not that needs to be taken far more seriously than it has been, not just because Hamilton prepared a report that supports the view or because Tillman's critics have made spurious claims about the historical record or Tillman himself, but because the text of the Constitution tends to support it. </span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I do believe that much work remains to be done in this regard, precisely because so much of the literature and briefing taking the position that Presidents hold office under the United States has been so peremptory. The weakness of that side of the literature, in my view, is not necessarily a sign of a weak position so much as it is a function of the position's strong intuitive appeal, both in a casual plain-language sense and as a matter of policy, such that the position has seemed too obvious until now to need much defense from a lone scholar. My hope in writing this post has been to at least help dissolve the sense that the Presidency's status as an office under the United States is beyond debate, so that scholars, researchers and lawyers inclined to support that proposition can begin the textual and historical work of explaining why it is correct, and so that scholars, researchers and lawyers who come to this question in a spirit of genuine inquiry can continue the work that Professor Tillman has so ably started.</span></span></span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-4863803680118552932017-08-28T12:55:00.000-07:002017-08-28T22:30:01.802-07:00Supreme Court 2016 Statutory Term in Review: A Postscript on Why the Majority Joined Breyer's Opinion in Midland<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Several
serious Court-watchers have written to me to suggest that Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Alito, Thomas, and maybe Kennedy likely joined
Justice Breyer's opinion in <i>Midland Funding </i>not because they agreed with its purposivist
rationale, but because Justice Breyer was the swing vote and assent to
his reasoning was necessary to avoid a fractured opinion or even a 4-4
split. I don't think I actually quite said that those Justices
bought Justice Breyer's reasoning, and I'm not sure how much it matters
if they did. However, I'll briefly lay out what can be garnered from
the argument transcript as to the concurring Justices' reasoning, offer
some speculation about how likely it is that the concurring Justices
were compelled to join Breyer's opinion in full or to let him say what he wanted to say, and then offer a
comment on how much it matters if Breyer's reasoning was really just
personal to Breyer.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">First, as to Chief Justice Roberts, an estimable and adroit statutory interpreter who I view, after cases like <i>Bond </i>and <i>Burwell</i>,
as more of a scion of the Legal Process School than a textualist
(though he can trade textual arguments with anyone), the oral argument certainly
reveals that he had some concerns with basing FDCPA claims on a theory
that a creditor's claim was barred by an affirmative defense. This is
the ground my correspondents speculate the concurring Justices had for
joining Breyer's opinion; indeed, they suspect that outside of Breyer,
the majority would be happy to hold that suits in state court on stale
debts aren't unfair or unconscionable means of debt collection.
However, I think it's also pretty clear that Roberts shared Breyer's purposivist concern with FDCPA litigation in district court,
given that at one point he contrasted FDCPA suits on time-barred
bankruptcy claims with FDCPA suits on time-barred debt-collection
actions, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/16-348_2cp3.pdf#page=50">remarking</a>:</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Well,
bankruptcy is very different. The whole idea is let's get everything
here in one place and -- and deal with it, you know, and different
priorities and all of that. I think it's much more significant if you
have things spinning out of the bankruptcy estate being adjudicated
elsewhere than the fact that you might have it as a general matter in --
in district courts.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Note
that this is, for better or worse, an extremely purposivist/pragmatic
concern. The claim is that, assuming that FDCPA suits about time-barred
bankruptcy claims would be "adjudicated elsewhere" than bankruptcy
court, deeming a time-barred bankruptcy claim to be unfair or
unconscionable under the FDCPA would defeat bankruptcy's "whole idea" of "getting
everything here in one place," no matter how unfair or unconscionable it
might be to sue on time-barred debts generally. This concern has
nothing to do with (a) the language of the statute or (b) the purposes
of the <i>FDCPA</i>. Rather, the argument would gerrymander out a set of
unfair/unconscionable means of debt collection in order to maximally
pursue a purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, though it's far from obvious
that a purpose of bankruptcy is getting all the debtor's
bankruptcy-related causes of action in one place, as opposed to his
debts (and, as I said in my post, bankruptcy-jurisdictional statutes already
largely do that). Interestingly, Roberts's concern isn't even Breyer's
more limited and pragmatic, if mistaken concern that district courts
would struggle to adjudicate bankruptcy-related issues if bankruptcy-related FDCPA
actions were allowed to be brought in district court; his concern is the
more purposive one of fulfilling bankruptcy's goal of getting
"everything here in one place," regardless of the content of the
"everything."</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice
Alito, in argument, doubted that chapter 13 trustees lacked the time to
or interest in objecting to stale claims; I believe he's the only
Justice who voiced such doubts, which tends to confirm my sense that the
opinion's doubts on this score had little to do with the Court's
decision. Justice Alito also, at one critical juncture, expressed
skepticism with basing FDCPA claims on a creditor's failure to honor an
affirmative defense. Justice Kennedy's questions were all of this
latter genre, and Justice Thomas didn't speak.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I think, then, that the <i>Midland Funding</i>
majority was likely an overlapping consensus of Justices that thought
filing a proof of claim on a time-barred debt wasn't textually unfair,
and at least two Justices (not coincidentally, the majority's two most
purposivist Justices) that had strong purposivist and pragmatic concerns
about allowing FDCPA suits on bankruptcy claims to be brought in
district court. Was it necessary to let Breyer discuss those concerns
in his opinion to avoid a fractured decision? I'm not so sure of that, for the following reasons. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It strikes me that a compromise could have been forged, if anyone cared enough to forge it, that would focus
on staleness particularly being an affirmative defense in bankruptcy,
where a claim is "deemed allowed" absent objection, without deciding
whether a time-barred debt-collection suit violates the FDCPA, and
without talking about Breyer's and Roberts's concerns of
bankruptcy-related litigation in district court. The opinion already
does talk about affirmative defenses to a large extent, so we're talking
about a cut rather than a complete reorientation. And it's not at all
clear to me that Breyer would have vigorously fought the cut; his
discussion of bankruptcy-related litigation in district court is already
rather muted relative to his discussion at oral argument. At worst, I
believe that Breyer would have been willing to fully concur in an
affirmative-defense-focused opinion, as he already wrote one that places considerable reliance on that rationale, while writing a separate concurring
opinion of his own raising his concerns. So my best guess is that the
other members of the majority didn't feel compelled to acquiesce to that
discussion, but simply didn't find it that offensive.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">How
much does it matter if the majority silently objected to Breyer's (and
Roberts's) purposivist reasoning? It could matter a lot; if it's the
case that such reasoning only enters a majority opinion of the Court
when the swing vote in a case happens to be a purposivist Justice, all
an opinion like <i>Midland Funding</i> shows is that we have one or two
purposivist Justices who occasionally play pivotal roles, which is
hardly new news. The direction of the law remains, one might argue, a
strongly textualist one. A few responses to that. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">First, besides that I simply don't think it's true that the law's direction is <i>strongly</i> textualist in light of cases like <i>Bond</i>, <i>Burwell</i> and <i>Yates</i>, the direction of the law isn't solely or really even mostly the Supreme Court's direction, and opinions like <i>Midland Funding</i> influence lower courts. For example, a bankruptcy judge reading <i>Midland Funding</i>
will likely take it as a signal that the Supreme Court doesn't want the
FDCPA to muck up the Bankruptcy Code's remedies for creditor misconduct
generally, not just in the case of claims on time-barred debts, and
will carry that sort of pragmatic anti-mucking-up reasoning with her
into other interpretive situations, as she's seen that the Supreme Court
reasons this way.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Second,
we are very possibly (probably?) headed into a world where Justice
Breyer and the Chief Justice are swing votes in most close cases, so I
think their fairly unreconstructed purposivism is a pretty big deal.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Third,
the fact that such purposivist reasoning slips into majority opinions
without objection, when, I speculate, it could have been removed or led
to a reassignment upon an objection, is at least suggestive of purposivist reasoning's continuing broad acceptability, even if
relatively few of the Justices practice it themselves.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-23203078192429621932017-08-26T22:57:00.000-07:002017-08-27T14:21:47.870-07:00Supreme Court 2016 Statutory Term in Review: Purposively Interpreting Statutes That Don't Say Much in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">We are always hearing that "we are all textualists now," though some of us are <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Roberts">textualists manqué</a> who write such <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-158_6579.pdf">aggressively atextual faux-textualist opinions</a> as to confuse people into writing <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755578">thoughtful but badly mistaken articles claiming that textualism has worked itself impure</a>, when in fact textualism's true evolutionary direction is one of <a href="https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/69-siegel158upalrev1172009pdf">inexorable radicalization</a> and <a href="http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2017/08/supreme-court-2016-statutory-term-in.html">oversimplification</a>. (For a thoughtful and thought-provoking example of a really radicalized textualism, see Judge Kavanaugh's "<a href="http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2118-2163-Online.pdf">Fixing Statutory Interpretation</a>," which not only proposes to do away with the usual targets of (much of) <i>Chevron </i>and any reliance on legislative history, but also would junk presumptions of non-redundancy, consistent usage, and <i>eiusdem generis</i> in favor of determining the "best reading" of a statute's text absent many of the most popular and natural contextual rules of thumb for doing that.) But aside from how many true textualists the courts really have in a strict sense, and I'm inclined to say not that many,* there are statutory opinions the Supreme Court puts out to this day that don't even look textualist or try to look it. These cases—not taught in legislation classes and little-noticed outside the fields on which they bear—tend to be cases where the statute itself gives the Court little direction, emboldening the Court to strike out in strikingly old-fashioned purposivist directions</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—so much so, I'll suggest, that an agency couldn't get away with them at Step Two of <i>Chevron</i>.</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">* If the courts are truly stocked with textualists, why do we still use legislative history to resolve ambiguities? The true theory of most American federal statutory interpretation, I would contend, is a chastened intentionalism, or an incoherent eclecticism.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">A. The problem. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-348_h315.pdf"><i>Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson</i></a> was such a case this term; it involved whether filing a claim for a time-barred debt in a chapter 13 bankruptcy is an "unfair or unconscionable means" of collecting a debt. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) gives a cause of action to debtors whose debt collectors attempt to collect from them by an "<a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/1692f">unfair or unconscionable means</a>"; besides a set of illustrative but far-from-exhaustive or terribly illuminating examples, the statute does nothing to help courts decide whether a means of debt collection is unfair or unconscionable. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The lower courts have long held that (though the Court has never decided whether) suing unsophisticated debtors in small-claims court on time-barred debts on the hope that they won't defend or assert a statute-of-limitations defense is an unfair means of debt collection. This seems sensible enough, though the defense is usually the debtor's to waive if he wants (supposing he knows he's got the defense or how to assert it, which is the problem). What about filing a claim in a chapter 13 bankruptcy on a time-barred debt? That's a bit different, and hence split the circuits. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The difference is that, in a chapter 13 case, an expert if harried lawyer in the person of a chapter 13 trustee, whose job is to litigate on behalf of the debtor's legitimate creditors, interposes herself between the debtor and creditors. If a claim is stale, that might, depending on the debtor's proposed terms of payment in his plan (a payment plan all chapter 13 debtors must file), dilute what the trustee's beneficiaries (so to speak) get paid. And so the hope is that the trustee will catch a time-barred claim and object to its allowance. If all that pans out, or can be expected to pan out often enough, maybe it's not so unfair to file a claim on a time-barred debt in a chapter 13 bankruptcy, any more than it would be unfair or unconscionable (as opposed to merely bad form or a waste of time) to sue Amazon on one. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">B. How should we deal with such an open-textured interpretive question? </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">How should a court go about interpreting a phrase like "unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt"? It will often be maintained that when Congress writes something so hopelessly vague as that, of course it intends to delegate a great deal of essentially legislative power to the courts to decide what ought to be deemed unfair or unconscionable.</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">* I'm not sure I'm even willing to concede that much; it strikes me that the courts should at least <i>try</i> to figure out whether a Congressman of 1977, when the FDCPA was written, would think filing a claim on a knowingly time-barred debt was unfair or unconscionable, or not, or to ask how a consumer debtor or debt collector of the time would (if being honest with themselves) understand the phrase in this context. I'm not quite sure why the fact that Congress was unsurprisingly unable to produce a code of debt collection and forced to sanction bad practices generically means that it wanted the courts to make normative judgments about what they deem bad, rather than looking to some ordinary understanding or popular judgment about what's bad and what's not, at least to the extent that's possible. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">* </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As far as I'm aware, the growing crowd of non-delegation revivalists has <a href="http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2520/">no problem at all</a>
with this sort of thing, which is because non-delegation revivalists
don't really mind delegation as such, but rather are driven by a
desire to minimize the power of administrative agencies and maximize
that of the courts</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span>but I digress.</span> </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That said, I can at least see a textualist argument that the understanding of unfairness and unconscionability the Court ought to look to is the Court's own, and of course I can certainly see a purposivist argument that in interpreting the statute to root out the sorts of unfair practices the statute was enacted to root out, a court is left to reason about what it deems unfair. What I cannot see much of an argument for of any sort, other than a rather free-wheeling purposivist or Posnerian pragmatic one, is that in deciding what an unfair and unconscionable means is, the Court should ask itself whether it makes sense to ban a means of debt collection or not for policy reasons that have <i>nothing </i>to do with its unfairness or unconscionability. Yet it is just that mode of reasoning, I will claim, that determined the outcome in <i>Midland Funding</i>.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">C. Justice Breyer's opinion.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Breyer's explanation for the Court of why filing a claim on a time-barred debt in a chapter 13 bankruptcy isn't unfair or unconscionable spans about five wide-margined pages, the last of which correctly dispels an argument that the Federal Bankruptcy Rules' equivalent of Rule 11 somehow settled the matter and has nothing to do with his positive case for the Court's holding. His reasoning begins with an <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-348_h315.pdf#page=9">extraordinarily vague rendition</a> of the ostensibly greater protections in bankruptcy court, vis-a-vis state court, that make it more likely that an attempt to collect on a stale claim in bankruptcy will be caught out. These protections, exactly as he puts them, are as follows:</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"A knowledgeable trustee is available." (Citation to the statute creating the office omitted.)</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"Procedural bankruptcy rules more directly guide the evaluation of claims." (Citation to one such rule and an advisory committee note on it omitted.)</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">An appellate panel of bankruptcy judges once wrote that the bankruptcy "claims resolution process is 'generally a more streamlined and less unnerving prospect for a debtor than facing a collection lawsuit.'" (Citation to their opinion and a statute that he parenthetically describes as "outlining generally the claims resolution process" omitted).</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Having ticked off "[t]hese features of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding"</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—the features, apparently, include its reassuringly streamlined and only mildly unnerving qualities</span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—he concludes that it's "considerably more likely that an effort to collect upon a stale claim in bankruptcy will be met with resistance, objection, and disallowance." Just how likely is left unsaid. Next, he considers an argument that there's simply no good reason to allow creditors to <i>try</i> to get paid on stale claims, even if they run a relatively low chance of succeeding. He's <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-348_h315.pdf#page=10">unconvinced</a> because (a) it's the trustee's burden to point the staleness out, and (b), citing his discussion a page above, "protections available in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding minimize the risk to the debtor."</span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I want to suggest that these initial assurances of chapter 13 protections have next to nothing to do with the actual reason for Justice Breyer's and many of the concurring Justices' votes, and that their real reasons can be found in the balance of Justice Breyer's positive argument for the Court's holding. I think this for a number of reinforcing reasons. </span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The first is the argument's remarkable thinness. Justice Breyer is an able empiricist, and if he thought he had a strong case for the claim that stale claims are likely to be caught out in chapter 13 bankruptcy, he would lay it out, likely with an appendix; he wouldn't say things, and only say things, like "bankruptcy rules more directly guide the evaluation of claims," and "the claims resolution process is . . . more streamlined and less unnerving." Nor can we imagine, I hope, the rest of the Court actually deciding a case on the basis of these essentially contentless claims, as opposed to some other, better reason.</span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The second is that the experts on the matter, the National Association of Chapter Thirteen Trustees, filed an <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/16-348-amicus-respondent-Chapter-13-Trustees.pdf">excellent trustee-authored amicus brief</a> explaining why their members were not especially likely to catch or object to stale claims. Justice Breyer normally is interested in this sort of brief, and their explanations are quite convincing: (1) chapter 13 trustees are swamped with claims, (2) claims sometimes don't contain enough detail to say if they're stale and trustees don't spend their limited time gathering information on potential defenses to small claims, (3) chapter 13 plans are often structured in such a way that creditors aren't prejudiced by the allowance of a stale claim</span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—e.g, if the plan</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> proposes to pay creditors a fixed percentage, or if it </span></span></span></span></span></span>proposes to pay creditors in full, </span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">in which cases only the debtor is harmed and the trustee has no interest in objecting</span></span></span></span></span></span>. Only the dissent cites the brief; Breyer has no response to it; Kannon Shanmugam's reply brief in support of the creditor wisely only cited it once and made no attempt to dispel its claims. It's hard to believe that Breyer and the majority truly thought that time-barred claims typically get caught in chapter 13 bankruptcies.</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The third, and perhaps most compelling as far as Justice Breyer goes, is that Justice Breyer asked a whopping twenty-six questions at <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/16-348_2cp3.pdf">oral argument</a>, none of which were about the likelihood of catching stale claims in chapter 13 bankruptcy, and almost all of which concerned the point he'll make next for the Court, to which I'll now turn.</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Breyer's <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-348_h315.pdf#page=11">real concern</a>, and perhaps that of the Court as well, is that he doesn't want "an ordinary civil court . . . to determine answers to these bankruptcy-related questions," the premise being that FDCPA suits over bankruptcy claims on time-barred debts will go to "ordinary civil courts," i.e. district courts, and force them to decide some bankruptcy-related question or another. Other passages in the opinion <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-348_h315.pdf#page=12">warn</a> of "postbankruptcy litigation in an ordinary civil court concerning a creditor's state of mind." This, I submit, is the nub of the Court's opinion. </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, it's not at all clear what "bankruptcy-related questions" Justice Breyer thought "civil courts" would have to decide if FDCPA suits about bankruptcy claims were actionable. </span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Whether a claim is stale or not is not a bankruptcy-law question, nor is whether the creditor knew whether the claim was stale (which matters under the FDCPA's bona fide error defense)</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">; they're questions of state law and FDCPA defenses, respectively. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In oral argument, however, Breyer <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/16-348_2cp3.pdf#page=35">speculated</a> that permitting FDCPA suits on bankruptcy claims would make "the Article III judge -- maybe not in some cases, but in many cases -- deciding pretty complicated things as matters of bankruptcy law growing out of a bankruptcy case." The Chief Justice, similarly, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/16-348_2cp3.pdf#page=50">worried</a> about "things spinning out of the bankruptcy estate being adjudicated elsewhere" when "[t]he whole idea [of bankruptcy] is let's get everything here in one place and -- deal with it, you know." This line of questioning eventually devolved into Breyer's <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/16-348_2cp3.pdf#page=36">daring</a> the debtor's counsel to "think of the most complicated [defense to a claim] you can think of and let's talk about that one," the notion being that debtors would bring FDCPA suits in district court alleging that a creditor should never have filed a claim because some especially complicated bankruptcy defense barred it. (Not a very plausible suggestion.) At this point, Justice Kagan (who would dissent) <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/16-348_2cp3.pdf#page=37">attempted</a> to helpfully point out that there really aren't what she called "bankruptcy-related" defenses to claims brought in bankruptcy, just defenses under state law to those (typically) state-law contract or tort debts. It seems, however, that this intervention didn't have its intended effect, as the opinion that ultimately issued darkly warns in its most critical passages of "civil courts" deciding "bankruptcy-related questions."</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">D. What's wrong with all that. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This line of reasoning has two interesting features, the first being that on its own terms it's quite wrong, the second being that it's methodologically rather curious. The wrongness is of no methodological interest, other than perhaps underscoring the practical problems with a pragmatic approach to interpretation that considers all sorts of policy concerns no one's briefed, but if you read what follows instead of skipping to the methodology you'll learn something fun and odd about federal jurisdiction.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">i. FDCPA claims about creditors' bankruptcy conduct wouldn't usually end up in "civil court."</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">On the first point, I happen to know a fair amount about bankruptcy jurisdiction, partly because I'm privileged to spend my spare time writing amicus briefs about it with the <a href="https://www.law.umich.edu/FacultyBio/Pages/FacultyBio.aspx?FacID=pottow">law professor</a> who won the last <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/executive-benefits-insurance-agency-v-arkison/">two</a> <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/wellness-international-network-limited-v-sharif/">cases</a> about it in the Supreme Court, and bankruptcy jurisdiction has a fascinating fillip that vests the <i>bankruptcy </i>courts with jurisdiction over FDCPA suits of this kind. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That is that bankruptcy courts, by <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/157">reference </a>of the district courts, are <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/1334">granted jurisdiction</a> not only over bankruptcy <i>cases</i>, and suits arising <i>under</i> bankruptcy <i>law</i>, but "all civil proceedings . . . <i>arising in</i> or related to cases under title 11 [that is, bankruptcy cases]." Bracketing what "related to" has been interpreted to mean, which is rather strange and controversial, a proceeding "arising in" a bankruptcy is generally deemed to be a sort of dispute that factually arises, well, in a bankruptcy, and could only arise in bankruptcy</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—such as, the courts of appeals all agree, a suit against a bankruptcy attorney for malpractice (even though the cause of action exists outside of bankruptcy). Federal <i>bankruptcy </i>courts decide that kind of claim, surprisingly enough, even absent diversity or a federal question. (Embedded federal questions in malpractice suits <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=849731011115200703&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">typically don't</a> make malpractice suits arise under federal law.) </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, an FDCPA action about a creditor filing a claim in a bankruptcy on a time-barred debt is just that sort of a claim</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—a claim that, when described that way, arises in and can only arise in bankruptcy</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>. Ergo, it "arises in" for jurisdictional purposes.* Ergo, if someone files an action of this kind in district court, complaining of something that happened in the bankruptcy case that remains on the bankruptcy court's docket, the district court is really supposed to kick it to the bankruptcy court under the standing reference order every district court has, under which it's referred everything within its bankruptcy jurisdiction (including all "arising in" matters) to its bankruptcy court, as <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/157">Congress has authorized district courts to do</a>. Of course, many FDCPA plaintiffs would sue in bankruptcy court in the first place because bankruptcy courts don't like it when creditors attempt to hoodwink their debtors in their court, but in any case, a creditor that didn't like the idea of a district court's adjudicating some "bankruptcy-related" matter in an FDCPA case could readily find its way back to bankruptcy court. (This would also have been, by the way, a great way to block the nationwide class certification Johnson sought, as it's generally thought that bankruptcy courts can only entertain district-wide class actions.) And if the case didn't raise the bankruptcy-related matters Justice Breyer fears these cases would, the creditor might otherwise prefer an Article III judge and wouldn't fight over the matter of the reference order.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">* There </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">may be some controversy over whether the bankruptcy court can
constitutionally enter a final judgment on the claim, rather than
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, if the creditor won't
consent, but this doesn't go to bankruptcy-court jurisdiction, just the degree of bankruptcy-court adjudicative authority.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ii. What question is the Court deciding? </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The methodological point is that the Court got quite far afield from deciding whether filing a claim on a time-barred debt in a chapter 13 bankruptcy is "unfair" or "unconscionable"; the Court seems to have instead decided whether it's a good idea to let debtors sue their creditors in "civil court" for what they do in bankruptcy court, quite apart from how unfair or unconscionable the things those creditors do in bankruptcy court may be. How does the Court even attempt to describe this exercise in terms of interpretation? </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The answer is, in the most purposivist/intentionalist way possible. Breyer <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-348_h315.pdf#page=11">says</a> he cannot find, in the statute, "good reason to believe that Congress intended an ordinary civil court applying the Act to determine answers to these bankruptcy-related questions." Rather, he says, citing a purposes section of the FDCPA, the FDCPA "seeks to help consumers, not necessarily by closing . . . a loophole in the Bankruptcy Code, but by preventing consumer bankruptcies in the first place." That is, what justifies the Court's inquiry into whether it makes sense to let debtors sue their creditors for bankruptcy collection practices is a claim about whether Congress wanted it, no matter how textually "unfair" and "unconscionable" the practices may be. And yet, there is of course no evidence that Congress shared Justice Breyer's and the Court's concern about "civil courts" deciding "bankruptcy-related" FDCPA suits; what the Court is really engaged in, at best, is the echt-purposivist inquiry of what Congress would have written on the subject had it thought to specifically legislate on the subject. This is the sort of question that Hart and Sacks had courts asking themselves in the '60s, and that people like Judge Posner would still have courts ask today.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I have nothing very interesting to say about whether this mode of interpretation is okay, and won't say the obvious and hackneyed things that could be said. I'll instead confine myself to the two following observations. The first is that, triumphalist claims for textualism's success notwithstanding, this opinion of May 2017, from which only Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg and Kagan dissented and in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Thomas joined, is not remotely textualist cricket. The dispositive reasons for which the Court decided the case don't even purport to be about the meaning of the critical language in the statute, but rather are all about whether Congress would have written a bankruptcy-claims carve-out from that language had it considered the matter for reasons that don't even pertain to the policies Congress was trying to advance. The unfairness of a merely stale claim versus a truly deceptive claim isn't what the opinion's about; the opinion's reasoning, if not quite its holding, applies to any bankruptcy claim, however unfair. A rather aggressive purposivism is alive today, not only in outliers like Judge Posner's <a href="https://www.blogger.com/media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2017/D04-04/C:15-1720:J:Wood:aut:T:fnOp:N:1942256:S:0#page=24">opinion</a> in <i>Hively</i>, but in majority opinions of the Supreme Court.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The second is that this kind of reasoning is more likely to be adopted when a statute's text says very little and seems to delegate a large measure of policy choice to courts. A court in the Court's situation is likely to feel not only that it's been delegated a decision to make about what collection practices are bad enough to be deemed "unfair or unconscionable," but that it's been delegated a decision to make about what collection practices should be actionable <i>simpliciter</i>. Even a textualist may so view the matter, and in any case with so little textual constraint bold purposive moves like Breyer's are more likely to slip by without textualist objection. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I think this is a mistake. Congress's intending, if it did so, courts to have broad discretion as to what counts as unfair doesn't entail that Congress intended courts to have broad discretion to except unfair practices from the statute's coverage for reasons unrelated to fairness. If Congress requires the Park Service to rid national parks of "big weeds," the agency has a great deal of discretion in defining "big," but I don't see that it can define out all weeds with thorns to cut on the cost of weeding gloves or save its employees cuts, nor even intentionally set "big" at a height that excludes all thorned weeds. A certain kind of statutory interpreter might disagree, especially with the latter claim, but here I just want to claim that the freewheling sort of discretion on display in <i>Midland Funding</i> isn't necessarily entailed by a broad delegation of discretion to the courts (or an agency). Rather, as we Chevronistas are always trying to assure our anti-<i>Chevron</i> friends, delegations are bounded things, not only by unambiguity on multiple sides (certain things are clearly unfair, other things are clearly not), but by the requirement that interpreters choose among permissible interpretations for <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2874941">reasons related to the reason for the rule they're interpreting</a>, or sometimes other uncontroversially acceptable factors, like <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-46_bqmc.pdf">cost</a>. Concerns, however valid, about "civil courts" deciding "bankruptcy-related" FDCPA claims have very little to do with the reasons for Congress banning unfair and unconscionable debt-collection practices, and seem better addressed to Congress than the courts.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-40491135490530888342017-08-16T13:47:00.005-07:002017-08-17T12:02:03.150-07:00Can Lower Courts Identify Scrivener's Errors on Remand in Higher Courts' Opinions? A Thought on Judge Posner in Sears (Now with a Postscript on Inferences from Denials of Rehearing)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">On Monday Judge Posner issued a short opinion on fees in <a href="http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2017/D08-14/C:16-3554:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:2010580:S:0"><i>In re Sears, Roebuck & Co. Front-Loading Washer Products Liability Litigation</i></a>, a case that attained a certain notoriety at the class-certification-appeal stage for Judge Posner's generous <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3118177165852557424&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">treatment</a> of Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3199918354099431454&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">doubling down</span></a> on the propriety of that treatment after his first opinion was GVR'd in light of <i>Comcast Corp. v. Behrend—</i>a decision which, in light of <i>Comcast</i>'s <a href="http://narrowestgrounds.blogspot.com/2016/03/tyson-foods-inc-v-bouphakeo-comcast-is.html">subsequent interment</a> in <a href="http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-1146_0pm1.pdf"><i>Tyson Foods</i></a> and the Court's ultimate <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/sears-roebuck-and-company-v-butler/">denial</a> of cert in <i>Sears</i> on further petition from Posner's disposition of the GVR, seems wise. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">However, it also seems that, as ballyhooed as <i>Sears</i> was as a matter of class-action doctrine, it wasn't such a great case; plaintiffs will only <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">receive </span>a <a href="http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2017/D08-14/C:16-3554:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:2010580:S:0#page=2">maximum of $900,000</a> from the case's settlement. (Correction: I am reliably advised that the $900,000 was awarded <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">to a smaller or lower-damages class, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">which complain<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ed </span></span>of a defect in the Sears washers' control units, while the larger or more seriously <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">aggrieved </span>moldy-washer class, whose<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> counsel's fees were not at issue in this appeal, received at least $12 million in settlement. Both classes were at issue in Judge Posner's prior opinions on certification. While Posner <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mentions the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">two separate classes in his opinion, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">one would never know from reading it that the </span></span></span></span></span>control-unit class, rather than both classes or the moldy-washer class, was the one that got only $900,000 in settlement.) Nevertheless, between the multiple trips to the Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court and the rather involved certification proceedings, class counsel, <a href="http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2017/D08-14/C:16-3554:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:2010580:S:0#page=2">quoting</a> Posner, "claimed to have incurred $3.16 million in fees . . . [and] subsequently increased their base fee estimate to $3.25 million, having discovered additional billable time." They also <a href="http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2017/D08-14/C:16-3554:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:2010580:S:0#page=2">requested</a> that their actual fees be multiplied by 1.85 to 1.9 "to account for what they claimed to be their extraordinary effort[.]" The district court <a href="http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2017/D08-14/C:16-3554:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:2010580:S:0#page=2">found</a>, Posner says, "that they were entitled to a base fee of only $2,726,191, which the court multiplied by 1.75, making the total fee award $4,770,834."</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, Posner will decide that a multiplier (which is apparently quite common) isn't called for here, for reasons which I must say are quite unclear other than his <a href="http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2017/D08-14/C:16-3554:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:2010580:S:0#page=4">unembroidered ipse dixit</a> that class counsel "failed to prove that a reasonable fee would exceed . . . the pre-multiplier figure sought by class counsel." (Judge Posner does, to be fair, <a href="http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2017/D08-14/C:16-3554:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:2010580:S:0#page=3">tersely note</a> earlier that the district court concluded that the case "wasn't very complex," a "conclusion [which] leaves us puzzled about the court's decision nevertheless to allow a multiplier.") However, a lack of reasoning is far from the biggest problem with this opinion. <a href="http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/rssExec.pl?Submit=Display&Path=Y2017/D08-14/C:16-3554:J:Posner:aut:T:fnOp:N:2010580:S:0#page=4">Here are its last three sentences</a>:</span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The presumption [that "fees that exceed the recovery to the class are unreasonable"] is not irrebuttable, however, and in
this case the extensive time and effort that class counsel had
devoted to a difficult [AS: but not very complex?] case against a powerful corporation
entitled them to a fee in excess of the benefits to the class.
But they failed to prove that a reasonable fee would exceed
$2.7 million—the pre-multiplier figure sought by class counsel
and already thrice the damages awarded the class. We
therefore reverse the judgment of the district court and remand
with directions to award $2.7 million—no more, no
less—in fees to the class counsel.</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Two things have gone awry here, the second of which is an apparent scrivener's error in what Judge Posner is ordering the district court to do on remand. The first is the claim that "2.7 million [was] the pre-multiplier figure sought by class counsel." It's not; they initially sought $3.16 million in pre-multiplier fees and ultimately asked for $3.25 million in pre-multiplier fees, at least if Posner's earlier statement of the facts is to be believed. $2.7 million</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—actually, $2,726,191</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—is what the district court <i>found</i> they were entitled to in pre-multiplier fees. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The second and far more consequential mistake is the "remand with directions to award $2.7 million</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—no more, no
less—in fees to the class counsel." The district court found that class counsel was entitled to $2,726,191 in actual<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> pre-multiplier fees</span>, which is undeniably "more" ($26,191 more) than $2.7 million. The opinion nowhere suggests that that finding was erroneous, clearly or otherwise, and the whole thrust of the opinion is that class counsel should get its pre-multiplier fees, whatever they are. Yet the district court is ordered, pretty unambiguously, I would say, to reduce those pre-multiplier fees by $26,191 to $2,700,000. Perhaps rounded numbers can be used as shorthand for unrounded numbers elsewhere discussed, but when you "remand with directions to award [a particular round number] no more, no less," it's hard to say that the round number is shorthand for a number $26,191, or roughly 1%, greater.</span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">If class counsel are reading this, I think a petition for panel rehearing would obviously be a very good idea, but the more interesting question is whether the district court would be bound on remand to award $2,700,000 in the event rehearing isn't sought or granted.<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> (See note on the significance of a hypothetical denial <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">of reh<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">earing.*)</span></span></span> I think the answer is no; I can't see a reason why the district court shouldn't be allowed to detect scrivener's errors in decretal language in the same way that it could detect them in statutes, which are legal commands that must be followed just as much as a court of appeals or Supreme Court mandate is. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The point, however, isn't an uncontroversial one. For example, in <i>Johnson v. Williams</i>, the Supreme Court held that deferential AEDPA review applied to a particular habeas claim and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2080982278377755854&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1099">remanded for further proceedings, presumably under that standard, consistent with its opinion</a>. However, at the top of its opinion, it <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2080982278377755854&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1092">carelessly and inconsistently wrote</a> that "we hold . . . that the restrictive standard of review set out in § 2254(d)(2) . . . applies, <i>and that under that standard respondent is not
entitled to habeas relief</i>"—a point which the rest of the opinion never addressed. The Ninth Circuit (yes, that Ninth Circuit), including Judge Reinhardt (yes, that Judge Reinhardt), though well aware that this was almost certainly a mistake, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2558366139552048116&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">felt constrained</a> on remand "to follow the mandate of the Supreme Court," internally inconsistent and plainly marred by sloppy drafting though it was, and deny habeas relief. It would take a subsequent GVR in which the Court <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10509446917136763834&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">tacitly admitted it messed up</a> for the Ninth Circuit to adjudicate the prisoner's habeas claim under the standard the Court previously told the Ninth Circuit to adjudicate it under.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">My cursory research on reading opinions to contain scrivener's errors shows that district courts, in reviewing ALJ opinions (or other agency opinions), identify scrivener's errors fairly often, that courts of appeals <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5525477547867990150&q=No.+16-12622&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">occasionally identify</a> scrivener's errors in district-court opinions or sentences, but that, perhaps because of the constraints of the mandate rule and lower courts' reticence to criticize their superiors, lower courts hardly ever identify mistakes in higher courts' decisions on remand, or in higher courts' decisions more broadly. The one instance I've found of a district court identifying a mistake in one of its circuit's opinions, though not one entered in the case before it, is in this old unpublished opinion by Judge Kimba Wood, which unfortunately isn't on Google Scholar or Courtlistener's new and purportedly comprehensive database of every opinion on Pacer. The particular mistake she caught rather puts one in mind of Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in <i>Bock Laundry</i> (see my previous post on mistake and scrivener's error):</span><br />
<div>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Defendants understandably retreat from this interpretation. They ultimately characterize <i>181 East 73rd Street</i> as holding that Standard 2 should apply to both plaintiffs and defendants, whether they are sponsors or tenants. The support for this view is in the last sentence of the text of <i>181 East 73rd Street.</i> “And in this case, congressional intent and the unambiguous statutory language are in harmony—a party may recover attorneys' fees under the Abuse Relief Act only if the suit is lacking in substantial merit.” 954 F.2d at 51. The word “party” in this sentence suggests that Standard 2 applies to plaintiffs and defendants, whether they be tenants or sponsors. Taken literally, the sentence implies that the unambiguous statutory language of [15 U.S.C] § 3611(d) does not single out defendants for special treatment with respect to attorneys' fees, despite the fact that one of the two sentences in § 3611(d) states: “A defendant may recover reasonable attorneys' fees if the court determines that the cause of action filed by the plaintiff is frivolous, malicious, or lacking in substantial merit.” <u>Because that is an absurd result that finds no support in the rest of the Second <span class="co_searchTerm co_currentSearchTerm" id="co_term_1173" tabindex="0">Circuit's</span> <span class="co_searchTerm" id="co_term_1174">opinion</span>, I can only assume that the term “party” was placed in that sentence by <span class="co_searchTerm" id="co_term_1189">mistake</span>, instead of the word “defendant.”</u></span></blockquote>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>305 E. 24th Owners Corp. v. Parman Co.</i>, No. 85 CIV. 3788 (KMW), 1992 WL 209292, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1992) (emphasis added). The Second Circuit <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15278155413581309253&q=994+f2d+94&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p97">would correct</a> the mistake in its prior opinion rather more obliquely on appeal.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><u>A postscript on rehearing</u> </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">* Should the Seventh Circuit deny <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">panel <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rehearing, that might seem <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a signal that for some unexpressed reason, the panel really<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">thought the district court's finding on pre-multiplier fees <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">was $26,191 off, or that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">three times </span>what plaintiffs <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">would receive was enough<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, 3.03 times was too much,</span> and that class counsel would have to eat $26,191. (Indeed, it's not completely impossible that Judge Posner was thinking the latter<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">.) </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">A lot d<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">epends, though, on the chariness with which rehearing is granted. In <i>Johnson</i>, the Supreme Court denied rehearing, which the Ninth Circuit incorrectly took as a signal that the Court really meant its <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">unexplained holding. But after the Ninth Circuit wrote about how unexplained and inconsistent with the rest of <i>Johnson</i> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that holding was and how compelled they were to follow it all the same, the Court quietly <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">granted cert<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, vacated the Ninth Circuit's f<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">aithful application of their mandate, and</span></span> r<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">emanded with directions to consider the petitioner's claim under AEDPA, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">thereby tacitly </span>overruling their prior "holding." <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The moral of that story seems to be that the Court <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">doesn't grant rehearing to fix mistakes in its opinions<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, even if it really knows they're there. And of course, this comes as no surprise; the Court virtually never grants rehearing. Th<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e Court's reluctance to grant <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rehearing to correct mistakes, though, doesn't mean that its denials of rehearing <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">clarify </span>that its alleged mistakes<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> aren't</span> mistakes, or ratify the mistakes; <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">quite the opposite. It means <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">when it denies rehearing, it isn't deciding whethe<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">r its<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> opinion is mistaken, but is deciding something else (whether, perhaps, the mistake is important enough to warrant the embarrassment of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rehearing). Since rehearing denials don't<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> seem to tell us much </span>about whether the Court <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">meant what it appears to have <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">accident<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ally </span></span>said, a</span> lower court <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">is still fre<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e to determine, on my view, that it's clear from the entirety of the Court's opinion that it didn't <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mean to say what it did.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">On the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">other hand, if a court usually grants rehearing when i<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s opinions contain scrivener's errors, even if those errors are only important to the parties, the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">unexplained deni<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">al of rehearing probably <i>does</i> suggest that </span></span></span></span>that court doesn't think its opinion contains a scrivener's error. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The best practice for <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">appellate courts, however, would be to explain why they're denying a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> scrivener's-</span>error-based <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rehearing petition so that it's clear to lower courts that the appellate court has rejected the claim of scrivener's error, rather than <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">merely having elected not to address it for reasons besides it<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s merits. At the least, appellate courts should be more transparent about their rehearing standards in this regard so that reasonable inferences can be drawn from unexplained denials, instead of shaky inferences from a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">set of brute results on rehearing petitions. For example, if the Seventh Circ<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">uit were to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">deny rehearing in <i>Sears</i> without explanation, a lowe<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">r court would probably have to look at a large set of rehearing denials and grants to determine whether the Seventh Circuit regu<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">larly denies <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rehearing petitions presenting valid claims of scrivener's error, or whethe<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">r a denial truly signals <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a merits rejecti<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">on of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">such a claim<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> given that all the good ones garner rehearing.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span> </div>
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Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-43263414671873151092017-08-13T01:01:00.000-07:002017-08-14T21:45:27.545-07:00Supreme Court 2016 Term in Review: (Apparent) Mistake, Another Textualist Possibility Unexplored in SW General<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">1. Linguistic <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">m</span>istakes <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">vs. </span>linguistic accidents. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Have you ever said to someone, "I don't think that means what you think it means," or more declaratively, "that doesn't mean what you think it means"? If so, you're familiar with <a href="http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1647&context=mlr#page=16">the concept of linguistic mistake, as distinct from linguistic <i>accident</i></a>, or what lawyers call scrivener's or drafting error. When you tell someone that what they said doesn't mean what they think it means, what you mean is that you think they intended to say precisely the words they said, but that, because they seem to intend to convey something other than what they said <i>means</i>, they are likely mistaken about the meaning of the words they said.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">For example, if a wise <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">but unpolished </span>student writes on an exam, "the Court shouldn't of avoided the <i>Chevron</i> question in <i>Esquivel-Quintana</i>, that was a really lame move," it is possible that the student intended both to use a semicolon and write "shouldn't have" and accidentally wrote "shouldn't of" and used a comma in a hurry. But it is just as possible and probably more likely that this student intentionally wrote "shouldn't of" because he mistakenly believes, as many people do, that "shouldn't of" is a grammatical construction that means "shouldn't have," and also quite likely that the student intentionally used a comma because he mistakenly believes that commas can link independent clauses that can only be linked by semicolons. When Congress makes that sort of an error, it hasn't engaged in <i>scrivener's </i>error, properly understood. The metaphorical scrivener's metaphorical pen didn't slip; the text Congress enacted was the text it meant to enact. Congress was just mistaken about the meaning of the words it deliberately used.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">On the other hand, if your boss (<a href="https://www.mcglinchey.com/images/pdf/Amalgamated%20Transit%20Union.pdf#page=5">or Congress</a>) tells you to file an appeal in no less than seven days, you won't think he meant to say what he said, or is mistaken about the meaning of what he said; you'll likely believe he meant to say "more" and <i>accidentally</i> said less. You won't think he mistakenly believes that "less" means more, since no one fully conversant in English does. When Congress makes this sort of an error, it <i>has</i> engaged in scrivener's error. The scrivener's pen did slip, those members of Congress and staffers who read the text didn't catch it, and Congress voted for and enacted a text other than the text it intended to enact.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">2. Thompson's understanding of "notwithstanding" as mistake rather than alternative use.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Readers of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">my </span>last post will recall that: (1) in 199<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">8</span>, Senator Fred Thompson introduced on the Senate floor the statute that was the subject of <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1251_ed9g.pdf"><i>SW General</i></a>, having "authored" that statute; (2) that the statute provided for three different ways of becoming an acting officer in subsections (a)(1) through (a)(3), and provided in subsection (b)(1) that "notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)" an acting officer with less than ninety days of prior service as first assistant to his present office couldn't continue to serve as acting officer if he were nominated to permanently fill that office; and (3) that in his remarks, Thompson said in the clearest terms that the phrase "notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)" meant that (b)(1)'s prohibition only applied to acting officers who took office under (a)(1), as if the word "notwithstanding" meant "but as to," rather than the standard meaning of "despite." In my post, I argued that this <i>might</i> show that "notwithstanding" had an alternate meaning of "but as to" and was more ambiguous than it appeared.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of course, it can't be the case that just because one Senator, even a statute's authoring Senator, thinks a word in a statute means or can mean <i>x</i>, it can mean <i>x</i>. Were that so, no Senator could ever be mistaken about what words mean, and we certainly need <i>some</i> account of senatorial linguistic mistake. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In my post, I readily conceded that if Thompson were the only person in the world with his understanding of "notwithstanding," he would be wrong, and claims that "notwithstanding" were ambiguous in virtue of his understanding would be unwarranted. I'm probably willing to go much farther than that. I do think it's pedantic to say that "irregardless" unambiguously means "not regardless" or is gibberish; there are simply too many people who think otherwise. But I am not quite so unpedantic to say that "principle" is ambiguous between the meanings of "precept" and "primary" just because many people believe it's correct to say "principle objective" instead of "principal objective." People who say "principle objective," I am inclined to claim, are mistaken about what "principle" means, not early adopters of an alternative usage. So too may Senator Thompson have been mistaken about what "notwithstanding" means. Indeed, while careful textualists must investigate the possibility that his understanding reflects a lesser-known but surprisingly prevalent alternative usage, I think it's likely the case that such an investigation would reveal he was mistaken (though I can't, at this time, draw the line for you between common mistakes and alternative meanings with anything approaching precision.).</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">3. Textualism as objectified intentionalism and the textualist understanding of mist<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">akes.</span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">theory</span> </span> </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Where does that leave a textualist? With great respect to simple-minded textualists, some of whom are quite sophisticated, the simple-minded textualist will say (as<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> the Court said)</span> that once we've determined "notwithstanding" isn't ambiguous we take our marbles and go home. A statute's meaning is its text's ordinary meaning—subject to the textualists' caveats about context (which in any event can't mutate ordinary meaning but only clarify it), absurdity, and screamingly obvious scrivener's error—and "notwithstanding" has only got one, so there we are. Intentions are for the intentionalist buzzards to pick over, and what did Fred Thompson—bless his constitutionalist heart!—really know about English anyway?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">With respect, as I say, to simple-minded textualists, that's not really what textualism is about. To sophisticated textualists, textualism isn't about ordinary meaning; it's about, to quote <a href="https://blogs.cornell.edu/marmor/files/2015/06/Manning-WhatDividesTextualistsfromPurposivists-ColumbiaLawReview2006-1odme75.pdf#page=10">John Manning approvingly quoting Justice Scalia</a>, "'objectified intent'</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">.</span>" <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">O</span>r to quote <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11006962055285318757&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1343">Judge Easterbrook approvingly quoting Justice Holmes in a proto-textualist mood</a>, "we ask, not what this man meant, but what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of English." That is, if a normal speaker of English wrote a given statute, what would you think he was <i>trying </i>to say? </span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It's because textualism is a search for apparent intent on the face of the text that we textualists do much of what we do. It's why, when a clause is ambiguous, we give it a non-redundant meaning instead of a redundant one</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—because we believe <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">normal speakers don't</span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mean </span>to speak redundantly. It's why, when Congress mentions one thing and not something else <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that's related, we<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> read it to implicitly exclude the something else</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—because we <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">imagine that Congress would have mentioned it if it didn't intend to exclude it</span></span></span></span></span>. </span></span>It's why, when a word in a list is ambiguous between a meaning that clashes with the rest of the list and a meaning that coalesces with it, we give it the latter meaning (think "pins, tacks, and nails")</span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—because we <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">assume </span>Congress intend<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s</span> to stay on topic, rather than include wildly divergent things in the same list. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">None </span>of these moves <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">has </span>anything to do with semantic meaning or <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">an ordinary meaning that hasn't been enriched by apparent intention</span>. The ordinary or semantic meaning of "nails" d</span></span></span></span>oesn't somehow contract to metal nails when it's placed next to "pins" and "tacks"; semantically, it's just as<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> biva<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">lent as ever.</span></span> We read "nails" to mean metal nails there because ordinary people <i>mean</i> or <i>intend to convey</i> the idea of metal nails when they talk about nails in the context of pins and tacks. </span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, one thing we sometimes do when we are trying to determine what people <i>appear</i> to mean by what they say is to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">observe </span>that what they <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">appear </span>to have meant to say isn't what they said and deduce that they're probably mistaken about what they said means. As I said at the beginning of this post, we all have told someone that "that doesn't mean what you think it means." If someone writes about their "principle objective," indeed if Congress writes about a "principle objective," we will not only take them to mean "principal objective" but act on that understanding, even though it is just barely possible that someone might use "principle," in its correct sense, adjectivally and mean something like "an objective concerning principles." You could imagine, for example, a popular religious figure punningly writing that "your principle objective should be to follow the Golden Rule." This small window of uncertainty aside, no reader of "principle objective" in a statute, however scrupulously textualist, would read it to actually mean "principle objective" because it isn't absolutely certain that Congress really intended to convey "principal objective." Someone who writes "principle objective" appears, </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">far more likely than not, </span></span> to be mistaken about what "principle" means and to intend to convey "principal objective." </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Moreover, we don't only identify linguistic mistake when it's near-certain. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Recall, from the last <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">post, Justice Kagan's hypothetical about someone who orders a salad, stea<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">k and fruit cup, and says that not<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">withstanding the order of the fruit cup, they don't want any strawberries in their meal. This<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> hypothet<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ical, she <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">reasoned</span>, shows that "notwithstanding" means "de<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">spite<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> (the fruit cup),</span>" not "but as to only (the fruit cup)." But we <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">can imagine a similar hyp<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">othetical that would lead us to form very different intuitions about what the customer thinks "notwithstanding" means. Suppose he ordered an iced tea<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, oysters and steak, and said that notwithstanding the order of oysters, he <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">positively dislikes and wants no ice.</span> Does he really mean that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">despite the oysters, which of<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ten come on ice, he wants no ice in anything<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> he gets, including his iced tea? Or does he <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mistakenly </span>believe "notwithstanding" means "but as to" and mean that as to the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> oysters he wants no ice? (Also, by the way, note the possibility for domain restriction here, as discussed in my post on <i>Advocate General</i>.)</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mistake</span>, I think, seems more probable, though <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">w</span>e can't be certain or even <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">overwhelmingly </span>confident; perhaps he loathes ice in all settings an<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">d </span>wants a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> cold tea, which needn't <i>be</i> on ice to have <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">been</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> "iced." And if he ordered a soda, which <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">usually comes out of fountains cold without adding ice, global icelessness is a perfectly possible <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">interpretation of what he's said. But even here, I think it more likely than not that he means only to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">hold the ice on his oysters, especially because he's <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mentioned </span>the oysters and not the more obvious candidate for containing ice, the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> soda<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. We can reasonably infer t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">hat the customer<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, more likely than not, mistakenly <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">believes "not<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">withstanding" means "but as to,"<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> and should interpret his order as if he said "but as to" (unless one wants to run the risk of<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> losing a tip by implying he doesn't know what not<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">withstanding means in an attempt at clarification).</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As textualism is a game of identifying objectified intent, not ordinary meaning, which it will often track but which it will frequently enrich and from which it will occasionally deviate, textualism, like <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">taking restaurant orders,</span> is sometimes a game of identifying objectified mistake</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—a <i>seeming</i> misunderstanding on the part of Congress of what its words mean, judging by the text, and a <i>seeming</i> intention to convey something other than what it said, again judging by the text. (Leave aside whether Congress factually <i>was</i> mistaken; that truly is an inquiry for the intentionalists.) This is a game that textualists actually and not just theoretically play. </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">b. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">practice</span> </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">For example, in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14118102670860400516&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p509"><i>Bock Laundry</i></a>, Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which Congress (not the Advisory Committee on the F<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ederal</span> Rules of Evidence) drafted, said that you could generally impeach witnesses with prior felonies; as to a "defendant," though, their probative value had to outweigh their prejudicial effect. It certainly didn't seem as if Congress could have really meant to say that civil defendants, but not civil plaintiffs, received the benefit of prejudice-weighing. That was, though, the ordinary meaning of what they said. </span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Scalia, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14118102670860400516&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p527B">acknowledging</a> that "defendant" literally meant civil and criminal defendant alike, thought that Congress <i>appeared</i> to have meant something else. Critically, he <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14118102670860400516&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p528">disclaimed</a> any interest in "which meaning can be <i>shown to have been</i> understood by a larger handful of the Members of Congress" as a matter of legislative-historical fact. Rather, he wanted to know "which meaning </span></span></span></span></span>is most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus <i>most likely to have been understood</i> by the <i>whole</i> Congress which voted on the words of the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it)." That is to say, he wanted to know what, on the face of the text, Congress appeared to have most likely intended and what "the citizens" would believe Congress most likely intended</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—which is to say, he wanted to know what Congress objectively appeared to have mistakenly believed "defendant" to mean.</span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Posing that question, Justice Scalia concluded that Congress appeared to have mistakenly believed "defendant" to mean "criminal defendant" (a mistake, he noted, that is sometimes made "<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14118102670860400516&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p529">in normal conversation</a>"), and on that ground interpreted "defendant" to mean "criminal defendant" rather than its literal meaning. Scalia, admittedly, isn't quite as clear as I<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> hope I've</span> been that he's reasoning in terms of linguistic mistake, but my reading of his opinion is <a href="http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1647&context=mlr#page=17">not</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1647&context=mlr#page=17"> an original or idiosyncratic one</a>.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">c. Confidence levels for mistakes vs. accidents </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Before finally turning back to <i>SW General</i>, a word on how confident a textualist must be to make the objective-m<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">i<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">st<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ake move. Textualists generally insist on certainty before identifying scrivener's error, and though some (<a href="http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1243&context=nulr">one?</a>) textualists think that's wrong, we're right t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">o do so. Scrivener's error, a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">doctrine about when Congress <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">accident<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ally </span></span>enacted <i>the wrong text</i> in some detail, must be clear lest tex<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">tualism collapse into intentionalism; if we went around asking, as that one textualist has suggested we should, whether Congress more likely than not<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> intended to write one thing when it said another, we'd just be asking what rules Con<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">gress intended</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> apart from whatever it said. We might not be purposivists</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—people who ask what purposes Congress had and construe statutes accordingly</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—but it's hard to see how we'd be textualists if we'd discard the text whenever there <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">seemed to be a 51% chance that Congress meant to enact a different one. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Further, because scrivener's error is a matter of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">legislative-historical fact, for the reason that textualists <i>do</i> care about actual subjective legislative intent to the minimal extent that <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1838566">they care</a> whether <a href="https://blogs.cornell.edu/marmor/files/2015/06/Manning-WhatDividesTextualistsfromPurposivists-ColumbiaLawReview2006-1odme75.pdf#page=31">Congress really intended to enact the bill they enacted</a>, the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> search for scrivener's error on a more-l<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ikely-than<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">-not standard would not be objective, but just as subjective and immersed in legislative history as the intentionalist interpretive enterprise generally. Indeed, barring distinctions too numinous for all but a handful of judges to draw, i<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t would simply <i>be</i> the intentionalist interpretive enterprise.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Linguistic mistakes, however, are quite another matter. When Congress makes or seems to make a lingui<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">stic mistake, it hasn't accidentally enacted the wrong text; it's intentionally picked the words it picked because it<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'s mistaken abou<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t what they mean and <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">thinks they mean something else. To read a text as l<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">inguistically mistaken isn't to discard the text, but to obey its <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">apparent intent, w<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">hich for a conceptualy rigorous textualist is what textual meaning <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">is. To follow a text's lite<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ral meaning when there <i>appears</i> on the face of the text to be a 70% chance that Congress mistakenly thought a word meant something other than what it <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">means is to disobey objectified intent and to deviate, importantly, from what ordinary citizen-readers will take the statute to mean.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">4. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Mistake in <i>SW General</i>, and the role of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">actual mistakes in identifying objectified mistakes.</span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It is, then, a conceptual possibility that the correct textualist <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">reading </span>of "notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)" in <i>SW General</i> is "but as to subsection (a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">)(1)" because Congress <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">appears, on the face of the text, to have</span> mistakenly believed, more likely than no<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t,</span> that "not<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">withstanding" meant "but as to<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">." What textual indications are there, if any, that Congress <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"had" (that is, appears to have had<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, not actually had) this mistak<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">en belief?</span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I don't think there are many, nor that those there are are especially strong, but there certainly are some. The first is the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">at<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">-least minor <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">oddity th<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">at Congress bothered t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">o write "notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" at all. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Conceiving of Congress, as Holmes and Easterbrook would, as a normal speaker of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">English, we t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">end to assume that Congress doesn't sprinkle cross-references into statutes unless they do some work. What work does "not<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">withstanding subsection (a)(1)" do if it doesn't limit what follows to an exception to (a)(1)? If you'll recall, (a)(1) through (a)(3) are all paths to becoming acting officers; (b)(1) conf<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">licts with all three because it cuts <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">acting officers' service short. And if (b)(1) cuts (a)(2) and (a)(3) short without the help of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"notwithstanding (a)(2)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> an<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">d (a)(3)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">," as the Court held, then why was it necessary to say that (b)(1) applied "notwi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ths<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">tanding subsection (a)(1)"?</span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The Court <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1251_ed9g.pdf#page=16">suggested</a> that the conflic<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t between (b)(1) and (a)(1) was <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">especially </span>aggravated; since (a)(1) made certain officials acting officers by operation of law and said they "shall" serve as acting officers, while (<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">b)(1) <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">sai<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">d the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">y "may not" continue to serve in an acti<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ng role</span> once nominated to serve p<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ermanently</span></span></span></span>, Congress would especially want to clarify that (b)(1) trumped (a)(1). Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) involved, on the other hand, perm<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">issive </span>presidential <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">appointment to acting status, which <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">arguably poses less of a conflict with <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(b)(1)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">All that's arguable, certainly, but <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">does it really explain wh<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">y "notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" was needed? If it weren't there, would anyone doubt that a provision about who "<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">may not<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" serve once nominated would cut short the service of those who "shall" initially serve upon a vacancy? Consider, on the other hand, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">how <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">vital </span>"notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" is<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> if it really, as its drafter said, limits (b)(1) to an (a)(1) exception.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Sotomayor's dissent <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1251_ed9g.pdf#page=37">argues</a> that reading "notwithstanding" to mean "de<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">spite" rather than "but as to" poses another superfluity problem; I believe <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that </span>one is <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1251_ed9g.pdf#page=18"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">easily parried</span></a>. But <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">whatever conclusions one may draw about the strength of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">an apparent-linguistic-m<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">istake reading of "notwithstanding," I want to c<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">lose by addressing one final point, which is the relevance of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the historical fact that Senator<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> Thom<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">pson <i>was</i> mistaken about <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">notwithstanding's meaning (ass<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">uming that his <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">use isn't a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">cceptable alternative use).</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Textualists are not concerned with actual intentions, only "objectifi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ed" or apparent ones. Actual intentions are for intentionalists.</span> However, for <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a linguistic mistake to be apparent, it<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> first must be possible. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">We <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">simply don't know anyone who <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mistakenly thinks that "less" means "more," so when Congress says "no less than seven days<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" and seems to<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> have meant <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"no more," we don't say that Congress <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">seems to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">have been mistaken about the meaning of "<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">no less"; we say that Congress seems to have accidentally <i>written </i>"no less<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" and think of the pro<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">blem in terms of scrivener's error, for which <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">we require certainty</span>.</span></span> Linguistic-mistake readings of statutes are only viable when <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the mistake in question is <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">conceivable, and to be conceivable, it helps if we know of some cases where <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">it's </span>happened. One reason that it's so easy to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">assume </span>someone thinks "principle" means "principal" is that many people do. And one reason Scalia was willing<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> to read "defendant" to mean "criminal defendant" in <i>Bock Laundry </i>is that people sometimes <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mean defendant that way <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"in normal conversation." Indeed, many non-lawyers may <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mistakenly believe that the only people called "defendants" are criminal defendants. Some of them<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> are probably in Congress.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Senator Thompson, then, is relevant to a claim that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Congress's apparent intention in writing "notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)" was to communicate <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the idea "but as to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">subsection (a)(1)," <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">not because he shows that it <i>was</i> Congress's intention, but because he shows that it <i>could have been</i> the intention of a normal speaker using Congress's words<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">O<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nce you read Thom<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">pson confidently <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">asserting that "notwithstanding sub<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">section (a)(1)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" meant that (b)(1) only <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">limited</span> (a)(1)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, not (a)(2) or (a)(3)</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>, it's no longer so hard to imagine a Holmesian normal speaker of English m<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">istakenly <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">thinking "notwithstanding" means "but as to."</span></span> Apparently, it happens.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">*<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> Acknowledgements to Mitchell Berman's <a href="http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1647&context=mlr#page=16">typology</a> o<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">f <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">legislative intent </span>in "The Tragedy of Justice Scalia"</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—one of the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">few </span>truly excellent and practically <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">useful </span>bits of interpretive scholarship in the last few years</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>for suggesting mu<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ch of this post, though I dissent from his judgment of Scalia as <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">tragic figure.</span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-26473173872958497032017-08-11T01:52:00.000-07:002017-08-12T15:01:36.478-07:00Supreme Court 2016 Statutory Term in Review: Disregarding Legislative History's Textualist Uses in SW General<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I. Textualists and Legislative History </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Textualists believe in using legislative history to interpret statutes—even when, if not for a statute's legislative history, they would otherwise find the statute's text clear. What grounds could I have for making such a provocative remark? It's famously true, of course, that textualists reject the notion of legislative history as authoritative gloss. That's because textualists believe a statute's legal meaning is what its language means in some objective sense, not what Congress intended to convey by it. But textualists have always granted that legislative history can help us work out what statutory language means, if only because legislative history, like any other writing or speech, can serve as evidence of how particular words or phrases are used, and thus what those words or phrases mean. Here, for example, is Justice Scalia discussing the point in a <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852430">published dialogue</a> with John Manning five years ago:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">And by the way, I don't object to all uses of legislative history. If you want to use it just to show that a word could bear a particular meaning--if you want to bring forward floor debate to show that a word is sometimes used in a certain sense--that's okay. I don't mind using legislative history just to show that a word could mean a certain thing. We are trying to ascertain how a reasonable person uses language, and the way legislators use language is some evidence of that, though perhaps not as persuasive evidence as a dictionary. That is using legislative history as (mildly) informative rather than authoritative: “the word can mean this because people sometimes use it that way, as the legislative debate shows,” rather than “the word must mean this because that is what the drafters said it meant.”</span></blockquote>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">There's an interesting ambiguity here. Scalia's clear that he's not persuaded by arguments that statutory language must mean this because that's what the drafters said it meant. It's unclear, though, whether he's open to arguments that statutory language <i>can </i>mean this because that's what the drafters said it meant to them, or whether the only sorts of legislative history he'll consider for this purpose are statements that incidentally <i>use</i> a word or phrase in a certain way, rather than defining it or glossing it. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I think it's likely that Scalia would at least be reluctant to use gloss as evidence of linguistic meaning; Scalia seemed to distrust legislative gloss apart from his concern that it not be <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">deemed controlling</span>. Earlier in his response to Manning's question on legislative history, he complains about legislative history that "simply declares what the committee or sponsor intends a word or phrase
to mean: 'Subsection B means this or that.' That statement is meant to
be authoritative; its one and only function is to tell us how that
committee or sponsor wants the bill to be interpreted. When judges
attribute that intention to Congress as a whole, they are not
ascertaining meaning . . . ." However, if legislative history can be evidence of what a word in a statute <i>can</i> mean, what's better evidence, as far as legislative history goes, than a definitive statement by that statute's drafters on what they think that word means in that statute? A floor speech in which a Senator uses a statutory term to mean something or another only shows what the term can mean in a context that may bear little resemblance to the context in which it's used in the statute; we may also be generally suspect of informal usage as a proxy for meaning in the statute's relatively formal and technical context. On the other hand, a statement by the drafters that some snippet of statutory language means something to them would seem much stronger evidence of what that language at least <i>can</i> mean to reasonable people in the context of the statute itself.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Bracketing for the moment Scalia's possible hostility to using legislative gloss as evidence of linguistic meaning, it's at least clear that Scalia was open to using some legislative history as evidence of what statutory language can mean, but not open to using legislative history as authoritative evidence of what statutory language does mean. This use of legislative history to suggest linguistic possibilities, but not to resolve linguistic debates, has an intriguing corollary; for Scalia at least, legislative history is much more probative when a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">statute seems clear</span> than when <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">it's ambiguous</span>. When Scalia already knew from other sources that a statute was ambiguous, legislative history had no work to do for him; it could at most redundantly confirm that a statute <i>could</i> mean what a dictionary or his own understanding of the language already told him it could mean. But when a statute seemed clear, legislative history could productively dispel that appearance of clarity and show him that a "word can mean this because people sometimes use it that way." </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This seems counterintuitive given textualists' devotion to the plain meaning rule, but the internal textualist logic is perfectly sound. As textualists don't think a statute means what Congress intended, the usual way people use legislative history—as a solvent of ambiguity if the statute's text isn't clear—makes no sense for textualists. There's just no reason for textualists to say that if a statute's ambiguous, it means what "Congress" (really, certain involved committees or members) said it meant. But textualists are interested in what statutory language means, and absent argument that Congress is so linguistically incompetent that its usage is worthless evidence of linguistic meaning, it makes no sense to have a rule by which legislative history is disregarded so long as a statute seems clear <i>prior</i> <i>to</i> considering evidence of alternative usage in legislative history. That would be tantamount to saying that courts should decide whether a statute's clear on less than all the relevant evidence. Indeed, on Scalia's understanding of legislative history's uses, it would seem that the <i>only </i>time when legislative history matters, at least in any dispositive way, is when a statute would seem clear if not for legislative history.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">A famous opinion by Judge Easterbrook confirms that textualists, or at least the judiciary's two <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">leading </span>textualists, see legislative history's use as a dissolvent of seeming clarity rather than a solvent of ambiguity. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11006962055285318757&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006"><i>Matter of Sinclair</i></a>, perhaps the finest statement of textualist theory a court has ever produced (though it's <a href="http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/pubpdfs/campos/CamposMLR.pdf">hardly immune from criticism</a>) was written at a time,1989, when textualism was far from the dominant modality of statutory interpretation. In explaining why he was taking a textualist approach to legislative history</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span>specifically, legislative history that flatly stated a bill had limited retroactive application when the statute in question just as flatly stated its "amendments . . . shall not apply with respect to cases commenced . . . before the effective date of this Act"</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span>Judge Easterbrook felt he had to reconcile that approach with then-still-vital cases that said legislative history bore on statutory interpretation even when a statute was plain. His solution was to say that legislative history could bear on whether a statute <i>was </i>plain</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—that evidence of alternative usage in legislative history can dissolve a seeming clarity:</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What's a court to do? The answer lies in distinguishing among uses of
legislative history. An unadorned "plain meaning" approach to
interpretation supposes that words have meanings divorced from their
contexts — linguistic, structural, functional, social, historical.
Language is a process of communication that works only when authors and
readers share a set of rules and meanings. What "clearly" means one thing to a reader unacquainted with the
circumstances of the utterance — including social conventions prevailing
at the time of drafting — may mean something else to a reader with a
different background. Legislation speaks across the decades, during
which legal institutions and linguistic conventions change. To decode
words one must frequently reconstruct the legal and political culture of
the drafters. Legislative history may be invaluable in revealing the
setting of the enactment and the assumptions its authors entertained
about how their words would be understood.<i> It may show, too, that words
with a denotation "clear" to an outsider are terms of art, with an
equally "clear" but different meaning to an insider </i>[emphasis added]. . . These we take
to be the points of cases such as <i>American Trucking</i> holding that
judges may learn from the legislative history even when the text is
"clear". Clarity depends on context, which legislative history may
illuminate. The process is objective; the search is not for the contents
of the authors' heads but for the rules of language they used. </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span></blockquote>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Quite different is the claim that legislative intent is <i>the</i> basis of interpretation, that the text of the law is simply evidence of the real rule. . . . The "plain meaning" rule <i>. . .</i> rests not on a silly belief
that texts have timeless meanings divorced from their many contexts,
not on the assumption that what is plain to one reader must be clear to
any other (and identical to the plan of the writer), but on the
constitutional allocation of powers. The political branches adopt texts
through prescribed procedures; what ensues is the law. <i>Legislative
history may show the meaning of the texts — may show, indeed, that a
text "plain" at first reading has a strikingly different meaning — but
may not be used to show an "intent" at variance with the meaning of the
text. </i>[Emphasis added.]</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As with Scalia's remarks to Manning, one may wonder exactly how the two halves of this dichotomy are to work. Once one grants that legislative history may show that language that clearly means one thing to a court can or even <i>does </i>mean something else (unlike Scalia, Easterbrook seems open in this passage to arguments that legislative history may show what a statute does mean, not just what it may possibly mean), how can legislative history ever "show an 'intent' at variance with the meaning of the text"? If a committee report may show that language that appears to plainly mean x has "a strikingly different meaning" of y, can't any legislative history that seems "to show an 'intent' at variance with the meaning of the text" be recharacterized as evidence of the "strikingly different meaning" that text had to the "insider" writing it?</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I think Easterbrook would say (and in <i>Sinclair</i>, at least begins to suggest) two things in response. The first and perhaps less persuasive is that some language's meaning is just too plain for legislative history to show it can mean something else. If Congress writes that a law "shall not apply to cases commenced before the effective date of this Act," even legislative history that claimed that that precise language meant that courts had discretion to apply the law retroactively would be hard to take as a gloss of what that language truly meant to the legislative history's authors. Rather, we might suspect that they were attempting to manufacture ambiguity on an issue they lost. Second, not all or even most legislative history will speak directly to the question of what statutory language means. The legislative history in <i>Sinclair</i> didn't actually regard the statute's effective-date clause; it glossed another section of the statute, and it <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11006962055285318757&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1345">seems unlikely</a> that the drafters of that history were <a href="http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/pubpdfs/campos/CamposMLR.pdf#page=32">even aware</a> of the effective-date clause's existence. In other cases, legislative history may generally describe objectives that members of Congress intended but didn't achieve in every (or any) detail. It's in th<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">is <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">kind of sense that we should take Easterbrook's somewhat cryptic concluding remark in <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>Sinclair</i> that "[n<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">]o legislative history suggests any other meaning [t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">han the apparently plain one]. The committe<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e report suggests, a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t best, a different intent."</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">II. Legislative History in <i>SW General</i></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a. The statute</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">We can now turn to the Court's opinion in <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1251_ed9g.pdf"><i>NLRB v. SW General</i></a>. <i>SW General</i> was a case about whether a provision in the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) that prohibited nominees to a position from serving in that position in an acting capacity while they wait to be confirmed</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span>unless they had previously served as the first assistant to that position for at least ninety days</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span>applied to (a) all types of acting officers, or (b) only those who became acting officer by automatic succession by virtue of being the vacant office's first assistant. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The FVRA provides for three types of acting officers in subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) of FVRA's <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/3345">Section 3345</a>. The first, under (a)(1), are first assistants to an office, who succeed automatically to an acting role in the case of a vacancy in that office unless the President acts under subsections (a)(2) or (a)(3). Under (a)(2), the President can direct any Senate-confirmed executive-branch official to serve in an acting capacity in any vacant office. And under (a)(3), the President can designate any officer of an agency who's been in the agency for ninety days, and is paid at a GS-15 rate or greater, to serve in an acting capacity in any vacancy in his agency.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i> </i></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i> </i>In <i>SW General</i>, the President used his (a)(3) powers to elevate Lafe Solomon, a senior official at the NLRB of ten years' standing, to serve as the NLRB's acting General Counsel. He then nominated Solomon to serve as the NLRB's GC permanently</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—triggering, potentially, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the prohibition in 3345(b<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">)(1) that bars nominees to a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n office </span>from acting in that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">office </span>unless they served as first assistant to the office for ninety days. Solom<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">on had never been the NLRB GC's first assistant, so it followed that he couldn't serve as the acting GC during his confirmation process</span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—unless <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">3345(b)(1)'s prohibition didn't apply to (a)(3) acting officers<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, as the NLRB argued.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The NLRB's textual basis for arguing that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">3345(b)(1) didn't apply to (a)(3) officers was rather thin. 3345(b)(1) begins: "</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="chapeau">Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), a person may not serve as an acting officer for an office under this section. . . ." The NLRB argued that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"[n]otwithstanding subsection (a)(1)" meant that the prohibition only applied to (a)(1) acting officers; the private parties challenging Solomon's official acts as void argued that the reference to (a)(1) merely alleviated a uniquely strong tension between (a)(1) and (b)(1), since (a)(1) mandated that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">first assistants shall serve as acting officers and (b)(1) mandates that they shall not (absent sufficient first-assistant service) once nominated to their temporary office. The private parties also argued that<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> (i) notwithstanding simply doesn't mean "notwithstanding <i>and <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">as</span> to</i>," as the NLRB would have it mean,<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> (ii) that (b)(1)'s bar on any "person" serving "under this section" made it plain that (b)(1) <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">applied to all acting officers appointed under any part of<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> 3345, not just (a)(1) acting officers who succeeded to their posts under (a)(1), and (iii) that the NLRB's interpretation c<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">reated surplusage in multiple parts of the statute.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="chapeau"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">All that is quite compelling; perhaps most compellingly, "notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)" just doesn't seem to create the textual daylight the NLRB argued it did. As Justice Kagan <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2016/15-1251_q86b.pdf#page=6">reasoned</a> at oral argument, suppose "I'm talking to my waiter, and I place three orders. I say, number 1, I'll have the house salad. Number two, I'll have the steak. Number three, I'll have the fruit cup. And then I tell the waiter, notwithstanding order number three, I can't eat anything with strawberries. So on [t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">he NLRB's] theory, the waiter could bring me a house sal<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ad with strawberries in it, and that seems to me a quite odd interpretation of what's a pretty clear instruction: No strawberries."</span></span> Quite so<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. </span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">N</span>otwithstanding order <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">number three just means, well, <i>notwithstanding </i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">order <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">number </span>three, or de<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">spite order number three (w<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">hich might seem to call for strawberries), not "but as to order number three, and only order number three." And the same seems true of "notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)"; it just means<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, in an<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">y ordinary sense of the phrase, "de<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">spite subsection (a)(1)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> [</span>which the following might <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">seem to present a difficult conflict with if not for this indication that t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">his subsection shall trump (a)(1)], the following is the rule"</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—not "but as to, and just as to, (a)(1), the following is the rule."</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">And yet I hesitate. For as clear as it is to me, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">virtually any n<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">eutral lawyer who's thought about this case, and all the lexicographers that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"despite," <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">not "but as to,"</span> is the <i>prescriptively </i>correct <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">usage of "notwithstanding," <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">it wouldn't at all surprise me if a substantial fraction of high-school<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">-educated or even college-<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">educated Americans would read <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)"</span> to signal an (a)(1)-specific exception, or if the same fraction uses notwithstanding to mean "but as to." Perhaps widespread <i>mis</i>usage (but who decides what's misusage?) doesn't ambiguity make; <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">perhaps <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the only understandings that matter, for purposes of a statute addressed to acting officers in <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Senate-confirmed positions, are educated legal understandings, though here it's interesting to note that the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> Office of Legal Counsel and the executive branch had always <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">read </span>(b)(1) the NLRB's way. These, however, are rather arguable points; what I should really like before pronouncing the statute clear is some confirmation that my an<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">d others' relatively sophisticated understandings of "notwithstanding" fully capture the range of meanings that reasonabl<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">readers of English could <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">suppose the reasonable writers of English in Congress had in mind when they used the word.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">b. The legislative history</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It is here where the legislative history has some value. It seems that Senator Fred Thomps<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">on</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">successful Washington</span> attorne<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">y, player of attorneys on <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Law and Order</span></i></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">dra<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">fted much of the FVRA, and in particular the reference to (a)(1) in (b)(1). Explaining t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">o his colleagues</span>, in great and <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">highly </span>accurate detail, the many changes to the bill that had been negotiated since it last saw the Senate floor, Thompson <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/10/21/CREC-1998-10-21-pt1-PgS12810-6.pdf#page=13">said this</a> of (b)(1) as it r<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">eads today:</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The 180 day p<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">eriod in 3345(b) governing the length of service prior to the onset of the vacancy that the first assistant must satisfy to be eligible to serve as <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the acting officer is reduced to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">90 days. Under 3345(b)(1), <i>the revised reference to 3345(a)(1) means that this subsection applies only when the acting officer is the first ass<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">istant, and not when the acting officer is designated by the President pursuant to 3345(a)(2) or 3345(a)(3).</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> The 90 day service re<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">quirement is inapplicable to a first assi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">stant who has already received Senate confirmation to serve<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> in that position [this is an accurate synopsis of 3345(b)(2)]. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What "revised reference to 3345(a)(1)" was Thompson talking about? The phrase "notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)." It's clear that Thompson, the "author" or proponent of that language, thought it meant that what followed applied only <i>to</i> (a)(1), not (a)(2) or (a)(3). To put the point even more strongly, it's clear that Thompson, who evidently only wanted (b)(1) to be an exception <i>as to</i> (a)(1), believed he could make that point by saying that (b)(1) applied "notwithstanding" (a)(1). This might not earn Thompson or his staffers a good grade for draftsmanship, but it's what an educated attorney of the time the FVRA was drafted thought notwithstanding meant in the context in which the Court was called upon to interpret it.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">c. The Court's opinion </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What does Chief Justice Roberts' scrupulously textualist opinion make of this legislative history? Nothing. In the first place, he <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1251_ed9g.pdf#page=14">tells us</a> that the "ordinary meaning" of notwithstanding is "in spite of," </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">citing a pair of dictionaries and Scalia and Garner's authoritative guidance.</span> It's used to tell us "which provision prevails in the event of a clash," not to cabin the overriding effect of a provision to those it specifically negates. What of the fact that Congress strangely only mentioned (a)(1) in the notwithstanding clause, rather than (a)(2) and (a)(3), with which (b)(1) also clashes by cutting short acting officers' service? No matter; after all, if a hypothetical radio station were to awkwardly and rather unidiomatically <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1251_ed9g.pdf#page=15">say</a> that "[w]e play your favorite hits from the '60s, '70s and '80s[; n]otwithstanding the fact that we play hits from the '60s, we do not play music by British bands," you wouldn't think they do play music by British '<i>70s </i>bands. Rather, you'd think they were particularly addressing the assumption that they would play <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">music by <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The Beatles and Rolling Stones given that they play '60s hits, but not actually limiting their no<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">-British-band rule to '60s hits. </span></span></span>So too it follows that "notwithstanding (a)(1)" doesn't mean "but as to (a)(1)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">,</span>" but only "in spite of (a)(1)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> (implied: with which the following especially conflicts)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">."</span></span> After some further remarks on various superfluities posed by the NLRB's reading, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1251_ed9g.pdf#page=18">the statute is pronounced clear</a>.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Then, and only then, Roberts comes to the statute's legislative history, including Thompson's understanding of his own use of "notwithstanding" to mean that (b)(1) only restricted (a)(1). As an initial matter, he dismisses all of it, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1251_ed9g.pdf#page=18">writing</a> that "[t]he text is clear, so we need not consider this extra-textual evidence." Eventually turning to Thompson, he <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1251_ed9g.pdf#page=20">points out</a> that Senator Byrd</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>who offered a much less detailed exegesis of the revised FVRA that didn't specifically engage with (b)(1)'s cross-reference to (a)(1), and apparently played a lesser role in drafting the amendment in question</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>said after Thompson spoke that under (b)(1) any acting officer couldn't serve once nominated to his position absent ninety days of first-assistant service. (It's <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crec/1998/10/21/CREC-1998-10-21-pt1-PgS12810-6.pdf#page=15">not quite clear</a> that Byrd was saying this.) This disagreement between Thompson and Byrd, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1251_ed9g.pdf#page=20">Roberts scoffs</a>, "is a good example of why floor statements by individual legislators
rank among the least illuminating forms of legislative history," which is sort of like saying that dictionaries aren't illuminating forms of interpretive guidance because they contain multiple definitions of the same words. And that's all <i>SW General</i> has to say about the FVRA's drafter's understanding of "notwithstanding."</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">d. My critique (finally) </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Whatever the weight of Thompson'<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s statement, a point on which I'm agnostic, it should be clear that Roberts' dismissal of it rests on a confusion about the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">role legislative history has t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">o play in textualist interpretation. (This could be because Roberts, however many textualist opinions he produces, is <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-158_6579.pdf">the</a> <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-114_qol1.pdf">farthest thing</a> from a textualist <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that </span>the judiciary has to offer these days.) For textualists<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, legislative <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">h<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">istory isn't extra-textual evidence that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">can decide or even <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">help decide </span></span>the <i>intended </i>meaning of unclear texts<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">; Thompson's statement wouldn't be any more relevant if dictionaries showed that notwithstanding could mean what he thought it meant. A textualist will be skeptical that Thompson's intent was necessarily Congress's intent, and thoroughly <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">disinterested, in any event, in what Congress's actual intent was.</span> </span> So it doesn't matter <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">if </span>Thompson and Byrd disagreed on what they meant the statute to mean, because a textual<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ist <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">doesn't care what they actually meant.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Rather, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">to a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rigo<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rous<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> textualist, legislative histor<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">y is <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">one of many sorts</span></span></span></span></span></span> of secondary evidence, and not a particularly privileged one, of what language in the text <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">can </span>mean<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. And because legislative history will only be <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">probative<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> when other, more conventional and authoritative <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">sorts of </span>evidence of meaning and usage (like dictionaries) don't already show an ambiguity, legislative history only especially matters to textualists when the text otherwise seems clear. So we cannot pronounce the FVRA clear <i>before</i> considering that its drafter read the key word in the case differently than the dictionaries do; nor<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, for that matter, can we pronounce the FVRA clear before considering that the Office of Legal Counsel issued contemporaneous post-enactment guidance <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">reading </span>the reference in (b)(1) to (a)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(1) <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">o limit (b)(1)'s prohibition to (a)(1). We must at least consider the possibility that the text isn't clear because <i>some</i> pe<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ople in the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> community of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">federal </span>officials and lawyers to whom the statute was addressed (though not Senator Byrd) understood it, at the time it was enacted, to mean something other than what it <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">seems to clearly mean.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, there may be, of course, a variety of textualist <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">arguments that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Thompson's particular statement doesn't matter<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> even if legislative history can shed light on usage in theory. Let's consider <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a few of these. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">T<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">hey'll all, as we'<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ll see, track Sc<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">alia and Easterbrook's <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">caveats</span> on <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">textualist uses of legislative history.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">First, a textualist professor and friend has suggested to me, along the lines of Easterbrook<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'s di<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">stinction in <i>Sinclair</i> between legislative history that reveals "a different intent" and legislative history that truly goes to textual meaning, that Thompson wasn't really talking about what the text meant, but just what he hoped the bill to achieve. I <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">deem this a thoroughly </span>implausible reading of T</span>hompson's remarks <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that's nothing more tha<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n a textualist's characteristically motivated effort to avoid engaging at all with legislative history, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">no matter how relevant to textual meaning it may be<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. Thompson says that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"[u]nder 3345(b)(1), </span>the revised reference to 3345(a)(1)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">,"</span> that is, the phrase "notwithstanding subsection (a)(1)," "<i>means</i></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i> </i>that this su<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">bsection [3345(b)(1)] applies only when the acting officer is the first assi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">stant [under (a)(1)], and not when the acting officer is designated by the Pres<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ident pursuant to 3345(a)(2) or 3345(a)(3)." <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Legislative history </span>doesn't get more anchored to the text than <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">this remarkably granular</span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">statement about what a revised c<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ross-reference in one subsection to another "means." One might as well say that the Court's opini<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">on in <i>SW General</i> itself isn't really about what the language in 3345<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(b<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">)(1) means.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Second, the same professor somewhat more reasonably suggests, along the lines of Scalia's distinction between legislative history that says what a statute means and legislative history that shows how a word is used, that perhaps Senator Thompson was just prevaricating about what he thought the language meant in ho<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">pes that courts would read an idea he couldn't get into the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">bill's text into the bill. Here too, we seem to be fishing for reasons to avoid confronting legislative history<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. My f</span>riend's supposition <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">isn't </span>consistent with the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">FVRA's<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Clinton-era<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> history</span></span>, in which Senator Thompson and other Republican sponsors who wanted to limit President<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> Clinton's acting-officer manipulations </span>had to make deals with Dem<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ocratic Senators to<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> give the President <i>more </i>flexibility in order to get the bill past a filibuster<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">.</span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">O</span>n my friend's supposition, Thompson would have been<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> pretending tha<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t the FVRA gave <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Clinton<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> more leeway to pu<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t his nominees into acting positions than his negotiating partners would allow. It also isn't consistent with how careful and accurate the rest of his remarks are, and one also has to wonder why no one would correct Thompson if he were really lying about getting an idea into the bill that his colleagues fought to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ke<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ep</span> out.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That said, there's no doubt that remarks of this kind <i>can </i>be self-serving, while a Senator's casual misus<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e of "not<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">withstanding" in a floor speech to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mean "but as to"<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> is<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> much less likely to be a connivance to convince courts that "notwithstanding" had that alternative meaning in 1995. Of this concern I would say that absent evidence that when a member of Congress s<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ays to his <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">colleagues that some statutory language has a meaning a dictionary <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">doesn't support, he's <i>usually </i>trying to fool them or a court</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">evidence which I really don't see</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></i></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>we shouldn't exclude this sort of evidence of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">usage. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">We can discount for the risk <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">inte<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rpretive gloss in legislative history is disinge<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nuous</span></span></span> without discarding <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">it altogether. Besides<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, while the risk of disingenuousness is greater with interpretive gloss of statutory language than cas<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ual use of some words that appear in a statute, the value of gloss, i<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">f sincere, seems <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">much greater. "Notwithstanding" might mean something quite different in the phrase "no<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">twithstanding subsection (a)(1)," and indeed in the context of the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">FVRA </span>more broadly, than it means in hypotheticals like "notwithstanding order number three" or "not<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">withstanding t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">he fact <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that we play hits from the 60s." We should be, I think<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, quite reluctant to discard evidence of how drafters of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a phrase in a statute cont<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">emporaneously understood it</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Conversely, we should be </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">more humble than we <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">often </span>are about the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">epistemic value of homespun hypothetical usages that differ from the statutes we're interpreting in every possible way other than sharing a couple word<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s and maybe some similar syntax.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Third, another <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">textualist professor has suggested to me that Thompson's <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">apparent understanding of notwithstanding </span>might not <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">be </span>a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">standard use of the word, and that we can only give<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> statutory language standard meanings. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This is perhaps anticipated by Easterbrook's claim in <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Sinclair </span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that there was simply only one way to read "shall not apply to cases commenced before the effective date of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">this Act," no matter what the le<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">gislative history might say. </span></span></span></span>I'm more or less rece<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ptive to this proposal depending on what's meant by standard. If by standard <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">we mean prescriptively acceptable, as som<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e people will, I don't see how we can rule out usages that lots of people use as interpretive possibilities just because we're taught not to use them (which is usually becau<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">se they were much less common at some time in the past). If Congress wants to use "irregardless," I c<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">an't imagine a justification for interpreting the word as gibberish, rather than wha<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t anyone would under<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">stand it was trying to say, because irregardless is bad English. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">If by standard, however, we merely mean non-idiosyncratic, I do think a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> very strong case c<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">an be made that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a statute isn't ambiguous <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">just because one person</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">even if he were the statute's drafter</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">thinks it means something that no one else does. T<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">he more, however, eviden<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ce of us<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e or understanding shows that Thompson wasn't the only one who read "not<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">withstanding" the way he did at the time the FVRA was enacted, the more we must deem his understanding "standard," even if irregular or relatively uncommon.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Finally, because p<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">eople accustomed to<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> non-textualist uses of legislative history will reflexively <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">assume I'm suggesting one, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nothing I've said is meant to suggest that we should use Thompson's statement to <i>close</i> debate on what "notwithstanding" meant in the FVRA, or <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">even use it as evidence of any <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">kind or weight of what Congress intended the FVRA to mean and thus what it doe<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s mean<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">.</span> I only suggest that Thompson's statement, along with the OLC's contemp<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">oraneous unde<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rstanding, <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">might</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> show that the FVRA isn't as clear as it initially seems, and that we must consult th<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ese extra-textual sources of evidence of usage<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> before we deem t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">he statute clear, just as <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the Court </span>consulted the extra-textual evidence of the dictionary, Scalia and Garner, and <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">its </span>intuitions about the meaning of hypothetical<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> uses of "not<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">withstanding" in connection with <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'60s hits and fruit cups before deeming the FVRA clear. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I'll even grant that the dictionary has more weight than the legislative history, though I tend to give the le<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">gislative history more weight than the fruit cups.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></div>
Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-43387199813059323382017-08-01T22:34:00.000-07:002017-08-02T18:13:04.384-07:00Supreme Court 2016 Statutory Term in Review: Textualist Pathologies in Advocate Health Care Network<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I'm
going to do a review of the Court's most methodologically interesting
OT 2016 statutory cases, less the ones I've already written on. I was
inspired to write this series of posts by a <a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/340864-justice-kagan-channels-scalia-in-textualist-supreme-court">good column</a> in The Hill by Professor J<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">o<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">na<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">than Nash, who describes Justice Kagan's <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-74_5i36.pdf">opinion</a> in <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/advocate-health-care-network-v-stapleton/"><i>Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton</i></a> as a "tour de force in textualist interpretive technique." I'm not even sure if <i>Advocate Health Care</i> is a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> go<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">od textualist opinion; it seems to turn almost entirely on a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">basic mistake. But it is<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, I think, a very representative opinion of how textualism is practi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ced today. <i>Advocate Health Care</i> exhibits <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">three </span>textualist pathologies that we textualists should cure<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> ourselves of: </span>conflating literal meaning with <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">legal meaning</span>, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">overco<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n</span>fidence </span>about what a statute literally means<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, and overaggressive application of the anti-surplusage canon.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">1. The Statute</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>Advocate Health Care </i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">involved the church-plan exemption from E<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">RISA. A "church plan" is <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-74_5i36.pdf#page=6">defined as</a> "a plan established and maintained . . . for its employees . . . by a church<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" or association of churches.</span></span></span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">A subsequent amendment to ERISA <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-74_5i36.pdf#page=6">clarified</a> that a "plan established and maintained for its employees . . . by a church includes a plan <i>maintained </i>by an organization</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> the principal purpose or function of which is the administration or
funding of a plan or program for the provision of retirement benefits or
welfare benefits . . for the employees of a church . . . if such organization is
controlled by or associated with a church[.]" Call these organizations principal-purpose organizations, or PPOs. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The question then arose whether a plan maintained <i>and</i> <i>established </i>by
a principal-purpose organization, i.e., not by a church, counts as a
church plan, or whether a plan must at least be established by a church,
as the church-plan definition says, to be a church plan. Several
circuits held the latter, reasoning that while the statute broadened the
definitional requirement of church maintenance to include
principal-purpose organization maintenance, it never said that a plan
both maintained and established by a principal-purpose organization
counted as a plan established and maintained by a church. The entities
that offered such plans, on the other hand, argued that that's just what
the statute says; the statute literally equates merely being maintained
by a principal-purpose organization with being "established and
maintained . . . by a church" when it says that plans established and
maintained by churches include PPO-maintained plans.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">2. The Opinion </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What
does Justice Kagan do with this problem? Essentially, she
question-begs her way to a conclusion. The heart of the opinion is <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-74_5i36.pdf#page=10">this syllogism</a>:</span><br />
<div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<div class="co_paragraph co_indentLeft1">
<div class="co_paragraphText">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Premise 1: A plan established and maintained by a church is an exempt church plan.</span></div>
</div>
<div class="co_paragraph co_indentLeft1">
<div class="co_paragraphText">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Premise 2: A plan established and maintained by a church includes a plan maintained by a principal-purpose organization.</span></div>
</div>
<div class="co_paragraph co_indentLeft1">
<div class="co_paragraphText">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Deduction: A plan maintained by a principal-purpose organization is an exempt church plan.</span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The
question Justice Kagan begs is whether "includes a plan maintained by a
PPO" means "includes <i>all </i>plans maintained by PPOs," rather than simply
"includes (or put otherwise, doesn't exclude, or includes some) plans
maintained by PPOs"—implicitly, the ones established by churches. It's <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">not</span> obvious what "includes" means here; that's just the point at
issue. Consider, for example, as Justice Kagan gets around to doing
some pages later, a <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-74_5i36.pdf#page=12">hypothetical statute</a>
that says "a disabled veteran of the active Armed Forces includes a
person who served in the National Guard." Does that mean that every
person who served in the National Guard is deemed a disabled veteran?
No</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—just that disabled veterans include National Guardsmen, namely the ones who are disabled.</span><br />
<div class="copyWithRefReference">
<br /></div>
<div class="copyWithRefReference">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What
does Justice Kagan do with this hypothetical? She says it's a special
case. Generalizing from the features of this hypothetical, she claims
that statutes that say a two-part definition/defined term</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—like "disabled veteran," or </span>"established and maintained by a church"</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span>"includes" <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">some type of thing </span>and <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mean<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span></span>that the defined term includes some subset of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that type of thing </span>that
otherwise meet the definition will have two features. First, the two
parts of the definition or defined term will be relatively "distinct"
and "independent," which increases the chance of their "standalone
relevance" such that a gloss on what can be read as just one part of the
definition is less likely to modify both parts. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Second, and much more importantly, in the case of the disabled veteran, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-74_5i36.pdf#page=14">we know</a> that defining disabled veterans to include <i>all </i>National Guardsmen "could not possibly have been what Congress wanted"; "<a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-74_5i36.pdf#page=13">the mind rebels against reading the statute literally, in line with the logical . . . principles [the syllogism] described above</a>."
In other words, though she doesn't quite say this, we can depart from
the supposed literal reading of "includes" to mean "includes all" only
when reading "includes" that way is absurd, or very near to it; at one
point she suggests her literal reading of "includes" in ERISA would have
to be "<a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-74_5i36.pdf#page=14">utterly untenable</a>"
to be rejected. (Here I agree with Professor Nash, who also detects an
absurdity subtext at this point in the opinion.) In the case of the
church plans, she claims, the mind doesn't rebel against deeming plans
neither established nor maintained by churches, but rather established
and maintained by church-affiliated PPOs, to be both established and
maintained by churches. (Your mind's mileage may vary.) </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Besides
claiming that "a plan established and maintained by a church includes a
plan maintained by a PPO" literally means "includes all plans
maintained by PPOs," Justice Kagan <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-74_5i36.pdf#page=11">also reasons</a>
that the alternative reading would make surplusage of the two words
"established and." Had Congress only wanted to modulate the meaning of
"maintained by a church" to include PPO maintenance, it could have said
that a plan maintained by a church included a plan maintained by a PPO;
the phrase "established and" must add something lest we suggest that
ERISA contains two surplus words, and that something is to make clear
that the PPO maintenance proviso overrode the entire church-plan
definition, not just the maintenance half. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">3. Textualist Pathology #1: Overconfidence About Literal Meaning </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">A
key premise of Justice Kagan's opinion is that "a plan established and
maintained by a church includes a plan maintained by a PPO" <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">at least literally means that every plan maintained by a PPO is<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> defined as a plan established and m<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">aintained by a church<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span>and that</span></span></span> sentences like "a dis<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">abled v<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">eteran
of the active Armed Forces includes a person who served in the National
Guard" literally mean that every National Guardsman is a disabled
veteran. </span></span>Is it true, though, that "a disabled veteran of
the active Armed Forces includes a person who served in the National
Guard" even <i>literally </i>means that <i>every </i>former National Guardsman is a disabled veteran? I don't think that's at all obvious. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Consider,
to take just one of countless examples of an alternative meaning of
"includes," the following exchange. Someone tells a man he has to buy a
pair of "nice black shoes." He asks for clarification about what
counts as a nice black shoe. Do, he asks, loafers count as nice black
shoes? Yes, his <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">interlocutor</span>
replies, "nice black shoes include loafers," or, if you want to get the
grammar on all fours with ERISA's, "yes, a 'nice black shoe' includes a
loafer." What <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">has she literally said</span>?
That every loafer of any color and quality is a "nice black shoe"? Must we invoke
anti-absurdity to interpret this sentence? No; what she <i>literally</i> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">has said </span>is simply that the set of things called "nice black shoes" includes (or doesn't exclude) <i>some</i> loafers of an indefinite number, a number which<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, as far as purely literal meaning goes, </span>may or may not be equal to the number of all the world's loafers<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. </span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What</span>
she implicitly means is that "nice black shoes" include loafers, so
long as those loafers are (1) black and (2) nice. As we know that not
all loafers are black or nice, we know that she is not saying that every
loafer is a nice black shoe.</span></div>
<div class="copyWithRefReference">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="copyWithRefReference">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">How
did Justice Kagan get the Court to unanimously agree that "includes"
literally means "includes all" and that the mind must rebel against this
super-inclusive reading of "includes" in order to read "includes"
otherwise? I have no idea. When my mind sees "the term <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'</span>disabled
veteran' includes a National Guardsman," it doesn't rebel <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">against </span>what I
perceive to be the sentence's literal meaning; I just think the sentence
is literally saying that some disabled veterans are National Guardsmen
and clarifying that National Guardsmen can be disabled veterans. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, I don't doubt that "includes" sometimes means what Justice Kagan says. A statute that <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nix_v._Hedden">helpfully clarified</a>
that "a fruit includes a tomato" would just mean that all tomatoes are
fruits, not that only the really fruity ones (whatever that means, if
anything</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—oddly
enough, I've never eaten a tomato) are. But a statute that said "the
term 'seedless fruit' includes a tomato"? That only means that seedless
fruits under that statute include seedless tomatoes, and it doesn't
literally mean all tomatoes either. What it literally means is simply
that "seedless fruit" is not exclusive of tomatoes; the requirement that
tomatoes be seedless to count as "seedless fruit" is<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> technically, I think,</span>
implied (rather than literally said) given our assumption that the
statute isn't self-contradictory and doesn't mean that seedless fruits
include seeded fruits. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What this shows, I think</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—though it's hard to say for sure, as the linguistics of "includes" are surprisingly complicated</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—is
that even in definitions, "includes" is a word of multiple meanings.
"Includes" can just mean "includes all of," but it can also mean
"includes at least some" or "does not exclude." Neither is the word's
singular literal meaning; <i>both</i> are literal meanings of includes, and it will require context to figure out which is meant</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—to
dismambiguate, as linguists say, the word. But it is characteristic of
textualists these days to hastily conclude that one of several possible
meanings of a word is its literal meaning and presumptive legal
meaning, subject to some heavy burden of persuasion otherwise. More
broadly, overconfidence about normal meaning of all sorts, whether of a
single word or the <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-8358_o7jp.pdf">number of antecedents a word or phrase normally modifies</a> or any other number of usage patterns, is one of contemporary textualists' most characteristic traits.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">4. Textualist Pathology #2: Conflating Literal Meaning with Meaning Simpliciter and Relegating Non-Literal Meaning to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the Absurdity Doctrine</span>.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Suppose
Kagan were right that "a disabled veteran includes a former National
Guardsman" literally means that every former National Guardsman is a
disabled veteran. Perhaps I am right about what "includes" can mean in
sentences like "nice black shoes include loafer<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s," </span>but not about what "includes a ____" means in sentences like "a seedless fruit includes a tomato<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">.</span>" "<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I</span>ncludes
a ____," we might think, always literally means "includes every such
thing" while "includes ___" can mean "includes some ___." If we think
that she's right about literal meaning in the disabled-veteran case, is
it necessary that we find that reading "utterly untenable" and conclude
it "could not possibly have been what Congress wanted" before we reject
the statute's literal meaning? I don't think so, because literal
meaning doesn't exhaust meaning.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Suppose
the disabled-veteran hypothetical read a little differently. In light
of a dispute in the courts about whether a veteran with PTSD can count
as a disabled veteran, Congress amends its disabled-veteran statute to
say that "a disabled veteran includes a veteran suffering from PTSD."
Assuming that the statute literally means that disabled veterans include
all veterans with PTSD, must we read the statute that way? I don't
think so. It is possible</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—the mind doesn't rebel against it</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—that
Congress wanted to protect every veteran with PTSD, however slight.
But maybe what it meant was only that veterans with PTSD <i>can </i>be
disabled veterans; they still have to suffer from PTSD badly enough to
be "disabled," as the statute elsewhere defines disability, and an
extremely mild case of PTSD won't suffice. This is <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">possibly </span>the
more plausible guess about what Congress meant. But if we follow
Justice Kagan, we will have to say that because it's only more plausible
than the statute's literal meaning and not absolutely compelled by
absurdity doctrine, we're stuck with the statute's literal meaning.</span></span></div>
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<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This, I think, is mistaken, because literal meaning isn't all that meaning is. <a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2873883">A statute's meaning can consist of what the statute implies, but doesn't literally say</a>.
For example, if <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">it weren't explicitly addressed</span>, the disabled-veteran
statute would literally embrace veterans of any country's armed forces.
But no one would think the statute means that disabled veterans of the
Syrian Army receive disabled-veteran benefits. Limitation to service in
the United States' armed forces is implied. This is a cousin of what
linguists call quantifier-domain restriction: the idea that if you say
"everybody will be at the party," the quantifier "everybody" is
impliedly restricted to only extend over some "domain" or subset of
persons that "everybody" literally signifies, like your circle of
friends in the place where you live.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Similarly, when the Court claimed in <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/13-7451_m64o.pdf"><i>Yates</i></a>
that "any tangible object" only meant record-keeping objects because
the phrase was preceded in a list by words like "record" and "document,"
the Court was using <i>noscitur a sociis</i> to restrict the domain over which "any" extended, though "any tangible object" literally means <i>any </i>tangible
object and definitely does not literally mean any record-keeping
object. I happen to think the Court restricted "any tangible object" in
a way that no one would ever use the phrase, literally or otherwise,
but I have no objection to restricting the phrase's domain in
principle. We would at least all agree, for example, that if a child's
told to pick up "every object" off his bedroom floor, he isn't being
told to move the furniture or search for dust mites, though "every
object" most definitely includes furniture and dust mites. To claim
that the child really has been told to pick up his furniture and that
the only reason he shouldn't is because his parent obviously misspoke
and meant to say something like "pick up every object on your floor,
except the furniture and dust mites," is quite confused. The parent
expressed herself perfectly well and explicitly exempting furniture was
unnecessary; the implicit limitation on "every object," given the
communicative context, was not only comprehensible, but all but
unambiguous.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">If
these sorts of domain restriction are part of statutory meaning, not
just instances where we determine that what Congress wrote was an absurd
mistake, then it seems permissible to limit "a disabled veteran
includes a veteran who suffers from PTSD" to "a disabled veteran
includes a veteran who suffers from PTSD and is disabled by virtue of
it." We shouldn't have to prove that Congress couldn't possibly have
meant what it literally said (assuming that what it literally said was
that all veterans with PTSD are disabled); we should only have to show
that the better reading of what the statute implies and thus means is
that veterans with PTSD must be disabled, just as the <i>Yates </i>Court
only had to show that its limited reading of "any tangible object" was
the phrase's most likely reading given its context. Likewise, even if
ERISA literally says that any PPO-maintained plan is established and
maintained by a church, that doesn't mean it's out of bounds to say that
the statute implies, and thus means, that only church-established
PPO-maintained plans are established and maintained by a church. And
again, if we can make this move, we shouldn't have to prove the statute
definitely doesn't bear its literal meaning before we make it; literal
meaning is just one level of meaning, and not necessarily the most
important or controlling. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of
course, perhaps ERISA in no way implies that a plan established and
maintained by a church must be established by a church when it says that
a plan established and maintained by a church includes a plan
maintained by a PPO; requiring church establishment but allowing PPO
maintenance may not be a plausible reading of the statute at all. To
say that the statute might imply a church-establishment limitation on
the PPO gloss is not to say that it does. But if we accept the claim
that a definitional clause like "a 'disabled veteran' includes a former
National Guardsman" literally means that all former National Guardsmen
are disabled veterans, it does seem that we have to acknowledge that
definitions of this sort <i>can </i>imply a limiting condition borrowed
from the terms they define, e.g., that the disabled-veteran clause
implicitly means "a disabled veteran includes a former National
Guardsman <i>who is disabled</i>." To claim instead that we're only
sure in that case of what Congress meant to write but mistakenly didn't
fails to explain why we so naturally read the clause as if it in fact
ended "who is disabled." By contrast, when Congress <a href="https://www.mcglinchey.com/images/pdf/Amalgamated%20Transit%20Union.pdf#page=4">famously and absurdly wrote</a>
that CAFA appeals had to be filed "not less than seven days" after the
appealed order's entry, one didn't naturally read the statute as if it
read "not more than seven days"; it was obvious that Congress had meant
to write "not more," but no one would have ever claimed that Congress
implied "not more" by writing "not less."</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">While textualists are at times quite cogniza<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nt<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">
of the fact that literal meaning can be implicitly delimited or
modulated by context, at other times—as in this opinion—they seem to
believ<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e
that a statute means whatever it literally means unless what it
literally means is absurd. That need not be a tenet of textualism. It
would be more correct<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, and perfectly textualist, to say that a sta<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">tute means what its <i>language</i> means unless <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">what its language means is absurd and <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">transparently not what <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Congress <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">meant, and <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">to say that what a statute's language means is not<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">always </span>co<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">extensive with what its language literally means, given that meaning can e<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ncompass i<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mplication. No <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">textualist should feel compelled to invoke <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the absurdity doct<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rine </span></span>to explain <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">why "a seedless fruit includes a tomato<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" doesn't mean that a see<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">dless f<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ruit include<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s a tomato with seeds. Rather, he should feel free to say that while the statute might literally mean that a seed<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">less
fruit includes any tomato (though I'm not at all sure of that), the
statute implies that a tomato must be seedless to be a seedless fruit.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">5. Tex<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">tua<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">list Pathology #3: the Anti-Surplusage Obsession</span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">One of Justice Kagan's non-question-begging arguments is her argument that if Congress had only meant to clarify that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">PPO-maintained
plans counted as church-maintained plans, but hadn't meant to eliminate
the requirement that a church plan be church-established, it would have
only written that a plan maintained by a church includes a plan ma<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">intained by a P<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">PO, not that a plan <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">established and</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> maintained by a church includes a plan maintained by a PPO. This strikes me as a singularly weak invocation of the an<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ti-surplusage canon.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Courts typically justify anti-surplusage on the theory that Congress presumably doesn't write, as Justice Kagan put<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s it, "<a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-74_5i36.pdf#page=11">stray </a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-74_5i36.pdf#page=11">marks on a page</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">," and that every word they <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">write must convey some additional non-redundant meaning. <a href="https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/statutory-interpretation-from-the-inside-an-empirical-study-of-congressional-drafting-delegation-and-the-canons-part-i/">Empirical research</a> o<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n</span> congressional drafting suggests that this is dead wrong.</span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of course, a survey of congressional drafters doesn't tell us muc<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">h about whether in any given cas<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e a drafter avoided re<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">dundancy; it is also at least theoretically vulnerable to the objection<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> that, even if the point of anti-surplusage is to get <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">legislative </span>intent right, it's possible that Congress<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, in reviewing its drafters' hand<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">iwork, would assume that the bill the drafters drafted isn't redundant and that "established and<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" does some additional work that "maintained" doesn't. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Be that as it may, I think <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Kagan's invo<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">cation of anti-surplusage is un<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">iquely weak as a matter of estimating congressi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">onal intent, for the reason that it seems quite natural for Congress to repeat the whole of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the definition of chur<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ch plans</span></span> when clarifying that a defined term <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">doesn't exclude, and includes some, PPO-maintained plans. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Take the case of the nice black <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">shoes.
When you ask for clarification on whether nice black shoes include
loafers, what you're really asking for clarification on is whether
"nice" shoes include loafers, not whether <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">black loafers exist<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. But when told to buy a "nice black shoe<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">," you're at least as likely to ask if your friend's concept of nice black shoes includes loafers as to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">more precisely ask whether <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a loafer meets th<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">eir notions of a "nice" shoe; it's simply more natural to repeat the whole term you're seek<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ing definitional clarification on<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, not the particular part of the definition that needs clarifying. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Similarly, if a statute <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">defined and frequently used the term "disabled veteran," it wouldn't be at all su<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rprising if Congress clarified the meaning of "veteran" by writing that a disabled vet<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">eran
includes a National Guardsman rather than more precisely writing that a
veteran includes a National Guardsman. And it should equally come as
no surprise that even if Congress only meant to clarify what it meant
for a plan to be maintained by a church, it would <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">cop<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">y/paste and gloss </span>ERISA's </span>entire definition of church plan rather than <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">carefully reducing the definition to its most relevant constituent part and glossing that</span>. The idea that we <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">would be co<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nsigning </span></span>part of the statute to the status of "stray marks on a page" <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">were we to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">conclude that </span></span>Congress repeated a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> key statutory phrase when it was onl<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">y trying to clarify <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the meaning of<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a part of that phrase (to be<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> precise, the whol<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">phrase less two words) </span></span></span></span>takes anti-surplus<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">age to rather pedantic and implausible extremes.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now,
I happen to think that anti-surplusage needn't get congressional intent
right to be right. Indeed, it seems a little incoherent to me to be a
textualist on the one hand and say that one <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">uses
the canons because they accurately capture congressional intent on the
other. If the reason you use the interpretive techniques you use is
because you think they get intent right, you probably shouldn't be a
textualist and should reso<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rt to a more thoroughgoingly intentionalist approach altogether</span>. What I think justifies an<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ti-s<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">urplusage is that people who don't know very much <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">about
congressional drafting, but who do read the statutes that regulate
them, tend to assume that Congress doesn't lard the U.S. Code with re<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">dundancy. That may be empirically false, but if it would <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">thwart public expectations to throw anti-su<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rplusage out, I don't think we should. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n addition to that justification for anti-surplus<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">age,
it also makes difficult and otherwise unpredictable cases relatively
easy and predictable, and it is a rule against which Congress can draft
if it wants to.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That said, if we're going to do anti-surplusage in <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">order to honor public expectations, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">we should only take anti<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">-surpulsage so far as the public imagines Congress takes it. If the public wouldn't be surprised that Congress would <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">repeat and gloss </span>a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">whole definition</span></span></span></span> when it only means to gloss <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the </span>particular part of that definition to which the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">gloss is obviously germane, then there's no need <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">to
say anti-surplusage blocks interpretations to that effect. For the
reasons I just gave above, I don't think that churches would be shocked
to learn that when Congress said that a plan established and maintained
by a church includes a plan maintained by a PPO, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">it only meant to clarify </span>that a PPO-maintained plan is a church-maintained plan<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> and that plans est<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ab<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">lished and m<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">aintained by churches include <i>some</i> PPO-mainta<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ined plans: the ones established by churches</span></span></span></span>. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>The <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">peo<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ple who respond to that interpretation by saying, "but if <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that's</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> what Congress meant, why wouldn't it just say that a plan mainta<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ined by a church includes a PPO-maintained plan instead of writing the two extra words 'established and' before maintained<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" are, I suspect, very nearly limited to the lawyers and judges who come up with hyper-textualist moves of that ilk.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span>
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Finally, even if we just<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ify anti-surplusage on the ground that it's <i>some</i>
way of predictably disposing of hard cases, it seems to me a condition
of that justification that anti-surplusage be a rule that Congress can
practicably legislate around. Even if courts aren't going to interpret
statutes to mean what Congress intended them to mean, Congress <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">sho<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">uld</span></span>
at least have some control over what courts interpret what they write
to mean. The more, however, we apply anti-surplusage to block <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">extremely natural sorts of redund<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">anc<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">y, like the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">repetition (or practically speaking, copying and pasting) of a whole defined term when Congress is only trying to clarify a par<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ticular ambiguous constituent pa<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rt<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> of it, the more difficult we make it for Congress to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">legislate<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> against <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the background of anti-surp<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">lusage or anticipate how it will be applied. It really might not occur to a drafter trying to clarify that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">plans established and maintained by a church <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">include</span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">PP<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">O-maintained plans, so long as <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">they're </span>church<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">-established, that a court will think he was trying to say something much<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">
more categorical unless he omits the "established and" and only writes
that a plan maintained by a church includes a PPO-maintained plan.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">To tie this discussion back to contemporary <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">textualist
pathologies, anti-surplusage has always been with us. But it strikes
me as a relatively new (though quite unsu<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rprising)</span> development for the Supreme Court to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">denounce
an argument that Congress conveniently repeated a definition when it
really meant to gloss that definition less two words of<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> it* as reducing <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">part of the statute </span>to "stray marks on a page<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—notations that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Congress regrettably made but did not really intend.</span></span>"
This kind of hyper-anti-surplusage stance isn't, I hope I've shown,
justifiable as a matter of textualist theory, or any theory. But it is
of a piece with several text<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ualist tropes, or tendencies: the denial of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ambiguity and hard interpretive <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">choice on the part of the courts and use of dubious p<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">resum<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ptions about <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">congressional usage to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">efface ambiguity and choice</span>, and the assum<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ption of superhuman degrees of ling<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">uistic precision on the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> part of Congress. These tropes take us farther <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">away from being good interpreters of statutory language, even as they create the appearance of rigorous fidelity to it.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">* <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Though <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">even
this overstates the case. Congress, on the view the Court rejected,
was glossing the whole definition, and clarifying that plans maint<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ained <i>and established</i>
by churches do not exclude plans maintained by PPOs. Congress, on this
view, was only speaking redundantly inasmuch as it didn't mean to s<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ay that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a plan is both <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">maintained <i>and established</i> by a church <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">if it's maint<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ained by a PPO.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-59097865060949711882017-07-22T01:12:00.001-07:002017-07-22T01:12:25.573-07:00What Justice Powell's Papers on His Opinion in Marks Tell Us About the Marks Rule<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Yesterday, I got the <a href="https://law2.wlu.edu/powellarchives/">kind archivists at Washington and Lee Law School</a> to digitize Justice Powell's case file in <i>Marks</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <i>v. United States</i></span>, which he wrote. The entirety of his rather slender file on <i>Marks</i> can be viewed <a href="http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/75-708_Marks_US.pdf">here</a>. <i>Marks </i>was a fairly unnegotiated opinion that began its life as a per curiam, and Justice Powell's papers don't tell us <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a great deal </span>about what he understood his famous narrowest-grounds rule to mean. (Of course, even if<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> they</span> did, it's <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/797328">doubtful</a> that evidence about what Justice Powell understood <i>Marks</i> to mean would tell us anything about what <i>Marks </i>means; <i>cf.</i>, as Scalia was fond of pointing out in this connection, Justice Stevens's <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16601719755691850462&q=negusie+v+holder&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1171">woeful misunderstandings</a> of <i>Chevron</i>, which he wrote.) However, they do show that Justice Powell was at least inclined to reject predictive, fifth-vote approaches to <i>Marks</i> that attempt to identify what Judge Kavanaugh has <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3050712287267230868&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p610">creatively</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4855364956518896140&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1337">called</a> the "<i>Marks</i> middle ground" of a fractured opinion<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">as opposed to the narrowest grounds <i>Marks</i> actually says matter<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">,</span></span> by determining which Justices' views would occupy the outcome-determinative center of gravity in future cases on the same subject matter. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">A. An <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">historical prolegomenon (which you can skip if you<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> already know all about <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Warren/Burger Court obscenity law and the background of <i>Marks</i>).</span></span></span> </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">To begin with, if you want to understand <i>Marks</i> you should take some time to understand why it was that almost 200 years into its history, the Court finally got around to announcing a rule about the precedential effect of its plurality opinions, which is something that people who work with <i>Marks</i> rarely bother to do. The answer has to do with the circular evolution in the Warren and Burger Courts' obscenity law, which eventually put the Burger Court in the position of working out the jury instructions that pornographers ought to receive for <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">pre-Burger-Court-precedent</span> conduct under fractured Warren Court precedent. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In the beginning of the Warren Court's evolution on obscenity, Justice Brennan, who was then a moderate on the subject, wrote a 1957 opinion for the Court in <i>Roth </i>that <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14778925784015245625&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p489">held</a> material was obscene and unprotected if "</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." By 1966, however, Brennan's views had liberalized and he was prepared to <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006&case=10189557359995044131&scilh=0">hold</a>, in <i>Memoirs v. Massachusetts</i>,<i> </i>a case about suppressing the publication of a pornographic 18th-century novel, that material wasn't obscene unless it appealed to the prurient interest <i>and </i>was "utterly without redeeming social value." </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Unfortunately (speaking only from <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the perspective of predictability, not the merits of Brennan's position)</span>, Brennan was unable to get five votes for that view. Warren, who wrote a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> confusing</span> separate opinion in <i>Roth</i> that had voiced some inchoate concern about applying obscenity law to great art, joined his plurality opinion, as did Justice Fortas, who joined the Court after <i>Roth</i>. But Justice Stewart would not join; he instead would have <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006&case=10189557359995044131&scilh=0#p421">protected</a> the <i>Memoirs</i> on the ground that they weren't "<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12404909807077661368&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p499">hard-core pornography</a>." It's unclear whether that test was more or less demanding than Brennan's (it's possible the answer is both); in an attempt to "prevent any possible misunderstanding," Stewart "set out in the margin a description, borrowed from the Solicitor General's brief, of the kind of thing to which I have reference." Th<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">at way, one senses Stewart thinking, if you didn't want to read the SG's scandalous descriptions of hard-core pornography, you could <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">just<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> read the body of his op<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">inion</span></span>. </span></span>The footnote makes amusing reading but doesn't clarify much. Then there was Justice Black, who <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006&case=10189557359995044131&scilh=0#p421">concurred in the judgment</a> on the ground that the First Amendment banned all obscenity prosecutions, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12404909807077661368&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p480">complaining</a> that the plurality's "utterly without redeeming social value" test was "as uncertain, if not even more uncertain, than is the unknown substance of the Milky Way." Finally, Justice Douglas also concurred in the judgment, also reasoning that the First Amendment banned all obscenity prosecutions, on the basis of a sort of self-congratulatory anti-majoritarian snobbishness:</span><br />
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Every time an obscenity case is to be argued here, my office is flooded with letters and postal cards urging me
to protect the community or the Nation by striking down the
publication. The messages are often identical even down to commas and
semicolons. The inference is irresistible that they were all copied from
a school or church blackboard. Dozens of postal cards often are mailed
from the same precinct. The drives are incessant and the pressures are
great. Happily we do not bow to them. I mention them only to emphasize
the lack of popular understanding of our constitutional system. Publications and utterances were made immune from majoritarian control
by the First Amendment, applicable to the States by reason of the
Fourteenth...</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That's Wild Bill Douglas for you. (On the same day, he wrote an opinion <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12404909807077661368&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p489">defending</a> "the masochistic yearning that is probably present in everyone and dominant in some"<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">too much information!—</span></span>on the ground that "some like Chopin, others like 'rock and roll.'") Anyway, by 1966 and until 1973, a majority of the Court couldn't agree on a test for obscenity; in the interim, the Court famously retreated into its film room, watched the pornographic films for which petitioners had been convicted, and then issued unexplained summary affirmances or reversals on the basis of their film-room judgments. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">By 1973, however, Justice Fortas had been forced off the Court, Warren had retired, Black had died, each had been replaced by conservative Nixon nominees (including Blackmun, at the time), and Brennan no longer had the votes against a looser approach to obscenity, nor was willing any longer to defend his own barely non-absolutist approach. So it was that the Court more or less circled back to the obscenity test it had announced in <i>Roth</i> and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=287180442152313659&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p24">held</a> in <i>Miller v. California </i>that works which, taken as a whole, appealed to the prurient interest and lacked <i>serious</i> literary, artistic, political or social value were obscene. At a time when obscenity was still vigorously prosecuted, this was a big deal; while <i>Miller</i> was pending, Burger and Nixon <a href="https://youtu.be/Cbvq9KyOEc0?t=1m49s">discussed</a> the case at length in a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> recorded</span> exchange where neither comes off very well. (Burger on <i>Memoirs</i>: "This means if they, uh, if they have one of these outrageous orgies, then if they mention Vietnam or the condition of the, uh, ghettos, it redeems the whole thing!")</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">B. Then <i>Marks</i> </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In the aftermath of <i>Miller</i>, the courts of appeals were initially unanimous that <i>Miller</i>'s obscenity standard didn't apply retroactively to pre-<i>Miller</i> conduct. If <i>Miller</i> had substantively changed obscenity law, they reasoned, it couldn't apply retroactively, and while <i>Miller</i> wasn't much different from the prior <i>Roth</i> standard, it was meaningfully different, as the <i>Miller</i> Court emphasized, from that of the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality. The only question was whether the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality's standard was the law after <i>Memoirs</i> and before <i>Miller</i>, and the courts of appeals had little difficulty concluding it was; if the crucial third, fourth, and fifth votes in <i>Memoirs</i> protected the titular <i>Memoirs</i> on the ground that the <i>Memoirs</i> weren't utterly without redeeming social value, lower courts were bound to protect materials that weren't utterly without redeeming social value. However, when Stanley Marks was federally prosecuted for a barely<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span>pre-<i>Miller</i> screening of an adult film, a Kentucky district judge instructed the jury under <i>Miller</i>, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed on somewhat obscure grounds, setting the stage for the Court to decide what the law was in the pre-<i>Miller</i> period and what the precedential effect of its fractured opinions was generally.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">When the Court granted certiorari, the Solicitor General, who was then <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Robert Bork, decided to confess er<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ror. (It's not at <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">all clear that Bork did so <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">at the cert stage.) </span></span>Weeks before Bork filed his <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Frank Easterbrook co-authored brief, the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> Court decided <i>Gregg v. Georgia</i>, a case that also turned on <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">interpreting <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">fractured precedent. <i>Gregg</i> and a cluster of consolidated cases grouped u<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nder it </span>involved constitutional challenges to the dea<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">th<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> penalty; severa<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">l years before, th<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e Court had decided<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i> Furman v. Georgia</i>, a case in which a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">coalition of abolitionist Justices and death-penalty moderates struck down death-penalty statutes that the moderates deemed excessive<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ly arbitrary. <i>Gregg</i> would i<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">tself lack a majority opinion, but <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Stewart</span> would write for a three-Justice plurality in a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=15950556903605745543&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#[16]">footnote</a> that <span style="font-size: normal;">"</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">[s]</span>ince five Justices wrote separately in support of the judgments in <i>Furman,</i>
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds— MR.
JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE," and generally endeavor to apply Justices Stewart's and White's views to the statutes before the Court in <i>Gregg<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">.<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">**</span></span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span>The members of the <i>Gregg</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> plurality apparently took <i>Furman</i>'s stare-decisis effect fairly seriously; Justice Powell, who dissented in <i>Furman</i> but joined Justice Stewart's plurality in <i>Gregg</i>, would <a href="http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/74-6257_GreggGeorgia1976AprMay.pdf#page=14">tell</a> the conference a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">fter argument that he "accept[ed] <i>Furman</i> as precedent" and <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">note</span> that the states <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">before the Court </span>had "ende<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">avored to meet the views of Stewart + White<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">," though he was unsure if the two states whose statutes the plurality ultimately invalidated satisfied <i>Furman</i>.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">** </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">By the way, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the fact that <i>F<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">urman </span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">headlined a trio of consolidated cases with multiple judgments <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">explains why </span>the <i>Marks</i> formulation, which is just a quote of this footnote, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">awkwar<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">dly talks about <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"Members who concurred in the judgment<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><u>s</u> on the narrowest grounds<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">."</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Bork<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> had almost certainly decided to confess error before <i>Gregg</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">; he would report to the Court at oral argument that three years prior he <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">had <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"communicated" </span>the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">government's posi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">tion that pre-<i>Miller</i> conduct should be <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">prosecuted under the <i>Memoir<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> plurality standard, but that somehow that communication hadn't reached the U.S. Attorneys. But the <i>Gregg</i> footnote <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">almost certainly modi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">fied Bork<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> and Easterbrook's analysis, or <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rather</span>, awkwardly interrupted it. In the middle of the relevant section of their brief, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">which is accessible on Westlaw, Bork and Easterbrook <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">plopped</span> this acknowledgement of the <i>Gregg </i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">footnote</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">:</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The Court has recognized that when no position commands a a majorit<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">y </span>of the Justices, the rule of the case is expressed by the most <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">narrow </span>view of a Justice or grou<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">p of Justices concurring in the disposition. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>See Gregg v. Georgia</i>, N<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">o. 74-<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">6257, decided July 2, 1976, slip op. 12 n.<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">15, 3<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">8-39 n.47 (opinion of Stewart, Powell and Stevens, JJ<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">.); <i>Roberts v. Louisiana</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, No. 75-5844, decided July 2, 1976<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, sli<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">p op. 9-11 (White, J. dissenting<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">). The views of the plurality in <i>Memoirs<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">consequently became the prevailing rule.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Everything they said before and after that paragraph <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">made a different argument altogether, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">namely</span></span></span> that the <i>Memoirs </i>plurality was the law before <i>Miller</i> because "[b]</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">etween 1966 and 1973 <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. . . </span>no
conviction could obtain the five votes necessary for its upholding
unless it satisfied the tests laid down by the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">." Bork and Easterbrook's argument for this wasn't really that <i>Memoirs</i> was a precedent, but that it was no precedent at all; they claimed that in the post-<i>Memoirs</i>, pre-<i>Miller</i> period, the Court didn't follow whatever <i>Memoirs</i>' holding was, but "reverse[d]</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">obscenity convictions based on the views of each individual Justice" (a fact which the Court didn't make public <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=287180442152313659&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#[4]">until</a> it decided <i>Miller</i>, though hints at this decisional approach were contained in the Court's 1967 opinion in <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14036544365029738881&q=386+us+767&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006"><i>Redrup</i></a>). Since the Justices on the <i>Memoirs</i> Court continued to vote their individual <i>Memoirs</i> positions as if <i>Memoirs</i> had never happened, lower courts, they reasoned, were obliged to apply the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality view because no conviction could ultimately be sustained by the Court in these years without satisfying the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality. And people in Marks's position would have expected their conduct to be judged by the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality's standard, as only satisfaction of that standard would satisfy the Court, should it choose to review their convictions.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This frankly retrospective-predictive approach to figuring out what the public<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">would </span>have</span> understood obscenity law to be from 1966–73 has an obvious defect (besides the total obscurity to the public of what the Court was doing from </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">1966–73)</span>; by 1970, two of the three members of the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality were gone, replaced by members of the <i>Miller</i> majority. It shouldn't have been at all obvious to Marks that a pre-<i>Miller</i> Court sitting in instant judgment of his February 1973 conduct would have held it protected unless it satisfied the by-then defunct <i>Memoirs</i> plurality; after all, just four months later the same nine Justices would decide <i>Miller</i>. Indeed, on December 14, 1971, eight days after Justice Powell replaced Justice Black and four days after Justice Rehnquist replaced Justice Harlan, completing what would become the <i>Miller </i>majority, the Court issued the last of its unexplained obscenity summary reversals. The next time it spoke on the subject before <i>Miller</i>, it issued a <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14245554701828404349&q=408+us+229&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">reasoned per curiam</a> that reversed a conviction under the <i>Roth</i> standard, not mentioning <i>Memoirs</i> at all.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">These flaws in Bork's reasoning notwithstanding, when he got around to arguing <i>Marks</i>, he found an extremely receptive audience for his confession of error; four out of the five members of the <i>Miller </i>majority were happy to deny <i>Miller</i> retroactive application and apply to pre-<i>Miller</i> conduct a test that they had <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=287180442152313659&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p22">complained</a> in <i>Miller</i> was "</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">virtually impossible to [satisfy] under our criminal standards of proof" and doubted "had any meaning at all." In fact, the Court was so receptive to Bork's confession that it didn't even bother to appoint an amicus to defend the Sixth Circuit's judgment. This is in some ways rather remarkable given that after <i>Memoirs</i> itself the Court <i>never </i>publicly applied the <i>Memoirs </i>plurality test, and that the three senior members of the <i>Miller </i>majority regularly dissented from the Court's summary reversals tacitly applying <i>Memoirs</i>.<i> </i>Only Justice Rehnquist <a href="https://www.oyez.org/cases/1976/75-708">gave Bork a hard time</a> for declining to defend what Rehnquist thought an eminently defensible position. And at conference, only Rehnquist <a href="http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/75-708_Marks_US.pdf#page=40">voted to affirm</a> the Sixth Circuit, "tentative[ly]" opining that before <i>Miller</i> there was "no firm precedent in this Court." </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It is here where things get a little interesting. After getting the assignment, and probably some time before the circulation of the first draft that we have in the file, though it may have been in response to a subsequent request (discussed below) by Justice Rehnquist to add a footnote to the circulated draft, Justice Powell suggested to his clerk David Martin, now a Professor Emeritus at Virginia Law, that he add a footnote citing some of the pre-<i>Miller </i>cases that followed the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality. He explained this change <a href="http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/75-708_Marks_US.pdf#page=109">in the following way</a>:</span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I would make a change along the foregoing lines because changes in the personnel of the Court weaken the "five Justices" argument [i.e., the argument pushed by Bork and Easterbrook that before <i>Miller</i>, a conviction would have to satisfy the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality to be upheld by five Justices because the Justices continued to vote their respective <i>Memoirs</i> views after <i>Memoirs</i>]. The point is that the view of the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality was the holding of the Court and followed as such. </span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I believe this change was made at what would ultimately be the opinion's <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12064198172779556411&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#[8]">footnote 8</a>, which string-cited the circuit cases following the <i>Memoirs </i>plurality after the opinion's statement that "</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">[t]he view of the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality therefore constituted the
holding of the Court and provided the governing standards. Indeed, every
Court of Appeals that considered the question between <i>Memoirs</i> and <i>Miller</i> so read our decisions." Indeed, it's possible that Martin, in addition to adding Powell's requested footnote, closely paraphrased Powell's note in the sentences I just quoted, though it's also possible that Powell was paraphrasing Martin's draft. We can't tell because we don't have it. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This note perhaps isn't everything that those of us who detest fifth-vote approaches to <i>Marks</i> could want from Powell's papers, but it's pretty good. We could imagine, I suppose, a theory of precedent as deference to smart people. Such a theory could conceive of a fractured opinion of the Court as a sort of opinion poll of our best and brightest and most well-briefed judges. On this theory, we would follow the "fifth vote" in a fractured opinion, the one "<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3050712287267230868&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p610">that occupies the middle ground between (i) the broader opinion supporting the judgment and (ii) the dissenting opinion</a>," not because it would predict future results, but because the median view of the Supreme Court is likely to be the best. If that were our rationale for the fifth-vote approach, it wouldn't matter that the approach has a predictive shelf life of the next retirement.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The Court, however, has never been arrogant enough to suggest this view of its precedents, such a view couldn't possibly explain the categorical obeisance we pay to them, and fifth-vote advocates don't argue for their approach in these terms. Rather, they seem to believe, as Bork and Easterbrook argued, that their approach can predict what the Court would actually do with a given case before the lower courts. As Judge Kavanaugh has <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3050712287267230868&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p610">put it</a>, by identifying a "<i>Marks</i> middle ground," "</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">lower courts will decide cases consistently with the opinions of a majority of the Supreme Court," whether that hypothetical majority is comprised of the swing vote plus a plurality, or a swing vote plus dissenters. In fact, Judge Kavanaugh rather remarkably <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4855364956518896140&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p1337">refuses</a> to apply <i>Marks </i>to opinions in which the dissent doesn't address the issues addressed by the fractured majority, because then he can't tell who occupies the true middle ground and therefore can't tell what the Court would do with the case before him.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The most fatal of many flaws in that rationale for fifth-voteism is the one Powell pithily identified: that "changes in the personnel of the Court" rapidly denude the fifth-vote approach of any genuinely predictive power. Instead of theorizing the narrowest-grounds rule he announced in <i>Marks</i> as a prediction about what the Court might have done before <i>Miller</i> with Marks' case had the Justices continued to vote their respective views and not follow <i>Memoirs</i>, Powell seems to have genuinely believed that the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality's view was the "holding of the Court" and was to be "followed as such" until overruled, even if there were no longer any reason to predict that the Court would continue to adhere to it. It's also noteworthy that the Bork/Easterbrook "five Justices" argument is completely absent from Powell's opinion itself. While Powell urged Martin to more or less <a href="http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/75-708_Marks_US.pdf#page=43">parrot</a> Bork's brief on other points, Bork and Easterbrook's extended argument for why the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality was the law before <i>Miller </i>never shows up in the opinion; only their almost parenthetical citation to the <i>Gregg</i> "narrowest grounds" footnote does. Nor did anyone on the Court ever suggest that the Bork/Easterbrook argument make its way into the opinion.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It is also interesting to learn that the one Justice on the Court who initially found "no firm precedent" in <i>Memoirs </i>would ultimately join Powell's opinion because he became convinced by the "five Justices" argument that Powell internally rejected. After (probably) Powell's note to Martin, Martin produced and Powell circulated a polished first draft that reads almost identically to the opinion we have today (with the exception of its having been drafted as a per curiam), <a href="http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/75-708_Marks_US.pdf#page=53">complete with its citation</a> to the delphic "narrowest grounds" formulation in the <i>Gregg</i> plurality's footnote. Join memos began to pile in—Burger, who whatever his other faults, wasn't a humorless man, <a href="http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/75-708_Marks_US.pdf#page=62">wrote</a> to say that he thought the case important enough to merit a signed opinion after having assigned it as a per curiam, and that "[t]o show my <u>bona</u> <u>fides</u>, I would volunteer to sign it if you declined to do so!"</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—and a slightly modified draft went out, again unsigned. Then Rehnquist wrote on January 14, 1977 to join on the condition that Powell add some language distinguishing a fair-warning case he had recently written. Explaining why he now could "subscribe" to the view that <i>Memoirs</i> was the law pre-<i>Miller</i>, he initially praised the opinion for "writ[ing] up more persuasively than I thought could be done the arguments for reversal," but then went out of his way to <a href="http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/75-708_Marks_US.pdf#page=74">give an argument</a> for the result that was identical to Bork and Easterbrook's and was nowhere in the draft opinion:</span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">[The obscenity statute's] broad language was necessarily confined by the decisions of this Court determining what is, and what is not, obscenity. Although the formulation of that test in <i>Memoirs </i>never attracted a majority of the Court, a process of vote counting makes clear that after that decision and before <i>Miller</i> this Court would not affirm a conviction which did not satisfy the test stated by the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality.</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">It is possible that Powell's note was a reaction to this letter; the note is immediately preceded in Powell's file, or at least his archivist's digitization of that file, by a <a href="http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/75-708_Marks_US.pdf#page=108">typescript</a> of Powell's <a href="http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/75-708_Marks_US.pdf#page=78">first stab</a> at meeting Rehnquist's concern about distinguishing his opinion, which came in the form of a footnote, as did Powell's suggestion in his note to Martin. I believe, however, that the two are unconnected and that the footnote Powell describes in his note to Martin and his proposed footnote addressing Rehnquist's problem are entirely different footnotes. Either way, the only evidence we have that anyone on the Court joined <i>Marks </i>on predictive grounds involves <i>Marks</i>' least committed joiner.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Powell's note does not conclusively resolve what Powell would have thought of the disagreement between me and Professor Williams discussed in my last post. To recap, Professor Williams thinks that under <i>Marks</i>, lower courts are free to take, and should take, the following untraditional approach to fragmented opinions: follow the Court when the Justices concurring in the judgment would agree on the result, and freely choose between the rivaling concurring/plurality opinions in cases where they would disagree. By "narrowest grounds," he thinks <i>Marks</i> meant, or should be read to mean that set of cases described by the overlap of <i>differing</i> grounds. For example, if three Justices want to apply strict scrutiny to some kind of statute and two Justices want to apply intermediate scrutiny to it, a lower court must uphold a statute of that kind that passes both, must invalidate a statute that fails both, and can choose between strict and intermediate scrutiny if it passes the latter but not the former. I think that that is the correct approach to fractured precedent, subject to one potential caveat that I haven't worked out yet, but that it is absolutely foreclosed by <i>Marks</i>. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In my favor, I have the point that <i>Marks</i> is quite clear that the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality stated the holding of the Court, not that lower courts had to follow it only in cases where the plurality and the concurring Justices would agree. For example, <i>Marks</i> remanded for the district court to instruct the jury under the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality standard, not to choose whether to dismiss the case, as Black and Douglas would have done, or instruct the jury under <i>Memoirs</i>. Williams, however, reasonably argues in the comments to my prior post that that's just because, or could be just because, the concurring Justices' views were precedentially foreclosed by <i>Roth</i>, a majority opinion that held that there <i>was</i> an obscenity exception to the First Amendment. Since Black and Douglas were just two Justices, they had no power to overrule <i>Roth</i> by concurring in a judgment on their <i>Roth</i>-inconsistent grounds. Hence, even under Williams's rule, the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality, and just the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality, was the law pre-<i>Miller</i>. I don't think that Powell's note intimates any view on whether he concluded the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality was "the holding of the Court" for that rather elaborate reason, or for the reason that, as his opinion actually said, the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds relative to the judgment, i.e., the grounds that would upset the fewest obscenity prosecutions. I do think that the statement in the <i>Gregg</i> footnote, which formed the basis for the <i>Marks</i> rule, that "the holding of the Court [in <i>Furman</i>] </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">may be viewed as that position taken by <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. . .</span> MR.
JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE WHITE<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">," not some comp<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ound of their <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">position </span>and other concurring <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">positions</span>, cannot be <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">as easily explained away by recourse to some <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">prior opinion ruling ou<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t the other concurring Justices' <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">positions</span>, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">since </span>no <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">opinion like that exists</span>.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">However, it is interesting to learn that Justice Powell's law clerk reasoned his way to the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality being controlling in what at first looks like the way that Professor Williams does<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. In his bench memo, he <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/75-708_Marks_US.pdf#page=18">wrote</a>:</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>Miller</i> did emphasize that the <i>Memoirs</i> tests were accepted by only three Justice<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s. This may have made it easier for five Justices in <i>Miller</i> to change the formulation, but it certainly cannot obscure the fact that the <i>Memoirs</i> tests were very much alive in the intervening years. They were operative <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">because the other two Justices who made up the <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Memoirs</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> majo</span></span>rity did not believe that the First Amendment permitted suppression of obscene materials at all. (Their position is never mentioned by CA6<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">). <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"[T]he holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. . . ." <i>Gregg v. Georgia</i>, at 12 n. 15<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> (Opinion of Stewart, Powell<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> and Stevens).</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of course, Martin doesn't say <i>why</i> it follows from the sweep of Black and Douglas's view that the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality test was "operative." He could mean, as Williams reasons, that the plurality was operative because Black and Douglas's view couldn't operate in light of <i>Roth</i>. Or he could just mean that the plurality was operative because it was narrower and Black and Douglas's view was broader. The citation to the <i>Gregg</i> footnote suggests the latter, and so too does the opinion he produced, in which he <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12064198172779556411&q=abbas+till+marks&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p193">only said</a> of Black and Douglas that they "concurred on broader grounds" and "reiterated their well-known position that the First Amendment provides an absolute shield against governmental action aimed at suppressing obscenity"—not that their position was precedentially foreclosed. Ultimately I think the <i>Marks</i> opinion itself affords only a smidgen of daylight to Williams, but that nothing in the papers shows that Powell and Martin didn't have his view in mind. What the papers and the re<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">jected approach take<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n in the Bork/Easterbrook brief</span></span> do show is that Powell didn't understand his own opinion in terms of the predictive fifth-vote approach that <a href="https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/02/69-Stan-L-Rev-795.pdf#page=19">several circuits</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2310127943061541224&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p64">use</a> and for which other judges and scholars advocate.</span> <br />
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Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-59312831164020488302017-07-13T19:26:00.000-07:002017-07-13T16:30:06.744-07:00A Sixth Circuit-Themed Primer on the Marks Doctrine, and an Endorsement of a Proposal to Overhaul Marks<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">**<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This post now contains a hopefully instructive back-and-forth in the comments section between me <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">and <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Ryan Williams, the author of the titular proposal to overhaul, o<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">r in his view reinterpret, <i>Marks</i>.</span></span></span></span> </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">One doesn't call one's blog "The Narrowest Grounds" without a healthy obsession with the <i>Marks</i> doctrine, that often mystifying (but really quite simple) heuristic for deciding which opinion, if any, states the holding of a Supreme Court decision that lacks a majority opinion. And one wouldn't be much of a Court-watcher if one weren't a little curious about how newly confirmed Sixth Circuit judge Amul Thapar (who was a short-lister for the Scalia vacancy before his confirmation) would fare in his <a href="http://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/court_audio/aud2.php?link=recent/06-14-2017%20-%20Wednesday/15-1869%20Peter%20Bormuth%20v%20County%20of%20Jackson.mp3&name=15-1869%20Peter%20Bormuth%20v%20County%20of%20Jackson">first oral argument as a circuit judge</a>, which also happened to be his first en banc. So I was delighted to hear Judge Thapar jump on counsel in the first 20 seconds of their argument last week with a string of engaged questions on how to apply <i>Marks</i> to <i>Town of Greece v. Galloway</i>, a recent 3-2-4 decision of the Court on legislative prayer. (Counsel for amicus in support of the plaintiff begins at 11:20 of the argument and Thapar starts in shortly after; the plaintiff <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">argued </span>pro se.) Unfortunately, Judge Thapar's questions reflect a common misunderstanding of <i>Marks</i>, the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">prevalence </span>of which in turn reveals the deep incoherence of the doctrine. <i>Marks</i>, I conclude, should be replaced by Ryan Williams' proposal in "<a href="https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/02/69-Stan-L-Rev-795.pdf">Questioning <i>Marks</i></a>," which gets what the law should be here exactly right</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
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</xml><![endif]--></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—even though his rule would leave courts, contrary to what he claims, with considerably less guidance in cases governed by fractured precedent<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, and would require the Court, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">contrary to what he claims, to overrule <i>Marks</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">.</span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">A. A Perhaps Irrelevant but Hopefully Amusing Sixth Circuit-Themed Pr<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ologue</span> </span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">By way of prologue, the Sixth Circuit has historically had a bee in its bonnet about <i>Marks</i>. This is in part because the Sixth Circuit, historically an ideologically fractious court, loves to go en banc on those issues that are so ideologically fractious that they fracture the Supreme Court, and then paper over their ideological disagreements in the most legalistic way possible by exhaustively reasoning that their respective favorite concurring opinions in a fragmented Supreme Court decision conveniently happen to be the Court's <i>Marks</i> holding, or, if they dislike all of the concurring opinions they have to choose from, that none of them are. One of the most memorable (in more ways than one) opinions in the Sixth Circuit's history, Judge Boggs' dissent in the Sixth Circuit's en banc in <i>Grutter v. Bollinger </i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(yes, that <i>Grutter v. Bollinger</i>)</span>, began with a seething 5<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">6</span>00-word <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5560607866175763046&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p777">essay on <i>Marks</i></a> as applied to <i>Bakke </i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(for perspective, that's 500 words longer than this<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> post<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">)</span></span></span>, with scintillating section headings like "No Set and Subset or Continuum Available," "The Potential for Two <i>Marks</i> Holdings," and, most portentously, "The Dicta Problem." </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The late Judge Martin, the object of Judge Boggs' ire in <i>Grutter</i> (in more ways than one), would respond years later with a mini-essay of his own on "<a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=9589374779700398826&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p208"><i>Marks</i>-meets-<i>Rapanos</i></a>," which seems to have been intended to make a major contribution on the subject but unfortunately defined <i>Marks</i> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">narrowest grounds</span> in two completely <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">contradictory </span>ways<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span>as logical subsets of broader opinions, and as whichever grounds change the law the least from prior precedent. Several months later, Judge Sutton offered his <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6536682156797811283&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p562">much clearer take</a> on <i>Marks</i>; it, however, gets much less attention because it doesn't read like a <i>Marks</i>-themed mystery novel. <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1263469858274984159&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">The panel opinion</a> underlying <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">last week</span>'s en banc, baffled by Judge Martin's contradictory definitions, split 2-1 on <i>Marks</i>. And funnily enough, the other Sixth Circuit en banc <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">last week</span>, which concerned Ohio's execution drug protocols, addressed an area that <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10752510346595419167&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">used to be</a> a <i>Marks </i>problem (albeit an extremely easy one, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=14802060693487913799&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p220">even for the Sixth Circuit</a>) until the Court <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6027367229870790758&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#[2]">cleared the problem up</a> in <i>Glossip</i> two years ago, though not without what it <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">fairly </span>called an "inexplicabl[e]" dissent from Justice Sotomayor on the Court's prior <i>Marks</i> holding. In short, while advocates in the D.C. Circuit are advised to principally prepare how to answer that court's inevitable questions about <i>Chevron</i>, advocates in the Sixth Circuit might be advised to prepare, at least when relevant, to talk about <i>Marks</i>.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">B. How to Apply <i>Marks</i> to <i>Town of Greece</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, and Why Judge Thapar and Others <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">A</span>re Confused About What a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Narrowest Ground <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Is.</span></span> </span> </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The <i>Marks</i> problem posed by <i>Town of Greece </i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">is a classic one. In <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Town of Greece</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, five Justices concurred in a judgment reversing the Second Circuit's injunction of Greece's legislative prayers. Just<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ices <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Thomas<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, joined by Justice Scalia,</span> concurred in the judgment on the ground that Greece's legislative prayers were not uncons<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">titutional because they were not <i>legally</i> coercive; absent legal coercion to participate or discrimination <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">as to<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> which faiths <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">got to give the prayers</span></span></span>, they would have held that all <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">legislative prayers were constitutional.</span></span></span></span> Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Alito, held that Greece<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'s legislative prayers were not unconstitut<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ional b<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ecause they were n<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ot legally or practicall<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">y coercive, in the sense that social or political pressures coerce participation; absent discrimination or legal or practical coercion, they held that legislative prayer was constitutional.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Under the prevailing approach to <i>Marks</i>, and the seemingly most legitimate<i>—</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the </span>logical-subset approach <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7019061013457049021&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p781">pioneered</a> by Judge Silberman in <i>King v. Palmer</i>, where <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a court is supposed to ask w<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">hether "one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader opinions" co<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ncurring <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">in the judgment, such that it <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">can <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">conclude</span> that a majority of the Court concurring in the judgment <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">is logically committed</span> to that subset<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span>it should be easy to see what the <i>Marks</i> rule in <i>Town <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">of Greece</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> is. Justice Thomas would allow virtually all legislative prayers: those that are non-discriminatory an<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">d</span> </span></span></span></span></span>do not legally coerce<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> participation are constitutional under his rule. Justice Kennedy would allow a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> subset of the legislative pr<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ay<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">er<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s Justice Thomas would allow; those that are non-discriminatory, do not legally coerce participation, <i>and</i> do not practically<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> coerce partici<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">pation thro<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ugh social<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">or </span>political pressure are constitutional on his rule.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> So it can be said, as Judge Silberman wrote in <i>King</i>, that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justice Kennedy's opinion "embod[ies] a po<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">sition implicitly <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">approved by at least five Justices who <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">support </span>the judgment"; five Justices agreed that the legislative prayers that Justice Kennedy would allow<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> are constitutional.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">At oral argument last week, Judge Thapar didn't see it that way. He asked why Justice Tho<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mas's opinion wasn't the logical subset of Justice Kennedy's. After all, Justice Kennedy would invalidate a fairly sizable set of legislative prayer<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s: those that legally or practically coerce. Justice Thomas, on the other hand, would invalidate a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> subset of that set<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">: <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">jus<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t those that legally coerce. Wouldn't, Judge Thapar <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rea<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">sonably asked, "all five Justices at the very least agree that legal coercion violates the Establishment Clause<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">?" On the other hand, Judge Thapar argued, only three Justices think that practical coercion violates the Establishment <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Clause.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Judge Thapar is right<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> on all <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">counts</span>; he's just wrong about his conclusion. Justice Thomas's opinion <i>is</i> a subset of Justice Kennedy's, as to the question of wh<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">at legislative prayers violate the Establishment Clause. Five Justices <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>do </i>agree that legal<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ly coercive legislative prayer violates the Establishment Clause; only three think that practical<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ly coercive legislative prayer does. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> this misses, though, is <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that Justice Kennedy's opinion is a subset of Justice Thomas'<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s as to the question of what legislative prayers <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">do<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n't</span></span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> violate the Establishment Clause. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Five Justices agree that legally and<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> practically <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">non-coercive prayers <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">don't violate </span>the Establishment Clause</span></span></span></span>; only <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">two </span>think that legally non-coercive<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> but practically coercive legislative prayers don't violate the Establishment Clause. And Kennedy, again,<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> thinks that only a subset of the prayers<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> that T<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">homas says don't violate the Establishment Clause are actually constitutional.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This seems to present a paradox, but it's one that classical <i>Marks</i> doctrine has an easy answer to. What Judge Thapar misses, and what <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">many people miss in thinking<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> about <i>Marks</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">,</span></span></span> is that the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> logical subset on which five Justices concurring in the judgment must agree must be one that <i>supports the judgment</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, and that narrowness is defined <i>relative to</i> the judgment.</span> <i>Marks</i> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12064198172779556411&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p193">ask<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ed</span></a> lower courts to identify "</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that position taken by those Members who <i>concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">," <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">i.e, to determine whose grounds for concurring in the judgment were narrower grounds <i>for</i> <i>concurring in t</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>hat particular judgment</i>, </span></span>not to identify whichever position is "narrower" in some <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">more general</span>, non-judgment-specific sense. In <i>Town of Greece</i> the Court held that Greece's legislative prayers were constitu<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">tional, so the subset that five Justices have to agree on <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">in order for any of their opinions to </span>satisfy <i>Marks</i> must be a proposition about which legislative prayers <i>are</i> constitu<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">tional, not which ones aren't. Otherwise, it wouldn't be a ground <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">for the judgment. </span>Five Justices agreed that legislative </span></span></span>prayers that do not <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">discrim<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">inate or coerce, legally <i>or</i> practically, are constitu<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">tional; that is a rule of law th<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">at supports the judgment<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> that Greece<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'s legislative prayers were constitu<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">tional. The imp<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">licit agreement of five Justices that legislative prayers that discriminate or legally coerce <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">are <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">not</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> constit<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">utional</span></span>, on the other hand, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">does not explain<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span>the judgment that Greece's prayers are</span>.</span></span></span> Put another way, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">given that the Court <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">reversed <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">an injunction of Greece's prayers, the narrowest ground for <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">concurring in that judgment</span> is a rule that upholds fewer prayers. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Had the Court held that Greece's legislative prayers were unconstitutional, the narrowest ground for that holding would be a rule that invalidated fewer prayers.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">C. What Judge Thapar's <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Misunderstanding Reveals About <i>Marks</i>' Incoherence<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> and the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Failed Majoritarian Aspirations </span>of the Logical-S<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ubset Approach.</span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">O<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nce understood this way, <i>Marks</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> is <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">perfectly workable, and <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the meaning of "narrower"<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> in <i>Marks</i> is no longer a mystery</span></span></span>. But it doesn't make much sense. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">First, consider </span>Judge Thapar's misu<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nderstanding of <i>Marks</i> as applied to <i>Town of Greece.<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">His misunderstanding doesn<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'t reveal something uniq<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">uely paradoxical about <i>Town of Greece</i>; the same misunderstanding is possible in every case <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">to which <i>Marks </i>applies. Take, for example, <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/11-210"><i>United States v. Alvarez</i></a>, where six Justices<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> voted to invalidate a law that regulated false speech. Four applied strict scrutiny; two said that only intermediate scrutiny applied to false<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> speech. The law in <i>Alvarez</i> failed both. Most people have no difficul<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ty in seeing that intermediate scrutiny is a subset of strict scrutiny in that case; it invalidates a subset of the laws that strict scrutiny would, and six Justices agreed to invalidate at least that subset. But it<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'s </span>just as true that strict scrutiny is a logical subset of intermediate sc<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rutiny; it upholds a subset of the laws that intermediate scrutiny would, and six Justices were necessarily committed to upholding t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">he subset of false-speech regulations that passed strict scrutiny.</span> The same is true of any <i>Marks </i>case you can imagine; if one opinion delineates a subset of laws tha<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t five<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> Justices <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">concurring in the judgment agree are <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">constitutional<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a different opinion will necessarily delineate a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> subset of laws that five Justices co<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ncurring in the judgment agree are <i>un</i>constitutional. If one <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10330935680184758118&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p2695">opinion</a> delineates a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> subset of plea agreements that five Justi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ces co<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ncurring in the judgment agree are "based on<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" the Sentencing <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Guidelines, another <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10330935680184758118&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p2690">opinion</a> will necessarily delineate a subset of plea agree<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ments that five Justices concurring in the judgme<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nt agree are <i>no</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>t </i>based on the Sentencing Guidelines. T<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">hat's just how <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">logic<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">al subsets <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">in this context<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> work</span></span></span>; if <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I think that a certain set of things are "x," and you think<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> that a subset of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that set of things are x, <i>I</i> think that a subset of the things you think are <i>not</i> x are not x.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of course, in all cases to which <i>Marks</i> applies, one of the two logical subsets on which the Court agrees will actually support the judgment, while one won't. So this may not see<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">m a probl<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">em; of course cou<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rts should follow the point of majority consensus that supports the Suprem<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e Court's judgment. But I think it is a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">serious problem for two reasons. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In the first place, it makes the content of controlling precedent turn on<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> the happenstance of how <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the rules the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">various <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Justices adopted applied to particular facts, or how the Justices think t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">hose rules apply<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> to particular facts</span></span>. Had the prayer in <i>Town of Greece</i> been deemed legally coercive, Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy would have voted to strike it down, and it wo<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">uld have been Justice Thomas who offered the narrower ground for that holding. Had the law in <i>Alvarez</i> happened to <i>pass</i> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">intermediate and strict scrutiny, the narrower ground for upholding it would be strict scrutiny, and we'd be saying that the <i>Marks</i> rule on false speech is that only laws regulating <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">false speech that pass strict scrutiny are constitutional.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">B<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ecause it so happened that i<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">failed intermediate <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">scrutiny, we say th<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">at the nar<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rower ground for the holding that it was unconstitutional was intermedi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ate scrutiny. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Oddly, then, because the issue of regulating false speech first reached the Court <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">with a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n ill-tailored, bas<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ically <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">indefens<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ible law, the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">preced<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ential </span></span>rule on such laws, as between the opinions concurring in the judgment, ends up being one that upholds as many of them as possible. But had the law in <i>Alvarez </i>bee<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n one that was <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">narro<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">wly tailored to a compelling interest in regulating false speech, the rule that would bind <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">lower courts would be one that upheld as few false-speech regulations as possible.<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> Certainly this approach <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">identifies reasons for judgments to which a majority of the Court subscribe, and in that sense instantiates the traditional approach to precedent on which<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> the Court binds lower courts by giving majoritarian reasons for its judgments.</span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">But it does this at the cost of randomly translating the Justices' <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">positions </span>into <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">precedent</span>.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Second, <i>Marks</i> overstates consensus.<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">In<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <i>Town of Greece</i> the majority concurring in the judgment only agreed that legislative prayers that do not legally or practically coerce are <i>constitutional</i>. Implici<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t assent to that proposition grounds the judgment. But f</span>ive Justices did not agree that legislative prayers that either legally or practically coerce are unconstit<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">utional; as far as what's unconstit<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">utional goes, five Justice<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s only <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">could agree that legislative prayers that legally coerce are unconstitutional.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Once </span>Justice Kennedy's <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">opinion is identified as <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the one that stated the Court's <i>Marks</i> rule, however, lower courts under <i>Marks</i> are to follow it in full, as if five Justices not only agreed with Justice Kennedy about<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> which legislative prayers are constitutional, but which ones are <i>not</i>. Recall that under <i>Marks</i> we are to follow <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the "position" taken by the Justices who concurred in<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> the judgment on the narrowest grounds, not just some aspect of their position <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">with which five Justices implicitly agree.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What results is obesiance to legal rules<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> with which some Justices concurring in the judgment do not <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">agree, not even implicitly.</span></span> </span></span></span>If <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a court finds that Justice Kennedy's opinion <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">states <i>T<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">own of Greece</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'s <i>Marks</i> rule, it will enjoin legislative prayers that fail Justice Kennedy's test, even though <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">only three Justices concurring in the judgment agreed<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">practically coercive legislative prayers are unconstitutional.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Marks</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">takes implicit conse<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nsus to a shallow proposition like "legislative prayers that neithe<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">r legally nor practically coerce are constitutional" and launders that consensus into the much <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">deeper </span>proposition, which then binds lower courts, that "<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">legislative prayers that neither legally nor p<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ractically coerce are constitutional, and <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">legislative prayers that either legally or practically <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">coerce are not," or more simply, "the test for whether a legislative prayer is constitutional or not is whether it neither legally nor practically coerces." Li<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ke<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">wise, in <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>Alvarez</i>, where <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">six </span>Justices agreed that regulations of false speech that fail intermediate scrutiny are unconstitutional, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">and concurred <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">in the judgment because of it, </span></span><i>Marks</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> will <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">take that consensus and pretend there was consensus to the far broader proposition that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>the test</i> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the constit<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">utionality of a regulation of false speech</span> is intermediate scrutiny, tho<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ugh four Justices concurring in the judgment woul<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">d strike down <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a regulation of false speech that passed intermediate s<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">c<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rutiny and failed strict. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Because of the nature of <i>Marks</i> logical subsets, the same <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">problem arises in any case where <i>Marks</i> applies<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. Put in roughly formal terms, in <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a <i>Marks</i> case five or more Justices agree that something is x<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> (where x stands for constitutional, uncons<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">titutional, based on the Se<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">tencing Guidelines, or what have you). Some of them think that something is x if it is p; others think that something is only x if it is p <i>and</i> q. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">All five then agree that something is <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">x if it i<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s within the subset of p things <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> are both </span></span></span>p and q<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">On the other hand, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">all five agre<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e that something isn't x if it's within the subset of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">non-q things </span>that aren't <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">even p</span>. </span>If that was all that bound lower courts, that would be fine. But <i>Marks</i> says that because <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">majority agreement <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that something is x if it's p and q grounded the judgment that the thing in the case itself was x, the test for whether something is x <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">or not x</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> is whether or not it's both p and q, though<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> there isn't majority agreement that something isn't x if it isn't both p and q<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The people who subscribe to a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">l<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ogical-subset theory of <i>Marks</i> think the </span></span></span>point of identifying <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the narrowest ground on which a Justice concurred in the judgment is to find a subset of legal grounds for the Court's judgment <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">to whi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ch<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> majority of the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> Court concurred in the judgment necessarily agree,<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> on the theory that lower courts can only be bound by majority agreement on legal grounds for the Court's judgments<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. If that's the point of <i>Marks</i>,</span> then <i>M<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">arks</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> as universally applied <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">isn't doing what it's supposed to. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Instead of binding lower courts to only <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">those<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> points of law to which </span>the majority concurring in the judgment impl<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">icitly agreed, it binds them to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rules with which Justices concurring in the judgment explicitly disagreed. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Perhaps following a <i>Marks</i> r<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ule can be justified on the ground that it represents the position of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">swing vote necessary to forming a majority for the judgment<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, and perhaps a swing-vote theory of <i>Marks</i> can be justified on a traditional command theory of precedent; without the swing vote, there's no judgment, so it's his legal reasoning that's truly necessary to the judgment. Perhaps it can be justified on a predictive t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">heory of precedent; were <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the Court to grant cert in any given legislat<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ive-prayer case<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> before a lower court</span>, the argumen<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t would go, </span>the path to a majority would <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">go through Justice Kennedy<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, so a lower court should try to work out how Justice Kennedy would decide it.</span> (<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">At least <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the pat<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">h to a majority</span></span> would go through Kennedy</span> if you assume that Justice Gors<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">uch doe<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">sn't agree with the <i>Town of Greece </i>dissenters; these sorts of unseemly, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">if empirically grounded,</span> assumptions are part of the hazards of a predictive theory of precedent.) I am inclined to reject the swing-vote and predictive approaches to <i>Marks</i> for reasons either too inchoate or too complicated <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">to go into here (<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"Questioning <i>Marks</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" does<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> a good job of rejecting them)</span></span></span>, but for now all I want to say is that by its own terms, the logical-subset approach to <i>Marks</i> is a failure. It does <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">not live up to its aspirations of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">only binding courts to rules <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">implicitly agreed to by the majority of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the Court that concurred in <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a </span>judgmen<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t, even though it touts itself for doing just that and <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3050712287267230868&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p618">vehemently</a> rejects approaches to <i>Marks</i> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that bind lower courts to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">opinions that do not represent logical-subset majority consensus.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">D. "Question<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ing <i>Marks</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"—A Solution<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. . . </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What does live up to the logical-subset approach's majoritarian aspirations is R<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">yan William<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s's proposal in "Questi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">oning <i>Marks</i>." Williams argues that a lowe<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">r court should simply follow <i>all</i> opinions concurring in a fractured <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">case's judgment. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">If the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">majority concurring in the judgment would agree on the result in a given case before a lower court, the lower court is bound. But if the result would differ<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> depending on which opinion concurring in the judgment the lower court applies, the lower court isn't bound, and can choose between the various <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rules proffered by the Justices concurring in the judgment. So in <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the case of <i>T<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">own of Greece</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, a lower court is b<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ound by the two p<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ropositions <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">as to which the majority implicitly agreed; a legislative prayer is constitutional if it neither legally <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nor practically coerces, and unconstitutional if it legally coerces. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">When it comes to prayers<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">are <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">non-coercive in all senses, and prayers that legally coerce, both Justice<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s Thomas and Kennedy's opinions point to the same result. </span></span></span></span></span>A lower court is not bound<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, however, to follow what the prev<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ailing approach to <i>Marks </i>would call the <i>Marks</i> rule of <i>Town of Greece</i>: that a legislative praye<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">r is <i>un</i>constitutional if it practically coerces. If a legislative prayer practically coerces but doesn't legally coerce, Justices Kennedy and Thomas would disagree on whether it's constitutional, and lower courts have discretion to follow which<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ever <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">opinion they find more persuasive on that point.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">1. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(Correctly) Deprives<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> Lower C<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ourts of All the G<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">uidance <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That <i>Marks</i> P<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">urports to Offer. . . </span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Williams, being a savvy marketer of his <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">idea, claims in favor of his approach <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">to fractured opinions that it actually gives l<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ower courts more guidance than the logical-subset approach to <i>Marks</i>, pointing out that in cases<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i> </i>where five Justices <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">wil<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">l always agree on the same result but have logically unrelated reasons for doing so (for example, in <i>McDonald</i> five Justices agreed that the Second A<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mendment was inc<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">orporated as to the states, but couldn't agree on what part of the Fourteenth <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Amendment <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">did the incorporating), his rule will <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">offer</span> guidance where the logical-<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">subset approach doesn't. It isn't at all clear to me<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, though, that a significant number o<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">f fractured o<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">pinions generate predictable results under Williams' approach without offering <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a logically nested set of reasons</span></span></span></span>. He gives <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">two </span>examples<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=6892271506340161224&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006"><i>Rapanos</i></a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> and <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">McDonald</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">,</span></span> of a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">fractured opinion that's tech<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nically</span> f<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ailed to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">generate </span>a <i>Marks</i> rule on the logical-subset approach (though no one even thinks of <i>McDonald</i> in <i>Marks</i> terms); <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10330935680184758118&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006"><i>F<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">reeman</span></i></a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, as a <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/negron-v-united-states/">pending cert petition</a> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">and a couple <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3050712287267230868&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p618">circuit</a> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3824050243311476874&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">opinions</a> argue</span>, is perhaps another. On the other hand, we can all rattle <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">off lots of fractured opin<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ions where one opinion<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'s rationale cleanly nests within that of anoth<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">er.</span></span></span> It strikes me that constit<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">utional doctrine<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> (whic<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">h tends to produce most of the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Court's fractured opinions<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">) being what it is, it will usually be the case that one<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> opinion concurring in the judgment states a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rule that's<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> a logical su<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">bset o<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">f other opinions concurring in the judg<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ment, either because it requires a more or less demanding standard of review that's subsumed within the other opinion's standard, or because it adds<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> or subtracts some factor from the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> other opinion's test. Moreover, for Williams to be right about his approach to <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Marks</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">offering <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ignificantly more </span></span>guidance</span></span>, the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">areas of logical non-overlap <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that cause<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> an opinion to run afoul of the logical-subset approach have to be relatively <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">small </span>(as th<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ey perhaps are in <i>Freeman</i> or <i>Rapanos</i>), or his approach<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, which only binds lower courts where opinions agree on results, won't offer much more guidance than the logical-subset approach does in these <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">sorts of cases.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span><a href="https://www.blogger.com/"><i><span id="goog_1409878117"></span><span id="goog_1409878118"></span></i></a></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What is clear to me is that Williams' approach <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">deprives lower courts of precedential guidance in the cases where identifying a <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Marks</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> rule actually matters. C<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ourts could figure out, without <i>Marks</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> or really even <i>Town of Greece</i>,</span> that a legislative prayer in which onlookers are <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">legally coerced by contempt sanctions to participate violates the First Amendment. Courts could figure out, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">just from </span>reading <i>T<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">own of Greece</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> without the aid of a <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Marks </span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">doctrine</span>, that a legislative prayer that isn't discriminatory or coercive in any way does<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n't violate the First Amendment.</span> Courts could figure out, w<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ithout any help from the Supreme Court at all, that a regulation of false speech that passes strict scrutiny is constitutional, and after reading <i>Alvarez</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, courts could figure out without help from <i>Marks</i> that<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> at the least regulations of false speech that fail intermediate scrutiny are unconstitutional.</span></span><i> </i></span>What courts want <i>Marks</i> for is to figure out what t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">o do with </span></span></span></span></span></span>cases where the majority that concurred in the Court's judgment would <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">disagree. The reason people fight over <i>Marks</i> in cases is that it matters in those cases whether a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> legislative praye</span></span>r<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> need only be non-coercive legally or must be non-coercive practically too, or whether a regulation of false speech has to pass intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny too. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The logical-subset approach gives lower courts answers to these questions in the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">numerous </span>fractured cases (more numerous <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">in my view than Williams's)</span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">where one opinion is a logical subset of the other.</span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>Williams's approach does not<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, and really only tells lower courts to heed obvious constitutional truisms and to not to be on the wrong side of a whole majority concurring in a judgment. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That, however, is in my<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> view a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> virtue of his rule, not a bug<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> (though <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">courts thinking about adopting his rule and jettisoning <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the logical-<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">subset <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">approach</span></span></span> ought to realize what they're getting into and not take his claims of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">i<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ncreased</span></span> guidance for granted). Instead of binding courts to legal rules that only one<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> or two Justices think<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> are right, for the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> reason that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a shallower version of those rules randomly happened to be the narrowest ground for the resu<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">lt<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> at which the Court <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">happened to arrive </span>on the facts of the case before them, Willi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ams would only bind lower courts to points on which the majo<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rity of the Court concurring in the judgment agreed. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As to points on which the Court ca<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n't agree, there's no reason for its decisions to be binding, and <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">no urgent need for binding guidance <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">on </span>the areas of intra-majority disagreement in the handful of fractured opinions the Court issues. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">2. And Requires the Court to Overrule <i>Marks</i>. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Unfortunately, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Williams's <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">proposal can't become the law until we overrule <i>Marks</i>—though <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Williams<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, being, as I say, a savvy marketer of his idea, insists ot<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">herwise. <i>Mar<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ks</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> said that lo<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">wer courts were bound by "the position taken by those Members [of the Court] who concurred in the judgm<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ents on the narrowest grounds." <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This language, whatev<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">er <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">other ambiguities it famously has,</span></span> clearly instructs lower courts<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> to figure out which "Members<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" concurred on the narrowest grounds (whatever that means<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">) </span>and then follow their "position." Will<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">iams <a href="https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/02/69-Stan-L-Rev-795.pdf#page=46">suggests</a> that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">it might be read to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mean that courts are bound by "the reasoning <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">within the concurring opinions [by which he means a combination of reasons gleaned from multiple concurring opinions] that a majority of the con<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">curring Justices support." I simply cannot see how <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">he<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> gets to there from <i>Marks</i>. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Besides being hopelessly at odds with what <i>Marks</i> said about identifying the holding of<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> a fractured opinion</span></span>, he can't <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">begin to </span>explain<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i> </i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the actual holding of <i>Marks</i>. In <i>Marks</i>, the Court, after stating <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">its narrowest-grounds<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> rule,</span></span> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12064198172779556411&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#p194">held</a> that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">under that rule </span>"</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the view of the <i>Memoirs</i> [<i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">v. Massachusetts</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">] </span>plurality<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> therefore</span> constituted the holding of the Court<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nd </span></span>provided the governing standards . . . [and] was the law<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">on </span>what c<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ould b<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e prosecuted as obscene </span></span>in <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the post-<i>Memoirs</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, pre-<i>Miller<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> v. California</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> years</span></span>. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(<i>M<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">arks </span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">was decided after <i>Miller</i> but involved a pre-<i>Miller</i> offense; hence<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> the</span> need to clarify what <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Memoirs</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> meant after it had been overruled.) </span></span></span>I<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t didn't say that under <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Memoirs</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, lower cour<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ts were obliged to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">hold a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> prosecution for obscenity unconstitutional if it were under the plurality's test and that of<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> the concurring opin<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ions, but that if a prosecution were constitutional under the plurality's test but not the concurring opinions, a lo<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">wer court could have done what it wanted. It simply said that the plurality<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'s "view" was the Court<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'s "holding<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">," </span>"provided the governing standards<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">,</span>" and "was the law." Williams <a href="https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/02/69-Stan-L-Rev-795.pdf#page=46">says</a> that in the c<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ontext of <i>Marks</i> itself, which <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">was a case <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">he<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> claims</span></span> on<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ly turned on what the law was when the </span></span><i>Memoir<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> plurality <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">and the concurring opinions in <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Memoirs</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">generated</span> the same result</span></span></span></span>, what the Court said made sense. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> But this is really just to say that the Court could have <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">reasoned in a completely different fashion to the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> same result. <i>Marks</i> did not say that for purposes of retroactivity<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, the law pre-<i>Miller</i> was at least what the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality said it was <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">; it said it was <i>the</i> holding of the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> Court, <i>the</i> governing standard, and <i>the </i>law<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, from which <i>Miller</i> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"marked a significant departure</span>." </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">What really proves Williams wrong is <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">two things: the</span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Court's discussion of pre-<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>Memoirs</i> practic<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">e, and the fact that, in <i>Marks</i>, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the concurring opinions and plurality in <i>Memoirs </i>didn't necessarily ali<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">gn</span></span></span>. First<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> as to the practice. </span>In arguing that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>Memoirs</i>'<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> holding was cl<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ear, fractured though it was, </span></span></span></span>t</span></span>he <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Court praised lower courts for <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">correctly and universally </span>reasoning that<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> under <i>Memoirs</i> "[m]aterials were deemed to be constitutio<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nally protected <i>unless</i> the prosecution carried the burden<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" of meeting the plurality's test, in which case they weren't protected—though two concurring Justices in <i>Memoirs</i> would have <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">banned obscenity prosecutions altogether. Under Williams's approach, lo<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">wer courts <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">reviewing a prosecution of materials that qualified as obsc<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ene under the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality would have had a choice: agree with Justices Black and Douglas that the First Amendment forbade all obsc<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">enity prosecutions, or agree with the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality that some materials could be banned as obsc<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ene. Yet<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> that's just what the Court said lower courts correctly <i>didn't</i> do; <i>Marks</i>, in fact, is all about how defin<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ite and non-discretionary the law was before <i>Miller</i>, such that application of the <i>Miller</i> test<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> to pre-<i>Miller</i> offenses <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">was imper<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">missibly retroactive.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">As to the result of <i>Marks</i>, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Wil<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">liams says that <i>Marks</i> was<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> just about whether you could give a <i>Miller</i> instruction <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">on a pre-<i>Miller </i>offense without violating due process; <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">if lower courts<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> were bound pre-<i>Miller </i>to turn away obscenity pro<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">se</span>cutions that didn<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'t, at least, meet the <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Memoirs</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> plurality's<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> more dema<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nding </span>test</span></span>, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the answer was <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">no</span>. So, he reasons, that's all the Court<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> had to decide: whether the plurality control<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">led when it <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">aligned with </span>the concurrin<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">g opinions that would have banned<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> o<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">bscenity prosecutions</span></span>, and under those circumstances they could loosely talk of the plurali<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ty being controlling</span>. </span></span></span>But that's not really all that <i>Marks</i> was about; <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">M<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">arks</span></span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> was also about how <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the jury should be instructed on remand. The Court didn't know whether Marks <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">was scot-free under the <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Memoirs</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> plurality or not; in fact, as the Court <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=12064198172779556411&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006#[12]">noted</a>, the Sixth Circuit had held below that he was guilty under either <i>Miller</i> or the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality, though the Court said that that should be left for a "properly instructed jury" to decide. So whether the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">district court <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">had to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">instruct the jury <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">under the <i>M<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">emoirs</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> plurality, as I read <i>Marks</i>, or was free to choose between the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality and holding all obscenity prosecutions unconstitutional, as Williams reads <i>Marks</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, mattered enormously. Contrary to what Williams suggests, the Court decided just this question, and held that Marks was "entitled to jury instructions requiring the jury to acquit unless it finds that the materials involved were 'utterly without redeeming social value'"</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—that is, obscene under the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality.</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> It then remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, so a "properly instructed jury" could decide whether Marks really was guilty under the <i>Memoirs</i> plurality or not. </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Were Williams right, <i>Marks</i> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">couldn't have held what it did; it would have held that the district court could <i>either </i>give the instruction it described, or hold, if it wanted, that all obscenity prosecutions were unconstitutional<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">S<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">o I conclude that for "Questioning <i>Marks</i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" to become the law, the Court would have to overrule <i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Marks</span></i><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> first. But again I view this as a feature of Williams'<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">s p<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">roposal and not a bug.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com9tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-25739746671046014982017-06-26T16:27:00.001-07:002017-06-26T18:26:35.079-07:00The Court Did Something Interesting Today...<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">granting certiorari in <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/digital-realty-trust-inc-v-somers/"><i>Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers</i></a>. I will hopefully make some time to comment later this week on the significance of <i>Digital Realty Trust</i>, but roughly speaking, it's a case about what happens when lower courts apply <i>Bond</i> and, I must say, <i>Burwell</i>'s atextual methodology (I think <i>Burwell</i> was correctly decided, but only on the alternative and at least not explicitly articulated ground of drafting error) to a distinctly non-<i>Bond</i>/<i>Burwell</i>-like problem. The closest analogy is really <i>Bond</i>, though what the lower courts have done with the statute at issue in <i>Digital Realty Trust</i> is vastly more defensible than <i>Bond</i>, which I deem perhaps the Court's least defensible statutory decision in its history. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">The problem in <i>Digital Realty Trust</i> goes as follows. A <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/78u-6">section</a> of the Dodd-Frank Act provides securities "whistleblowers" an array of anti-retaliation protections and incentives for whistleblowing. That section helpfully contains a definition of "whistleblower" that applies in that section alone; to quote the statute, "[i]n this section, the following definitions shall apply . . . ." A whistleblower is defined as "</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">any individual who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who
provide, information relating to a violation of the securities laws to
the [Securities Exchange] Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
Commission." This is not an ordinary-language definition of whistleblower, to say the least; only whistleblowers who talk to the SEC count as statutory "whistleblowers."</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, a later subparagraph of this not-overly-long section of Dodd-Frank, subparagraph (h)(1)(A), provides protection from retaliation to "a whistleblower" for any:</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">"lawful act done by the <u>whistleblower</u>—</span>
<br />
<div class="psection-4">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="h_1_A_i"></a>
<span class="enumbell">(i)</span>
<span class="ptext-">in providing information to the Commission in accordance with this section;
</span></span>
</div>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div class="psection-4">
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="h_1_A_ii"></a>
<span class="enumbell">(ii)</span>
<span class="ptext-">in initiating, testifying in,
or assisting in any investigation or judicial or administrative action
of the Commission based upon or related to such information; or
</span></span>
</div>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="h_1_A_iii"></a>
<span class="enumbell">(iii)</span>
<span class="ptext-">in making disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 [statutory cross-references omitted] and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission." </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-">It so happens that the disclosures required/protected by Sarbanes-Oxley referenced in romanette (iii) include internal reporting to management. So, if the section-specific definition of whistleblower is read into the anti-retaliation subparagraph, the subparagraph's shield from retaliation against Sarbanes-Oxley disclosures in romanette (iii) would only apply to people who made internal reports under Sarbanes-Oxley <i>and</i> blew a whistle to the SEC before they were retaliated against</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span>which, it's claimed, will rarely be the case of anyone</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span> thereby negating the apparent purpose of romanette (iii). </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-">For this reason, both the <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?q=berman+v+neo+ogilvy+llc&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006&case=4432349298645599925&scilh=0">Second</a> and <a href="http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/16-1276-op-bel-9th-cir.pdf">Ninth</a> Circuits have simply declined to read the section's definition of whistleblower into the section's retaliation subparagraph, instead reading whistleblower in that subparagraph to just mean an ordinary-language whistleblower who makes disclosures of the kind protected by romanette (iii)</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span>much as <i>Bond</i>, for much weaker contextual reasons, declined to read the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act's definition of chemical weapon into that statute's only operative provision, replacing it with the Court's ordinary-language understanding of what constitutes a chemical weapon. Interestingly, both circuits justified that holding by reference to <i>Bond </i>and <i>Burwell.</i> I have some views about the propriety of that maneuver and how we should decide when it's appropriate to engage in definition-correcting moves of this kind, but those will have to wait until my next post. For now, I will just add that if all this doesn't sound exciting enough, this is a <i>Chevron</i> case(!!); the SEC has <a href="https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545fr.pdf#page=5">interpreted</a> the statute to protect "<i>three</i> categories of whistleblowers"</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span>not just the one category defined in the statute</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span class="ptext-"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span></span>including any person who makes a romanette (iii) disclosure. Imagine what Justice Gorsuch will have to say about that.</span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-56886804973558728422017-06-23T00:53:00.001-07:002017-06-23T08:45:02.876-07:00A Response to Justice Alito's Hypotheticals in Maslenjak<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Yesterday the Supreme Court <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-309_h31i.pdf">decided</a> what it means to "knowingly procure, contrary to law, the naturalization of any person"—a <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1425">federal crime</a> for which the penalty, if the person whose naturalization the defendant procured contrary to law is himself, is revocation of citizenship. The parties litigated two ways of reading this language. The first is merely that the acts by which one procured naturalization must be contrary to law, regardless of whether the illegality itself was a but-for cause of, or a contributing factor to, procuring naturalization. That is to say, if one has to do a series of things to procure naturalization, including filling out an application with several hundred statements, one has procured naturalization in a manner contrary to law so long as any one of those acts was, in some respect, illegal, e.g., if one of the applications was false. This was the government's theory. The second way, the defendant's way, to read the language is that the naturalization must be procured <i>by</i> a means contrary to law, i.e., that some illegal act must at least materially contribute to obtaining naturalization.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Eight Justices joined Justice Kagan's opinion to the extent it held that the correct reading of the language is causal. Justice Kagan <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-309_h31i.pdf#page=10">claims</a> that this follows from "the way language naturally works"; we wouldn't say, she reasons, that someone obtained a painting illegally unless he did something illegal that caused him to obtain the painting. She tries to illustrate this with a couple hypotheticals that I don't think work. For example, she says we wouldn't say that someone illegally obtained a painting if he drove illegally on the way to the auction house. That may only show that traveling to the place where one obtains a painting has nothing to do with obtaining the painting causally or otherwise, just as you wouldn't say that "I bought clothes quickly" because you drove quickly to the store. However, I think she's right; to take a perhaps better hypothetical, if you pay for something expensive in cash and knowingly pass the cashier a Canadian penny, plus an amount well in excess of the item's price, to make the change even out, we probably wouldn't say that you bought the item illegally (though I'm not quite sure of this), though we definitely would say it if you paid the whole purchase price in rolls of Canadian pennies.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Before turning to how Justice Alito attempts to rebut this reading of "knowingly procure, contrary to law," I want to say a little about what sort of claim Kagan is making when she says that "language naturally works" so as to connote (or denote) that an illegal act caused the procurement when we say that someone procured something contrary to law. (It isn't at all clear from the opinion.) In the first place, it seems to have nothing to do with the meaning of words and phrases like "contrary to law" or "illegally" generally. When we say that someone "drove illegally," we do not mean that some illegal act was a cause of the driving. If we say that someone shot a deer contrary to law, we probably simply mean that their shooting the deer was illegal, not that they used an illegal gun that caused the deer's death. On the other hand, it also seems to have little to do with the meaning of words like "procure" or "obtain" generally. If we say that someone "barely procured naturalization" or "slowly procured naturalization," we obviously don't mean that the slowness of the procurement, or its being barely procured, was the procurement's cause; quite the opposite, in fact. So why is it that Kagan's gloss of "procure, contrary to law" or "illegally obtain" seems so intuitively correct? Is "illegally obtain/procure" just idiomatic for obtaining/procuring <i>because</i> of some illegality, even though "illegally" doesn't necessarily modify verbs in a causal way, and procure and obtain aren't always modified causally either?</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Idiom might explain it, but that seems an easy way out. What I want to tentatively suggest is that when an adverb modifies "obtain" or "procure," it must at least materially qualify the whole of the obtaining or procurement. We wouldn't say, for example, that someone obtained something adroitly if what they did was only adroit in one small respect. More broadly, when any adverb modifies any verb, it probably has to at least materially describe that verb. For example, we wouldn't say that someone "drove from New York to California illegally" because he briefly sped in Montana, or that he drove from New York to California at a slow speed because he drove at a slow speed for an hour in Indiana. So to say that someone procured naturalization contrary to law, it seems insufficient that one immaterial statement in the process of procuring naturalization was false and illegal; the procurement must be materially illegal in order to sensibly talk about an illegal procurement. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, here is where I think obtaining or procuring might differ from other verbs</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">.</span> If you agree that to say that someone drove from New York to California illegally the drive must have been materially illegal, all we are saying is that some substantial percentage of the drive, in terms of duration, must have violated some law. But when we talk about materiality in the context of obtaining something, I am inclined to think we mean material to obtaining that thing, not just that some substantial number of the acts one took towards obtaining it were illegal. (Of course, some adverbs just don't have this kind of material relationship to obtain or procure; see note.**)</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> So if every page of an application for naturalization contained some question that was immaterial to the result, misstatements as to each such irrelevant question, though they may make up a substantial portion of the application, don't seem to amount to an illegal procurement of naturalization. For misstatements to be material to procurement, and thereby amount to a procurement contrary to law, I believe they have to materially contribute to causing the procurement.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Interestingly, this is just where Justice Alito disagrees with Justice Kagan. He agrees with me, or rather I agree with him, that in order to procure naturalization contrary to law, you have to do something illegal that's material to procuring naturalization. But unlike me, he thinks that that materiality need not be causal; the illegal act, he <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-309_h31i.pdf#page=23">says</a>, need only have a natural tendency to influence whether one obtains naturalization, regardless of whether it does. He attempts to demonstrate this through two hypotheticals. As Justice Kagan offers no response <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">to them, I offer mine.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">First, he supposes that eight co-workers buy two season tickets for their favorite football team. They then agree to each write their names on one slip of paper and put the slip in a hat, from which a slip is then drawn to see who gets the two tickets (for themselves and a guest) for a given game. One of the eight puts his name in twice, and wins the drawing. Alito <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-309_h31i.pdf#page=24">concludes</a> that "he 'procured' the tickets 'contrary to' the rules of the drawing even though he might have won if he had put his name in only once."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">This hypothetical, it strikes me, hardly proves that "procures contrary to law" doesn't connote or denote causality, because the relationship between the second slip and winning the drawing <i>is</i> causal, at least in the sense the law understands causality. Suppose, for instance, Person A knows Person B is considering committing suicide and has put one poisoned chocolate truffle into a box of eight chocolate truffles with the intention of randomly selecting one from the box and eating it. If Person A secretly puts a second poisoned truffle in the box in hopes of increasing the chance that Person B will kill himself, and Person B does take one of the two poisoned truffles and die</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—assume the police can't tell whether it was Person A's truffle or not</span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—</span></span>I'm pretty sure that Person A will be found liable, at least in tort, for causally contributing to Person B's death (unless Person B's act is deemed an intervening cause, which is irrelevant to the point I'm making), even though Person B might have died from eating the original poisoned truffle. If there's a 50% chance that an illegal act caused some outcome, and we can't tell whether or not it did, we <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=7084631840002460993&hl=en&as_sdt=4000006">call that act the outcome's legal cause</a>.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">On the other hand, suppose that one member of the group fills out the slips of paper for everyone. The cheater in this modified version of Alito's hypothetical writes his own name on a second slip of paper, which he puts in the hat. If the original slip in the hat with his name on it is drawn, which can be ascertained simply by comparing the handwriting on that piece to the handwriting on all the others, and he thereby wins the drawing, would we say that he procured the tickets contrary to the rules of the drawing? I think not, even though what he did had a natural tendency to affect the drawing's outcome. We certainly would say that his participation in the drawing was contrary to its rules, but not that he procured the tickets contrary to the drawing's rules, or "illegally," which shows, I think, that when it comes to procurement materiality is causal.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Alito's second hypothetical is rather stronger. He supposes that an Olympic runner wins a race while using a performance-enhancing drug; she's found out and is disqualified. Because the second-place time was slow, it's speculated that she would have won without the drug. Nevertheless, Alito <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/16-309_h31i.pdf#page=24">says</a>, "it would be entirely consistent with standard English usage for the race officials to say that she 'procured' her first-place finish 'contrary to' the governing rules."</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I think this example simply trades on a particular feature of what's deemed material in Olympic running. In running, as I understand it, any cheating, whether material to the outcome of any particular contest or not, often results in disqualification. Had the runner in Alito's hypothetical worn a banned running shoe, her results would have been disqualified as well, even if the shoes made very little difference and the second-place finisher wasn't close. Here, when we say that someone procured a first-place finish contrary to rules, all we mean is that they violated a rule during the race. To violate a rule is to be ipso facto ineligible; therefore, any procurement of a first-place finish in a race where one violated a rule is contrary to the rules. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Suppose a sport, though, that doesn't view every infraction as quite so material. For example, it is discovered two games into the NBA Finals that a minor role player is using a performance-enhancing drug, his team down 0-2; he is then suspended from the series, but his team is not disqualified from playing on, and that team wins the next four games and the series. Would we say that the team procured its championship contrary to the rules of basketball? Pretty obviously not. What if the team won its first two games before the player got suspended, then won only two of the five thereafter en route to winning the Finals in seven games? The answer is probably still no, especially absent reason to think the drug made the player materially better and the player made the team materially better. Or, what if several players on the team wear an illegal basketball shoe, or get away with wearing illegal elbow guards, and are fined a nominal sum for it? Now we really won't say they procured their championship illegally, though we would have in the case of the runner with the illegal shoes. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">On the other hand, what if the San Francisco Giants had won the <a href="http://www.baseball-reference.com/postseason/2002_WS.shtml">2002 World Series</a> in seven games, a series in which the then-possibly-steroid-using Barry Bonds hit .471 with a .700 on-base percentage, a 1.294 slugging percentage, and 4 home runs in 17 at-bats? We likely would say that the Giants procured the championship contrary to the rules of baseball, given that Bonds' contributions were necessary to the outcome, and given the huge statistical gap between Bonds in his pre-steroid years and Bonds in his allegedly steroid-using years, such that his steroid use likely made a material causal contribution to the outcome. So again I conclude that absent an unusual context-specific theory of materiality, to procure something illegally means that illegality materially contributed to the procurement, and that to say that illegality materially contributed to the procurement is just to say that it materially <i>causally</i> contributed to the procurement.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">** </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Of course, this won't be the case of every adverb that modifies obtain or procure. To
obtain quickly just means that the whole process was quick, but even
here note that quickly must modify the whole process or not at all</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">—there
is no carving up the process into parts and saying that someone
obtained something quickly because a material part of the process was
quick. On the other hand, more durational verbs, the sorts of verbs, like drive, where it makes sense to say "he (verb) for two hours" (which isn't the case of obtain or procure), can be sensibly modified where one
is really only describing a material part of the relevant duration. The
contrast is a subtle one, but to be precise, to say that someone
obtained something quickly just means that the whole length of time it took them to obtain it is a relatively short span of time in which to obtain it; to say that someone drove from
Point A to Point B slowly or quickly may not necessarily describe the
whole length of the drive so much as the speed at which they were driving most of the time.</span></span> </span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-7420543479422278886.post-71805306663368043592017-06-13T02:39:00.001-07:002017-06-13T02:39:48.577-07:00A Thought on the Relevance of Congressional Authorization and Related Enactments to the Establishment-Clause Question in the Travel-Ban Case<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Over at <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Take Care</span>, Leah Litman and Ia<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n</span> Samuel have a <a href="https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-basic-error-in-texas-s-amicus-brief-in-the-travel-ban-case-aka-youngstown-zone-zero-redux">post</a> faulting Texas for arguing, in its <a href="https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/files/epress/16-1436_tsac_States_of_Texas_et_al.pdf?cachebuster%3A47=&utm_content=&utm_medium=email&utm_name=&utm_source=govdelivery&utm_term=%22%20target=">amicus brief</a> in support of the government's cert petition in the travel-ban case, that because Congress has given the President statutory authorization for orders like the travel ban, the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">courts should give great deference to the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">executive under <i>Youngstown</i> in reviewing plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claims</span></span>. Litman and Samuel, or L&S for short, argue that <i>Youngstown</i> is only applicable to disputes about the allocation of federal power between the President and Congress (that is to say, though they don't <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">precisely </span>say this, claims that the President has acted in excess of his powers under Article II), not claims that the President has violated provisions of the Bill of Rights which limit federal power as a whole. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I think that's entirely correct, though I<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'m </span>not sure what saying things like, to quote the pr<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ofligately capitali<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">zed</span></span> headline for the piece, "Texas's Amicus Brief Makes An Argument That Is So Obviously Wrong Some People Thought It Was Not Worth Responding To,"* adds to the argument other than a gratuitous<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> (and<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">completely unfunny, unless intended as Take Care <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">self-</span>parody</span></span>, in which case, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">mildly funny!</span>)</span> </span>attempt at snarky insult to the people working in the Texas SG's office, or the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">professors </span>who originally raised <i>Youngstown</i> as a defense of the order. It's almost certainly the case of a <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">great many </span>perfectly good arguments that "Some People" mistakenly thought them "So Obviously Wrong" that they were "Not Worth Responding To" </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(even <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">people </span>who <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">L&S</span> "admire and respect<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">," see <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">endnote</span></span>),</span> just as it's the case of many bad arguments that some people (usually the ones making them) think them so obviously right that response would be <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">futile</span>. <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">However admirable and respectable these "Some People<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">" are, the </span></span>only argument that's <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">laughably</span> wrong here is the suggested inference</span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">from the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> fact <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">some people </span>thin<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">k Texas is <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">laughably wrong to the conclusion that it is.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">also think <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">it <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">would <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">occ<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ur </span></span></span></span>to any <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">minimally charitable </span>reader of Tex<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">as' brief<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span></span></span></span>that <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the Texas SG, who's a pretty sophisticated Supreme Court <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">advocate, may well <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">understand </span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">L&S'</span> indeed trivially obvious points about <i>Youngstown</i>, but<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> cleverly cho<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">se</span></span> to respond to the statutory arguments against the ban advanced in <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">two strong </span>concurring opinions<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> --<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span></span>which Texas may be concerned will persuade the Court<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">to deny cert or affirm</span>, as their authors <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">undoubtedly hoped<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> -- </span></span></span>in the guise of a <i>Youngstown</i> argument <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">against</span> plaintiffs' constitutional claims<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. The reason Texas would do this is that the majority opinion below only addressed those constitutional claims, and criticizing the concurring opinions doesn't naturally fit into any of the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">traditional reasons for granting cert (<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">as relevant here, the importance of the issues decided below, and that the decision below was wrong)</span>, even though those opinions may counsel against cert. </span></span>The bulk of what's framed as a <i>Youngstown</i> argument is in substance an argument that, contrary to Judges Keenan<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'s</span> concurrence, Trump's order was authorized by 8 U.S.C. 1182, and that contrary to Judge Thacker's concurrence (<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">as we<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ll as </span></span>some very forceful <a href="http://yalejreg.com/nc/see-the-sights-of-terminal-4-a-reply-to-section-1182f-enthusiasts-by-ian-samuel/">blogging </a>by Samuel), Trump's order did not violate 8 U.S.C. 1152. The <i>Youngstown</i> framing seems to me to be just that: a framing device intended to avoid the awkwardness of directly <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">attacking the concurring opinions below at the cert stage. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">While I agree, L&S's snark and perhaps <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">uncharitably </span>literal reading of Texas's brief aside, that statutory authorization for the President's actions does not make them constitutional under <i>Youngstown</i>, which is <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">best understood <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">as </span></span>an Article II doctrine only, not a general test of the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">constitutional </span>validity of presidential actions, I am not sure that I agree that statutory authorization<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> is simply</span> "irrelevant to the claims in the travel ban litigation," that congressional authorization "wouldn't change <i>any</i> of the analysis about whether the actions that the President did take did in fact violate the First Amendment" (emph<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">asis in original),</span> or that courts "don't need . . . to pause to consider whether there are any statutes authorizing . . . the President's actions, when they address a claim that the President has violated an individual's rights, or a particular amendment to the Constitution." This seems very possibly wrong in the following way.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I take it a fighting question in the travel-ban litigation, though <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">L<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">&S <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">may </span></span></span>think it an extremely easy one, is whether or not the Establishment Clause applies at all in immigration. Congress has authorized the President, in 1182, to suspend the entry of any "class" of aliens whose entry he deems detrimental to the interests of the United States, with no exception for religious classes. In 1152, Congress forbade immigrant visa preferences on a number of grounds, including race and sex; it did not, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">interestingly,</span> forbid immigrant visa preferences on the basis of religion. Congress has, as Josh Blackman <a href="http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/03/15/the-legality-of-the-3617-executive-order-part-iii-the-establishment-clause/">chronicles here</a>, given special preferences in immigration to ministers going back to at least the 1880s, given preferences in asylum to religious minorities claiming religious persecution, requiring immigration courts to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">regularly hold trials on asylum-seekers' religious beliefs,</span> and has given preferences to Jewish and evangelical Christian immigrants from the Soviet Union. All of these laws would <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">likely be <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">on </span></span>shaky constitutional ground if they concerned some important <i>domestic</i> governmental benefit, and their passage seems to suggest that the Congresses that enacted them and Presidents that signed them believe that the Establishment Clause applies with less (if any) strength in immigration than in domestic contexts. As the Court <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">wrote</span> <a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5798409807190948077&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr#p792">in </a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=5798409807190948077&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr#p792">an opinion</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">it <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/16pdf/15-1191_2a34.pdf#page=18">uncritically cited today</a> that denied an e<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">qual-protection challenge to an entry restriction, "</span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">in the exercise of its broad power over immigration and naturalization,<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span>Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens."</span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Now, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">L&S</span> say that congressional authorization is irrelevant to whether some presidential act violates the First Amendment, because the First Amendment binds Congress and the President alike. But this doesn't quite follow, indeed doesn't follow at all, because congressional authorization of religio<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">us</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> exclusion</span> in immigration, and a tradition of religious preference in immigration, could be relevant to <i>what the Establishment Clause means</i> in the first place. As the Court recently <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-1281_mc8p.pdf#page=12">put it</a> in <i>Noel Canning</i>, while "it is the 'duty of the judicial department . . . to say what the law is,' it is equally true that the longstanding 'practice of the government' can inform our determination of 'what the law is.'" This sort of use of historical practice is not a remotely novel concept, and while it<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'s <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">invoked </span></span>most often in separation-of-powers cases (though related uses of tradition are rife in substantive due process cases), it's <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">hardly out of bounds in individual-rights cases generally or Religion Clause cases specifically</span>. Indeed, only three years<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> ago, in an Establishment Clause case, the Court <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-696_bpm1.pdf#page=12">wrote</a> that "<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">it is not necessary to define the prec<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ise boundary of the Establishment Clause where history shows that the specific practice is permitted. </span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><i>Any test</i> the Court adopts <i>must </i>acknowledge a practice that was accepted
by the Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and
political change." </span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">That passage, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">to be sure</span>,</span></span></span> particularly looks on <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">possibly </span>originalist grounds to histor<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ical practices dating back<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> to the <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">F</span>ounding,<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> and I<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'m <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">un</span>aware of Fou<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nding-era religious preferenc<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">es or discrimination in immigration, though <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I would not be shocked to learn that they existed</span>. </span></span>B</span>ut it's far from obvious that the only hist<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">orical practices that matter in <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Esta<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">blishment Clause c<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">as</span>es</span></span> are <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">F</span>ounding-era practices. </span></span></span></span>Arguments from <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">post-Founding </span>historical practice are certainly strongest in separation-of-powers cases, as there they can be justified in terms of interbranch acquiescence. But as Cu<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">rtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison <a href="http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5176&context=faculty_scholarship#page=45">wrote</a> in the Harvard Law Review a few years ago, "not all reasons for invoking practice d<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">epend on acquiescence.</span></span></span>" As they <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">pretty convincingly argue</span>, one could care about post-Founding historical practice for <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">any number</span> of or<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">iginalist, Burkean, po<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">pular-constitutionalist, common-law cons<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">titutionalist, and reliance-based reasons. And I stron<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">gly doubt that there are <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">many (any<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">?) constitutional lawyers or scholars w<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ho would claim that post-Founding <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">congressional </span>practice is <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">completely irrelevant to how we <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">should interpret, say, the Fourth Amendment, or the Fifth, or Sixth, or Eig<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">hth<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: normal;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">To be clear, I mean<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> to make <u>no</u> claims</span></span></span></span> about the extent of the practice of religious preferences in immigration or how far back that practice may go, the extent to which that practice could be justified under domestic Esta<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">blishment Clause doctrine, or the extent to which <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">post-Founding </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">practice should inform the interpretation o<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">f the Esta<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">blishment C<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">lause <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">in areas </span>on which the courts, until this year, have been <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">virtually silent. But <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I do mean to claim that the fact tha<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">t two branches of government (if the<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ban's legal critics are <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">right about its motives) have given their blessing to religious <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">discrimination </span>in immigration <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">abso<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">lutely has</span></span> <i>some</i> bearing on what the third branch ought to do wit<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">h them.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">*
To be fair, I don't know if <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">L&S</span> are responsible for their
headlines<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, or if some crackerjack Take Care editor is.</span> <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">B</span>ut the post itself says much the same thing in much the same
way: "</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Before we [engage with this argument], a note of caution: When we wrote the original post, we
were told (by several people whom we admire and respect) that perhaps
this post wasn’t even worth writing, because the argument we were
rebutting was so silly." Also, the <i>Youngstown</i> "argument is so obviously wrong that 'many law students have spotted it'" (quoting<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">, for authority, one of <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">L&S's </span>own tweets</span>). <i>Also</i>, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the Texas Law Review is (un)subtly shamed</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> for having "elected to reprint in its online c<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ompanion</span>" some blog posts by Josh Blackman <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">making </span>that </span>o<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">bviously wrong<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> argument.<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">I have always <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">assumed that gripes about law-review publication choices are the lifeblood of law<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">-<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">professor water cooler gossip, but only on Take Care can we non-academics find th<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ose gripes in writing -- and about a law review's online com<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">panion's publication choices<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> no less<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">(!)<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">Here, I <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">should confess </span>to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a min<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">uscule degree of</span></span> bias <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">on account of the fact t<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">hat </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the offending <a href="http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Blackman-95-SeeAlso.pdf">Tex. L. Rev. </a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Blackman-95-SeeAlso.pdf">See Also </a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Blackman-95-SeeAlso.pdf">piec</a><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Blackman-95-SeeAlso.pdf">e</a> cited </span></span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a </span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">comment</span><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> I made on someone else's blog<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> post</span></span>,<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> which w<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">as <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">a fun first (for my blog comments, not, I'm immodest enough to s<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ay, for this blog) </span>that went a little ways towards justifying what's now been <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">nearly </span>half a lifetime of inveterate law-blog commenting<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">. That bias notwithstanding, the piece in questi<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">on, a crit<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">ique of the Ninth Circuit's first decision in the trav<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">el-ban case, <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">though</span> marred b<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">y an argument that I at least deem obviously mistaken,</span></span></span></span> was an otherwise fine dissection of a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">n opinion that I think most people now concede was <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">extremely weak, and amply deserved its publication in a<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> law<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> review's online companion. Even were that not the case, it strikes me as bad form to <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">take a barely veiled dig at </span>a law review<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> for publishing an article</span> because one doesn<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">'t agree<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> with <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">the arguments the article makes<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"> (absent factual error about what the law <span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;">just </span>is that I don't think is quite present here, as <i>Youngstown</i> isn't, at least on its face, circumscribed in the ways L&S cogently argue it should be).</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span></span>Asher Steinberghttp://www.blogger.com/profile/13081594205660019619noreply@blogger.com0